Week 7: Leaders and Decision Making

Question 1

Title: All the World’s a Stage: US Presidential Narcissism and International Conflict

Author(s)?

Answer 1

John P. Harden

Question 2

All the World’s a Stage, Harden, 2021

This reading addresses what main issue?

Answer 2

So the whole idea about this paper is that Harden is interested in understanding how personality can impact a leader’s preference formation and foreign policy behavior. The major idea being more narcissistic leaders are very likely to try and maintain their self-image by selecting how they will fight on the world stage and who they will fight against. And the idea is that you’re going to see narcissitic leaders fighting against high-status states alone

Question 3

All the World’s a Stage, Harden, 2021

What makes this paper different from others?

Answer 3

Harden is able to connect leader preferences to leader attributes and showing empirically that this impacts internatioanl security by arguing that when you have high amounts of trait narcissism - specifically grandiose narcissism- you’ll approach international conflict differently and place more emphasis on your own personal gains aka inflated self image.

When you’re so focused on your self image, you’re going to be driven to initiate disputes with Great powers.

Question 4

All the World’s a Stage, Harden, 2021

What did the author(s) do to address this issue?

Answer 4

Harden addresses this issue empirically by measuring narcissism in US presidents at-a-distance and then analyzing whether narcissim is related to unilaterally initiaated GP conflicts.

Harden first defines what he means by narcissim which mainly has to do with self-absobtion, lack of empathy, entitlement and inflated sense of self. From this he focuses specifically on grandiose narcissism and shows that there have been studies showing how this form of narcissim has affected policy. For example, it has been connected to depleting the commons, attraction to quick ascent to leadership position and degards for relationship status when pursing mates for intimate relationships.

So to understand if it is truly the case that leaders will weigh their personal desires more heavily than political survival or state security, harden puts forth the idea that leader narcissim will be related to dispute initiation thorugh five causal mechanisms: 1) they prefer great power politics bc of their self-aggrandizement, 2) their behavior increases tnetiosn becuase of believeing that your country is disrespected 3) they are risk-acceptant so theyre more willing to initiate threats or use force 4) they work without partners bc they dont want to share the spotlight 5) they send unclear signals and are caught up in proving that they are capable intellignet and strong

Empirically, harden measures disputes as those where the US initiates without partners and primary target is a great power. The dependent variable being annual initiation and then initatiion percent. he measures narcissim with the big-5 procedure which used facets correlated with measures of narcissim

Question 5

All the World’s a Stage, Harden, 2021

How did the author(s) address this issue?

Answer 5

An interesting part of harden’s analysis is that he references historians’ accounts of whether you were narcissistic. and applies his big-5 measure to mean ratings of presidential personality facets. He controls for other factors like hawkishness and dovishness or military and combat expereince as well as prior executive exerpeice

Question 6

All the World’s a Stage, Harden, 2021

Why did the authors address this issue in this way?

Answer 6

Addressing the issue empirically gives us a sense of the causal nature of narcissim on foriegn policy behaviors.

Question 7

All the World’s a Stage, Harden, 2021

What are the major findings of the paper?

Answer 7

Harden’s two hypotheses are significant. He shows that as narcissim increases, administrations are increasinly likely to unilaterlaly initiate GP disputes and to have those disputes take up a greater percentage of their initiations.

He also uses a case stuidy of venezuela and roosevelts behavior during the venezuela crisis.

Question 8

All the World’s a Stage, Harden, 2021

What are the implications of this paper and their methodology?
+
How does this paper contribute to the broader literature?

Answer 8

This provides us with a way to empirically show that leadership is an opportunity to self-aggrandize for some people and an opporunity to further state interests for others. being able to distinguish between these to could help us understand impoortant behaviors in internatioanl realtisons

Question 9

All the World’s a Stage, Harden, 2021

What are my critiques? What does a world without their contribution look like?

Answer 9

• dont like diagnosing people
• only used views corroborated by historians
• limitations in empirical analysis

Question 10

Title: Tying Hands, Sinking Costs, and Leader Attributes
a. Author(s)?

Answer 10

Yarhi-Milo, Kertzer, and Renshon, 2018

Question 11

Tying hands and sinking costs, Yarhi-Milo, kertzer and renshon, 2018

This reading addresses what main issue?

Answer 11

So the whole idea about this paper is that in much of game theory in order to convince your opponent that you can credibly commit and to signal your type, that you need to use a costly signal to do this. So the authors are intersted if this actually even works.

The two types of costly signals are tying hands and sunk-cost signaling. but people arent even really sure if leaders can understand those signals the way our models suggest they should.

Question 12

Tying hands and sinking costs, Yarhi-Milo, kertzer and renshon, 2018

What makes this paper different from others?

