UK Government: The PM & his Cabinet Flashcards
(98 cards)
1
Q
Primus inter pares
A
Latin term for first among equals, implying the PM is the most important member of the cabinet yet they govern in a collective manner.
2
Q
1992 Ministerial code
A
Formally sets out the duties & expectations of the PM & govt ministers.
Until then, having a PM was merely a convention.
3
Q
How is the PM chosen?
A
PM is the leader of the elected party, but technically through convention, the monarch invites the leader to form a government & summons them.
4
Q
How was May chosen?
A
In 2017, she had a minority government, she was offered a confidence & supply deal with the DUP where they supported her in parliament.
5
Q
What are the different ways PMs leave office?
A
-losing an election.
E.g. Callaghan
-retire due to health concerns.
E.g. Wilson 1976
-may feel they lack direct personal mandate.
E.g. May & Johnson
-vote of no confidence.
6
Q
Core executive
A
Includes PM & cabinet as well as senior civil servants, cabinet committees & the cabinet office.
Each component has own resources & levers of power.
Civil service is politically neutral & senior figures remain in post when govt changes.
7
Q
Key roles of the Executive
A
-making policy
-passing legislation
-financing
-being the national first responder
8
Q
Making policy
A
Set up political priorities & decide upon policy at cabinet meetings, committees.
The administrative party (civil service) has job to implement the policies & run the state.
9
Q
Passing legislation
A
Although parliament must pass all days, major acts are discussed & approved at cabinet level then sent to pmt for debate & decisions.
Relatively straightforward- majority in Commons. (counter: Brexit).
10
Q
Financing
A
-Key role of executive & the chancellor and the treasury to make decisions on taxation & govt spending.
-These decisions are normally announced in annual budget.
-Cabinet is where arbitration takes place overseen by PM.
11
Q
Being the national first responder
A
-In times of national emergency (war,corona,terrorists etc), the executive must quickly put out emergency measures to deal with the threat & reassure public.
-Often requires comms & co-op between departments & ministers.
12
Q
The main powers of the Executive
A
-appointment/dismissal of ministers.
-deployment of UK armed forces overseas.
-relations with international powers.
-organisation & structure of civil service.
-issuing statements during emergencies.
-controlling parliamentary timetable, policies must be lawful to avoid arbitrary govt (dictatorship).
13
Q
How are the prerogative powers of the executive significant?
A
-UK govt do not need to seek parliamentary approval to deploy armed forces overseas.
-PMs can select who joins & leaves govt & can select ministers who lack democratic mandate.
-Executive can deliver broadcasts & speeches during national crisis’.
E.g. estimated that 27mil watched BJ’s message about national lockdown.
-Executive plays crucial role in negotiating treaties & agreements with other nations in areas of trade & defence. (without parliamentary approval).
14
Q
How are the prerogative powers of the executive less significant?
A
-By convention, military action overseas is out before vote in HOC.
E.g. Air strikes in Iraq & Syria.
-PMs are restricted in their selection for ministers as the cabinet should be diverse & include people of the other parties.
E.g. May included remainders & brexiters.
-Brexit shows how limited prerogative powers are.
E.g. Supreme Court forced PM to submit any Brexit deal before pmt.
15
Q
Royal prerogative
A
Powers formerly held by the Monarch or by Government ministers that may be used without the consent of the Commons or Lords.
16
Q
Ministers vs Civil servants
A
Ministers:
-elected
-party members
-temporary
-run departments
-make policy
Civil servants:
-appointed
-neutral
-permanent
-work in departments
-advise on policies
17
Q
Sulsbury Convention
A
Lords cannot veto anything on the manifesto.
18
Q
PMs roles
A
-tough decisions with regard to ministerial colleagues & policy decisions.
-persuasion of cabinet colleagues.
-learning on the job.
19
Q
Is the UK becoming more presidential? - The cabinet’s role
A
-critics argue that the original model of the cabinet govt ceases to exist.
e.g. Blair’s former cabinet colleague, Mowlam in documentary (cabinet confidential) states “cabinet itself is dead, it doesn’t have a function to play.”
-Blair’s govt accused of preferring sofa government. or informal chats with 2/3 ministers, to full length discussions.
-Thatchers style was criticised for being intolerant & her cabinet was called “wets” (dissenters) & “dries” (supporters).
20
Q
Is the UK becoming more presidential? - Spatial government (coalition)
A
-some felt real power was concentrated on 4 leading figures.
-known as The Quad. (Cameron, Clegg, Osborne & Alexander).
-concept of spatial leadership where there’s distance between PM & their govt and party.
