The nature of pleasure and happiness Flashcards
(22 cards)
How does Mill provisionally define happiness?
‘By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.’
However, he does say that ‘much more requires to be said; in particular, which things it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure.’
What comparison does Mill make with beasts?
‘A beast’s pleasures do not satisfy a human being’s conception of happiness’.
What are the higher pleasures to which Mill refers?
‘But there is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than those as mere sensations.’
‘It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasures are more valuable than others.’
What is the test that Mill establishes for determining which is the higher pleasure?
‘Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference… that is the more desirable pleasure.’
‘competently acquainted with both’
‘I apprehend there can be no appeal’
‘must be admitted as final’
Mill has established two mutually exclusive categories, the ‘animal sensations’ and those only capable of being experienced by a human’s ‘higher faculties’. He has suggested a test to determine the quality of each pleasure-category. What is the result of this test?
The competent judges… ‘do give a marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties’.
‘A being of higher faculties requires more to make him happy’.
What explanation does Mill give for the unwillingness of beings of higher faculties to ‘sink into lower forms of existence’?
‘We may give what explanation we please of this unwillingness; we may attribute it to pride… we may refer it to the love of liberty and personal independence, means for the inculcation of it, to the love of power, or to the love of excitement, both of which do really enter into and contribute to it: but its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity… which is so essential a part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong that nothing which conflicts with it could be, otherwise than momentarily, an object of desire to them’.
‘confounds the two very different ideas, of happiness, and content’
‘it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.’
What explanation(s) does Mill give for why many men do not pursue the higher pleasures?
‘Men often from infirmity of character, make their election for the nearer good, though they know it to be less valuable; and this no less when the choice is between two bodily pleasures, than when it is between bodily and mental. They pursue sensual indulgences to the injury of health, though perfectly aware that health is the greater good.’
‘Capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant, easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance; and in the majority of young persons it speedily dies away if the occupations to which their position in life has devoted them, and the society into which it has thrown them, are not favourable to keeping that higher capacity in exercise.’
What is Mill’s final definition of happiness?
The ultimate end… is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality.
What are the seven dimensions which Jeremy Bentham uses to determine how pleasurable something is?
- Its intensity
- Its duration
- Its certainty or uncertainty
- Its propinquity or remoteness
- Its fecundity
- Its purity.
- Its extent
What is Berger’s interpretation of Mill?
Happiness is composed of pleasures, and pleasures are intrinsically valuable. Pleasures are not equal when considered in relation to a person’s happiness. The pleasures that result from the exercise of the higher faculties are more important for happiness, than the lower pleasures.
What is Crisp’s thought experiment with Haydn and the oyster?
You are a soul in heaven waiting to be allocated a life on Earth. The angel in charge offers you a choice between two lives, that of the composer Joseph Haydn and that of an oyster. Besides composing some wonderful music and influencing the evolution of the symphony, Haydn will meet with success and honour in his own lifetime, be cheerful and popular, travel and gain much enjoyment from field sports. The oyster’s life will consist only of very mild sensual pleasure, like a human floating very drunk in a warm bath. However, Haydn will die at seventy seven, while the angel will make the oyster live for as long as you like. The assumption of full commensurability of the Benthamite account means that at some point in its life, the welfare of the oyster will outweigh that of Haydn. However, it feels intuitively that no number of years of the oyster’s life would make it better in welfare terms that that of Haydn. Mill saw the force in this kind of objection, he sought to modify his account to respond to them.
What is full hedonism (according to Crisp)?
Substantive component which states that welfare consists in pleasurable experiences.
Explanatory component which states that what makes these pleasurable experiences good is their being pleasurable.
What is Crisp’s interpretation of the higher/lower distinction?
The higher lower distinction reflects a relative relationship, rather than two mutually exclusive categories. I would prefer the pleasure of drinking an ice cold lemonade to any quantity of the pleasure of scratching an itch. However, I would prefer the pleasure of reading philosophy to any quantity of the pleasure of drinking lemonade. The lesson here is that one cannot classify a pleasure as higher or lower without saying exactly what it is being alleged to be higher or lower than.
However, it is important to bear in mind that the competent judges are not defining the higher or lower pleasures.
They are merely providing evidence about which mode of existence is preferred between the two groups that have been established.
The distinction is not between pleasures themselves, but pleasures in the way that they relate to happiness.
