The States Flashcards

(56 cards)

1
Q

What does the 10th Amendment say?

A

Powers not explicitly delegated to the federal government, nor prohibited to the states, are reserved to the states or the people.

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2
Q

Holding in National League of Cities v. Usery?

A

Congress cannot use its Commerce Clause power to directly regulate the “traditional functions” of state governments (like running schools, police, and fire departments). Doing so would undermine the states’ ability to operate independently, violating the principles of federalism protected by the Tenth Amendment.

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3
Q

Rule from Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985)?

A

Congress has the authority under the Commerce Clause to apply federal labor standards (like the Fair Labor Standards Act) to state and local government employees, and the Tenth Amendment does not bar such regulation.

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4
Q

Majority and Holding in Garcia v. San Antonio Metroploitan Transit Authority?

A

Blackmun, Brennan, White, Marshall, Stevens → NLC v. Usery standard was unworkable. Rules based on subjective determinations of integral or traditional government functions provid little or no guidance in determining the boundaries of federal and state power. NLC did not offer what a traditional vs nontraditional function is. Federal and state courts have struggles to identify them for purposes of state immunity under the commerce clause. Function tests invite subjective judicial judgements about which state functions are important. The political process ensures that laws that unduly burden states will not be promulgated.

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5
Q

Dissent in Garcia v. San Antonio Transit ?

A

Dissent (Powell joined by Burger, Rehinquist and O’Connor): → Decision substantially alters the federal system embodied in the constitution. Judicial review is essential to prevent federal overreach → reliance on the political process is insufficient. The state’s role in our system is a matter of constitutional law not legislative grace.

Dissent (O’Connor, joined by Powell and Rehnquist) → The Constitution’s structure protects state sovereignty not just through the Tenth Amendment but through the very design of federalism itself. This structural balance is being ignored by the majority. Courts must have a role in defining and enforcing limits on federal power to protect the states. Without that role, there is no meaningful check on Congress under the Commerce Clause.

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6
Q

Rule from New York v. United States?

A

Rule: ANTI COMMANDEERING DOCTRINE →
Congress may not compel states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.
Commandeering state legislative processes violates the tenth Amendment.

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7
Q

Holding and Majority in New York v. United States?

A

O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas →
Congress may not compel states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program. congress can collect funds from the surcharges on out of state on out of state waste generators under its power to tax. Congress can put conditions on the states receipt of federal funds under its spending powers → monetary incentives were constitutional. While the federal law is supreme, it cannot compel state governments to take specific actions or regulate in a way that infringes on state sovereignty. The Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from coercing states into enforcing federal laws or regulations in certain areas, even though federal law might preempt conflicting state laws. Forcing states to “take title” to radioactive waste was an unconstitutional command for states to act.

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8
Q

Dissent in New York v. U.S.?

A

Dissent:
White, joined by Blackmun→ The act is a constitutional use of the commerce clause; the take tile provision encourages responsible waste management not coercion. Majorities’ decision undervalues state cooperation and overlooks practical need for shared responsibility. This could have been done under the spending clause or commerce clause.
Stevens → The majority’s distinction between permissible and impermissible federal control, the notion that congress doesn’t have the power to use a simple command to state governments in unsound.

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9
Q

Rule from Printz v. U.S.?

A

Congress cannot commandeer state executive officials to administer federal law.

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10
Q

Majority and Holding in Printz v. U.S.

A

Scalia, Rehinquist, O’Connor, Kennedy, Thomas) →

Federal government cannot commandeer state executive officials to execute federal law. No historical tradition of forcing state officials to execute federal law/ States retain residuary and inviolable sovereignty. Commandeering blurs state and federal linesThe take care clause is an executive function. The president must execute the law, not state officials. Interim provisions of the Brady act are unconstitutional.

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11
Q

Concurrences in Printz v. U.S.?

A

Thomas→ Court should reconsider whether federal gun control laws like the Brady Act are even valid under the Commerce Clause. Importance of individual rights protected by the Second Amendment, implying that federal regulation of private gun ownership may exceed constitutional bounds.

