The Fifth Amendment: Interrogation and Confession Cases

Question 1

Hector (a slave) v. State (1829)

Holding

Answer 1

Voluntariness of a confession a matter of law for judge

Question 2

Brown v. Mississippi (1936)

Issue, holding

Answer 2

Issue:
- Whether convictions, which rest solely upon
confessions shown to have been extorted by
officers of the State by brutality and
violence, are consistent with the due process
guarantees of the 14th Amendment.

Holding:
- Convictions, which rest solely upon
confessions shown to have been extorted by
brutality and violence, violate the 14th
Amendment
- forced confessions not good with due process

Question 3

Miranda v. Arizona (1966)

Answer 3

Issue:
- Whether a custodial interrogation is so coercive that a confession cannot be voluntary absent protective safeguards

Holding:
- By its nature, a custodial interrogation is so coercive that an accused cannot voluntarily give a confession without law enforcement providing protective safeguards
- “The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self- incrimination”
- “By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”

Question 4

Berkemer v. McCarty (1984)
Two Statements to Police, both without Miranda warnings: (1) At the traffic stop – stated he had two beers and several
joints; (2) at the jail – “I guess, barely” and “no angel dust or PCP in the pot”

2 issues and holding

Answer 4

Issue:
- Whether the Miranda rule governs the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation as part of a misdemeanor traffic stop?
Holding:
- Yes

Issue:
- Whether roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a traffic stop constitute custodial interrogation for Miranda purposes?
Holding:
- It depends

Question 5

Berkemer v. McCarty (1984)
- Miranda still apply to misdemeanor arrests as part of a traffic stop
- Why?

Answer 5

Miranda should be predictable and consistent, too hard for law enforcement to know whether it’s a misdemeanor or felony

Question 6

Berkemer v. McCarty (1984)

Even though Miranda applies, still need to ask whether suspect was in “custody” for
Miranda purposes. If the answer is no

Answer 6

then no Miranda warnings are required and
statements are admissible

Question 7

Berkemer v. McCarty (1984)

Even though Miranda applies, still need to ask whether suspect was in “custody” for
Miranda purposes. if in custody

Answer 7

the Miranda warnings are required and if not
given, confession is inadmissible

Question 8

Berkemer v. McCarty (1984)

“Questioning to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse
interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators the answers they seek.”

Answer 8

“Miranda becomes applicable as soon as a suspect’s freedom of action is
curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest.”

Question 9

Berkemer v. McCarty (1984)

So when is someone in custody for Miranda purposes:

3 questions

Answer 9

1. Was the suspect subjected to restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest?
2. “How a reasonable man in the subject’s position would have understood his situation?”
3. “would a reasonable person have felt free to terminate the encounter and walk away?”
   -if yes, then likely not in custody; if no,
   then perhaps in custody, so long as he’s subject to restraints
   comparable to what occurred in Miranda

Question 10

JDB v. North Carolina (2011)

Issue, Holding

Answer 10

Issue:
- Whether the age of a child subjected to
police questioning is relevant to the
custody analysis of Miranda

Holding:
- Yes, when age of a child is relevant in
considering whether a suspect is in custody
for purposes of Miranda

Question 11

JDB v. North Carolina (2011)
- Whats the test for “custody” under Miranda?

Answer 11

1. Objective test; subjective views of both parties irrelevant
2. Asks how a “reasonable person in suspect’s position would understand his freedom to terminate questioning and leave

Question 12

JDB v. North Carolina (2011)

How to define a reasonable person, in terms of a child?

Answer 12

majority would define it as a
reasonable child in suspect’s position

Question 13

Rhode Island v. Innis (1980)

Issue, Holding

Answer 13

Issue:
- Whether police officers discussing information regarding a case in the presence of a suspect who has been read his
Miranda rights and invoked his right to counsel amounts to an interrogation under Miranda

Holding:
- No, in this particular case, the police conduct did not amount to interrogation under Miranda
- However, law enforcement actions may constitute an interrogation under Miranda via express questioning or its “functional equivalent”

Question 14

Rhode Island v. Innis (1980)