-PM relies on smaller inner circle of advisers. Known as inner cabinet.
21
Q
Is the UK becoming more presidential? - SpAds / special advisers
A
-first appointed by Wilson.
-policy advisors who wield too much power over the PM at expense of fellow ministers.
-Campbell in Blair’s govt was interviewed and said “we don’t do God”.
-Johnson had 108 spAds compared to 99 of May e.g. Cummins, Sir Eddie Lister as chief strategic advisor who worked previously with Johnson as London mayor.
-many spAds are long time political associates of PM.
-Claire Short under Blair’s government said “centralisation of power into the hands of the PM & increasingly small number of advisors who make decisions privately without discussion.”
-Cummings role in 2020 confirmed this, as he travelled to Durham during height of covid lockdown & was irresponsible & therefore criticised for being too powerful.
22
Q
Is the UK not becoming more presidential? - minority government
A
-PMs with minority govt are not that powerful.
-May suffered 2 crushing defeats over her proposed Brexit deals.
-she had extremely divided cabinet.
-2 of her cabinet ministers resigned (whom agreed to the deal); David David & Boris Johnson.
-they compared her deal to ‘polishing a turd’.
-May’s deal was rejected & she was forced out of office.
-lacked majority in office & signed confidence & supply desk with DUP to get legislation through.
23
Q
Is the UK not becoming more presidential? - Thatcher & Blair
A
-even large majority governments can be imperilled.
-both forced out of office due to criticism & divides within party.
-Thatcher for poll tax.
-Blair for Iraq war.
-backbenchers loyalty is not guaranteed & conditional.
-all PMs have to work with rivals (Blair & Brown).
24
Q
Is the UK not becoming more presidential?
A
25
How far has the role of the PM changed in recent times? Greatly
-lots of PMs (Thatcher & Blair) accused of presidential leadership because they bypassed cabinet meetings & preferred smaller gatherings with advisors.
-growth in use of spAds for policy advice.
-development of social media & celeb culture results in growing focus on personality of the individuals rather than wider cabinet. (2010 televised leaders debates as part of electoral campaigns).
-increased media scrutiny.
26
How far has the role of the PM changed in recent times? Barely
-no formal changes as they possess the same prerogative powers. If anything those are reduced (calling election easily).
-predominant premierships should be assessed alongside Major’s, Cameron’s coalition etc.
-influence of spAds is exaggerated. Ministers advice shouldn’t be overlooked e.g. when deciding governments response to covid, powerful advice came from medical experts like chief medical officer Whitty.
-image aware PMs want to present themselves as collaborative. E.g. BOJO appeared at media briefings with scientific adviser Vallance during covid pandemic.
27
How policy is made
-manifesto pledges.
-personal convictions of PM.
-outcome of referendums.
-results of deals (coalitions).
-responses to national crises.
-public and media pressure.
-changing social and cultural attitudes.
28
Case study: Fulfilling manifesto pledge - extending free childcare
-2017 manifesto, conservatives promised to offer working parents of 3&4 year olds 30 hours of free childcare a week instead of 15.
-Primarily designed to increase the number of parents in work land therefore contributing to the nations economy.
-also said some young people will be taught basic skills by nurseries.
-only those earning less than £100,000 would be eligible.
29
Case study: The personal conviction of the PM - privatisation & sale of council houses
-1979 thatcher came to power with clear ideas & principles.
-her clear belief in benefits of property owning democracy & desire to shrink the state.
-‘Right to buy’ scheme
30
Case study: The outcome of a referendum: Brexit
-Cameron promised in 2015 to hold a Brexit referendum which he regretted & resigned when the outcome was to leave.
-2016 with a 52%-48% victory.
-many MPs didn’t want the referendum.
-May was a Remainer but still attempyef to uphold referendum result.
-her policy making was about democratic duty.
-resigned in June 2019 & Bojo took her place.
-he used “Get Brexit done” manifesto.
31
Case study: The results of deals with minority/other coalition parties: 2011 AV referendum
-2010 election produced a hung parliament.
-coalition comprised manifesto promises.
-Lib Dems wanted electoral reform & a more proportional voting system (AV).
-defeated by 67.9% to 32.1% on a low turnout of 42%.
32
Case study: Responses to national crises & emergency situations: The coronavirus pandemic
-in early 2020, it was clear the pandemic began & governments faced many issues requiring swift responses.
-the global financial meltdown of 2008-9 in Browns govt, the 7/7 bombings in London tested him.
-May’s govt confronted with several IS attacks including Manchester Arena suicide bombing in 2017.
