Terms Flashcards
(134 cards)
1
Q
Cooperation
A
Any action which is intended to benefit others, regardless of whether the actor also benefits in the process
Fails more often than it works
Tendency to emphasize positive outcomes for self and other
2
Q
Competition
A
Tendency to emphasize relative advantage over others
3
Q
Interdependence
A
People can affect others’ outcomes and lives through actions
4
Q
Social Dilemmas
A
Conflicts between short-term self interests and long-term collective interests
One behavior will produce the best outcome for the self and a reduced outcome for the collective, while another behavior will produce the best outcome for the collective and a reduced outcome for the self
Individual rationality leads to collective irrationality
If everyone chooses the best outcome for themselves, then everyone ends up with a worse outcome than if everyone had chosen the best outcome for the collective
5
Q
Prisoner’s Dilemma
A
Basic and abstract
To get the most, take advantage of someone who cooperates
Worst outcome is to cooperate and be taken advantage of
Temptation to defect MUST be greater than the reward for cooperating
Talking to each other and deciding what to do in front of others changes one’s thought process
6
Q
Social Trap
A
Situations where a positive outcome for the self leads to negative outcomes for the collective
Immediate, small positive outcome for self may have large, delayed, negative outcome for the collective
RESOURCE DILEMMA
Examples: pollution, overfishing
7
Q
Social Fence
A
Actions with initial negative self-consequences and delayed collective positive consequences
Immediate negative cost to self but long-term positive benefit to collective
PUBLIC GOODS DILEMMA
Examples: donating to public radio, paying taxes
8
Q
Public Goods Dilemma
A
Models real-world interactions by making a contribution to a dyad or group
Temptation to free-ride on other’s donations
Requires: Jointness of supply (no matter how many people use the public good, it will never be fully consumed) and impossibility of exclusion (people cannot be excluded from using the public good)
9
Q
Step-level public goods
A
Require a minimum amount to be provided in full
Sometimes in best interest to cooperate, depending on what others choose
Examples: building a bridge
10
Q
Continuous public goods
A
Resource is provided based on amount given; any amount contributes to enhancing the good’s quality and provision
Best strategy is to always defect regardless of others
Changing a continuous good to a step-level good may increase cooperation
Examples: a playground that can grow more as money is donated, public radio
11
Q
Public goods lab based task
A
Give money to either a group fund, which gains interest, or a self fund
Group account is equally split among the group regardless of the donation amount
Temptation to defect (keep more money for self) but reward for cooperation (more money in group fund = more interest = more return)
12
Q
Resource dilemma
A
People decide how much to take from a common resource
Temptation to take as much as possible for oneself
Requires: Resource replenishment rate; optimal harvest level at which resource is sustainable
13
Q
Resource dilemma lab based task
A
There is a 4 person group where members consume from a shared resource over 15 trials
Limit on harvest amount each trial, and a standard replenishment rate
People tend to take as much as they can and then it crashes
Without communication, people take more than is sustainable
14
Q
Cooperation Index
A
Degree to which there are conflicting interests in a situation
The degree to which interests influence the behavior of others varies across situations
15
Q
Structural solutions to social dilemmas
A
changing the situation to promote cooperation
create situations where interests are more aligned (e.g., incentives)
16
Q
Motivational solutions to social dilemmas
A
change the way an individual decides and behaves in certain situations
Affecting cognitive, affective, and motivational processes underlying individual behavior in the social dilemma
(e.g., communication, trust, self-efficacy, social identity)
17
Q
Normative approach to social dilemmas
A
What should people do in these situations
Used in economics, game theory
18
Q
Descriptive approach to social dilemmas
A
what people actually do in these situations
Used by social psychologists
19
Q
Collective rationality
A
cooperative behavior by both individuals yields greater outcomes than does non-cooperative behavior by both
20
Q
Evolutionary Theory
A
Assumes that humans have evolved behavioral strategies for social interactions
Outlines problems in past human environments that may have led to adaptations relevant to resolving conflicts
21
Q
Rational Choice Theory
A
Assumes that humans are rational actors that seek to maximize their self-interests
Uses theoretical formulas to generate predictions about how perfectly rational actors should behave
22
Q
Interdependence Theory
A
Assumes that the possible structural outcomes of social interactions can be understood and related according to six fundamental dimensions of the structure
Identifies the structure of the social interaction and makes predictions about how that structure affords particular person and situation variables to affect behavior
23
Q
3 views on mixed-motive concepts
A
Epicurus: people should be driven by long-term goals, even if that means short-term pain
Pyrrho: People should give in to short-term pleasure because no cause and effect relationships are ever truly known (skepticism)
Zeno: People’s ultimate goal should be stable emotional reactions in everyday life (stoicism)
24
Q
Give-some game
A
Each participant could give to the resource, but giving is not required for using
(Step-level and continuous public goods)
25
Take-some game
has a finite pool from which all can draw, but if everyone draws too much than no one gets any