O’Connor→ Emphasized that the ruling doesn’t strike down all forms of federal-state cooperation — just federal commands to state executive officers. Cooperative federalism is still constitutional when voluntary.

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12
Q

Rule from Haaland v. Brackeen?
Majority?

A

Barrett, Roberts, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Jackson

The Indian Child Welfare Act does not violate the Constitution. Congress has the authority to regulate Indian child custody proceedings under the Indian Commerce Clause. ICWA does not comendeer state governments, and the petitioners lacked standing on the equal protections and nondelegation claims.

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13
Q

Conccurrences in Haaland v. Brackeen?

A

Concurrence (Kavanaugh): → ICWA is constitutional under current claims and standing limits. Raised cautionary flags on equal protections concerns → race based placement preferences could create constitutional issues in the future. Open invitation to decide this in the future w/ standing.

Concurrence (Gorsuch, Sotomayor and Jackson) → ICWA corrects a history of forced child removal, states have virtually no role in indian affairs. Tribal sovereignty has its own place in the constitution that states can not infringe.

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14
Q

Dissent in Haaland v. Brackeen?

A

Thomas and Alito
The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was unconstitutional because Congress lacks the authority to enact it, and Justice Alito argued that the majority’s decision was contrary to the best interests of the children

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15
Q

What is the Dormant Commerce Clause?

A

In absence of Federal Regulation, states can regulate interstate commerce, but they can not enact laws that discriminate against or unduly burden interstate commerce.

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16
Q

What is the Dormant Commerce Clause Test?
What case is it from?

A

Philadelphia v. New Jersey

Is the law facially discriminatory against interstate commerce? If yes then per se invalid.

Such laws are on permissible if the state can demonstrate →

1) The law serves a legitimate local purpose, and
2) That purpose cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.

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17
Q

What is the Pike Balancing Test? What Case is it from?

Pike v. Bruce Church

A

If a law is not discriminatory, does the law incidentally burden interstate commerce?

A law will be upheld unless the burden on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the punative local benefits.

To decide the extent of the burden to be tolerated, Courts weigh:

1) The nature of the local interest involved
2) Whether the interest could be promoted with a lesser impact on interstate commerce.

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18
Q

What is the Market Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause?

A

A state does not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause when it acts as a market participant—i.e., when it buys, sells, or produces goods or services—and may favor in-state interests in that capacity.

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19
Q

What is a limitation to the Market Participant Exception? What case is it from?

A

A state cannot impose downstream restrictions on how goods are used after the market transaction; such conduct is regulatory and subject to DCC scrutiny

South-Central Timber v. Wunnicke

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20
Q

Rule from Philadelphia v. New Jersey?

A

A state may not discriminate against other states’ articles of commerce on the basis of origin

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21
Q

What was the Holding in Philadelphia v. New Jersey?

A

New Jersey’s law was unconstitutional under the Commerce

Clause.Waste is an article of commerce, NJ’s law discriminates on its face against out of state waste based on origin. Even if the purpose is state environmental protection, targeting only out of state waste is an impermissible means. NJ can not isolate itself from the national economy to serve internal problems.

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22
Q

Rule from Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison Wisconson

A

A state or local law that discriminates against interstate commerce is invalid under the commerce clause if there are reasonable, less- discriminatory alternatives to achieve the same legitimate local objectives.

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23
Q

What was the holding in Dean Milk o v. City of Madison Wisconson?

A

The Ordinance was unconstitutional under the dormant commerce clause. Madison could achieve its goal of safe milk through less discriminatory means like inspecting milk plants outside of the five mile radius or instituting higher inspection standards applicable to all milk.

24
Q

Rule from Pike v. Bruce Church?

A

PIKE BALANCING TEST!

A state law that is non-discriminatory on its face that only incidentally affects interstate commerce will be upheld unless the burden imposed on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to punitive local benefits.

