week 5 Flashcards
(19 cards)
Normative decision making
attempt to define how people should make decisions
Descriptive decision theories
Attempt to predict how people actually make choices not t define ideal choices
When do we use heuristics
Tversky and Kahneman’s general problem-solving framework (1974) suggests we use heuristics when:
The decision is low-priority
We are deciding under time pressure
The problem is intractable
Because of our cognitive limitations (e.g., information overload)
Or because we have limited access to information
Dual process theories
System 1: unconscious, automatic, effortless, fast
Often used under conditions of limited time/information- independent from working memory
System 2: conscious, controlled, effortful, slow
Often used to evaluate problems flexibly, systematically, thoroughly- limited by working memory
Miserliness
Humans are cognitive misers because their basic tendency is to default to processing mechanisms of low computational expense
Theory: inhibiting System 1 and using System 2 both draw on limited working memory (WM) resources
If so, loading WM should cause particular problems with tasks requiring System 2 – but not with tasks requiring System 1…
Experiment WM placed under load could be high or low. Participants varied in WM capacity
Strengths and problems of dual system theories
s- seems consistent with our intuitions, Much experimental evidence which is diverse
p- Multiple and vague definitions are offered by various theorists, disagreements about how the two systems interact
Can system 2 On override system 1
Type 1- processes suggest default initial response
Type 2- processes monitor system 1 outputs
Evans & Over (1996): they operate in parallel – but S2 doesn’t always detect the error created by S1, or does so too slowly to prevent it
Either way, S1 seems to be our earliest opportunity to influence behavioural change…
Nudges
Behavioural interventions informed by research on human behaviour
Nudge people towards the ‘better’ option in terms of health, wealth, or wellbeing
Do so by making the ‘better’ option more convenient or salient for the decision-maker – thus often (not always) targeting heuristic Type 1 processes
Anticipated regret as nudge
Simonson (1992) offered students two imaginary choices:
(1) whether to take advantage of a current, moderate sale to buy something, or wait for a later, possibly better sale
(2) whether to buy a bargain brand VCR or a more expensive, well-known, high-quality brand
In the experimental condition participants were asked to think about the regret they might feel after making their decision
When there is a safe option, people can be influenced to anticipate the regret they will feel if the risky option turns out badly
Imagining alternatives to past events
Often (but not always) triggered following a negative outcome
“If only X had not happened, then Y would not have happened”
To think counterfactually, we have to:
Mentally undo what has really occurred
Reason about what might have occurred if the past had been different in some way
People tend to think about how things could have been better (‘upward counterfactual’) instead of how things could have been worse (‘downward counterfactual’)
Counterfactual emotions
Counterfactual thought is linked to certain emotions
We mentally undo not studying hard, and imagine the outcome if we had
Because the counterfactual outcome would have been better (upward counterfactual), we may feel regret
We mentally undo looking both ways to cross the road, to imagine the outcome if we had not
Because the counterfactual outcome would have been worse (downward counterfactual), we may feel relief
Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004:
Participants recalled a dissatisfying experience with the delivery of a service, which they regretted
Degree of regret was not associated with tendency to complain – but WAS associated with switching service
Regret
A painful, counterfactual emotion that we experience when we realise that we would have obtained a better outcome had we chosen differently
A consequence of decision making
Requires a sense of agency: I myself could have decided differently and obtained a better outcome
Decision Justification Theory suggests two components to regret:
Evaluation of the outcome (compared to other possible outcomes)
Self-blame for a poor decision
The action effect
In the short term, action is regretted more than inaction
People’s real-life regrets are for the things they didn’t do – inaction - in contrast to their greater short-term regret of action
Particularly when they are thinking about more general regrets
Why is inaction more regrated
Inaction is more general in nature than action
So regretted actions may be harder to cognitively access than regretted inaction
Decision-making styles
Maximisers
Selecting the best possible option
But requires a lot of effort (if it’s possible at all) to gather all necessary information to make best decision
Satisficers
Selecting a ‘good enough’ option: satisfactory, not optimal
Arguably represents the kinds of decisions we are actually capable of making
Intertemporal
Intertemporal = between times
Some of the choices we make are between experiences now and in the future
People often face difficult choices about whether to delay gratification: getting a long-term reward requires giving up an immediate reward
Psychologists can run experiments to help philosophers find out:
Do people respond to the thought experiments as they predict?
What makes a difference to whether they do or not?
Advantages:
Psychology can use data to test philosophical claims
Philosophy can sharpen conceptual issues in psychology
Why do people discount the value of future events
Mood: sadness associated with choosing more immediate rewards (seek immediate comfort)
Future rewards seems like losses, because feels like you ‘have’ the immediate ones already
Flip this: ‘You will get £amount in the future… do you want to speed it up and receive less?’
The closer in time events are, the more concretely people think of them; the further in the future, the more abstractly they think of them (Construal Level Theory). Making events seem more concrete can make them seem closer