Different from resource dilemmas because they have a FINITE pool
26
Puzzle of cooperation
Start with a mutually cooperative group --> mutation in population to not cooperate --> defecting phenotype emerges --> all have non-cooperative phenotype
By the end, everyone is a defecting individual because it is the most beneficial strategy
27
Adaptations for cooperation
Must fir the organism to the environment
Needs to solve a problem for reproduction and increase its likelihood
Accumulated output of selection process
28
4 aspects of adaptations
species-typical (reoccurring among members of the species)
Is incorporated in physical design of organism
Coordinated with environmental structure
Has a functional outcome (including the replication of genes)
29
4 levels of analysis in cooperation
Mechanisms - what is going on within the person at the time he or she helps
Development- how the psycholgical mechanisms underlying cooperation develop within the lifespan; how genes and environment interact
Function-why an individual would develop in such a way as to have that psychology mechanism and what selective pressures cause it to persist
Phylogeny- how and when the mechanism evolved in our evolutionary history, and what prior traits it could have evolved from
30
4 Evolutionary theories of human cooperation
Kin Selection, Direct Reciprocity, Indirect Reciprocity, Costly Signaling
31
Kin Selection
Promote own genetic future by making sacrifices for those who share genes with them
People are more likely to help kin than non-kin, especially in life-threatening situations
Cues of kinship include facial features and early life co-residence (but these cues can misfire)
Limitations: requires that others be perceived as kin
32
Direct Reciprocity
Tit-for-tat: people act cooperatively towards others, and expect something to be returned in the future
Important for populations in which members interact regularly
Can maintain cooperation at high levels and across generations
Falls prey to mistakes and potential mutual non-cooperation
Requires ability to monitor others' behaviors
33
Shadow of the future
knowing there will be a future interaction increases cooperation
34
Strong Reciprocity
punishing non-cooperators or norm violators at a cost to oneself, even if they will not interact again in the future
People do pay a cost to punish others, and this punishment increases cooperation
35
Indirect Reciprocity
We cooperate with others we may never meet again, but we will meet their group again
Cooperation may be to indirectly gain benefits
Having a helpful reputation tells others that they should help you
Cognitively demanding due to need for monitoring and memory
Language and gossip facilitate reputations - people tend to believe the gossip about others
36
Milinski et al. (2002), Indirect Reciprocity
People were more likely to be cooperative in an indirect reciprocity game
Were more likely to receive money when they had a cooperative reputation
people refused to help others who did not cooperate in a public goods dilemma and people who did not help on the first trial of indirect reciprocity
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Social cynicism
belief about the extent to which other people are trustyworthy
38
Individual vs. Group Selection Theories
Individual: tradition Darwinian logic; genes-focused view
Group: behavioral trait can emerge from one group being more cooperative than another
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Intersexual selection
Some type of process for attracting a mate
Women may cooperate more in a mixed-gender group to signal to men that they are cooperative and kind
40
Intrasexual selection
Competition within sex to reproduce with the right mate
Male intrasexual selection has a tendency towards cooperation
Patrilocality: men were less likely to migrate to a new group than women
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Male coalitional psychology
men tend to cooperate with in-group more than outgroup members, and compete more with male outgroup members
42
Sex differences in cooperation
Stereotype of American women is that they're more cooperative
Expectation is for women to be more cooperative, but men and women generally do not differ
Male same-sex groups were more cooperative than female same-sex groups
43
Criticisms of evolutionary approach
Genetic determinism is false (my genes cause me to act this way)
Difficult to know the early environment before adaptations were present
People can create an evolutionary story about anything
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Ultimate causes of behavior
What caused humans to possess a dispositions for behaving a certain way
Focus of evolution
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Proximate causes of behavior
Current features of person and environment which influence people to behave a certain way
Focus of social sciences
46
Individualism
tendency to maximize outcomes for self with minimal regard for outcomes for others
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Altruism
Tendency to maximize outcomes for others with minimal regard for outcomes for self
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Aggression
Tendency to minimize outcomes for the other without regard for outcomes for self
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Cultural variation in cooperation
Vary greatly across cultures
Individualist cultures have a tendency to pursue personal goals
Collectivistic cultures have tendencies to pursue group goals
Greater exposure to different cultures increases a willingness to support global public goods
50
Hermann et al. Social Dilemma
Used a public goods dilemma to evaluate cross-cultural differences in cooperation
Over time and across countries, contributions decrease
Large difference on average between countries, but no country gave everything
51
What is culture?