Test for Interrogation under Miranda

Answer 14

1. Actual investigation
2. Functional equivant of questioning

Question 15

Rhode Island v. Innis (1980)

Functional equivalent of questioning

Answer 15

1. Any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are
   reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect
2. Focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than police intent
3. A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an
   incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to an interrogation

Question 16

Illinois v. Perkins (1990)

Issue, Holding

Answer 16

Issue:
- Whether a suspect is interrogated for Miranda purposes when the suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a law enforcement officer and gives a
voluntary statement

Holding:
- Whether a suspect is interrogated for Miranda purposes when the suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a law enforcement officer and gives a voluntary statement

Question 17

Illinois v. Perkins (1990)
Majority: The key point here is that

Answer 17

“the essential ingredients of a police-dominated atmosphere and compulsion are not present when an incarcerated person
speaks freely to someone he believes to be a fellow inmate”

Question 18

North Carolina v. Butler (1979)

Facts:
- Butler is in custody and read his Miranda warnings
- Understood his rights, states, “I will talk to you, but I am not signing any form”
- Note: He says nothing about his right to counsel

2 issues, holding

Answer 18

Issues:
- Narrow: Whether Butler waived his right to
counsel when he said “I will talk to you, but
I’m not signing any form”
- Broad: Whether a waiver of the right counsel
must be explicit or can it be inferred.

Holding:
Waiver of Right to Counsel does not have to be explicit – a waiver may be inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated

Question 19

North Carolina v. Butler (1979)

This case is about waiver –

Answer 19

must a waiver of Miranda rights be explicit or can it be inferred. It matters because if the rights were not waived and a confession was obtained, that confession is inadmissible.

Question 20

North Carolina v. Butler (1979)

What right? Right to
Counsel at issue here;

Answer 20

he most likely explicitly waived his right to silence

Question 21

Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010)

2 issues, Holding

Answer 21

Issue:
1. Whether the exercise of a suspect’s right to remain silent requires an express declaration; in other words, must the suspect expressly invoke the right to remain silent
2. Whether the waiver of a right to remain silent must be explicit or may it be implicit.

Holding:
1. For a suspect to invoke his/her right to remain silent, it must be explicit
2. For a suspect to waive his/her right to remain silent, it does not have to be explicit and may be implicit

Question 22

Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010)

Majority

Invoking right to remain silent (4 points)

Answer 22

• Davis v. California – found right to
  counsel has to be made unambiguously
• Such requirement “results in an objective
  inquiry that avoids difficulties of proof
  and provides guidance to officers on
  how to proceed in the face of
  ambiguity”
• Suppression of a voluntary confession in
  these circumstances would place a
  significant burden on society’s interest in
  prosecuting criminal activity
• Key: To invoke right to remain silent,
  suspect must unambiguously exert that
  right – just sitting there silently is not
  enough to assert the right

Question 23

Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010)

Majority

Waiver of right to remain silent? (4 points)

Answer 23

• Even if he didn’t invoke his right to
  remain silent, he still had to “knowingly
  and voluntarily” waive the right
• Test for waiver: voluntary, product of a
  free and deliberate choice rather than
  intimidation, coercion, deceptions and
  made with full awareness of the nature
  of the right and the consequences
• Court: an implicit waiver of the right to
  remain silent is sufficient
• “Implied through the defendant’s
  silence, coupled with an understanding
  of his rights”

Question 24

Edwards v. Arizona (1981)

Facts:
- Jan 19 – Edwards placed in custody, then states, “I want an attorney before making a deal”

• Jan 20 – investigators approach Edwards
  without an attorney. Edwards says no. They tell
  him he has to. They read him his Miranda
  warnings . . . He then implicates himself

Issue, Holding

Answer 24

Issue:
- Whether Edwards waived his right to counsel
when he provided a statement to law
enforcement on Jan 20th after having been read
his Miranda warnings

Holding:
- No, Edwards did not waive his right to counsel when reapproached on January 20th
- When Edwards invoked his right to counsel on January 19th, that meant law enforcement could not reapproach him without his counsel present

Question 25

Edwards v. Arizona (1981) This case is about

Answer 25

This case is about what happens after the right to counsel is invoked. Can law enforcement reapproach and try again? If they do, can waiver be implicit?