25
Rule from South Central Timber Development v. Wunnicke?
MARKET PARTICIPANT DOCTRINE AND ITS LIMITS→ A state must impose burdens on commercial transactions within the market in which it is a participant but it may not impose conditions that have a substantial regulatory effect outside that particular market.
26
Holding in South Central Timber Development v. Wunnicke?
White, Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens A state acting as a market participant can impose conditions on commercial transactions within that market w/o violating the dormant commerce clause but the states actions must remain confined to the market which it participates. When a state's regulatory effect extends to other markets, it exceeds the scope of the market participant exception. Alaska's requirement that all timber be processed in that state indirectly regulates the timber processing market.
27
Rule from National Pork Producers Council v. Karen Ross?
A state law that applies evenhandedly and reflects legitimate local interests does not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause merely because it has out-of-state effects. Pike balancing applies only if the challenger first shows a substantial burden on interstate commerce and moral interests cannot be weighed against economic costs.
28
Holding and Majority in National Pork Producers Council v. Karen Ross?
5-4 Gorsuch writing, Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett NO PER SE EXTRATERRITORIAL RULE→ The dormant commerce clause doesn’t impose an automatic ban on laws that have a practical effect of impacting interstate commerce even absent discriminatory intent. Even if a state law does not expressly discriminate, but its practical effect demonstrates a discriminatory purpose it violates the dormant commerce clause. BUT Courts shouldn’t engage in pike balancing if economic burdens are pitted against non-economic benefits because courts can’t compare the two. Even if pike balancing is suitable, it's proper only if the complaining party first demonstrates a substantial economic burden on interstate commerce. Prop 12 didn’t discriminate b/w California and out of state producers. You can’t strike down a law just because it affects other states. If you want to win under the Dormant Commerce Clause, you have to either (1) show that the law’s purpose is to discriminate against out-of-state businesses, or (2) show a major burden on interstate commerce so we can do Pike balancing. The pork producers did neither — so their claim fails.
29
Who was the Dissent in National Pork?
Roberts, with Alito, Kavanaugh and Jackson joining Under pike, even a non discriminatory burden may be struck down if it clearly outweighs local benefits. The organizations alleged a substantial burden on interstate commerce and the case therefore should have been remanded for a Pike Balancing analysis. Kavanaugh Laws like proposition 12 implicate not only the dormant commerce clause but also potentially the import-export clause, privileges and immunities and full faith and credit clause.
30
What is the Doctrine of Selective Incoperation?
Originally, the Bill of Rights (first 10 amendments) applied only to the federal government. Through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, many of those rights have been “incorporated” — meaning they are now enforceable against the states. The Supreme Court did not incorporate all rights at once. Instead, it used a case-by-case approach, incorporating only those rights deemed: 1) Fundamental to the American scheme of justice 2) Deeply rooted in the Nation's History and traditions
31
Rule from McDonald v. City of Chicago Illinois?
A right in the bill of rights is incorporated against the states through the due process clause if It is fundamental to the Nations scheme of ordered liberty and Deeply rooted in the Nation's History and traditions
32
What was the Holding in McDonald v. City of Chicago?
The Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for self-defense is fully applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The right to bear arms is “fundamental to the Nation’s scheme of ordered liberty” and “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition.” Because of this, it qualifies for selective incorporation. The majority rejected the idea that the right to own a handgun for self-defense is less important at the state level than federally.
33
Who were the concurrences in McDonald v. City of Chicago?
Scalia → Supports using historical interpretations even though not perfect. Concurrence was just going at Stevens' throat. Thomas → Incorporation should be through the privileges and immunities clause not Due process Clause. The PIC was originally intended to protect substantive rights like the right to keep and bear arms.
34
Who were the Dissents in McDonald v. City of Chicago?