-in early stages of pandemic, Johnson’s govt advised against overseas travel & facilities remained open.
-construction of several hospitals (Nightingale hospital) in the ExCel conference centre in london.
-many sections of the economy were shut down (pubs, restaurants, gyms etc).
-emergency legislation (the Coronavirus Act 2020) was introduced for penalties for social gatherings & non essential travel.
-uncertainty whether it was permitted to drive in isolated areas & go for walks.
-chancellor, Sunak, introduced a promise that govt would cover up yo 80% of wages for most employees unable to work.
33
Case study: Mounting pressure from the public & the media: Climate change policy
-campaign for drastic action dealing with climate change & carbon emissions.
-pressure groups (Extinction rebellion) use direct action to direct attention to the issues.
-high profile individuals such as Thunberg (environmentalist) attract followings & she used strategy of global climate strikes by school students.
-2019, govt pledged to cut greenhouse gas emissions to almost 0 by 2050.
-May said it was a moral duty to leave this world in a better condition than what we inherited.
-climate change committee & public has effect.
34
Case study: Changing social & cultural attitudes: the 1960s & liberalisation of public attitudes
-time of rapid social change, liberalisation of attitudes towards sex,marriage & women’s rights.
-parties try to be ‘in touch’ with the people but not so much that they lose votes among traditional & conservative voters.
-Wilson’s Labour govt 1964-70, changes in social outlook were often reflect in legal changes.
E.g. legalised abortion up to 24 weeks of pregnancy, ending death penalty, decriminalising male homosexuality, Divorce reform act 1969 etc.
-policies can reflect changes in social & cultural attitudes.
35
The power of the PM & his cabinet to dictate events & determine policy-making
Some cases demonstrate how they can dictate this:
-the introduction of poll tax (1990 by Thatcher).
-the invasion of Iraq (2003 by Blair).
-decision to all an early election (2017 by May).
36
The introduction of Poll tax 1990
-domestic funds was a property based tax that helped fund local councils.
-paid by councils (Labour run)
-Conservatives had a long desire to reform the system of domestic rates & included this in their 1987 manifesto.
-proposed to replace the rates with a flat-rate tax payable by nearly all adults (the community charge).
-replacing the previous system based on property value with a fixed tax per person.
37
Outcome of Poll tax 1990
Thatchers biggest political misjudgement:
-major roots in London usually ending in violence (100 injuries & 400 arrests).
-anti poll tax rally’s & campaigns.
-inter party opposition in Thatchers govt with her former cabinet minister Heseltine.
-Thatcher failed to win sufficient votes in the 1st ballot & was persuaded to step down rather than possibly ca s defeat in 2nd.
-Tory opinion poll numbers were slipping.
-the next leader, Major replaced the poll tax with council tax which was a property based tax.
38
What the Poll tax 1990 meant for the Conservatives
-Thatcher was to blame for its unpopularity & demonstrates how PM personally decides policy.
-highlighted her inability to listen to others, Howell (a loyal backbencher) raised issue of an elderly couple who wrote to the PM “you’ve taken advantage of your position..now virtually a dictator riding roughshod on anyone who opposes you.”
-Thatchers advisor said a meeting would be a waste of time.
-Shows the power PMs can have on pushing policies & the dangers of rejecting advice of political allies.
-Conservatives went onto lose the next election in 1992.
39
The decision to invade Iraq in 2003
-sometimes involving military can be successful (Thatcher & Falklands war).
-US president George W. Bush asked him to commit troops to a US-led invasion of Iraq, to which Blair obliged.
-he justified UK’s involvement on moral grounds of removal of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).
-UK could’ve easily said no like France & Germany & many other EU/NATO states.
-Iraq’s dictator, Hussein was removed.
-Iraq went into bloody civil war & the region was destabilised & foundation for militant groups (IS).
-180 British lives were lost & thousands of Iraqi lives and NO WMDs found.
-allegations of human rights abuse acts committed by British soldiers on Iraqi civilians & prisoners.
40
Outcome of Invasion of Iraq 2003
-large scale anti war protests.
-public distrust in Blair.
-no pressure from cabinet or party to invade, no sense that national security was threatened imminently by Iraq.
-Blair just wanted to cement his relationship with Bush.
-2004 report by Lord Butler & 2016 Chilcot report were highly critical of these actions - ministers were denied access to key papers.
-Blair’s preference for “sofa govt” meant little collective discussion & he disregarded security warnings & criticisms.
-he had no political cover especially when the non existence of WMDs emerged.