Question 26

Edwards v. Arizona (1981) Rule | 4 points

Answer 26

- when an accused has invoked his right to counsel; - He is no longer subject to further interrogation until counsel has been provided to him; - Unless he initiates further communication/exchanges/conversations with the police - A valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights

Question 27

Maryland v. Shatzer (2010) | Issue, Holding

Answer 27

Issue: - Whether law enforcement may re- approach a suspect in custody after invoking the right to counsel when there has been a break in custodial custody Holding: - Yes, law enforcement may re-approach a suspect in custody after invoking the right to counsel when there has been a minimum of a 14-day break in custody between the first and second attempts at interrogation

Question 28

# Maryland v. Shatzer (2010) Majority overall holding

Answer 28

held that a suspect may not subjected to further interrogation by the authorities “until counsel has been made available to him unless he himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police”

Question 29

Maryland v. Shatzer (2010) Timing of the break in custody

Answer 29

“Confessions obtained after a 2-week (14 days) break in custody and a waiver of Miranda rights are most unlikely to be compelled”

Question 30

# Maryland v. Shatzer (2010) - Suspect placed in custody, advised of Miranda rights, invokes right to counsel - Under Edwards, police cannot

Answer 30

reinitiate without an attorney present while the suspect remains in custody However, if suspect leaves custody for 14 days or more, and then returns to custody and is again given Miranda rights, the police may then attempt to question the suspect

Question 31

New York v. Quarles (1984) | Issue, Holding

Answer 31

Issue: - Whether law enforcement may engage in questioning of a suspect in custody without Miranda warnings when prompted by concern for public safety Holding: - Yes, overriding concerns of public safety may justify an officer’s failure to provide Miranda warnings

Question 32

Dickerson v. US (2000) | Issue, Holding

Answer 32

Issue: - Whether 18 USC 3501, which established that the admissibility of a custodial suspect’s statement turned only on whether they were voluntarily made, overruled Miranda v. AZ. Holding: - No, as Miranda is a constitutional decision of this Court, Congress may not overrule it and Miranda continues to govern the admissibility of a custodial suspect’s statement

Question 33

# Dickerson v. US (2000) When does Congress and Supreme Ct have constitutional authority to overrule the Court?

Answer 33

1. Congress – has the “ultimate authority” to modify or set aside any judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitution 2. Supreme Court – has the ultimate authority to interpret and apply the Constitution; this authority cannot be legislatively superseded

Question 34

# Dickerson v. US (2000) Whether Miranda is a constitutional rule or an effort by the Court to regulate evidence in the absence of congressional direction?

Answer 34

- If Miranda is the Court regulating evidence in the absence of congressional direction, then Congress may overturn it through §3501 as an exercise in their authority to create rules of evidence that are not required by the Constitution - If Miranda is a constitutional rule, then the Court has the sole authority to interpret and apply it and Congress may not supersede it through §3501

Question 35

Dickerson v. US (2000) Constitutional Rule or Rule of Evidence?

Answer 35

- Quarles, Tucker, Elstad – Miranda rules are “prophylactic” and “not themselves rights protected by the Constitution - Court surprises everyone – Miranda is a constitutional rule

Question 36

Missouri v. Seibert (2004) | Issue, Holding

Answer 36

Issue: - Whether an initial failure to advise a suspect of her rights bar subsequent admissions by the suspect after she has been fully advised of her rights Holding: - Yes, based on the facts here, the initial failure to advise a suspect of her right bars subsequent admissions - Key is whether the Miranda warnings given “midstream” could have been effective enough to accomplish their object, given the specific facts of the case

Question 37

United States v. Patane (2004) | Issue, Holding

Answer 37

Issue: - Whether physical evidence from a Miranda violation must be excluded from trial Holding: - No, physical fruits of a Miranda violation must not be excluded from trial

Question 38

Vega v. Tekoh (2022) | Issue, Holding

Answer 38

Issue: - Whether a plaintiff may sue a police officer under 42 U.S.C. 1983, based on improper admission of an “un- Mirandized” statement in a criminal prosecution. Holding: - No, Miranda sets out constitutionally based prophylactic rules, a Miranda violation is not tantamount to a 5th Amendment violation.

