Topic 2 - Maxims Flashcards
(37 cards)
Lyelle v Kennedy
The case established an equitable principle which grants the court power to order a discovery of document, and the failure of the party to produced the ordered document leads to a presumption against him.
This rule does not apply in Action for forfeiture cases (Seddon Case)
Seddon v Commercial Salt Co. Ltd
By a lease agreement, the 1st defendant acquired a lease interest in a land for twenty-one years minus a day. The agreement provides that where the defendant assigns or alienate or transfer the land without the consent of the leasor, the lease becomes determined.
The plaintiff, who had a reversionary interest in the leased land brought an action of forfeiture against the first, second and third defendant upon the above mentioned clause. He requested the court for an order for discovery of document against the defendant.
While the order was grated at the trial court, it was reversed upon appeal on the ground that there cannot be an order for discovery of document in an action for forfeiture. The court relied on the ruling in Earl of Mexborough v Withwood
Adecentro v OAU
Equity were developed to supplement and not to override common law rules, and in fact, equity would not have existed without common law
Trans Bridge v Survey international
Eso JSC obitered that “equity should not be threaded as a tyrannous phenomenon threatening the law… it is not a warlord determined to do battle with the law”
Archibong v Duke
Principle: specific performance will not be granted where damages are adequate. But the provision for liquidated damages in a contract does not necessarily bar the grant of specific performance
Fact:
The plaintiff agreed to convey to the defendant certain property and the defendant was to pay a fixed sum of money in consideration thereof. A clause in the agreement provided that …if either of the parties hereto rescinds this contract for whatever cause, such party shall incur and become liable to the other for £500 damages.” The defendant defaulted in the payment of the purchase price and the plaintiff thereupon sued him claiming specific performance of the agreement or in the alternative £500 damages for breach of the agreement. Held:
Webber, J. granted specific performance and directed that the defendant carry out the terms of the contract within three months otherwise, he (the defendant) should pay to the plaintiff the sum of £500 as liquidated damages for the breach.
Comment
It is submitted that the clause in this contract is capable of two interpretations. It may be argued on the one hand, that the clause enables the defendant to choose either to perform the contract or pay the specified sum of money; and on the other hand, that the defendant is bound to perform the contract, the money clause being added by way of security.
If the first interpretation is applicable, specific performance cannot be decreed because the parties have agreed that damages will be an adequate remedy and thus exclude the basis for the decree of specific performance. If the second interpretation is applicable, the court will readily grant specific performance. The approach of Webber, J. in the above case is questionable. It is submitted that, instead of finding the easy way out, the judge should have made up his mind having regard to the evidence adduced whether to grant specific performance or award damages.
Chidiak v Coker
Principle: Equity follows the law
Fact:
The question in this case was whether a sub-lessee of Crown land was liable on the covenant to repair when the Crown Lands Ordinance(No. 45) of Nigeria in section 7 provided that in all leases of Crown Lands shall be implied a covenant not to assign, sub-let or otherwise part with the possession of the land without the previous consent of the Governor in writing.
The appellant had before then been the sub-lessee of the respondent who was himself the lessee of Crown Lands in question. The initial term having come to an end, the appellant had negotiated and executed a fresh sub-lease which was not executed by the respondent before some year and a half had passed. In any case the Governor’s consent even though backdated to the commencement of the fresh sub-lease was not forthcoming before the year and a half had run out. Meanwhile, the appellant continued in possession.
While in possession but before the Governor’s consent, the house burnt down.The respondent sued the appellant on the covenant to repair in the sub-lease.
Held:
Without the prior consent of the Governor, the sub-lease could not be granted; that consent could not have been assumed. Therefore at the time of the fire, there was on sub-lease. The court expressed the view that it could not be presumed on the facts of that case that the Governor gave the necessary consent to a lease transaction, and that the onus was on the plaintiff relying on the instrument to prove the consent.
Savannah bank v Ajilo
PRINCIPLE: A contract may be made illegal by statute. The court will never lend its aid to enforce an illegal contract. Ex turpi causa oritur non actio confirms the proposition that the court will not enforce a contract that is predicated on illegality.
Fact: As a consequence of the failure of the respondent to repay a loan, the bank sold the land used as security but did not obtain the governor ‘s consent required under s. 22 of the Land Use Act. Held:
The sale of the land as illegal, null and void being in breach of the statutory provision.
Comment “ The main issue before the court was the legality of the sale of land without governors consent as required by statute. The question as to the statute being used as an instrument of fraud was not raised before the court otherwise, the judgement would have been totally different, as in Solanke v Abed, [1962] NRNLR 92
Solanke v Abed
Principle: the law will not allow the law to be used as an engine of fraud
Fact: The respondent, who held a lease of crown land, sublet it to the appellant without the governor ‘s consent as required by a statute. On realising that he had faltered the respondent ejected the appellant sued for trespass.
