UK POLITICS - Voting Behaviour and the Media Flashcards
(92 cards)
What are the 7 long-term determinants of voting behaviour?
- Class
- Partisanship
- Gender
- Age
- Ethnicity
- Region
- Education
In 1966, what percentage of the electorate were ‘class voters’?
66%
What is the decline in relationship between class and voting called?
Class dealignment
What are the four factors that lead to class dealignment?
- Changing class system: decrease in a traditional working class of manual labour (50% in 1961 to 30% in 2013)
- Cross-class locations: more difficult to judge class, decrease in trade unions and increase in home ownership
- Embourgeoisement: many working class people think of themselves as middle class
- Sectoral divisions: voters are more influenced by the sector they are in due to austerity
Give evidence that class is no longer a strong factor in voting behaviour.
At the 2024 general election, 2% less DE people voted labour than AB, bucking the usual class trends; additionally, only 4% less DE voters voted conservative than Labour.
Give evidence that class is still a strong factor in voting behaviour and why?
People who own their housing outright were more than 2x more likely to vote conservative than renters (37% and 14%); additionally, they were almost half as likely to vote Labour (25% and 42%).
What is partisanship?
When people vote for a party due to long term feelings of connection and attachment, developed social learning at home, school and the workplace.
Give evidence of the decline of party loyalty.
In 1964, 44% of voters ‘identified very strongly’ with a party; in 2005, this number fell to 10%. Additionally, in 2019, voters were 2x as likely to not identify with a party than not identify as Remainer of Leaver.
What is partisan dealignment?
The process by which individuals no longer long-term identify themselves with a party
What are the four factors that lead to partisan dealignment?
- Increased education: such as with the minimum school leaving age being increased to 16 by Heath’s Conservative government, people have been encouraged to question traditions
- Impact of the media and technology: voters have a wider variety of accessible political information and are therefore less reliant on party supporting newspapers
- Ideological changes: politics of the main parties have shifted, alienation some traditional voters (One Nationers and Social Democrats)
- Valence issues: other issues have become more prevalent (Brexit in 2019)
Give evidence of party realignment.
Some smaller parties have experienced strong identification, with 5% of Reform votes due to “I like/trust Nigel Farage”. Whilst there is still a small groups of party loyalists: 5% of conservative votes were because “I always vote for them/am a Conservative member.”
What was the traditional gender voting (giving an example) and its explanation?
Women traditionally voted conservative more than men, more or equal women voted conservative than men in every election between 1979 and 2001
- This may be because women did not go to work and people who have a lower education level are more likely to vote Conservative. It may also be the Conservative Party’s traditional emphasis on stability and safety.
Give evidence that gender is no longer a strong factor in voting behaviour and why.
The gender gap has decreased wildly, 1% more women voted Labour at the 2024 general election.
- This may be due to increasing levels of education and the recent instability of Conservative governments.
Give evidence that gender is still a strong factor in voting behaviour
- There is still a strong gender gap between the young; at the 2019 election, women 18-24 were 40% more likely to vote Labour than men the same age
- Men were 40% more likely to vote remain than women in 2024
How do different ages vote and why?
Older voters are more likely to be conservative and younger voters are more likely to vote Labour. This may be because older voters value security (that the Conservatives traditionally offer) and may also lose their youthful idealism that characterises leftism.
Give evidence that age is still a strong factor in voting behaviour.
In the 2024 election, for every 10 years older a person is, they are 6% more likely to vote Con and 4% less likely to vote Lab.
Give evidence that age is no longer a strong factor in voting behaviour.
At the 2024 GE, 25-49 year olds were 3% more likely to vote Labour than 18-24 year olds (44% vs. 41%), though they were still more likely to vote Conservative as well (14.5% vs. 8%).
However this may be due to increased turnout of Conservatives over fear of a dominant Labour government and as such is an exception.
How do different ethnic groups traditionally vote, giving an example?
BAME voters are more likely to vote Labour than Conservative; in 2024, Labour led among ethnic voters at 46% to the Conservatives 17%. Also anti-immigration policy is important - only 3% of ethnic minorities coted ReformUK (compared to 16% kf white). However this may be due to the link between ethnicity and social class.
Give two examples of ethnicity affecting voting behaviour.
- Labour 2005: Blair lost a large amount of the Muslim vote due to supporting the Iraq War
- Labour 2017: Corbyn lost a large percentage of the Jewish vote due to accusations of antisemitism towards the Labour Party
Give a counterargument to the effect of ethnicity on voting behaviours.
It is more that ethnicity affects how people react to short-term factors like leadership (Corbyn) or events (7x more white people voted for Reform, 34% of reform votes were to “control immigration”).
How do different regions traditionally vote and why?
There used to be a stark North (Labour) and South (Conservative) divide, this may have been a reflection of class as the South has traditionally been wealthier and this links to voting Conservative.
Give evidence that region is a strong determinant of voting behaviour.
However, in 2024, aside from London, the South was much more likely to vote LibDem or Conservative whereas the North was more likely to vote Labour or SNP, reflecting previous trends.
Give evidence that region isn’t a strong determinant of voting behaviour.
Valence factors have taken precedence in recent elections; with the ‘red wall’ (a series of Labour safe seats in the midlands) changing between parties twice in the past 2 elections. Even regional parties like the SNP are not safe, their seats dropping 75% in 2024, due to LabCon refusal of another referendum.
Why may education be a strong voting determinant?
Campbell (1960) argues that education affects people’s attitude, interests and values, making them more likely to vote for progressive parties, with Labour’s vote among degree holders double the conservatives; it also makes them less likely to be susceptible to populism, why only 7% of degree holders voted ReformUK.