Question 39

7 situations for miranda statements

Answer 39

1. impeaching 2. impeaching with right to remain silent 3. fruit of the poisonous tree 4. public safety 5. the two step 6. what if Miranda was read for a different offense 7. habeas corpus proceedings

Question 40

# Effect of Miranda violation: impeachment

Answer 40

Statements can be used for impeachment purposes - But CANNOT impeach with silence

Question 41

# Effect of Miranda violation: civil claims

Answer 41

No civil claim (but can use statements in violation of Miranda in a civil case)

Question 42

# Effect of Miranda violation: Two-step warnings

Answer 42

apply Elstad/Seibert

Question 43

# Effect of Miranda violation: physical/nontestimonial evidence

Answer 43

- apply Patane- admissible as long as confession was not coerced - Probable cause- OK as long as statements aren’t used at trial.

Question 44

Exclusionary Rule Applies to what 3 things

Answer 44

1. Applies to Miranda violations (made explicit in Miranda v. Arizona) 2. Applies to violations of Due Process Clause 3. Applies to violation of Self-Incrimination Clause of 5th Amendment

Question 45

Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine Applies to two things

Answer 45

1. Applies to violations of Due Process Clause (both physical evidence and statements) 2. Applies to violations of Self-Incrimination Clause of 5th Amendment (both physical evidence and statements)

Question 46

# Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine Generally, does not apply to

Answer 46

Miranda violations

Question 47

# Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine Generally, does not apply to Miranda violations:

Answer 47

- Does not apply to physical fruits (US v. Patane) - Does not apply to statement fruits (Elstad) - But does apply to “two-step” interrogation techniques when performed as a deliberate attempt to bypass Miranda (Missouri v. Seibert)

Question 48

Look at facts in Seibert versus Elstad and say

Answer 48

what one it looks like

Question 49

# Patone your good as long as you can

Answer 49

contribute the physical evidence to the statement

Question 50

Physical evidence from Miranda warning violation comes in

Answer 50

always

Question 51

Physical evidence from miranda warning violation comes in always, then

Answer 51

1. go through voluntariness factors 2. Amendment for state and amendment for federal

Question 52

Can use miranda violated statements when

Answer 52

not used as testimonial - can be used for impeachment

Question 53

using " I invoke my right to remain slient"

Answer 53

cannot use in court

Question 54

Miranda rights are not offense specific

Answer 54

maybe coud go into another test if time has passed

Question 55

Unmirandized statement can be used for

Answer 55

probable cause for arrest or warrent

Question 56

# Exclusionary Rule Applies to Miranda violations (made explicit in Miranda v. Arizona)

Answer 56

statement out

Question 57

# Exclusionary Rule Applies to violations of Due Process Clause

Answer 57

long time, is it creditable?

Question 58

# Exclusionary Rule Applies to violation of Self-Incrimination Clause of 5th Amendment

Answer 58

- cant take stand against self - if happen can make 1983 claim (civil)

Question 59

# Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine Applies to violations of Due Process Clause (both physical evidence and statements)

Answer 59

if violated cant use - use flowchart

Question 60

# Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine Self incrimination

Answer 60

flowchart

Question 61

# Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine Generally, does not apply to Miranda violations: - Physical

Answer 61

Admissible

Question 62

# Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine Generally, does not apply to Miranda violations: - statements

Answer 62

- look at elstad and seibert - use 2 step 1. purpose of miranda filed 2. whether properly done

Question 63

" I want out of here, ill confess"

Answer 63

will overborne dispite not being interrogated - Then look at the miranda basics - looking at from the suspects perspective

Question 64

# Perkins and Butler being undercover and miranda requirement

Answer 64

if undercover, no Miranda requirement

Question 65

"I want a lawyer" - Ask

Answer 65

was it scrupiously honored

Question 66

"I want a lawyer" - Brought back next day

Answer 66

violation

Question 67

"I want a lawyer" - Can speak in 3 different encounters

Answer 67

- suspect comes - 14 break in custody - with counsel

Question 68

If you determine a violation - physical evidence/statement

Answer 68

- Physical evidence (comes in) - Statement (look at the 2 step)