-resignation of Cook & Short (key high profile cabinet ministers) weakened Blair’s position.
-Dr Kelly’s suicide increased scrutiny of the Iraq war policy.
-led to reluctance in military ventures (Syria air strikes).
41
The decision to call an early election 2017
-hard to distinguish if the early election was a political strategy or policy.
-traditional prerogative powers.
-under FPTA 2011, another general election wasn’t due till 2020.
-on BBC’s Andrew Marr show, May said “I won’t be calling a snap election.”
-challenged Corbyn to “come out & fight” on 18/4/17.
-Labours support was needed to ensure 2/3rds majority in Commons for election, went through & took place on 8th June.
42
Outcome of 2017 election
-May wanted personal endorsement from voters & might’ve been influenced by Brown who talked of calling an early election to secure a personal mandate. (he delayed it till 2010 & lost).
-she thought she needed mandate to push through Britain’s exit from EU & wanted an increased majority to resist Tory Remainers threat.
-opinion polls indicated 20% lead for Conservatives but Corbyn was regarded too left-wing & easily defeat-able.
-Conservatives lost 8 seats of a HOC majority & overall lost 13 seats.
-manifesto flopped ‘dementia tax’ funding care for old people & undermined her portrayal of strong leadership.
-weak campaigner.
-The Guardian found she spent more than half the campaign in Labour held seats & just 1/5th in Tory marginals (overconfidence).
-relied too much on inner advisors.
43
Similarities of the 3 cases
-involved direct decisions by PM.
-each case appeared rational & logical at the outset.
-represented a gamble, none had to be taken (though Conservatives promised to reform domestic rates).
-PM failed to consult widely & heed closely the voices of caution within the party.
-each decision ended in failure & contributed significantly to resignations.
44
Differences of the 3 cases
-the Poll tax was a more ‘conviction’ policy & 2017 election was more determined by political considerations & Iraq was from pressure of allies.
-Poll tax was at the end of Thatchers premiership, 2017 election was early on & Iraq war was midway.
-2017 election was a test of PM’s abilities.
-the Iraq war didn’t end Blair’s premiership & he won the 2005 election but his majority fell.
45
The powers & resources of the PM: Institutional powers
Institutional powers:
-cabinet reshuffles & appointing ministers.
-chairing meetings weekly with cabinet.
-dictating policy priorities.
-the Cabinet Office.
-commanding Commons.
-issuing honours (ie. life peerages).
46
The powers & resources of the PM: Personal & political powers
-momentum & poltical capital that comes from leading party to victory leads to effective persuasion.
-effective management of colleagues in cabinet & backbenches.
-personal qualities as an effective communicator & national leader.
-ability to unite party.
-skill in managing the economy & handling unexpected challenges.
47
The powers & resources of the PM: Dependant on…
-opinion poll ratings, results of recent elections (council & by elections).
-personalities in cabinet & party at the time.
-potential leadership challenges.
-strength & threat posed by main oppostion.
48
Patronage powers & the cabinet: Cabinet reshuffles
-PMs can appoint & dismiss ministers w/o requiring approval of others.
-May removed 15 ministers including key figures (Osborne & former education secretary).
-Johnson took over & dismissed 11 senior ministers & 6 declined to serve.
(Patel at Home office & Javid as chancellor).
-Conservative MP (Evans) described Johnson’s changes as “not so much a reshuffle as a summers day massacre.”
-The Sun dubbed it as “Night of the Blond Knives” in reference to Macmillans govt where he dismissed 1/3rd of the cabinet and it was known as the “Night of the Long Knives.”
49
Patronage powers & the cabinet: Limitation of needing balance
-PMs must be careful to maintain a balance in the cabinet.
-refers to diversity of gender, ethnicity & policy positions.
E.g. May had to include Leave & Remain supporters in cabinet.
-Blair has to include a ‘big political beast’ of Brown in his cabinet & Prescott whose style & background complemented his leader (he worked as a steward & waiter in Navy & linked to Labours w/c when Blair who was public school educated couldn’t.
50
Patronage powers & the cabinet: Limitation of sacking members
-must be careful who & how many they sack.
-an ex minister can result in damaging consequences.
E.g. Thatchers demotion if Geoffrey Howe 1989 triggered a leadership challenge from another ex-cabinet minister, Heseltine, which led to her downfall.
-resignation speeches can damage a PM’s credibility, Howe “it’s rather like sending your opening batsmen to the crease, only to find that their bats have been broken before by the team captain.”
-he served in the cabinet for 10 years prior.
-too many reshuffles make a leader appear weak/difficult to work with.
