Tort - Negligence (Psychiatric Harm)

Question 1

Claim for distress not actionable

Answer 1

Hicks v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (1992)

Question 2

What nature of pure psychiatric harm is actionable?

Answer 2

Medically recognised psychiatric illness

E.g. PTSD, depression

Question 3

What nature of pure psychiatric harm is NOT actionable?

Answer 3

Anything NOT a medically recognised psychiatric illness

E.g. Anxiety, grief or distress

Question 4

Pure psychiatric harm is actionable if emanating from a shock

Answer 4

Dulieu v White & sons (1901)

Question 5

Claimant for damages for pure psychiatric harm must initially show to be suffering from a positive psychiatric illness

Answer 5

McLoughlin v O’Brian (1983)

Question 6

Reason for ‘shock’ requirement in secondary victim claims for pure psychiatric harm

Answer 6

Control device to prevent floodgate of claims from those too remote from the incident

Question 7

Test of foreseeability for pure psychiatric harm claims (1)

Answer 7

A person of ordinary fortitude would suffer psychiatric harm in the circumstances
(Exception to egg shell skull rule)

Question 8

Test of foreseeability for pure psychiatric harm claims (2)

Answer 8

Psychiatric injury must be foreseeable (at least in secondary victim cases)
King v Phillips (1953)

Question 9

Test of foreseeability for pure psychiatric harm claims (3)

Answer 9

Specific Foreseeability (in hindsight, not what a reasonable person would have foreseen at the time)

Question 10

Pure psychiatric harm test for primary victim

Answer 10

Claim for pure psychiatric harm will succeed if they are a primary victim and physical harm is reasonably foreseeable (not an exception to eggshell skull)
Page v Smith (1996)

Question 11

Claims for pure psychiatric harm restricted to events which have happened, not events which might happen

Answer 11

Rothwell v Chemical and Insulating Co Ltd (2007)

Question 12

Two categories of victims in pure psychiatric harm

Answer 12

Primary and secondary

Question 13

What is a primary victim for pure psychiatric claims?

Answer 13

Primary victims are those in the zone of danger

Question 14

What are secondary victims for pure psychiatric harm claims?

Answer 14

Secondary victims are those who witness an incident but are not themselves in the zone of danger

Question 15

Case demonstrating ordinary fortitude control mechanism for pure psychiatric harm

Answer 15

Bourhill v Young (1943)

Question 16

Further control mechanisms for pure psychiatric harm, secondary victims (and case)

Answer 16

1. Proximity of relationship
2. Proximity in time and space
3. Shock requirement

McLoughlin v O’Brian (1983)

Question 17

Relationship with the victim (Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (1992))

Answer 17

Relationship demonstrates ties of close love and affection (no exhaustive list)

Question 18

Case demonstrating court’s changing generosity re proximity in time and space (moving on from McLoughlin and Alcock)

Answer 18

Galli-Atkinson v Seghal (2003)

Question 19

Case which conflicts with Galli-Atkinson, despite satisfying all control mechanism criteria (pure psychiatric harm, secondary victims)

Answer 19

Ward v Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust (2004)

Question 20

Rule for Rescuers in danger zone (and case)

Answer 20

Rescuers at risk of physical harm in the zone of danger can rely on Page v Smith and claim under the normal Caparo test

White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (1999)

Question 21

Rule for Rescuers not in danger zone (and case)

Answer 21

Rescuers not at risk of physical danger must fulfil the Alcock criteria. As they will (almost certainly) not have proximity of relationship with any victims, unlikely to succeed.

White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire (1999)

Question 22

Case from which ruling in White was founded (re Rescuers)

Answer 22

Chadwick v British Railways Board (1967)

Question 23

General rule on unwilling participants (and case)

Answer 23

Actionable if a person has been put in the position of being, has been, or will be, the involuntary cause of another’s death or injury

Dooley v Cammell Laird & Co Ltd (1951)

Question 24

Restriction to the unwilling participant rule in Dooley, and case

Answer 24

Claimant must show reasonable belief of putting another in danger

Monk v PC Harrington Ltd (2008)