How does Crisp describe the higher/lower pleasure distinction?
Mill drops full cardinality. Mill means by quantity Bentham’s conception of welfare, according to which the value of a pleasure depends solely on its intensity and duration. When Mill speaks of quality, he means its intrinsic nature. Mill’s claim is that the intrinsic nature of a pleasure is such that it is more valuable for the person who enjoys it than would be the enjoyment of any amount of lower pleasure, regardless of intensity or duration.
What is the common criticism of Mill’s higher/lower distinction?
Either quality collapses into quantity, or Mill can no longer count himself a full hedonist. The first part of the dilemma is that under hedonism, only pleasurableness is valuable. If Mill places higher pleasures at one end of the scale and lower pleasures at the other end, increasing quantity must eventually tip the balance towards the lower pleasures.
If Mill denies that pleasures are incommensurable in this way, he must accept that the higher pleasures are valuable for some reason other than their being more pleasant, and hence he is not a full hedonist. Once he allows, e.g. ‘self-realising’ as a good-making property, he is not a full hedonist.
How does Crisp defend Mill against these objections?
They are just to beg the question against Mill. According to Mill, pleasurableness depends on intensity, duration and intrinsic nature. Mill can suggest that higher pleasures are more valuable because of their pleasurableness. The only way for lower pleasures to outweigh the higher pleasures is for its nature to be transformed. Mill just needs to rule out full commensurability, and can claim to be a full hedonist, while maintaining his distinction.
What is it about the nature of higher pleasures that make them more valuable?
Mill can refer here to a point that he stressed repeatedly in Utilitarianism, that ultimate ends must be accepted as good without proof. The nature of the higher pleasures just does make them more valuable. Any theorist of welfare must reach a point like this.
What is your overall view of Mill’s higher/lower distinction?
It is consistent with full hedonism, but implausible.
We can also question what conception of pleasure he is working with. He does not define pleasure and pain philosophically. Pleasure is an introspectible property of sensations that varies in length and intensity. The nature of the pleasure could not affect its pleasurableness so understood.
Does the verdict of the competent judges determine whether a pleasure is higher/lower?
Mill speaks of determining the quantity of pleasure as analogous to determining the quality of pleasure. It would be peculiar to suggest that an experience has a certain intensity because someone says that it does. Thus it would be reasonable to assume that a higher pleasure is not higher merely because the judges say that is so. The verdict of the competent judges is evidential.
Mill states that a higher pleasure is more valuable if all or ‘almost all’ of the competent judges prefer it. This lends further weight to the view that the judges are evidential. Mill is not claiming that the majority must be right, but that it is the only reasonable option to respect the preference of the majority.
Can the competent judges ever be sufficiently impartial?
It is not sufficient that the judges have experienced both pleasures. They must have enjoyed them properly and to the right extent. E.g. these cases would not count: you only enjoy reading Hegel as opposed to doing nothing all day, or you enjoy reading Hegel because you are reminded of a beautiful lecturer you once had.
It is here that the concern about impartiality enters. It may be that the characteristics required to assess the value of higher pleasures are fundamentally opposed to those required in the case of the lower pleasures. A philosopher who is a half-hearted sensualist cannot be an impartial judge.
However, I see no reason to assume that those who love philosophy cannot also truly appreciate sensual pleasures.
What is the lexical view that Mill holds?
Higher pleasures should be maximised and only once this has taken place are the lower pleasures to be pursued. As long as any higher pleasure can be gained at a particular point in time, it should be pursued, no matter the intensity of the lower pleasure available.
This view is too stark. Given the choice between reading 10 books of philosophy, or reading 9 books of philosophy and a wide variety of lower pleasures, it seems rational to prefer the latter. Combinations of enjoyable experiences can be more valuable, rather than the lexical view.
How does JJ Smart discuss the meaning of happy?
There is an important difference between being contented and being happy.
Consider a life of continual sensual pleasures. It is entirely consistent that you are not content to be assigned to such a life, and if you were, you would be content in the life.
Happy is mostly a descriptive term relating to contentedness and enjoyment, and partially an evaluative term. For A to call B ‘happy’, A must be contented at the prospect of B being in his present state of mind and at the prospect of A himself, should the opportunity arise, enjoying that sort of state of mind.
The evaluative consideration is what drives the higher/lower pleasure distinction.
