week 12 - holding politicians accountable Flashcards
(23 cards)
What are the two main mechanisms for holding politicians accountable in the principal-agent model of vertical accountability?
Selection: Choosing politicians with aligned incentives or “good types” (honest, competent).
Sanctioning: Punishing or rewarding politicians based on their performance (e.g., voting them out or re-electing them).
What is the principal-agent model of electoral accountability?
It’s a framework where voters (principals) delegate authority to politicians (agents), but face problems of misaligned incentives and incomplete information, leading to “agency slack” (politicians not acting in voters’ interests).
How does the selection mechanism work?
Voters try to elect politicians who are honest and share their preferences.
If selection is strong (voters can identify “good types”), performance is higher.
If weak, voters rely on shortcuts like party or ethnicity, and performance is lower.
How does the sanctioning mechanism work?
Voters monitor politicians’ actions and re-elect those who perform well or punish those who don’t.
Strong sanctioning (good information, competitive elections) leads to higher performance.
Weak sanctioning leads to low performance and more visible, less efficient policies.
What does the principal-agent model predict about performance when sanctioning is strong?
Politicians work harder and deliver better outcomes, especially when facing competitive elections and informed voters.
(Ferraz & Finan 2008: audits in Brazil increased accountability and reduced corruption.)
What does the principal-agent model predict when sanctioning is weak?
Politicians are less responsive, may focus on visible or clientelist policies, and corruption is more likely.
Voters may rely more on selection, but if information is poor, both mechanisms fail.
What does the principal-agent model predict about performance when selection is strong?
Voters can identify and elect “good types,” leading to higher performance even if sanctioning is weak.
What does the principal-agent model predict when selection is weak?
-> Voters use informational shortcuts (party, ethnicity)
-> Politicians may not be held accountable for performance, leading to lower quality governance (no incentive to perform).
What factors weaken sanctioning and selection mechanisms?
-> Poor voter information
-> Lack of media or transparency
-> Uncompetitive elections
-> Demographic divisions (e.g., ethnic voting) - not voting across ethnic/religious lines
-> Low credibility of information sources
What evidence supports the importance of sanctioning?
Ferraz & Finan (2008, 2011):
Random audits in Brazil, when publicized, led to lower corruption and punished corrupt incumbents at the polls.
What evidence supports the importance of selection?
Ferraz & Finan (2011):
Media coverage and information about candidates’ past performance help voters select better politicians, reducing corruption.
What is “agency slack” in the principal-agent model?
The gap between what voters want and what politicians deliver, caused by misaligned incentives and incomplete information.
How can accountability be improved according to the principal-agent model?
-> increasing voter information (transparency, media, audits)
-> making elections more competitive
-> reducing barriers to observing and sanctioning politicians.
What are the limits of selection and sanctioning mechanisms?
Both are flawed:
selection is hard if information is poor
sanctioning is weak if elections are uncompetitive or voters can’t observe performance.
How do fairer elections and better information affect accountability?
They strengthen both selection and sanctioning, leading to better public spending and lower corruption
(Ofosu 2019; Buntaine et al. 2018).
What is the role of motivated reasoning in accountability?
Voters may interpret information in a biased way, punishing or rewarding politicians based on prior loyalties rather than objective performance.
What was the main intervention in the Jablonski et al. (2018) study?
Sending SMS texts to Ugandan voters with official information about local government budget corruption before elections.
What were the main findings of the Jablonski study?
Voters who received bad news about corruption were 6% less likely to vote for incumbent councillors.
Those who received good news were 5% more likely to vote for them.
No effect was found for higher-profile district chairs.
What is the broader significance of the Jablonski study for anti-corruption efforts?
Communication technologies like SMS can enhance local electoral accountability by providing information that is hard for politicians to control or spin.
How does political competition affect accountability?
Greater competition can increase accountability by making it easier for voters to remove corrupt politicians, but only if voters are informed.
(Keefer & Khemani)
How does the income of the median voter affect accountability?
As the income of the median voter increases, demand for public goods and accountability may rise, potentially reducing corruption.
(Keefer & Khemani)
What is the incumbency disadvantage in corrupt settings?
In some contexts, incumbents are more likely to be punished for corruption, leading to an incumbency disadvantage—voters remove corrupt politicians when they have information.
(Ferraz & Finan 2008; Incumbency Disadvantage reading)
What is the difference between de jure and de facto accountability?
De jure accountability refers to formal rules and institutions; de facto accountability depends on how these rules are enforced and whether voters can actually sanction politicians.
(Keefer & Khemani)
