The Arab Spring Flashcards
(17 cards)
What triggered the Arab Spring
The original trigger happened in Tunisia. A informal street vendor committed self-immolation in response to police mistreatment. He represented a large class of informal workers/young Arabs who didn’t have access to the traditionally well-paying, privileged state employment that historically had been the main tool of political co-optation and redistribution despite going to uni.
His death triggered large street protests. At first they tended to be socioeconomic e.g. price of bread/employment but they then very quickly turned into anti-regime mobilisation. They wanted to remove the whole ruling elite and create a new political system which particularly happened in Tunisia but in Egypt and Libya and Yemen, in Bahrain and in Syria.
Protested in iconic public places making it visible, both to people in the cities but also the international media. Meant it was very hard to remove without massive use of violence, which happen in Bahrain
What was the outcome of the Arab Spring
5 long time dictators fell. The regimes in Tunisia and Egypt fell because the army decided not to shoot at the protesters and while the police sided with dictators the protests were to large to repress.
In Tunisia until 3 years ago there was liberal democratic arrangements with no military invovlement.
In Egpyt the army was much more politically involved. First governed by the State Security Council that was dominated by the army. Then a temporary civilian government but in 2013 the army created a coup against the gov which re-established & harsher and more authoritarian military dictatorship.
Libya: civic conflict and NATO involvement lead to regime collapse. No clear ruler who has soverngity
Yemen- mass protest, state breakdown, civil war and then a negotiated exit of Ali Abdullah Saleh. Under US and Saudi pressure, they felt his regime wasn’t viable. His regime wasn’t replaced by anything coherent. Had a fragmentation of the country into various regions competing with each other, more recently, a takeover of North Yemen by the Houthi movement.
Bahrain where you had strong mass protest, the security apparatus stayed coherent & cracked down very violently against this movement and essentially eradicated the movement and re-established the old security regime in a harsher form
Syria – brutal regime resilience: military repression (with Iranian and Russian aid) & armed struggle
All the monarchies in the region (apart from Bahrain) didn’t face mass protests that demanded regime change. There was some mass protests over socio economic issues but none for regime change in Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar and UAE.
What were the 6 key tropes of the Arab Spring
- Demonstrators always spoke in terms of the people in Arabic, and the main placards is that the people demand this. Quickly became the people demand the fall of the regime.
- Demands for bread, dignity, and freedom. The majority of day to day protesters were primarily concerned with the material demands more than political.
- The demand to bring down the regime. Had never a mass demand to remove incumbent dictators.
- The use of public squares. That’s the way protesters made themselves hard to ignore, both for regimes and for the international public.
- The decentralised style of organising. Most of the demonstrations were not initially organised or led by traditional opposition movements. Although the Muslim Brotherhood emerged on top in the few cases where you then had open elections they were actually initially against this mass mobilisation because they thought it was going to be fruitless and only lead to more repression. Instead, it was more decentralised youth groups, a sort of middle class, educated activists that seize the moment and organise the protests where social media played a very important role, at least on the elite level. But after they didn’t play a very prominent role because they lacked the organisational cohesion to field a large number of highly visible candidates in national elections.
- Pitched street battles.
Explain how the way the uprisings unfolded is not in line with traditional class based democratisation literature
Barry Moore argues it’s countries that have a strong bourgeoisie that become liberal democracies, because they have an interest in the rule of law/democratic safeguards guaranteeing capitalist economic activities.
However, the owners of capital/private sector were largely absent from the uprisings.
They either sided with regimes e.g Ahmed Ahmet a steel magnate in Egypt who benefited from lopsided privatisations/ access to subsidised energy provided by other state owned industries. He also ran the political campaign for Mubarak & the NDP, the ruling party in Egypt, in the last election before the uprisings.
Therefore, the bourgeoisie were often in cahoots with the regimes. Unlike the bourgeoisie in Europe who historically were the main driver of democratisation. But here they weren’t sure that the revolution was a good idea, given all the uncertainty and instability it would bring. There were no prominent businessmen who were leaders or visible supporters of the protest.
How does the Arab Spring go against Skocpol’s argument
There was no dominant class in conflict with the state nor was there international pressure on those regimes.
Also, none had a full social revolution, instead at best partial political revolutions in that the top political elite was replaced to, and some institutions changed, but there was no fundamental rejigging of the socioeconomic order of class relations like in Iran post 1979.
So all state elites remain influential even in Tunisia through the temporary democratic phase.
How is Skocpol right in explaining the Arab Spring
In her account revolutions only become possible once the state splits and becomes incoherent. At least that part does work in the Arab context.
Critically, this happened is where you had actual regime change. So in Tunisia & Egypt you had the security forces/military drop, the presidential families.
Whereas, when the security forces stayed loyal the regime continued e.g. in Syria.
