Tort - Negligence (Psychiatric Harm) Flashcards
(24 cards)
Claim for distress not actionable
Hicks v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (1992)
What nature of pure psychiatric harm is actionable?
Medically recognised psychiatric illness
E.g. PTSD, depression
What nature of pure psychiatric harm is NOT actionable?
Anything NOT a medically recognised psychiatric illness
E.g. Anxiety, grief or distress
Pure psychiatric harm is actionable if emanating from a shock
Dulieu v White & sons (1901)
Claimant for damages for pure psychiatric harm must initially show to be suffering from a positive psychiatric illness
McLoughlin v O’Brian (1983)
Reason for ‘shock’ requirement in secondary victim claims for pure psychiatric harm
Control device to prevent floodgate of claims from those too remote from the incident
Test of foreseeability for pure psychiatric harm claims (1)
A person of ordinary fortitude would suffer psychiatric harm in the circumstances
(Exception to egg shell skull rule)
Test of foreseeability for pure psychiatric harm claims (2)
Psychiatric injury must be foreseeable (at least in secondary victim cases)
King v Phillips (1953)
Test of foreseeability for pure psychiatric harm claims (3)
Specific Foreseeability (in hindsight, not what a reasonable person would have foreseen at the time)
Pure psychiatric harm test for primary victim
Claim for pure psychiatric harm will succeed if they are a primary victim and physical harm is reasonably foreseeable (not an exception to eggshell skull)
Page v Smith (1996)
Claims for pure psychiatric harm restricted to events which have happened, not events which might happen
Rothwell v Chemical and Insulating Co Ltd (2007)
Two categories of victims in pure psychiatric harm
Primary and secondary
What is a primary victim for pure psychiatric claims?
Primary victims are those in the zone of danger
What are secondary victims for pure psychiatric harm claims?
Secondary victims are those who witness an incident but are not themselves in the zone of danger
Case demonstrating ordinary fortitude control mechanism for pure psychiatric harm
Bourhill v Young (1943)
Further control mechanisms for pure psychiatric harm, secondary victims (and case)
- Proximity of relationship
- Proximity in time and space
- Shock requirement
McLoughlin v O’Brian (1983)
Relationship with the victim (Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (1992))
Relationship demonstrates ties of close love and affection (no exhaustive list)
Case demonstrating court’s changing generosity re proximity in time and space (moving on from McLoughlin and Alcock)
Galli-Atkinson v Seghal (2003)
Case which conflicts with Galli-Atkinson, despite satisfying all control mechanism criteria (pure psychiatric harm, secondary victims)
Ward v Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust (2004)
Rule for Rescuers in danger zone (and case)
Rescuers at risk of physical harm in the zone of danger can rely on Page v Smith and claim under the normal Caparo test
White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (1999)
Rule for Rescuers not in danger zone (and case)
Rescuers not at risk of physical danger must fulfil the Alcock criteria. As they will (almost certainly) not have proximity of relationship with any victims, unlikely to succeed.
White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire (1999)
Case from which ruling in White was founded (re Rescuers)
Chadwick v British Railways Board (1967)
General rule on unwilling participants (and case)
Actionable if a person has been put in the position of being, has been, or will be, the involuntary cause of another’s death or injury
Dooley v Cammell Laird & Co Ltd (1951)
Restriction to the unwilling participant rule in Dooley, and case
Claimant must show reasonable belief of putting another in danger
Monk v PC Harrington Ltd (2008)