51
Patronage powers & the cabinet: coalition
-brings constraints on prime ministerial powers of appt.
-Cameron ceded patronage power of 5 cabinet-ranking posts to the Lib Dem’s.
-these appts made solely by their leader, Nick Clegg.
52
Authority over the cabinet
-all PMs exercise formal control over the cabinet & they dictate when & where it meets.
-usually in cabinet room of no.10 & Tuesdays, Thursdays or Fridays.
-Sunderland Jan 2020 was held in recognition of that city being the first to declare a ‘Leave’ result in the EU referendum.
-decide agenda & formal chair proceedings.
-Cabinet manual declares it ‘the ultimate arbiter of govt policy’.
-collective responsibility.
-private secret meetings & official records not publicised until 30 years later.
53
Authority over the cabinet - Examples
Agreement in the cabinet is never automatic & depends on personalities, issues & wider political context:
-Blair wasn’t able to persuade his chancellor, Brown, to support the UK adopting the euro currency.
-May’s carefully constructed ‘Chequers deal’ over Brexit quickly unravelled.
-wise PMs use cabinet as a sounding boards & to ratify decisions made elsewhere (committees).
-ministers may leak details of discussions if their identity will not be revealed.
-Johnson issued a new edition of the Ministerial Code stating “there must be…no leaking”.
54
Arranging & sometimes chairing cabinet committees
Examples of committees organised:
-EU exit strategy
-Economic Operations
-National security council
-Climate change
-Parliamentary business & legislation
55
Arranging & chairing cabinet committeez
56
Dictating policy priorities
-many modem PMs have been able to exert influence on principles.
-especially those with strong majorities (Thatcher & Blair) & those elected on a clear platform such as “Get Brexit done.”
-Thatcher got a major programme of privatisation & reduced power of trade unions.
-Blair modernised constitution & put forward NEW Labour.
-can be bound by manifesto pledges & constrained by unfolding developments (an economic recession) can derail plans to boost public spending or lower taxes.
-foreign affairs require cooperation of political player outside the UK.
E.g. Brexit
57
The cabinet office
-created in 1916 to provide support for cabinet system.
-around 2050 civil servants.
-it’s role is to ‘support the PM & ensure effective running of govt’.
-headquarters for central govt & provides lead in areas, administrative support (circulating key papers), coordinates work between departments.
-head of civil service attends cabinet meetings weekly.
E.g. During Coronavirus, the cabinet office set up the Rapid Response Unit to deal with misinformation about the pandemic using social media to block false narratives.
58
Party leader
-usually guarantees PM’s policies get through parliament.
-leader is elected by MPs & party members = legitimacy to their authority.
-party loyalty is conditional & not guaranteed.
E.g. Thatcher forced out by own MPs.
E.g. 1995, Major called a leadership contest ‘back me or sack me’ tactic in an attempt to neutralise growing critics on backbenches. He won the leadership race but over 1/4 of his MPs backed his opponent, Redwood.
E.g. Blair, Brown & May. May in 2018, survived as leader when Tory MPs rejected a no confidence motion in her leadership by 200 votes to 117.
59
Dispensing honours
-PMs can award life peerages to MPs or supporters.
-used as a means of altering the balance of HOC for party advantages.
E.g. Blair & Brown made a total of 173 Labour peers & only allowed 66 Conservative nominations through.
E.g. Cameron & May, 136 Conservative life peers but only 59 Labour.
60
Dispensing honours - Independent Appointments committee
-an Independent Appointments Committee makes recs for non party political peerages & uses ‘propriety’:
1. individual should have good standing in community.
2. the past conduct wouldn’t be reasonably regarded as bringing HOC into disrepute.
61
Dispensing honours - Cameron & Johnson
-Cameron’s resignation honours sparked a headline in the Independent: “Cameron Honours list would embarrass a medieval court.”
-rewarded no fewer than 46 of his former aides, advisers & ministers with honours.
-included his former chancellor Osborne who was given the Companion of Honour & Llewellyn a peerage.
-rewarded Cook who was a generous donor a knighthood for political service.
-Johnson awarded a peerage go his own brother Jo Johnson.
This system can lead to accusations of cronyism & ‘cash for honours’.
62
Personal & political powers
-far harder to quantify & assess compared to institutional powers.
-**political capital** is important - the truest & readiness to follow a leader due to previous achievements.
-opponents fall silent when PM is winning election & flying high in polls.
-enhanced when PMs get it right with high risk police & jeopardised through miscalculations.
