Swinburne's argument for immaterialism

Question 1

Brain transplant argument (3)

Answer 1

Both halves of your brain transplanted into different heads. Both people physiologically continuous with you. Would you be person a/b or stay behind in empty head? 2) Can account for everything that happens to body but not what happens to you - not a material thing as can’t say where you went. 3) Swinburne is wrong - dont know because we don’t know what material thing we are. House of Commons can see all MPs but don’t know where Ken Clarke is (mask/unsure who he is) - doesn’t mean Clarke is not an Mp.

Question 2

Variant of Bt argument (3)

Answer 2

Possibility of person surviving with only half brain is enough to show that talk about people is not analysable as talk about bodies and their parts/material things. 2) Descartes is thinking can’t be replaced to something that only describes material things without changing meaning. Not same as Descartes is 6 feet and Descartes body is 6 feet. 3) Swinburne right that mental properties do not have same meaning as speak of material things. Does not follow that people are not material things - still could be material things even if not discoverable by reflecting on meaning of words.

Question 3

Body swapping argument (4)

Answer 3

You and I could swap bodies without matter moving between us. 2) Swinburne - could lose ability and gain sense info from this organism directly and instead acquire ability to move and gain sense info from that organism. Definition what is now your body is now my body. 3) Follows must be immaterial - as if was material would be impossible to swap bodies without any matter moving. 4) But could be brain in a vat and be hooked up to a body for one night and then another body the next. Lead you have swapped bodies yet you are still a material thing.

Question 4

Radical disembodiment argument (3)

Answer 4

1) I could exist without being made of any matter or survive without any material continuity. 2) No wholly material thing could exist without being made of any matter or survive without material continuity. 3) I am not a wholly material thing. 2) Swinburne appeals to logical possibility but lp does not entail it is absolutely possible. So may not be possible. 3) Just as logically possible to be a material thing. 1) I could exist without a soul. 2) No immaterial thing could exist without a soul. 3) I am not a immaterial thing.