Tentamen Flashcards

(91 cards)

1
Q

Normative

A

How people should be making judgments and decisions

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2
Q

Descriptive

A

How people actually make judgments and decisions

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3
Q

Prescriptive

A

Practical suggestions on designing judgment and decision-making processes based on normative and descriptive models.

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4
Q

Normative decisionmaking process

A
  1. Define the problem
  2. Identify the criteria
  3. Weigh the criteria
  4. Generate alternatives
  5. Rate each alternative on each criterion
  6. Compute optimal decision
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5
Q

System 1 thinking

A

intuitive, fast automatic, emotional, effortless system of decision making.

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6
Q

System 2 thinking

A

slow, effortful, conscious, explicit.

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7
Q

Accessibility

A

How easily something comes to mind – easily accessible perceptions from S1 have disproportionate weight on our judgments and decisions

Cognitive ease feels good – cognitive dissonance (doubt and uncertainty) are difficult and feel bad.

Determinants: perceptual salience, surprisingness, familiarity, when things are associated with emotion, with potential losses, in line with our current mindset.

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8
Q

Heuristics

A

Instead of answering a difficult question using S2, our first impulse is using S1 for easy accessible answer. Difficult questions are substituted for easier ones. Simple procedures to find adequate, often imperfect, answers to difficult questions. Simplified decisionmaker.

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9
Q

Types of Heuristics

A
  • availability – things that come to mind easier are judged more likely
    - representativeness – judgments influenced by how typical something is in its category
    - confirmation – judgment influenced by what we expect
    - affect – judgment affected by emotions.
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10
Q

Utility

A

Whatever is maximized – normative models do not tell what to maximize, they tell what we
should be doing to maximize whatever it is that we try to maximize.
humans are assumed to have utility functions

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11
Q

Utility transitiity

A

A>B, B>C, then A>C

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12
Q

Connectedness

A

A>B, A<b></b>

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13
Q

EUT

A

Expected utility theory - choose option with highest EU - EU = utility of outcome * probability of outcome

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14
Q

Bayes’ s theorem

A

P(A|B) = ( P(B|A) x P(A) ) / P(B)

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15
Q

Risk neutral

A

Utility increases with wealth at constant rate

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16
Q

Risk aversion

A

Utility increases with wealth, but at a decreasing rate.
Concave, this implies risk aversion.
Value a sure thing higher than a risky thing, even if expected value is the same
incorporated in Expected Utility Theory – common assumption
Level risk aversion varies between individuals

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17
Q

Prospect theory

A

We hate uncertainty, unless it enables us to see a path out of a bad situation.
risk averse dealing with gains, risk seeking dealing with losses.

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18
Q

The certainty effect

A

outcomes that are almost, but not entirely, certain are given less weight than their probability justifies.

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19
Q

The possibility effect

A

Highly unlikely outcomes are given more weight than their probability justifies

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20
Q

Ambiguity Aversion

A

the Ellsberg paradox: we are willing to pay less for a vague choice than for a clear choice.

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21
Q

The endowment effect

A

We attach higher value to things that we own than to things that we do not own. - Loss aversion

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22
Q

Framing

A

The concept of framing is about presenting something as a gain or a loss
Tom Sawyer – framing an unpleasant task as a privilege or unique opportunity.
Negative formulation leads more often to risk seeking, positive to risk aversion.

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23
Q

Mental accounting

A

Refers to a set of cognitive processes

Use of mental accounts – people tend to have different accounts in their mind. Different accounts have different purposes. Transferring funds between accounts feels wrong. Gains and losses feel different, depending on which account they are booked.

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24
Q

Transaction utility

A

Individuals not only derive utility from a product itself, but also from the ‘deal’ through which they acquired the product. How much they are prepared to pay for a product depends on how good the deal is that they feel they are getting.