63
Personal & political powers - Thatcher
-1982, she showed poltical charge to undertake military operation to retake Falkland Islands when they were invaded & occupied by Argentina.
-10 week war & Thatcher won leading to her landslide election victory in 1983.
-advisers urged caution & negotiation but her risk paid off.
64
Personal & political powers - Cameron
-2014, he agreed to a Scottish independence vote.
-took a gamble but was arguably forced by SNP as they pushed for it.
-by actively campaigning for Scotland to stay in the UK, he was putting his authority on the line.
-Scotland voted to remain & he gained more authority.
65
Personal & political powers - Blair
-called & won early elections in 2001 & 2005 with reduced majorities both times.
-cemented authority in party but didn’t stop criticism for his controversial policies (Iraq war & tuition fees).
66
What does enhanced political capital allow?
-enables PMs to shift balance of power & policy positions within cabinet over time.
-promotes loyalists & marginalising more critical voices.
-must avoid ‘echo chamber’ & should stay in touch with the rest of the party.
67
The power & resources of the cabinet
-fewer resources than PM & position is in hands of PM.
-too much dissent = demotions/sidelines in reshuffles.
-certain departments are more valued than others.
-Northern Ireland or agriculture seem as places of political banishment.
-Press coverage after reshuffles refers to ‘winners’ & ‘losers’ referring to individual ministers.
68
How can ministers exercise power & check the PM?
-fair degree of autonomy over policy details as some are really complex (introduction of Universal Credit).
-links to media & pressure groups. (2019, defence secretary Williamson sacked for allegedly leaking details from a National Security council meeting over security threats posed by allowing Chinese tech giant Huawei a role in constructing Britain’s 5G network) he was critical of plan.
-powerful ministers can refuse to be reshuffled, (2018, May had to enhance Hunt’s role for him to change his post as health secretary).
-cabinet meetings hold real debate & discussion.
-large number of ministerial resignations implies a weak & divided govt.
69
Does cabinet govt still exist? Yes
-cabinet remains key forum for high level policy decisions.
-can still influence policy & important for PM to find out minsters opinions to promote a coordinated approach to policies.
-senior & influential ministers are had to remove or sack (Brown under Blair & Hunt under May).
-too many cabinet resignations may be a sign of weakness & former ministers may be internal opposition to PM.
-govt departments contain own senior civil servants who provide ministers with policy support & expertise & also have own political advisers.
70
Does cabinet govt still exist? No
-many decisions made at cabinet committee level or bilateral meetings.
-many meetings are brief (less than 30 mins), used to resolve arbitrate disputes.
-ministers appointed by the PM must do their bidding & can be removed if they resist.
-PMs can appear strong & decisive by removing opponents & can mould a ‘cabinet of compliance’.
-the Cabinet Office & special advisers plays role in providing research & policy advice across departments & can bypass formal cabinet structure.
71
The difference between Individual & Collective ministerial responsibility
-govt ministers must share the same degree of responsibility (collective).
**Individual responsibility**: requirement that all ministers are responsible for own actions while in public office. When they fall short, they should resign.
**Ministerial responsibility**: the convention that ministers must explain & justify actions before parliament & committees.
72
The importance of Collective responsibility
-“heart of cabinet govt”.
-speak with one voice & present united front.
-requires all ministers to publicly support govt policies.
-ensures govt doesn’t appear divided.
-doesn’t prevent debates during meetings, “what happens in cabinet stays in cabinet.”
-those who cant accept burden of CR should resign.
73
The suspension of Collective responsibility
-Callaghan (1977) “I certainly think that the doctrine should apply, except in cases where I announce it does not.
-Cabinet manual “bound by convention of CR.”
74
The suspension of Collective responsibility - When it was suspended?
-during referendums in 1975 & 2016 over Britain’s continued membership of the EU.
-2016, over governments plans to build a 3rd runway in Heathrow.
-2011 AV referendum.
-agree to disagree time where principle was temporarily suspended.
75
The suspension of Collective responsibility - Johnson to May
-Johnson wrote articles & gave newspaper interviews where he set out positions undermining govt policy.
-The Independent reported how he told stories that gloomy economic forecasts are ‘mumbo jumbo’ & the NI border was blown out of proportion as fears over disruption to supplies of food & medicine were unwarranted.
May didn’t discipline him & thought he’d be more troublesome on backbenches.
76
The suspension of Collective responsibility - Truss to May
-2018, treasury minister, Truss, criticised her ‘male macho’ cabinet colleagues in a speech at London school of economics.
-suggested that ‘woodburning goves’ were telling people how to live their lives.
-fellow minister Gove criticised those for environmental impact.