How does transitology literature not explain the Arab Spring
They believe its elite driven, and assumes those elite groups are reasonably coherent, and transitions emerge from pacts between leaders of both sides who agree on some kind of compromise solution for a constitutional referendum, some guarantees for old regime figures so not everyone goes to prison. As a result, you have a top down, controlled process of transition. Base this on Southern European cases of the 70s & the Eastern European cases of the late 80s early 90s.
However, none of this really happened in the Arab countries (no negotiated transition). No collabertion between the opposition as they weren’t coherent/centralised enough to send people to delegate on their behald. Also no coordination with the regime as they wanted everyone to go. Instead saw a bottom-up movement with no central representative. There was no long term strategic plan and leadership.
List the ways the Arab Spring does not fit theories of revolutions and its puzzles
Why so much popular frustration if the socio-economic situation was not particularly bad compared to other developing countries? Absolute levels of poverty were relatively low in the region compared to other parts of the global South
Regime change and the democratisation wave in Europe after World War one & were usually stretched out over many years/ decades. Whereas in the Arab world, the uprisings all were triggered within a couple of weeks/months.
Monarchial exception- There were large scale protests against some of the monarchies, but there was no systematic regime change demands.
Why such terrible outcomes everywhere but Tunisia?
Attempt to answer the role of social class in the Arab Spring
Marxist inspired bourgeoisie leads to democracy model doesn’t work, but class structures might.
Had some working-class protests. Scholar Beinin highlights that even when workers protested, they usually did without a clear political agenda. They tended to protest over typical labour issues but they lacked, with the exception of Tunisia, centralised leadership that would give them broader political agency. Only in Tunisia was there a relatively independent labour union.
It’s not really a working class revolution, as capitalists were largely absent, if anything the presence of a crony bourgeoisie galvanised protesters. They were particularly upset about the visible corruption/rent seeking of certain capitalist individuals & families closely tied to the regime.
Can argue there is a class story in the strong presence of the educated middle class protesters, particularly protest leaders. Modernisation theorists say it’s not necessarily the owners of capital, but the middle class that tend to be the main protagonists of democratisation. Make this case for Egypt & Tunisia to an extent but there was a stronger participation in protest by working class and socially marginal people. If there’s any class basis, then this makes the most sense.
Attempt to answer the simultaneity of the uprisings
Weyland says it was the lack of well-informed & organised opposition leaderships that meant it was mostly spontaneous & mass driven protests that explains the timing of street level mobilisation & those people reacted to simple heuristics. So when Egyptians saw Ben Ali fell in Tunisia, a neighbouring country they saw Mubarak was just as vulnerable so went out and demanded regime change. They took the simple mental model that dictators can fall.
Also the tightly integrated cultural & political space of the Arab world can explain it. The presence of transnational media, pan Arab media & Al Jazeera. There was a shared media space and language around politics and Arab identities. Latin America not necessarily as tightly integrated. Nasser one of the main proponents of Arab nationalism as a political ideological movement created the voice of the Arabs where he gave regular speeches to the Arab masses and wanted to galvanise revolutionary protest across the region to bring regimes. Strong sense of common Arab identity, of shared Arab ideologies and political projects.
Why was there so much mobilisation despite socioeconomic outcomes not being terrible during the Arab Spring?
There was a lot wrong about public goods delivery & severe corruption issues. The old social contract under which people would expect after getting a uni degree, getting a gov job wasn’t working anymore. But still, compared to most other regions in the global South on an absolute scale, things weren’t that bad.
Evidence is that the perceived state of socioeconomics in the region was quite bad. So people self-reported high levels of frustration. Data from the World Value survey shows the share of people with no trust in gov & large companies is quite elevated, particular in the countries that did have revolutions whereas it is relatively lower in the countries that didn’t.
This is higher than it is in other low mid income or also upper middle income countries. So definitely people thought there was a lot to be complained about.
Attempt to answer why so much mobilization?
Crony capitalism around the ruling elites, especially ruling families. E.g. Trabelsi the wife Of Ben Ali made herself the matriarch of an extended family network of various crony businesses where she positioned her children/nieces/nephews across state owned enterprises & the private sector. This rubbed people the wrong way, especially in republics that historically had a relatively socialist & egalitarian ideological framing. The most visible early targets of protests often were those crony capitalists rather than the leaders of the regime.
In Tunisia the president and his wife & immediate relatives contributed very little employment & not a lot of output yet they had a huge share of overall net profits, which is a sign there are monopoly rents.
Socio Economic development in terms of life expectancy, education is reasonably high given it’s a relatively poor region but it was stagnant after the 1980s, and that was combined with relatively high historical expectations, because in the era of Arab nationalism in the late 50s, 60s & early 70s those regimes tended to legitimise themselves with a delivering socio economically. There was an implicit social contract that the regimes would be authoritarian, but citizens were meant to accept that as long as the regimes delivered the goods. So the expectations of citizens were relatively high compared to other regions of the global South.