Culture consist of explicit and implicit patterns of historically derived and selected ideas and their embodiment in institutions, practices, and artifacts
Cultural patterns may be product of action or motivating elements of further action
Key aspects: Part of our environment and in our minds
52
Third Party Punishment
Two people play the dictator game, and a third person watches
The third-party observer can pay to take money away from the dictator after they have decided how much to give
Henrich et al. (2006) found that people are willing to punish others for not being kind or generous
53
Dictator Game
Participant is given finite amount of resource
Recipient has no control over how much they receive - have to take whatever they are given
It is in the participant's best interest to give no money, as giving money would come at a cost to self
54
heinrich et al. (2006) punishment
Willingness to punish should positively relate to local social norms of cooperation
In countries which had higher amounts of giving in the dictator games, these countries also had people who were more willing to punish others who were not cooperative in the other games
55
Punishment
People punish those that contribute/cooperate less AND more than expected
They think that punishment will increase cooperation in the group
More effective in some societies than others
Societies that have cooperative norms use punishment to sustain these norms
56
Anti-social punishment
Punishment of cooperators by non-cooperators
57
Trust (definition)
A construct used to explain why and when people cooperate
A willingness to make oneself vulnerable in a social situation with the perception that the other person will not take advantage of them
Expectation that another person will treat you benevolently when you perceive that they have a tempting option that may hurt you or damage the relationship
58
Trust within vs. Between cultures
Gachter et al. (2010) partitioned Hermann's 16 cities into six cultural groups
Found greater differences between cultures than within cultures
Variation in cooperation was explained more by cultural group than physical loccation
More important for cooperation in some countries than others
59
Does trust predict cooperation?
YES.
Should matter most in situations with high degree of conflict.
K moderates the relationship between trust and cooperation, where a lower k value means a stronger relationship
Important mostly when conflict of interest is present
60
Social norms
behaviors that are expected by others in a group, and failure to behave accordingly results in negative evaluations by others (including sanctions)
Limitations of norms: can only apply when a person is being monitored or the possibility of punishment is present.
61
Cultural values
Abstract ideas that indicate good, appropriate, and desirable behavior in a specific society
Influential construct for cultural differences
Norms can transition to be values
62
Collectivist cultures
Emphasize promoting group goals, social norms, and shared beliefs
Tend to believe that their group will work together to achieve a public good
Less cooperative with outgroup members than in group members
Raising awareness of their interdependence does not increase cooperation
63
Individualist cultures
Emphasize individuals as autonomous and pursue personal goals
Cooperate more with each other when they are aware of their interdependence
64
Beliefs
Ideas of explaining patterns and associations in every day life
Most important belief is TRUST, which is the belief in the idea that others value your welfare and will not harm you
Belief in a powerful god may promote cooperation
65
Incentives
Structural (proximate) cause
Any adjustment to the direct outcome of the social interaction
changes make cooperation more aligned with self0interest and reduce conflict of interest
Cost time, resources, effort - may be inefficient in the short term, but pay off in the long run
When removed, there is lower trust and less cooperation
66
Punishment and reward
Punishments had slightly larger effect sizes on cooperation than rewards
For punishment to work, people need to know it will continually occur
More effective when an individual behaves the same way repeatedly in the same context
Antisocial punishment reduces cooperation and is not good for the punisher or the punished
67
Communication
More efficient and effective than incentives
Most effective immediate cause of cooperation
Enhances trust and expectations of cooperation (Cohen et al., 1996)
Face to face communication is the best kind
68
Social vs. Personal Norms
Social norms: we must have the possibility of being monitored and punished by others for these to affect behavior
Personal norms: we will sanction ourselves if we violate these norms; do not require that our behavior is observed by others
69
Social Value Orientation
A stable, individual difference variable
The weights people assign to their own and other's outcomes during interdependent situations
Dispositional, trait-like variable
Most people are, in actuality, between individualism and cooperation
70
SVO Measurement
Triple dominance Measure
Make a preference for how to distribute resources between the self and another person, who is simultaneously choosing their outcomes as well
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Cooperators
maximize joint gain and quality
72
Competitors
Maximize own gain relative to others' gain
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Prosocials
Altruists and cooperators
Tend to think that intelligent others will cooperate (collective rationality)
Behaviorally assimilates to a competitor
Tend to evaluate behaviors along a good-bad dimension where cooperation is good and moral
Tend to choose more equal outcomes over joint maximum outcome
74
Proselfs
Individualists and competitors
Tend to think that intelligent others will defect (individualistic rationality)
Will take advantage of an unconditional cooperator, but will cooperate playing TFT
Evaluate behaviors along a strong-weak dimension where cooperation is seen as weak
75
What encourages people to expect cooperation?