Stevens → The right to possess firearms differs from other recognized liberties because it’s not essential to autonomy, dignity, or equality, and it poses risks to public safety. State regulation of gun possession is deeply rooted in history, and local governments should be allowed to experiment with solutions to gun-related issues. Historical analysis should not be the sole determining factor for recognizing a fundamental right, as historical views can be ambiguous, incorrect, or misleading, and judges may lack the necessary expertise to interpret them effectively. Bryer, Joined by Ginsburg and Sotomayor→ Nothing in this country’s history supports the finding that a private right of self-defense is incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment against the states. Incorporating a private right of self-defense against the states will not protect discrete and insular minorities from state regulation, help ensure equal respect for individuals, promote a necessary part of the democratic process, or protect individuals at risk of unfair treatment by a majority.
35
Holding from Timbs v. Indianna? Majority?
Unanimous→ Gorsuch, Ginsburg, Roberts, Bryer, Alito, Thomas, Kagan, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh The Eighth Amendment’s protection against excessive fines applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. This protection is deeply rooted in history, dating back to the Magna Carta, the English Bill of Rights, and early American legal tradition. By the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, nearly all states already banned excessive fines. Because the protection is fundamental to ordered liberty, it is incorporated against the states.
36
Who/ what was the concurrence In Timbs v. Indiana?
Agrees that excessive fines clause applies to the states but disagrees with the use of the due process clause for incorporation. Believes the due process clause is limited to procedural rights.
37
Rule from Ramos v. Indiana?
A criminal conviction based on non-unanimous jury verdict violates the criminal defendants constitutional right under the sixth amendment, as incorporated against the states in the Fourteenth Amendment.
38
Holding from Ramos v. Indiana?
6-3 Gorsuch, Ginsburg, Bryer, Thomas, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh A criminal conviction based on a non unanimous jury verdict violates the criminal defendant’s constitutional rights. The Sixth Amendment, which applies to the states through incorporation, establishes that criminal defendants have a right to trial by an impartial jury consisting of jurors from the state and district where the crime occurred. The right to a trial by an impartial jury inherently includes the right to a unanimous verdict. Although a plurality of the Supreme Court held in one case that unanimous jury verdicts are not required, the decision is not binding because it was not a majority decision. Further, the plurality was clearly legally incorrect, and therefore the Court is not bound to follow its holding under the doctrine of stare decisis.
39
Concurrences in Ramos v. Indianna?
Thomas Agrees with the results but believes the incorporation of the unanimity requirement should be through the privileges and immunities clause not the due process clause. Kavanaugh Agrees with the decision but outlines a TEST FOR OVERRULING SARTRE DECISIS 1) s the prior decision not just wrong but grievously wrong? 2) Second, has the prior decision cause significant negative jurisprudential or real world consequences? 3) Third, would overruling the prior decision unduly upset reliance interests? Using this he determined Apocada was wrong. Sotomayor Overruling precedent here is not only warranted but compelled.
40
Dissent in Ramos v. Indianna?
Alito joined by Roberts and Kagan Stare decisis should control and the court should not overturn apodaca, Concerned about disruption of criminal convictions in Louisiana and Oregon and retroactive consequences of overruling precedent.
41
What is Article VI and what does it say and do?
Article IV, §2→ Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States. Prevents states from discriminating against out-of-staters.
42
What is the privileges and immunities clause of the 14th amendment say and do?
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States Stops states from violating national citizenship rights.
43
Rule from Slaughter House Cases?
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits only slavery and involuntary servitude as it existed under chattel slavery of African Americans before the Civil War. It does not apply to restrictions on the right to labor or to economic regulation. The Fourteenth Amendment protects rights of federal citizenship only, not rights conferred by individual states. Its purpose was to protect the legal status of emancipated slaves, not to restrict states from economic regulation or protect occupational freedoms.
44
Holding in Slaughterhouse?
Court upheld a Louisiana law granting a slaughterhouse monopoly, rejecting challenges under the 13th and 14th Amendments. It held that the 13th Amendment only prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude in the context of slavery-like conditions, not economic regulation. Under the 14th Amendment, the Court interpreted the Privileges or Immunities Clause narrowly, protecting only rights of federal—not state—citizenship (such as access to seaports or protection abroad), and not economic rights like pursuing a trade. The Due Process Clause was not violated because the law was a valid use of the state’s police power to protect public health. The Equal Protection Clause was deemed inapplicable, as it was meant to prevent racial discrimination, not to restrict uniform economic regulations.