So it’s less perhaps the absolute outcomes, but it’s the stagnation of the outcomes relative to the high expectations that arguably got people upset.
Why was there the monarchical exception in the Arab Spring?
The 6 oil rich monarchies on the Arabian Peninsula weren’t impacted. Likely oil helped as they had a lot of money so it’s easy to maintain basic social peace. King Abdullah & Saudi Arabia put together $130 billion welfare package in early 2011 when they saw what was happening. They started hiring large numbers of people in the Ministry of Interior, increasing wages in the public sector & reducing energy prices. Helps if you’ve got a lot of money to distribute when there’s a potential for unrest.
Jordan/Morocco survived despite being oil poor. Mohammed the sixth of Morocco was relatively popular despite issues with his regime. He survived with one hypothesis is that the way politics and economics has been run in the region was de facto patrimonial, in egalitarian, relatively elitist, based on informal networks, and this type of rule is more compatible with the official form and ideology of a monarchy that is with a republic.
Could argue on the ground, the monarchies & republics don’t look so different in terms of the regime practices/social/economic outcomes. But the Republic’s come from a long era of republicanism, supposed egalitarianism, & promises of material development which is more expensive than the promises by the monarchies.
Term Arabs coined for those Republics that in practice operate like monarchies around ruling families with a quasi hereditary control over the presidency. Like the Mubarak family in Egypt, wher Mubarak was rearing his son as a successor. Fine if you’re a monarchs as that’s what happens but if you’re a Republican president with a constitution there’s more of a disconnect.
Monarchies are can somewhat make better economic reforms due to lesser statist legacies, less of a history of deep Arab nationalist socialism and state led industries that were very inefficient in the republics.
What is Lisa Anderson’s argument
Main argument symoblic grieance of young Arab men
First have Mohamed Bouazizi as Coordination Focal Point:
- Symbolic resonance: Self-immolation captured widespread grievances about dignity, economic frustration, authoritarian humiliation
- Shared narrative: Bouazizi’s story provided common frame of reference across different social groups
- Timing: Created focal moment when scattered grievances could coordinate around single even
Facebook and Digital Coordination:
- “We are all Khaled Said” Facebook page (Egypt) - 400,000+ members provided visible commitment and coordination platform
- Real-time organization: Social media enabled rapid coordination of protest times, locations, tactics
- Overcoming fear: Online platforms allowed people to gauge support levels before physically participating
- Viral coordination: Hashtags, shared videos created sense of mass participation across borders
Although the 2011 Arab revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya were not solely the result of the Internet and social media.
In fact, similar uprisings occurred in 1919, demonstrating that the global diffusion of information and expectations is not a new phenomenon.
What is Hazem Kandil’s argument
Argues the Egyptian middle class revolted against the Mubarak regime due to the undermining of their material and political achievements by neo-liberal reforms that favored a new class of tycoon capitalists linked to the regime.
This created widespread dissatisfaction, leading the middle class to seize the opportunity of the Arab Spring to demand political change.
Because the patronage networks became overstretched, and the financial resources to sustain them diminished.
What is Wendy Pearlman’s argument
Argues understanding revolts, such as the one in Syria, requires a close examination of specific events, like the first mass street demonstration in Daraa on March 18, 2011.
Micro-foundational approach: Focus on individual decision-making, contingency, and local agency in the March 18, 2011 Daraa protest
Key findings from Syria:
- Contingency matters: Specific insults by security officials, particular mosque chosen, individual who first chanted
- Planning and spontaneity interact: Careful coordination combined with unpredictable crowd responses
- Mixed motivations: Strategic calculations, values (dignity, courage), and emotions (outrage, euphoria) all played roles simultaneously
Critique of general theories:
- Structural conditions were present but static: Authoritarian rule, economic grievances, demographic pressures existed for years
- Triggering required human agency: Activists had to make strategic choices about timing, location, tactics
- Local context crucial: Social networks, family honor, religious spaces specific to Daraa shaped how protest emerged
What is Melani Cammett’s argument?
Argues the Arab uprisings were not solely driven by a single economic factor, but rather by a combination of economic and political issues.
The uprisings were the result of the interaction of political factors and real and perceived economic developments. The narrowing of authoritarian coalitions, crony capitalism, the rollback of the state, declining welfare regimes, unequal life chances, and rising insecurity all contributed to the perception of increasing inequality of opportunities, which ultimately led to mass protests.
The authors suggest the Arab Spring uprisings stemmed from economic stagnation mixed with a perceived rise in inequalities and a lack of social justice.