```
Knowing the person has already cooperated
Intention to cooperate was communicated
Presence of incentive to cooperate
Knowing the other is dependent on them
Viewing the other as similar to the self
```
76
Prosocial expectations
Expect more cooperation
Self-fulfilling prophecy where people will start to respond appropriately to your behavior
Egocentric bias, where you think that others will respond like you would
77
Competitors expectations
Certain about their expectations of others' behavior
Think it's a dog-eat-dog world
May elicit competitive behavior from others
78
Social Identity Theory Definition/Background
Mere categorization into a group is enough to elicit intergroup discrimination
Focuses on self-concept and self-esteem as explanatory mechanisms causing ingroup favoritism
Metacontrast principle: ingroup favoritism requires intergroup comparisons and the presence of an outgroup
79
SIT Predictions
People will not discriminate in the absence of a salient outgroup
In interdependent tasks people will evaluate in group members more positively and see them as more trustworthy, increasing cooperation
80
SIT Outcomes
Not as empirically supported as BGR
People do cooperate more with ingroup members compared to unclassified strangers, indicating presence of an outgroup is not required for ingroup favoritism
Categorization along natural and artificial lines can create discrimination between groups
81
Bounded Generalized Reciprocity Theory Definition/Background
Evolutionary framework suggesting that in the past, systems of indirect reciprocity were likely contained within the ingroup
Groups were important for the survival and reproductive success of the individuals
Cooperate with someone because it gives you a good reputation so others will cooperate with you in the future; bounded by group membership
Humans have created a type of heuristic strategy to cooperate with ingroup members because this results in a good reputation and indirect benefits of being a cooperative partner
82
BGR Predictions
Ingroup favoritism will only be invoked when it makes a person's reputation better
Unilateral knowledge of group membership decreases cooperation
Discriminate to help the ingroup, not to harm the outgroup
People will discriminate in favor of ingroup members in absence of interdependence because of concerns about reputation and expectation of indirect benefits
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BGR Outcomes
Interdependence is not needed for ingroup favoritism to emerge
The possibility of direct reciprocity via sequential exchange weakens ingroup favoritism by weakening the effect of group membership
More ingroup love than outgroup hate on average
84
Greater support for BGR than SIT
Common knowledge of group identity (reputation) had bigger effect size than unilateral knowledge (no reputation)
Interdependent games (social dilemmas) had bigger effect sizes than independent games (dictator game)
Simultaneous decisions (social dilemmas) had bigger effect sizes than sequential decisions (trust game)
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In group favoritism
Members of a group positively evaluate other members of the group, and have greater empathy, trust and helping behaviors towards members; give greater rewards to members, and work harder to accomplish ingroup goals
Direct reciprocity employed more with outgroup while indirect reciprocity employed with ingroup
Emerges more from promotion of ingroup than harming of outgroup
Ingroup > outgroup; Ingroup > unclassified stranger; outgroup = unclassified stranger
People expected more from ingroup members than outgroup members
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Outgroup derogation
Ingroup > outgroup
Ingroup > unclassified stranger
Outgroup < unclassified stranger
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Intergroup coperation
Humans find themselves part of many different groups that do not have set boundaries and can change over time
We cooperate along group divisions
People give more to ingroup members in trust game
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Trust game
Two participants
Participant one gives some amount of money to participant two
Money given triples
Participant two gives some amount back to participant one
Participants gave more to recipients from their own countries
89
Minimal group paradigm in a lab
Participants would come to the lab and look at paintings
Assigned a group based on painting preference, manipulating group membership to an abstract measure
Participate in social dilemmas with new ingroup
Ingroup treated better than outgroup by d = 0.32, showing favoritism
90
Inter-individual vs. inter-group
Relations between groups tend to be more competitive than between individuals
Individuals are less trusting in groups and think groups are more competitive
Trust is more important for individuals than groups as it makes an inference about a single person, not a group of people
Perceived similarity of group and individual leads to more trust
91
Schema-based distrust of groups and individuals
Intergroup interactions may be considered in the schema of competition and are therefore inherently competitive
Anticipated interactions produce cognitive and affective responses wherein group are competitive, untrustworthy, hostile, and abrasive
92
Wolf et al., 2008 Competition
Align interests of two competing groups and examine interactions
Removing dilemmas encourages cooperation
Can make groups behave similarly to individuals in situations with less conflict and increasing cooperation
93
Intergroup social dilemmas
