Week 2 - Nuclear Proliferation Flashcards

(32 cards)

1
Q

Threatre Nuclear Weapons

A

Nuclear weapons for a localized, tactical area, distinct form strategic nuclear weapons used for globa-scale warfare (short range and yield) - made nuclear weapons acceptable

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2
Q

Jus in bello

A

justice in war/conduct in war

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3
Q

Strategic Deterrence

A

Defined as: the act of discouraging an act or event through instilling doubt or fear of consequences

Nukes can be used to prevent conquest from an opponent - if you have to launch then the weapon failed to deter
Escalation ends with MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction)
- to be effective, the threat must promise to do more and thus impose more costs than any benefits that would be gained through the action being deterred

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4
Q

Nuclear Proliferation

A

Defined as the spread of nuclear weapons and associated capabilities
States acquire nuclear weapons for: perceived need to deter adversaries, domestic policies, national prestige
Potential for “universalized deterrence” - every being in possesion of nukes means hat nobody can use them

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5
Q

Slowing Nuclear Weapon Spread - Supply Side Controls

A
  • Reduce state access to the technologies and materials for nuclear weapons
  • done through export controls/attacks on nuclear facilities
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6
Q

Slowing Nuclear Weapon Spread - Demand Side Controls

A
  • Reduce state demand for independent nuclear capability
  • carrots: (positive incentives or rewards used to encourage a state to comply with international agreements or norms related to nuclear weapons) conventional arms transfers, extended detterence, side-payments
  • sticks: economic sanctions, threat of punitive strikes
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7
Q

Slowing Nuclear Weapon Spread - Normative Controls

A
  • Delegitamize/denormalize nuclear weapons development
  • acts denouncing the military/political value, denouncing military weapons as evil, dangerous, and inhumane
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8
Q

Vertical Proliferation

A

Defined as the development and stockpiling of nuclear weapons by states that possess them
Stifle vertial proliferation through arms control agreements - placing limits on development, production, deployment, and testing of nuclear weapons

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9
Q

RLE - Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) 1963

A

Treaty banning nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, outer space and under water
- Primary signatories: USSR, US, UK and Moscow
- Potential violation by Israel/South Africa with the 1979 Vela Incident

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10
Q

Horizontal Proliferation

A

Defined as the spread of nuclear weapons to new states

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11
Q

RLE - 1988 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

A

Bilateral agreement between the US/USSR to eliminate intermediate range nuclear weapons

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12
Q

Nuclear Disarmament

A
  • the process of reducing in number or completely eliminating a country’s nuclear weapons
  • Requires a major shift in beliefs about the value of nuclear weapons (conductive international security environment)
    RLE - South Africa voluntarily gave up their nuclear arsenal
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13
Q

Potential Third Age? Current Situation

A

US/Russia have maintained a similar amount of nuclear weapons and China is rapidly developing (potential arms race)
Trend to reduce weapons - states are still expanding and changing doctrines to be ambiguous and escalatory

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14
Q

Scott Sagan on Nuclear Weapons Quote

A

Nuclear weapons are more than just tools for national security, they are political objects of considerable importance in domestic debates and internal struggles - serving as a symbol of modernity and identity

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15
Q

The Security Model

A

Realist idea, states build weapons for national security, those who are building national defence want nuclear weapons

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16
Q

The Domestic Policies Model

A

States build weapons for international policies and bureaucratic interests, political influences were the major reason for development (the UK/France largely built weapons due to internal domestic pressures)

17
Q

The Norms Model

A

States build weapons due to their value for prestige and national identity - India/Pakistan are largely seen to have built weapons to be percieved as modern

18
Q

How has Nuclear Proliferation changed in the Second Age?

A
  • In the 1st Age - centered around the US/USSR, threat of miscalculation, crisis, bipolar power dynamic
  • In the 2nd Age - more regional instability, even non-state actors possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)
    Sagan - we can no longer rely on the nuclear toolkit of the 1st age (evolved into a threat stemming from small regional nuclear weapons exchanges, non-state actor involvement, purposeful use of weapons)
19
Q

Sagan + Pessimists

A

Sagan - central pessimist who argues that nuclear spread makes the world less stable, new nuclear states engage in preventitive war, fail to build survivable forces and may lead to accidents
- Other factors to look at: terrorism, illicit networks, accident, civilian control mechanisms
- Sagan - maintaining peace during the Cold War was more differen thtan it is made seem by Americans today

20
Q

Waltz + Optimists

A

Waltz - beleives that fear of nuclear weapons is exaggerated, more may be better since new nuclear sates can deter other countries
- pessimistic view on responsible states is irrelevant, weapons have spread successfully
- retaliatory nuclear deterrence should remain the bedrock of global nuclear relations

21
Q

Nuclear Latency

A

Defined as states that possess the technology and resources capable of developing nuclear weapons but have no done so yet
- technology for a civilian nuclear program is similar to that needed for a bomb
RLE - Japanese Nuclear Capability
- potential nuclear threat regionally
- Maria Rost Rublee - Japan’s continued non-nuclear status seems puzzling since they have high levels of economic, scientific, and technological development

22
Q

Nuclear Proliferation Efforts

A

Limiting - negotiating nuclear arms control
Preventing - international non-proliferation regime
Defending - active and passive defences

23
Q

Limiting - negotiating nuclear arms control

A

Arms control agreements - limit, regulate, and reduce the threat from global nuclear forces, states seek stability and security and help control use and effects
- manage nuclear relations to enhance deterrence rather than replace it
- 3 aspects of nuclear arms control - limiting the test of weapons, limiting the development/deployment of weapons, limiting the scope for their use

24
Q

The future of Arms Control

A
  1. require the US and Russia to reduce their nuclear supply
  2. multilateralize the nuclear arms control process - involve the UK, China, and France who maintain that they’re operating at a minimum force structure already, how to involve the DPRK, India and Pakistan
25
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Main principles: 1. NWS cannot transfer/assit NNWS with weapons, 2. Assist NNWS with nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, 3. must work towards disarmament Debate about the NPT - central mechanism for controlling the global nuclear order since the 1970s Critics: enshrines the status quo, no intention to disarm, has a greater focus on non-proliferation, allows nuclear latency, does not address states outside NPT with weapons - Enforcing: no permanent secretary, relying on international institutions
26
Active Defence
Military systems are designed to neuter a nuclear attack by intercepting bombs/warheads before they hit their targets - Such defences are considered destabilizing since they complicate the credibility of a retaliatory second strike response (deterrence)
27
Passive Defence
- Used after an attack, used to minimize the impact of a nucelar strike on society
28
The Defence Dilemma
active defences are not viewed as essential components of a more nuanced detterence strategy to deal with new types of nuclear threats
29
Asymmetric Strategies
Strategies that employ non-reciprocal means to counter a threat (would counter a conventional threat with a terrorist or WMD threat)
30
Feaver on Waltz's theories
"Three problems with Waltz's theory: 1 - cannot explain most nuclear behaviour (the strategic arms race after the US/USSR had second strike capabilities - Waltzs' theory should suggest that achieving MAD should have been enough of a deterrent) 2 - his assertion that nuclear command anc dontrol and civil military problems are easily solvable (assumes that states will be responsible without any empircal evidence to back that up, extreme difficultly achieving this) 3 - his nuclear optimism is inconsistent with his structural realism (his assertation the nuclear weapons promote peace while also multipolarity is unstable)"
31
RLE - 1994 Budapest Memorandum
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan gave up their nuclear arsenal for International security assurances
32
RLE - Libya under Gaddafi
gave up WMD programs to improve relations with the West and escape sanctions