Held
The sublease was only illegal as performed by the respondent. The appellant retained all his rights under the sublease also because the statute did not provide any penalty for its breach .The respondent couldn ‘t take advantage of his own wrong as against the appellant.
Pilcher V Rawlins
Principle: Where the equities are equal the law prevails
Fact: A father settled real estate on trust for his children. One of the trustees, P, was the uncle of the beneficiaries. The trustees advanced money to R on the security of a mortgage (the mortgage deed explained the existence of the trust). Two of the trustees died leaving P as the sole trustee. P and R devised a fraud whereby the property would be mortgaged to S and L, who had no notice of the trust or the existence of the beneficiaries’ equitable interest. The fraud was revealed and the beneficiaries sought a declaration that S and L took legal title subject to their equitable proprietary rights in the property and an order that it be reconveyed to the trust. This case called for a consideration of how the competing interests of innocent parties ought to be balanced, where it was not possible to give effect to one without unduly prejudicing an equally blameless party. Moreover, the court were required to address the extent of the defence available to a bona fide purchaser for value, without notice of any pre-existing equitable interests.
Held:
The court found in favour of S and L, whom thus took their charge free of B’s equitable rights. S and L had acted diligently and reasonably believed they had taken good title, they had ‘neither knowledge nor means of knowledge’ of the trust; where the equities were equal, as was the case here, the law must prevail.
Joseph V Lyon
A assigned for valuable consideration, his after acquired stock-in-trade to the plaintiff, subject to a proviso for redemption. Before the plaintiff took possession of the after acquired stock, a pledged part of it with the defendant who had no notice of the assignment
Held:
The court held that the plaintiff’s interest in the after acquired stock-in trade was equitable and that since the defendant’s interest was legal and since he had no notice of the plaintiff’s earlier equitable interest, he had priority over the plaintiff. The consideration of the doctrine of notice and statutory enactments affecting it is very essential to the application of this maxim - where the equities are equal the law prevails.
Cave v Cave
X, a sole trustee used trust money to purchase a parcel of land and conveyed the land to Y, his brother. Y then mortgaged the land to A by way of legal mortgage and then to B by way of equitable mortgage. Both A and B were unaware of the trust.
Held:
It was held that A’s legal mortgage had priority over the beneficiary’s interest whilst B’s equitable mortgage must be postponed to the beneficiary’s interest, being later in time i.e The interests of the beneficiaries had priority over B’s mortgage, since they were earlier in time
Rice V Rice
FACT: A conveyance on which a receipt clause for the purchase price was endorsed was handed over to the purchaser, without the vendor actually receiving the purchase money. The vendor therefore had an equitable lien for the unpaid purchase money. Subsequently, the purchaser deposited the conveyance with Y, who had no notice of the vendor’s equitable lien. The question for determination was who of the two was entitled to priority. Held:
It was held that Y had priority over the vendor; that though the vendor’s equity was earlier in point in time, nevertheless the equities were not equal since his conduct had facilitated the creation of the later equity. Under the rule in Dearle v Hall a subsequent equitable encumbrancer can have priority over an earlier equitable encumbrancer.
Dearle V Hall
where the equitable owner of an asset purports to dispose of his equitable interest on two or more occasions, and the equities are equal between claimants, the claimant who first notifies the trustee or legal owner of the asset shall have a first priority claim
Adebajob V Brown
Principle: He who seeks equity must do equity
Fact: The appellant in building his house encroached on the respondent’s land. The respondent condoned this trespass by agreeing that the appellant compensate him monetarily. The appellant failed to pay the agreed compensation whereupon the respondent brought an action against the defendant for trespass
Held:
If there is a mistaken entry and when the mistake is discovered, and the person in possession is approached and he consents to the encroachment, then, the right to claim in trespass is lost, as his consent relates back to the initial entry without permission. The respondent was therefore estopped from suing the appellant
Lodge V National Union Investment
if the plaintiff seeks an equitable remedy or wishes to obtain any equitable relief, he must be prepared to act fairly towards the defendant
Case Summary
X borrowed money from Y, a moneylender and mortgaged certain securities to him. The contract was illegal and void since the moneylender was not registered under the English Moneylenders Act 1900. When X sued Y to recover the securities.
Held:
it was held that an order for delivery up would only be made if X were prepared to “do equity” by repaying the amount of the loan.
