Term 2 week 7 Flashcards

1
Q

What is the different between complete and imperfect and complete and perfect

A

If the game is imperfect information they do not know the extensive form.

Complete means normal form is common knowledge.

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2
Q

What happens to the players in games of incomplete information?

A

They do not know how they are playing against
What their strategies are
What their preferences are

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3
Q

How is a specific type of player denoted?

What do we assume about types?

A

ti
Each player has a probability of being each type

No redundant types - no single type that tells you information about other people.

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4
Q

How do players make choose to make moves in incomplete games of information?

A

They can’t make moves contingent on other actions as they do not know the type

So they make choices based on on their own type.

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5
Q

What is a best response in the games of incomplete information?

A

-If there is not an alternative strategy to si that gives a higher payoff for a given type t tilda.

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6
Q

What is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium?

A
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7
Q

What information do players have in incomplete information?

A

They know the probability distrubution of types.

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8
Q

If a player finds that they are Loyal how can they work out the probability that their opponent is also loyal?

A

First find the prob of player 1 being loyal
Then find p of 1 and 2 both being loyal

then do both loyal / player 1 loyal

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9
Q

How do you find a bayes nash equilibrium?

A

If it maximises expected payoff for both players.

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10
Q

What is an easier way of presenting the action that a player would take based on the type they are?

A

(x,y) x is the action type D and y is the action if type L

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11
Q

How do you set up a cournot model?

A
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12
Q

In what ways can the cournot model set up happen?

A

Either one person has all information and the other person does not

They both have no information.

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13
Q

What is the set up for cournot competition when there is one-sided asymmetry?

A

Firm 2 has information about how much firm 1 produces

Firm 1 has no information about how much firm 2 produces.

you set up the profit max for firm 1 and firm 2.

Then diff both w.r.t to q1
and q2 for each situation.

This yields best reply /

You get expected of firm 2 then plug it into expected of firm 1

Then you can but this q1 back into the high and low Q2

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14
Q

What is the difference between and expectation and a conjecture?

A

An expectation you think it can take the value between..

Conjecture estimate of single number

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15
Q

Draw the best reply functions

A
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16
Q

How do you do the double-sided asymetry?

A

you only have to generalise to a low cost firm and a high cost firm.

Then do the classic plugging in situation

17
Q

What is the application of different types to battle

A