77
Ministerial resignations
-accepting blame for error or injustice.
-unwillingness to accept collective responsibility.
-inability to deliver policy promise in own department.
-personal misconduct.
-political pressure.
Nearly never fall because of policy failure. This is because collectively the cabinet decides on this & if it fails the blame is shared.
Callaghan resigning as chancellor in 1967 over the devaluation of sterling is a rare example. He was shuffled to take the post of Home Secretary.
78
Ministerial resignations - Accepting the blame for an error or injustice within their department
-usually blame civil servants or heads of executive agencies for operational failures.
E.g. ministers esocapes with jobs. Intact after critical reports found departmental mistakes over the sale of arms to Iraq (1996).
79
Accepting the blame for an error or injustice within their department - Down affair & Dugdale (1954)
-resigned as minister of agriculture when an inquiry criticised his department for mishandling purchase of re-letting of 725 acres of farmland in Crichel Down, Dorset
-was purchased in 1937 for use as an RAF bombing range airfield & promsie was made to sell the land back when no longer required.
-instead, it was taken on by the department of agriculture & re-let for a higher sum.
-Dugdale took blame on behalf of his whole department & resigned.
-report revealed that he was aware of officials actions but didn’t try to stop them.
80
Ministerial resignations - Accepting the blame for an error or injustice within their department - Perry
-resigned as rail minister in 2016.
-failure of her department dealing with problem of resolving issues & reliability & overcrowded parts of the network.
-resigned following week & admitted she was ‘ashamed to be the rail minister’.
-“if I thought it would help by falling on my sword, I would.
81
Ministerial resignations - Accepting the blame for an error or injustice within their department - Civil servants
-take personal blame for mistakes in their departments.
-2011, head of the UK border force, Clark, resigned after border controls were relaxed without ministerial authorisation.
-he had gone beyond an initial pilot chemo of fewer checks by suspending some passport checks.
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Unwillingness to accept collective responsibility over policy
-another reason for ministerial resignations.
-happens when minister disagrees strongly about a particular policy.
-uncommon since parties are elected on a shared platform of policies.
-often come through reactions to unforeseen events or reflect long simmering divides within a party.
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Unwillingness to accept collective responsibility over policy: Concerned with…
-2003, Cook & Short resigned over the Iraq war.
-2 Lib Dem junior ministers Crockart & Wilmott resigned in 2010 rather than support govt policy of increasing tuition fees to £9000 yearly.
-2016, Iain Duncan Smith (former Tory leader) resigned from Cameron’s govt, as work & pensions secretary attacking £4 billion of planned cuts to disability benefits as ‘indefensible’.
-more than 30 conservative ministers resigned over May’s Brexit deal (including Davis & Raab - 2 Brexit secretaries).
Ross in 2020 resigned in protest at the failure of PM’s chief adviser, Dominic Cummins’ to resign over apparent breaches of lockdown “constituents couldn’t say goodbye to loved ones…i cannot in good faith tell the THEH were all wrong & on senior advisor on govt was right.”
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Case study: Iain Duncan Smith (IDS)
-work & pensions secretary 2010-2016 & resigned due to cuts to welfare budget, in particular to disability benefits.
-he felt the cuts were unfair and would disproportionately affect the most vulnerable people in society.
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Case study: Robin Cook & the Iraq war
-former Labour foreign secretary (1997-2001).
-he urged Britain should work with its European partners, not the USA.
-despite this, Blair decided to join the USA.
-“I think it’s wrong to embark on military action without broad international support..”
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Ministerial resignations: Inability to deliver a policy promise in their own department
-may feel undermined by other Whitehall departments of change in govt policy that directly concerns their department.
-point of principle.
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Case study: Tracey Crouch & fixed-odds betting machines
-2018, resigned over delays to a crackdown on maximum stake for fixed odds betting machines.
-Hammond, chancellor, said cut in stakes from £100 to £2 would only come into force in Oct 2019.
-she said pushing back the date was unjustifiable & would cost lives of problem gamblers.
-clear sense that a previously agreed policy had been deliberately delayed without her agreement, leading to her feeling undermined.
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Ministerial resignations - Personal misconduct
-most frequent cause of resignation & covers a wide range of misdemeanours.
-‘letting the side down’ breaking 1 of the 7 principles in the Ministerial Code:
1. Selflessness: acting in best interest of the public.
2. Integrity: must avoid placing themselves under obligation to people that may inappropriately influence them, no corruption.