45
Rule from Sanez v. Roe?
A state violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause by limiting welfare benefits for new residents based solely on their length of residency in the state.
46
Strict Scrutiny test from Sanez v. Roe
STRICT SCRUTINY TEST→ Laws that infringe on fundamental rights (like the right to travel) are subject to strict scrutiny which requires the government to prove that: 1) There is a compelling state interest behind the challenged policy, and 2) The state must show the law is narrowly tailored to serve that compelling governmental interest.
47
Majority/ Holding in Sanez v. Roe?
Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Bryer Constitutional right to travel includes the right of new residents to be treated equally in their new state, protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment. California’s reduced welfare benefits for residents who had lived in the state for less than a year violates this right. There are 3 components to the right to travel: entering and leaving states freely, being treated as a welcome visitor (Article IV), and receiving equal treatment as a resident (14th Amendment). Applying strict scrutiny, the Court held that California’s justifications—preventing migration of the poor, reducing costs, and federal authorization—were not compelling or narrowly tailored.
48
Dissent in Sanez v. Roe?
Thomas→ The Court breathes new life into the previ-ously dormant Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The durational residency requirement challenged here is a permissible exercise of the State’s power. Courts should not revive or reinterpret the clause to create new rights.“Privileges or immunities of citizens” are fundamental rights, rather than every public benefit established by positive law. Rehinquist → Argues the law is about residency requirements, not a restriction on travel. The right to become a resident is distinct from the right to move freely. The state has a legitimate interest in preventing welfare shopping and ensuring genuine residency before providing full benefits. The 1–year period permissibly balances the new resident’s needs for subsistence with the State’s need to ensure the bona fides of their claim to residence.
49
Rule from Supreme Court v. New Hampshire?
SUBSTANTIAL TEST → Under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, a state may discriminate against nonresidents’ rights only if: There is a substantial reason for the differential treatment; and The discrimination bears a close relationship to the state’s legitimate objectives.
50
Holding from Supreme Court v. New Hampshire?
Holding (Old court): New Hampshire's law restricting bar admission to state residents violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. The Clause aims to allow citizens to engage in business and earn a livelihood across state lines without economic discrimination. The practice of law, as an economic activity, is protected by the Clause. New Hampshire's justifications, including concerns about nonresidents’ familiarity with local laws and availability for legal duties, lacked empirical support. Residency was not a reliable proxy for the claimed issues, and less restrictive alternatives existed.
51
Rule from Lochner v. New York
Strict Scrutiny Standard → a court may not unreasonably interfere with the freedom of contract by limiting the working hours mutually agreed upon by employers and employees.
52
Rule from Williamson v. Lochner
Rejected Lochner. A law does not violate the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment as long as it has a rational basis—that is, if the legislature could have reasonably believed the law would serve a legitimate government interest, even if the law is unwise or inefficient.
53
Holding From Williamson v. Lochner?
The statute does not violate the 14th amendment. The law need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Rational basis review → decided a law need not be ideal, logical or effective it only needs to have a rational basis. Difference to the legislatures on what protects public health and safety. Even if a law is wasteful, needlessly expensive or inconvenient that does not make it unconstitutional.
54
Rule from City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc?
The mentally disabled are not a quasi-suspect class, and thus any legislative regulations affecting their rights are subject to rational-basis review and not intermediate scrutiny.
55
Rule from City of Boerne v. Flores?
Congress's power under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment is remedial, not substantive. Congress may only enforce rights recognized by the Court, and any enforcement legislation must be “congruent and proportional” to the constitutional violation it seeks to address. Congruence- A close fit b/w the injury and the means addressing it Proportionality- The remedy must be tailored to the scope of the problem.
56
Rule from United States v. Morrison
Congress does not have the authority under the commerce clause to regulate gender-motivated violence because such conduct is noneconomic in nature and does not substantially affect interstate commerce. Congress may use its enforcement power under article 5 of the 14th amendment to regulate state action but not private conduct.