Kasumo b Baba-Egbe
Principles
If the plaintiff seeks an equitable remedy or wishes to obtain any equitable relief, he must be prepared to act fairly towards the defendant. He Who Seeks Equity Must Do Equity
Case Summary
The respondent mortgaged some property with the appellant money-lender as security for a loan. The moneylender contrary to statutory requirement (s. 19 of Money-lenders Ordinarice) kept no record of the loan thus making the loan statutorily unenforceable. The respondent without repaying the loan instituted an action in the lower court for the repossession of the properly and its tille deed.
Held:
The Court held that the principle in Lodge v National Union Investment Limited was not applicable to a transaction declared unenforceable by statute. It would be wrong for a money-lender in default of statutory provisions to be allowed to defend himself in court by calling for the imposition of terms of repayment, for by doing so he would be enforcing, directly or indirectly, a claim in respect of the unenforceable transaction. in other words, the mortgage was unenforceable and the lender could recover neither the interest nor the loan capital. The security was therefore re-transferred to the borrower.
Craig v Craig
Case Summary
The petitioner, a wife, brought a case to the court seeking the dissolution of her marriage on the grounds that her husband had committed adultery. She claimed that her husband’s infidelity was the reason their marriage should end. However, during the proceedings, it came to light that the wife had also engaged in adultery in the past, with another man. She had not disclosed this fact to her husband before bringing the case. This revelation significantly affected the outcome of the case.
Held:
The court ruled against the wife and denied her the relief she sought. The court’s decision was based on the principle that anyone seeking justice must come with “clean hands.” This means that a person cannot seek legal protection or relief if they have acted wrongly or in bad faith in the matter at hand. Since the wife herself had committed adultery in the past and had hidden it from her husband, the court found that she was not in a position to accuse her husband of the same wrong.
Viatonu V Odunayo
Viatonu (the mortgagor) upon receiving notice of foreclosure went to Odutayo (the mortgagee) who agreed to grant an extension of two months, within that period Viatonu tendered the money in full but Odutayo refused to accept it on the grounds that it was too late. Odutayo exercising his power of sale, sold the property for £600 by private treaty to kuyero. Thẹ mortgagee, the auctioneer and the purchaser were members of the firm of the auctioneers which sold the property though the purchaser alleged that he had resigned from the firm. Further, the mortgage debt was £250, while the market value of the mortgaged property was £1,500. Held:
The sale of mortgaged property was set aside because the mortgagee, in exercising his power of sale did not act Bonafide; the purchaser could not claim protection of S. 27(2) of the Conveyance Act 1881 and could not recover possession, the sale being void against the mortgagor. But a purchaser of the legal estate who has not been fraudulent or negligent is preferred to the equitable mortgagee, even though the mortgagor in conveying the legal estate to the purchaser of the legal estate was acting fraudulently, having previously created an equitable mortgage over the land which he failed to disclose to the purchaser
Gill V Lewis
A tenant whose lease has been forfeited for non payment of rent cannot expect an equitable remedy against forfeiture where he has been using the premise for immoral purpose
Overto V Bannister
An infant received money from a trustee, having fraudulently misrepresented his age
Held:
The infant having fraudulently misrepresented his age was not entitled to be repaid on reaching the age of 21.
Lindsay Petroleum v Hurd
Lord Selborne held that “It will be practically unjust to grant an equitable remedy where the party has conducted himself as waiving such right”
Fagbemi v Aluko
Principle: Delay defeats equity
for the maxim to apply, three things must be proved. 1) Laches or 2) Acquiesence 3) Change in position of the defendant
Ephraim v Asuquo
Principles
There will be laches where the plaintiff has so acted as to induce the defendant to alter his position in the reasonable belief that the claim has been abandoned, or where the delay amounts to evidence of an agreement by the plaintiff to abandon his right.
Case Summary
The plaintiff sought to have a grant of letters of administration set aside. Held:
It was held that as nearly two years had elapsed since the grant, and the administrator had in all probability completed distribution of the estate, there had been laches, and the plaintiff’s claim failed.
Aganran v Olushi
The head of the family sold family property without the consent of other members of the family and the court held that the sale of family property by the head of the family without the consent of principal members of the family was voidable and not void. The sale was therefore voidable by the plaintiff. The plaintiff took no steps to set aside the sale until 1905, when he commenced the present action. The plaintiff had demanded and received €5 out of the proceeds of the sale, and it was held that this amounted to ratification by conduct (though he subsequently resiled from his promise). The court also found that the defendants had at one stage sued as owners of the land to eject trespassers, and the plaintiff knew of this but did not interfere; and that the defendants had erected houses on the land and the plaintiff did nothing to stop them.
Held:
It was held that all these circumstances, coupled with the three-year delay in bringing the action, amounted to lashes, and the plaintiff had lost his right to set aside the sale. Winkfield J. said: ‘I think that the actions of the plaintiff amounted to an expression of intention or a promise not to exercise the right which he possessed.’
