Test 2 Flashcards
(40 cards)
Virginia v. Black (2003)
Presumption of act of cross burning as evidence of intent to intimidate violates constitution. But limitation of conduct was within constitutional power of government based on “true threats doctrine” if restrict conduct only with intent to intimidate.
RAV v. City of St. Paul (1992)
The 1st Amendment prevents the government from punishing speech and expressive conduct because it disapproves of the ideas expressed. Government has no authority “to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the others to follow the Marquis of Queensbury Rules.” Certain areas of speech “can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.) - not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution so that they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination”
Cohen v. California (1971)
“Fuck the Draft” - Court reasoned that the expletive, while provocative, was not directed toward anyone; besides there was no evidence that people in substantial numbers would be provoked into some kind of physical action by the words on his jacket. “One man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942)
The Court identified certain categorical exceptions to First Amendment protections, including obscenities, certain profane and slanderous speech, and “fighting words.” He found that Chaplinsky’s insults were “fighting words” since they caused a direct harm to their target and could be construed to advocate an immediate breach of the peace.
Limited Classes of Speech (Chaplinsky)
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
Under the First Amendment corporate funding of independent political broadcasts in candidate elections cannot be limited. Majority maintained that political speech is indispensable to a democracy, which is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation. Disclosure requirements and some regulations fo BCRA still constitutional.
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission (2014)
Two-year aggregate limit is unconstitutional. Does little to address the concerns addressed by BCRA and limited participation in the democratic process. The aggregate limit fails to meet the stated objective of preventing corruption, it does not survive the righteous standard of review laid out by previous precedent dealing with campaign contributions from a First Amendment perspective and is therefore unconstitutional
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)
Upheld state-imposed racial segregation. The 14th Amendment intended to establish absolute equality for the races before the law, but held that separate treatment did not imply the inferiority of African Americans. Segregation did not in itself constitute unlawful discrimination
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada (1938)
By establishing Lincoln University as a state university for black students, the state of Missouri established precedent for providing equal opportunity in higher education for both black and white students. Therefore, the denial of access to legal education was unlawful discrimination. The state’s intent to eventually create a law school at Lincoln university was not enough to absolve the responsibility to provide a legal education in this case.
Sweatt v. Painter (1950)
The Court held that the Equal Protection Clause required that Sweatt be admitted to the university. The alternative “black” law school would have been grossly unequal to the University of Texas Law School. The separate school would be inferior in a number of areas, including faculty, course variety, library facilities, legal writing opportunities, and overall prestige. The Court also found that the mere separation from the majority of law students harmed students’ ability to compete in the legal arena.
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954) - Brown I
Separate but equal educational facilities for racial minorities is inherently unequal, violating the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. Segregation of public education based on race instilled a sense of inferiority that had a hugely detrimental effect on the education and personal growth of African American children
Bolling v. Sharpe (1954)
Noting the legal peculiarities of DC, the Court recognized that the Fifth Amendment (which applied to the District) did not contain an Equal Protection Clause, like the 14th Amendment. Lacking an equal protections standard to invalidate the District’s segregation, Warren creatively relied on the 5th Amendment’s guarantee of “liberty” to find the segregation of DC schools unconstitutional.
Brown II
The Brown I decision shall be implemented “with all deliberate speed.” The Court held that the problems identified in Brown I required varied local solutions. Chief Justice Warren conferred much responsibility on local school authorities and the courts which originally heard school segregation cases. They were ordered to implement the principles which the Supreme Court embraced in its first Brown decision. The court refused to order the schools to integrate right away, like the NAACP had wanted. It also did not set any clear deadline for when schools needed to be desegregated. It also meant that the Court was denying relief to the Black students in the Brown lawsuits.
Cooper v. Aaron (1958)
The relief the plaintiffs requested was for the African American children to be returned to segregated schools and for the implementation of the desegregation plan to be postponed for two and a half years. The Court held that the Arkansas officials were bound by federal court orders that rested on the SCOTUS prior decision in Brown - it was constitutionally impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause to maintain law and order by depriving the black students of their equal rights under the law. The precedent set forth in Brown v. Board of Education was the supreme law of the land and was therefore binding on all the states, regardless of any state laws contradicting it.
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County (1968)
SCOTUS held that the “freedom of choice” plan was not a sufficient step to bring about a desegregated unitary school system. While the freedom of choice plan may work in some situations, school districts must provide a plan that works to dismantle the segregated system in their district.
Green factors
Courts used five criteria identified to assess whether school systems had sufficiently desegregated: (1) faculty, (2) staff, (3) transportation, (4) extracurricular activities and (5) facilities)
Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education (1969)
SCOTUS held that it was the obligation of every school district to immediately terminate any and all segregated school systems and to only operate integrated schools. Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted that the Court of Appeals should not have allowed any more motions for additional time to desegregate because, in the Court’s opinion, the standard of allowing “all deliberate speed” for desegregation was no longer constitutionally permissible
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education (1986)
Court argued that Wygant’s layoff stemmed from race and therefore was unconstitutional. The Court noted that the government, when embarking on affirmative action, had two duties: (1) to justify racial classification with a compelling state interest and (2) to demonstrate that its chosen means were narrowly tailored to its purpose
Instead, racial preferences had to be based on prior discrimination. Layoff preferences incorrectly addressed injurious prior discriminatory hiring practices since “denial of a future employment opportunity was not as intrusive as loss of an existing job”
City of Richmond v. Croson (1989)
the Court held that “generalized assertions” of past racial discrimination could not justify “rigid” racial quotas for the awarding of public contracts/ Noted that the 30 percent quota could not be tied to “any injury suffered by anyone” and was an impermissible employment of a suspect classification. Allowing claims of past discrimination to serve as the basis for racial quotas would actually subvert constitutional values: “those whose societal injury is thought to exceed some arbitrary level of tolerability then would be entitled to preferential classification.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (1995)
The Court held that all racial classifications, whether imposed by federal, state, or local authorities, must pass strict scrutiny review. They must serve a compelling government interest and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest.
Regents of California v. Bakke (1978)
Four of the justices contended that any racial quota system supported by government violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964; Justice Powell agreed, casting the deciding vote ordering the medical school to admit Bakke. However, Powell argued that the rigid use of racial quotas as employed at the school violated the Equal protection clause. The remaining four judges held that the use of race as a criterion in admissions decisions in higher education was constitutionally permissible. Powell joined that opinion as well, contending that the use of race was permissible as one of several admission criteria.
Upheld affirmative action, allowing race to be one of several factors in college admission policy but ruled that specific racial quotas were impermissible.
Grutter v. Bollinger (2003)
The Court held that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body. The Court reasoned that, because the Law School conducts highly individualized review of each applicant, no acceptance or rejection is based automatically on a variable such as race and that this process ensures that all factors that may contribute to diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race.
Fisher v. University of Texas (2016)
Based on previous judicial precedent in cases dealing with minority admissions, the Court has held that such cases are reviewable under the 14th Amendment and that they must be reviewed under a standard strict scrutiny to determine whether the policies are “precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.” If the policy does not meet this standard, race may not be considered in the admissions process. The University has an ongoing obligation to use available data “to assess whether changing demographics have undermined the need for a race-conscious policy; and to identify the effects, both positive and negative, of the affirmative action measures it deems necessary.