step-level public goods: individuals contribute to a group effort to achieve a goal; any group just needs to do better than the other; people contribute more in this type of dilemma because they see their contributions as critical to the good (e.g., elections)
Continuous public goods: involves increased, constant effort to group which will increase rewards for group members (e.g., warfare)
94
Intergroup Prisoner's dilemma
Continuous benefit for one group having more players cooperate than the other group
95
Halevy et al., 2008 Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma
Two groups of three people, and each person has 10 points
Contribute to a group or individual fund (2 versions)
Group fund gains interest for each group members and takes away from members of other group
Individual fund just gives points to self
Additional condition: Group fund W, where points given to group fund increase with no changes to other group's funds
(Option: give to group fund because they care about group or dislike outgroup)
Communication increased competition, but general preference was to benefit the ingroup without harming the outgroup
96
Halevy et al. 2012 Follow Up Experiment
Focused on prior experience with between group conflict
Group either played 60 trials with possibility of within group donation, or 30 trials with only between group and 30 trials with within group
When given the chance to donate within the group after not having had the option, they gave as much to ingroup as those who had always had the option, and did not give significantly more to hurt the outgroup
Showed that when given the chance, people will promote ingroup love over outgroup hate
97
Human warfare
best for each individual not to participate
best for one group for everyone to participate
best for each group for no one to participate
Affects the group, the individuals, and the individuals in a group
Reasons for going to war vary from ingroup love to outgroup hate
98
Oxytocin and altruism
Oxytocin increases ingroup trust and investment in the ingroup
Increased contributions to the ingroup but not to harm the outgroup
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Phylogeny
development of a species over time
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Ontogeny
Development on an individual over time
101
Animal and human similarities
Chimps, orangutans, and 2 year olds performed similarly on cognitive tasks about space, quantity, and causality
All inhabit similar environments
Both engage in collaborative tasks with adults
102
Animal and human differences
Two year olds perform better during social tasks
Children can understand collaborative actions towards a goal
103
Instrumental Helping
A person is trying to achieve their goal
Occurs in absence of explicit reward for helping
Drop an object on the floor and see if chimp/child will pick it up
Both infants and chimps will help in this situation
104
Sharing Food
Involves dividing a resource
Chimps compete for food and are reluctant to share the valuable resource
Humans have been sharing food for a long time and have social norms around sharing food
105
Information Sharing
Can be a form of prosocial behavior
Infants will point to direct a person towards the sought object
Chimp information is self-serving
106
Children's cooperation (Olson and Spelke, 2008)
Had young children help a 'protagonist' doll distribute resources to others
Children distinguished between relatives, friends, and strangers, giving more to relatives and friends than strangers (Kin altruism)
Children employed and cooperated more with direct reciprocity than indirect
Children would give equally on average, and would only give differently when equality was not an option
107
Egalitarianism in Children (Fehr et al., 2008)
Children at different ages were asked to exchange several types of resources with an anonymous person in the other room
Then made an exchange with either ingroup or outgroup member
Willingness to share increased with age
Spiteful preferences decreased with age
Inequality aversion explained their decisions more so than maximizing joint gain
More egalitarian at all ages within ingroup
Effect was stronger among boys and older children
Boys were less inequality averse with an ingroup member than an outgroup member
Children without siblings were more likely to share than children with siblings
108
Theory of mind
ability to perceive that actors have internal mental states that differ from our own
Making inferences about the mind of another in an interaction
Tested using a false belief test to see if kids can understand the difference between the mind and the world
Occurs across cultures (human universal)
Those with more ToM give fairer offers in the ultimatum game
109
Empathy and prosocial behaviors
Adult manipulation of empathy involves perspective taking
12-18 month olds begin to react to other's emotions, sometimes engaging in prosocial responses
Empathy is important for adult cooperation, even when a partner defects in a situation
110
Organizational Citizenship behaviors
Performance of extra-role behaviors for the good of the company
Behaviors that benefits others and the organization
Increase productivity and profit
Social dilemma within company
111
Social dilemmas within companies
Social fences
Behaviors are discretionary (the person performing them has a choice), are unlikely to be rewarded, and benefit others
People percieved the immediate personal costs and organizational, individual benefits
People understood OCBs as social dilemmas and were able to see long-term benefits
112
What promotes OCBs?