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25
Bounded rationallity
use a subset of the information that is available to us. Use this info insufficiently, incorrectly or biased. We solve a simplified version of the problem, don’t optimize but satisfice.
26
Awareness and Attention
Info enters our brain via our senses – brain’s capacity for processing info is limited. To reach the brain’s working memory: info needs to be attended to.
27
Memory
Some info that reaches our working memory eventually makes it into our long term memory Info stored in long-term memory can later be called upon.
28
Bottom up
What happens to catch our attention
29
Top down
What we expect to hope and see
30
Selective attention - Inattentional Blindness
Hiding in plain sight when focusing
31
Selective attention - Change Blindness
Failure to notice change, not interesting
32
Presentation formats
Presentation of info determines attention (colors, fonts, pics)
33
Serial Positioning
The order in which items are presented affects attention/weight
34
Primacy effect
First item gets more attention / anchor
35
Recency effect
Last item get more attention - occupy working memory
36
Anchoring
When estimating, we start out from something we know and | adjust afterwards.
37
Menu effects
Choices depend on available alternatives | Joint vs separate evaluations
38
Choice architecture
Use knowledge about presentation formats, menu effects etc. to structure decision processes – let people make better decisions.
39
Language effects
Readability, jargon, sentiment, textual analysis fog index = 0.4* avg nr of words per sentence * % words with more than 2 syllables.
40
Halo effect
Salient positive characteristic overwhelms other characteristics, has a disproportionately large effect on beliefs / judgments. Similar: warm glow, horn effect (opposite), spill over effect (judgment spills over to other unrelated characteristics)
41
Representativeness
Intuition for probabilities often wrong – probability judgments influence by how typical something is for its category. Tend to over / under estimate – insensitive to base rate and sample size.
42
Conjunction fallacy
More specific but typical outcomes judged more likely than general outcomes influencing a specific one
43
Gamble's fallacy
the mistaken belief that if something happens more | frequently than normal, it will happen less frequent in future
44
Hot Hand fallacy
mistaken belief that a person who has experienced success with a random event has greater change of further success in additional attempts.
45
Pattern recognition
Our brains see pattern everywhere – focus on cause and effect In the long term – everything regression to the mean.
46
Survirorship fallacy
The mistaken belief that because someone or something survives it must necessarily be better or have specific unique characteristics.
47
Matthew effect
through a positive feedback loop randomly selected | early winners become more and more successful.
48
Confirmation bias
Search for and give more weight to new info that confirms our existing beliefs than info that disconfirms our beliefs. People often hold on to their beliefs even in the face of overwhelming evidence – own opinion more important than science.
49
Motivated reasoning
Develop stories or rationalizations that enable you to ignore or discredit disconfirming evidence – goed praten voor jezelf
50
Overconfidence
Overestimate our own knowledge and capabilities.
51
Overprecision
too certain about own accuracy
52
Overestimation
better/smarter/ etc than actually are (Planning fallacy, realistic plans tend to be optimistic, incentives play role (Conjunctive event bias – tend to over(under)estimate probability of con(dis)junctive events).
53
Overplacement
Falsley think we are better than others in certain dimensions.
54
Hindsight bias
Failure to disregard subsequently acquired knowledge when judging a past event/decision – incorrect feeling you knew it all along.
55
Outcome effect
Evaluations of past decisions affected by how things worked out
56
Decision Myopia
Bounded awareness – answering using S1 – not carefully considering problem
57
Status quo
Tendency to maintain current situation
58
Omission / Commission bias
Acting feels worse than not acting, even if the outcomes are the same
59
Regret aversion
Tendency to avoid taking actions we might regret
60
Sunk cost fallacy
When making decisions based on sunk cost, despite evidence that the cost of continuing outweighs the expected benefit.
61
Escalation of commitment
Pattern of behaviour in which a group or individual will continue to rationalize their decisions, actions, and investments when faced with increasingly negative outcomes, rather than alter their course.
62
Cognitive psychology
S1, S2, biases and heuristics
63
Social psychology
Norms and preferences
64
Social norms
Rules and standards that are understood by members of a group, and that guide or constrain social behaviours without the force of law.