3. Objectivity: must act & fake decisions impartially without discrimination.
4. Accountability: submit selves to scrutiny & reply truthfully.
5. Openness: transparency & no info should be withheld unless it’s sensitive commercial info or national security.
6. Honesty: truthful with parliament & public.
7. Leadership: actively promote & support principles & challenge poor behaviour.
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Personal misconduct: Ministers breaking the code - Blunkett
-Blunkett forced to resign 2 times from Blair govts.
-2004, he was Home Secretary & he asked officials to fast track a visa application for a nanny employed by an ex lover, Kimberly Quinn for her son that he had fathered.
-2nd time in 2005, he had to quit as work & pensions secretary after he accepted postion as director at DNA bioscience without consulting Advisory Committee on Business Appointments.
-Alleged there was conflict of interest.
-broke Objectivity principle.
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Personal misconduct: Ministers breaking the code - Hunhe
-Lib Dem MP, 2012, was forced out for perverting course of justice over a speeding ticket.
-got his wife to take his speeding points to avoid driving ban.
-broke Honesty principle.
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Personal misconduct: Ministers breaking the code - Green
2017, first Secretary of State & minister for the Cabinet office, dismissed over him lying to colleagues about pornography found on his computer.
-accused of sending suggestive messages & touching knee of young, Conservative activist, Kate Maltby.
-broke the Honesty principle.
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Do ministers have to resign if they break the code? (Patel)
No.
-Nov 2020, Patel (home Secretary) broke code by bullying & swearing at senior civil servants in her department.
-allegations emerged in March after a former Home office permanent secretary described a “vicious & orchestrated campaign” against him for challenging alleged mistreatment of civil servants.
-inquiry launched but she only had to apologise & received a warning.
-Sir Alex Allan, Whitehalls independent adviser on ministerial standards, resigned in protest at the PM’s inaction.
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Case study: Priti Patel & unauthorised meetings
-forced to quit in Nov 2017, after Downing St summoned her to return from a trip to Uganda & Ethiopia.
-she failed to be honest with May about 14 unofficial meetings with Israeli ministers, business people when taking a private holiday to Israel.
-Ministerial code requires ministers to be honest about meetings.
-she said on The Guardian “Boris knew about the visit. The Foreign office didn’t.”
-didn’t go well with her boss.
-July 2019, appointed Home Secretary by Johnson.
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Ministerial resignations: Political pressure
-means over time, minister has become too embroiled in controversy & negative publicity.
-hard for PM to resists calls for the ministers resignation.
-overwhlemjng pressure.
-the advent of #MeToo saw allegations of sexual harassment being taken more seriously in 2020, than a decade earlier.
-likewise, 2009 expenses scandal.
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Case study: Andrew Mitchell & ‘Plebgate’
-2012, Mitchell, then chief whips attempted to cycle out of Downing St directly out of the main vehicle gates.
-he was told to dismount & wLk his bike through a pedestrian entrance & he argued with the officer “Best you learn your f***ing place, you don’t run this f***ing govt, you’re f***ing plebs.”
-denied the use of the word ‘pleb’ & unsuccessfully attempted to sue The Sun for libel.
-designed as he was a distraction for PM & his episode clouded administration.
-Cameron’s govt had an issue with its image of being public school Oxbridge ‘toffs’.
-a senior minister using socially derogatory terms while on his way to the elite Carlton Club sent out the wrong messages.
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Overall reasons behind Ministerial resignations
-individual, not collective responsibility is the more significant factor behind resignation.
-can be genuine reasons, Clark (2020), designed for regional growth & local govt citing ‘balancing mg own life against the demands of the office’
-lots of pressure in office.
Overall, resignations implies a poor ministerial pick.
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Is the executive largely unaccountable to parliament? Yes
-answers in parliament, esp in PMQs, often favour style over substanceS ministers choose to avoid difficult & probing questions.
-principles can be open to interpretation, often ministers claim to be unaware of an error & if backed by PM, they won’t resign.
-select committees have relatively little power & an unconvincing or evasive performance is no guarantee of dismissal.
-mostly, party loyalty is guaranteed, because of party discipline & desire to prevent opponents gaining ground. Some on own benches attack their executive.
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Is the executive largely unaccountable to parliament? No
-ministers from the PM down are subject to regular grilling at ministerial questions & PMQs. Televising of this makes poor performance have a bigger impact.
-must follows principles on standards in public life.
-ministers appear before select committees & must be honest & truthful in hearings, often leading to probing & inquisitorial in nature.
-PM must retain support of party when this is weak, their position becomes untenable. Some ministers (Heseltine, Cook) are effective at undermining & exposing flaws of their leader.
