Violence

Question 1

causes of war

Answer 1

• permissive cause
• proximate cause
  -> both stem from anarchy

Question 2

permissive cause of war

Answer 2

nothing is there to prevent it

Question 3

proximity cause of war

Answer 3

security dilemma

Question 4

ES and violence

Answer 4

• war can be a tool to protect first two goals
• war can be an instrument of policy
• war is a social institution

Question 5

paradox of limited wars

Answer 5

war shouldn’t be limited too much for rulers to think they can control it
-> can lead to underestimation and reckless use (eg as alternative to sanctions)

Question 6

historical causes of war

Answer 6

• succession
• national territory
• confession

Question 7

Common Juxtaposition

Answer 7

• diplomacy is an alternative to violence
  BUT
  -> according to Schelling war and diplomacy are linked

Question 8

Ideal types of violence

Answer 8

• brute force
  -> offence vs defence
• coercion
  -> compellence vs deterrence (denial vs punishment)

Question 9

changes through nuclear revolution

Answer 9

• increased explosive force
• change in delivery systems for violence (new technologies, more difficult to stop)

Question 10

consequences of nuclear revolution

Answer 10

• increased speed
• level of destruction
• possibility for human annihilation (absolute power instead of relative power)
• potentially unlimited war

Question 11

second strike capability

Answer 11

applied in context of nuclear power vs nuclear power
-> ensures mutual destruction in case of attack
-> deters nuclear attack
-> part of diplomacy of violence (communication of willingness to strike back)

Question 12

notion of military victory

Answer 12

• never achieved when a state is eliminated
• can be a zero-sum-game if relative gains and losses (comparison of adversaries’ situation)
  -> was changed by nuclear proliferation to a game of absolute gains and losses (comparison of own situation)

Question 13

diplomacy of violence in nuclear age

Answer 13

• game of chicken as coercion strategy
• convincing opponent that one is irrational will compel them to cooperate
  -> best case: both parties defect (both attack)

Question 14

conditions affecting success or failure in game of chicken

Answer 14

• communication
• resolve conflict by forcing opponent to back down
• capabilities
• bluffing
• command and control over one’s weapons (prevent accidents and unauthorized use)
• tolerance of risk (it’s a competition in risk-taking)

Question 15

problems and paradoxes of game of chicken

Answer 15

• rationality of irrationality (needs to be applied sparsely)
• misperceptions
• escalation
• effective strategies can lead to catastrophes

Question 16

war as a social institution

Answer 16

has structure:
- beginning and ending
- grounds and goals
- conduct and permitted means
- combatants and interests
- international law

Question 17

beginning and ending

Answer 17

Starts with political breakdown; ends with treaties, surrender, or mediation

Question 18

grounds and goals

Answer 18

Justified through defense, ideology, or national interest; aims to achieve political outcomes

Question 19

conduct and permitted means

Answer 19

Regulated by norms, ethics, and international law (e.g., banned weapons, civilian protection)

Question 20

combatants and interests

Answer 20

Involves defined actors (state/non-state); reflects class, national, or ideological interests

Question 21

international law

Answer 21

Provides rules to limit war’s brutality and hold violators accountable

Question 22

Assumptions for diplomacy of war

Answer 22

• rational actors
• desire to survive

Question 23

compellence

Answer 23

one state wants to make another do something
-> mostly uttered as a threat

Question 24

deterrence

Answer 24

one state puts inhibiting measures into place to change a states’ mind
-> denial or punishment

Question 25

three stages of historical evolution of warfare

Answer 25

1. on an elite level (people were neutral, not involved in warfare) 2. threat to the people (people were involved, civilians as soldiers) 3. people become a tool for coercion (increase of civilian violence to make the attacker stop)

Question 26

Global zero debate – Pro

Answer 26

- existential threat to actors and bystanders - the more proliferation, the less transparent becomes the situation - what happens if deterrence (second strike capability) doesn't work anymore?

Question 27

Global zero debate - Con

Answer 27

- there would be more wars without nukes as a deterrence mechanism - problem isn't the nukes but their proliferation (sharing technologies to wrong NSA)

Question 28

Nuclear Taboo

Answer 28

- normative prohibition of nukes - social construction (nukes aren't immoral but their use is) - influences behaviour - reinforced by policy and rhetoric - three types of effects

Question 29

effects of nuclear taboo

Answer 29

1. regulative effects 2. constitutive effects 3. permissive effects