65
The bystander effect
The probability of taking action to help someone in trouble is inversely related to the nr of bystanders - diffusion of responsibility
66
Social preferences
- People tend to care what happens to others, not completely selfish. - Fairness: most people care about it, what is fair is a social norm. There might be biased perceptions of fairness. - Reciprocity: In our interaction with others, we tend to act as bookkeepers – different accounts for different individuals. In general: kind to people who are kind to us, unkind to people who are kind to us (or others). - Many relationships: characterized by gift exchange (higher wage leads to higher effort, less employee theft, more whistleblowing) - Trust – facilitates collaboration and value creation – trusting someone is risky – for management important to find a balance between trust and control.
67
Cooperation and competition
Presence of other humans does not only promote | cooperation, it also induces competition. Fundamental forces in any form of human organization.
68
In groups and out groups
Us vs Them – hard wired distinction – cooperation with in, competition with out. Corporate culture / professional identity. Prejudice and discrimination - NIH.
69
Status
Compare ourselves with ‘them’ – concern about relative | rank – winners/losers.
70
Source of pride and shame
Achievement of target – goal setting theory. How difficult do you set your targets? Dangers of targets: Short termism, narrow focus, risk taking, negative attitudes when missed, less learning, lower willingness to cooperate, unethical behaviour and fraud.
71
Gamification
integrate gaming elements in mundane tasks – employee earns points which lead to awards or redeemed for non- cash rewards – Mental accounting Exploit peoples utility for winning.
72
Consequentialist
Focus on outcomes, maximize total welfare, | utilitarianism
73
Deontological
Focus on rights and duties, actions can be right or | wrong, independent of their consequences (intention)
74
Philosophy of normative models
Consequentialist and Deontological
75
Rational choice model (of crime)
Gary Becker – moral dimension is irrelevant – the decision to engage in crime is the result of a trade-off of expected costs and benefits.
76
Fraud Triangle
Donald Cressey – Opportunity, Rationalization, Pressure
77
Ethical decision making
Moral Awareness - Moral Judgment - Moral Intention - Moral Action
78
Ethical decision making based on three assumptions
Awareness needed for a decision to have moral implications – often fail to recognize Behavioural intentions follow from reasoning - intentions do not follow from thorough reasoned judgment Moral action requires moral intention – actions often do not follow from clear intention to act in a certain way.
79
Contemporary behavioural ethics
- neither purely selfish nor purely ethical. - care for ourselves, but also if actions affect others / violate injunctive (group) social norms. - cognitive limitations and ability to fool ourselves – allow us to act more selfishly than we find ethical - bounded ethicality.
80
Bounded ethicality
The systematic and predictable psychological processes that lead people to engage in self-serving but ethically questionable behaviours – parallel with bounded rationality. You lie steal deceive as long as we retain our self-image of an honest and decent person.
81
Overclaiming credit
Overconfidence, attribution bias
82
In-group favouritism
doing favours in group harms out-group - wij vs zij
83
Implicit attitude
halo bias – more salary because you are tall.
84
Social pressure
‘just doing my work’, if everyone does it easier to say yourself its okay
85
Framing & Motivated reasoning
focus on favourable comparisons, always good excuse
86
Sacred values
certain behaviours go against deeply felt values or principles – things do not necessarily have a negative consequence.
87
Motivated blindness
deliberately look the other way when someone take immoral actions that benefit us – Moral wiggle room – ignore info to avoid feeling bad.
88
Indirect unethical behavior
delegate decision weakens perceived responsibility.
89
Moral Cleansing
Compensate bad behavior with good behaviour to restore self-image
90
Moral Licensing
using your good behaviour in the past as an excuse to allow yourself bad behaviour now.
91
Improving decision making - 7 Strategies
1. Use of decision analysis tools – linear models, algorithms, artificial intelligence 2. Acquire expertise – learning / experience typically improve decisions 3. Debiasing – unfreeze – change – refreeze. (use S2). 4. Reason analogically – reflect on and frame decisions at higher level of abstraction 5. Take outsiders view – place yourself in shoes of independent observer or take advice 6. Understand biases in others 7. Nudge – redesign so that S1 thinking leads to better outcomes.