Justice and direct reciprocity
Identification with the organization - to what extent the company is part of a person's self-concept
Status at work, including security of position
Personality (including individual differences in empathy, SVO)
Job satisfaction, organizational commitment
113
Types of justice
Perceived (in)justice leads to reciprocity
Procedural (i.e., promotion processes)
Distributional (i.e., outcomes, salary increases, firing)
Transactional (i.e., employee-management interactions)
114
Organization identification
extent to which the worker sees the organization as part of their self-concept
Team success = personal success
SIT: motivated to maintain a positive sense of self; cooperate with ingroup to maintain self-esteem
BGR: humans evolved in groups; cooperate to maintain reputational benefits; coopreate to avoid the cost of exclusion
115
Unionization
Step-level public good
SVO can determine who is likely to join a union and their motives for doing so
Union exists based on employee contributions, but not every employee has to join the union
Benefits from union negotiations go to all employees regardless of their membership
Reputation is important, and indirect reciprocity plays a large role in unions
116
first vs. second order social dilemmas
First order is the initial dilemma, and leads to elementary cooperation
Second order is the dilemmas that one may face when choosing whether to contribute to a costly system that might promote cooperation in the first order dilemma, leads to instrumental cooperation
117
2 questions researchers ask
What is the logical, rational solution? What promotes a cooperative choice?
118
3 ideas underlying mixed-motive concepts
1) desire to do well for oneself
2) one's outcomes are partially influenced by others as their outcomes are partially affected by our actions
3) doing wrong by others leaves on open to possible retaliation if interaction is ongoing
119
Utility
Tendency to promote a maximum amount of 'happiness," defined as pleasure with corresponding absence of pain
120
Hobbes (cooperation)
People will cooperate, but only because they are forced to, and failure to cooperate will cause punishment
121
Static vs. dynamic modeling of choice
Static = one decision
Dynamic = choosing unfolds over time and multiple decisions
122
Fitness
An individual's reproductive success
123
Direct fitness
eventual benefits outweigh the costs for an individual
124
Indirect fitness
eventual benefits outweigh costs for copies of one's genes residing in other bodies
125
Costly signaling
assumes cooperation is a signal that can benefit one's reputation
Not just in terms of cooperation, also in access to sexual mates and resources
Some traits evolve because the allow individuals to do better in competition for a partner
126
Gene-culture co-evolutionary model
Pays attention to interactions between evolved cooperative sentiments and cultural learning biases
Changes in genes lag behind environmental changes
127
Given matrix
Hedonic, self-interested preferences
Summarizes consequences of individual's actions and another person's actions on individual's outcomes
128
Effective matrix
Summarizes a person's broader preferences beyond pursuit of self-interest
129
Dual-concern model
Assumes concerns about own and other's outcomes
130
Problem solving (concern)
function of high self concern and high other concern
131
Yielding (concern)
low self concern and high other concern
132
Contending (concern)
high self concern and low other concern
133
Inaction (concern)
low self concern and low other concern
134
overassimilation
Tendency for cooperative individuals to behave eventually even more non-cooperatively than the fairly non-cooperative partner with whom they interact
