TURNING POINTS Flashcards
(27 cards)
1
Q
what were the major probs for Japan by 1942
A
- needed to beat B & US, maintain supply lines & rule conquered territories of 140+ M ppl (+300k POWs)
- lack of internal military coop - most army dedicated to China
- no plan to consolidate gains made - seized opportunities
2
Q
strategy of Coral Sea
A
- Yam reasoned US carrier would be prob - wasnt destroyed @ PH
- planned to move against Hawaiian islands but CS came first
- PUSPOE: isolate Aus from US who was supplying them w troops & materials
- opted for seaborne invasion as only means to cross from northern coastal area to Port Moresby was via Formidable Stanley Mtn range by Kokoda trail
3
Q
main consequences as turning point for Coral Sea
A
- Jap advance southwards halted = morale boost for US
- J failed to take Port Moresby = aircraft cant attack Aus ports & airfields from there
- Comms between Aus & Pacific theatres of war maintained
- impact on naval/aerial balance of power
- opened up opportunites for island hopping
- entire face of naval warfare changed - carrier forces considered true offensive weapons. attack would now center on carriers
4
Q
losses from Coral Sea
A
JAP:
- 77 aircraft, 1074 killed, 1 light carrier
US
- 66 aircraft, 543 killed, 1 fleet carrier,
5
Q
what were key errors by Jap from Coral Sea
A
- Japs didnt secure seed crop of experienced pilots to provide for training/equpping future fliers VS US realised danger of depleting their experienced aviator stockpile
- Yamamoto didnt have key carrier ready for Midway unlike US (Nimitz hastened Yorktown repair to 72hrs instead of 92 days & sent to midway)
- faulty intellgience
6
Q
some reasons why Japan lost Coral Sea & US won
A
JAPAN
- failure of naval intelligence - underestimated the strength of the forces available to the US = did not assign to the invasion the full strength available
- tactical errors -wasted valuable searching hours attacking unimportant target (tanker)
US
- advantage of knowing plan - intercept & decoding
- Had radar to detect incoming enemy aircraft
7
Q
Yamamoto Strategy for midway
A
- mirror success of PH - suprise attack
- Set up diversionary force under Vice Adm Hoshiro - attack Dutch Harbour in Aleutians by air before assault onMidway + small force of midget subs penetrate Port Darwin anticipating this will divert US fleet = attact attetion away from Midway Attoll
8
Q
3 phase plan midway
A
- Jap first carrier striking force attack midway by air - Vice Nagumo (built around first line carriers Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu)
- Bring in Midway invasion force (Vice Adm Kondo) - land 5k soldiers on island
- Yam expect US reinforcements = Nagumo force attack them along w Yam own feet of battleships, carriers & destroyers
aim = shock & overwhelm
9
Q
Nimitz plan midway
A
- aware of jap strength - knew they intended to destroy remaining naval strength = determined to strike jap carriers b4 midway invaded
- by march 1942 Commander Rochefort & team decipher JN-25 fleet code - able to make counter-plan
PLAN: - fight battle mainly in air - keeping carriers out of striking distance
- 3 carriers: USS Yorktown, Enterprise, Hornet
10
Q
rundown of battle of midway
A
- attack on aleutian islands June 3 - US B-17 Flying Fortress bombers attack Kondo invasion force
- second attack - both fail
- Nagumo launches 1st phase of plan - send 108 Jap warplanes = inflicts damage to US base
- 2nd wave of US carrier-launched bombers hit Akagi, Kaga, Soryu
- US dive-bombers from all carriers return to attack Hiryu
June 6: Yam orders ships to retreat
11
Q
main takeaways from BOM
A
- Jap now on permanent defensive stance
- turned tide deciseivly in favour of allies
- crushed J hopes of neutralising the US as naval power
- Jap expansionist phase ended & allies could begin to plan for advance towards home islands
12
Q
summary of losses midway
A
JAPAN
- 4 carriers, heavy cruiser, almost 300 aircraft, 200+ pilots, 3k+ men
US:
- aircraft carrier Yorktown, destoyer Hammann, 145 aircraft, 350+ men
13
Q
main failures of Japan midway
A
- crack-man policy = didnt ensure an increased flow of new pilots for a protracted conflict
- failed to ancipate US would penetrate fleet code
- failure to search properly for US fleet w sig no of planes at outset
- victory disease
- dispersion of Jap forces instead of concentration like US
- poor location of Yam command centre
14
Q
Fuchida says the crack-man policy was
A
“the foremost single & immediate cause of defeat”
15
Q
what does nimitz say ab midway
A
“Essentially a victroy of intelligence’
16
Q
Fuchida says victory disease resulted in
A
“an arrogant underestimation of the enemy”
17
Q
Combined Fleet chose to scatter its forces, reducing them thereby to..
A
“comparative feebleness”
18
Q
jap navy tradition - commander’s place at the front in warfare. what does fuchida say
A
“outward notion has no place in modern warfare”
19
Q
Guadalcanal objectives
A
- US intelligence found Jap building airstrip @ Lunga Pt - north of G
- J forces arrived in June to begin construction = prompt US to invade
- Jap presense in islands was threat to US-Au comms
- Allied control of G would make possible attack on Jap base @ Rabaul
20
Q
summary of Guad battle
A
- US troops quickly capture small islands of Tulagi & florida of G, captured airfield (renamed Henderson)
- jap resistence - assisted in success @ battle of Savo island
- Nov: US destroy 10/11 transport ships bringing in troops
- jap attack mid-Nov w over 10k troops halted - forced back & never recovered
- US claim control 9 Feb 1943
21
Q
losses @ guad
A
JAPS
- up to 30k troops (75% bc of disease + starvation)
- 38 naval vessels, hundreds aircraft
US
- 1.6k men, 4.2k wounded
- 29 naval vessels, 600+ aircraft
despite heavy losses they were able to replace them unlike J
22
Q
consequences of Guad as turning pnt
A
- as much as turning point as midway
- J lost multitude of pilots & aircraft
- US marines now surmounted first obstacle in reconquest of Solomons chain
- validated japs on defensive = morale boost
strategic importance: - shipping lanes between US-Au remained open
- made possible attack on Rabaul
- attrition warfare weakaned japs
- US could more easily attack J positions to north
23
Q
what was J aim for New Guinea
A
- gain control of Port Moresby = give them ability to dominate coral sea, northern coast of Aus & prevent comms
24
Q
Macarthur plan for NG
A
convinced Curtin & Gen Blamey to abandon Bris Line, instead:
- defense of Aus should be in NG where US & au troops would be stationed
- MC command aus units
25
what was the difficulty @ NG
jungles extremely dense & impenetrable, Kokoda trail hardly passable
26
key failures of japan @ NG
- attempt Kokoda & proceed to Port Moresby w/o aid of navy
- Aus built airfields around PM & supplied w aircraft to cut J supply lines & interdict advance = crucial as J proceeded w/p standard air cover
- nonexistence of an equiv to Army Corps of Engineers ensured all construction projects would be slow, inefficient & poor quality
27
consequences of NG as turning point
- solidified US position
- by ending J control of NG, J attempts to extend its defence perimeter in SWP was ended
- saved aus-US comms
- ended any possibility of Au invasion
- helped promote Gen Mac push thru SWP, island hopping & return to Phil