Answer 12

What makes this paper different is that the authors show that theories of signaling tend to assume homogeous audiences but that leaders vary siginificantly in how credible they actually percive signals to be dependeing on theur foregin policy dispositions rather than their levels of military or political experience. So they are able to call for more heterogoenous reciptiens into our theories of signaling

So basically, the idea of the paper is to test if costly signaling actually works, and then show which specific leader characteristics would allow them to interpret a costly signal in the way in whcih game theory assumes.

Question 13

Tying hands and sinking costs, Yarhi-Milo, kertzer and renshon, 2018

What did the author(s) do to address this issue?

Answer 13

The authors use survey experiments to test the microdoundstions of costly signaling with participants drawn from the israeli knesset who are elite and have histories of foreign policy decision-making

Question 14

Tying hands and sinking costs, Yarhi-Milo, kertzer and renshon, 2018

How did the author(s) address this issue?

Answer 14

The authors hypothesize that basically if costly signals actually work then a leader’s estiamte of their adversaries resolve should increase when a costly signal is used, and then they go on to suggest that public threats should consitute a more or less equally credible signal of reslove compared to military mobiliization.

Question 15

Tying hands and sinking costs, Yarhi-Milo, kertzer and renshon, 2018

Why did the authors address this issue in this way?

Answer 15

Thinking about the argument in this way allows us to understand if costly signals actually do work at all and what types of costly signals do work if rationlists are correct.

Question 16

Tying hands and sinking costs, Yarhi-Milo, kertzer and renshon, 2018

What are the major findings of the paper?

Answer 16

Using a vignette that describes a dispute between israel and another country subjects were asked to estimate the odds that the other country would stand firm in the dispute. So using a within and between subject design they show that elite political leaders do update their estimates of others’ resolve in response to costyl sginals. Now how the leader characteristics affect their caluclations – they show that leaders’ orientation in particular their bellieds about the desirability and efficacy of force as well as levels of interantioanl trust affect how they interpret costly signals. they then find that neither combat experince nor military exepreince wihtout combat signficantly affects how leaders interpret signals

Question 17

Tying hands and sinking costs, Yarhi-Milo, kertzer and renshon, 2018

What are the implications of this paper and their methodology?
+
How does this paper contribute to the broader literature?

Answer 17

This paper implies that costly signaling actually works (so military moblization and public threats), one signal is not more effective than the other though but sunk costs arent seen as effect by observers

Question 18

Tying hands and sinking costs, Yarhi-Milo, kertzer and renshon, 2018

What are my critiques? What does a world without their contribution look like?

Answer 18

TBD

Question 19

Title: Stoics and Hotheads: Leaders’ Temperament, anger and the expression of resolve in face-to-face diplomacy
a. Author(s)?

Answer 19

Seanon S. Wong
or
Wong, 2019

Question 20

Stoics and hotheads, Wong 2019

This reading addresses what main issue?

Answer 20

The whole idea about this paper is understanding why anger is a more credible expression of resolve and how leader temprament a stoic vs a hothead actuallt has an impact on their international politics

Question 21

Stoics and hotheads, Wong 2019

What makes this paper different from others?

Answer 21

Wong uses two case studies to provide an explanation for when leaders are more or less likely to back down in response to an expression of anger. That is, explaining when individual emotions become collective a political by detailing the psychological processes at work when leaders interact up close

Question 22

Stoics and hotheads, Wong 2019

What did the author(s) do to address this issue?

Answer 22

Wong is interested in addressing the issue in this way in order to further empirical substantiation to the usefulness of face-to-face diplomacy

Question 23

Stoics and hotheads, Wong 2019

How did the author(s) address this issue?

Answer 23

Wong provides a 2x2 table showing when a leader will send an authetic (credible) signal of anger and when it will be inwuthentic. The idea is that if you are a hot head who is angy by disposition you and a stoic who seems genuinely aggreived at something will be taken more credibly. If you are a hothead who seems to manipulate others with his emptions or you are a stoic who gets mad and makes someone feel badly about it.

Question 24

Stoics and hotheads, Wong 2019

What are the implications of this paper and their methodology?

Answer 24

What this paper implies is that face to face diplomacy is actually imporant and that though it is often dismissed as inconseqenetial that the perception of intentions can be intensly personal and influenced heavily by the temprament of leaders and the preconceptions they have of each other. This means like things like chronic anger can jeapordize a relationship so the trick is to behave in a way that meks the point but doesnt undermine negotiation.

So this means that future reserach can show how expression interactios with other factors imporatnt to the communication of resolve. For example, the norms the leaders often hold with regard to what consitutes a legitimate claim in a particular relatationship may influence the outcome of a negotiation.

Question 25

# Stoics and hotheads, Wong 2019 What are my critiques? What does a world without their contribution look like?

Answer 25

It would be really nice if this was empirical in some way, so we coudl see if this was causal in nature as well

Question 26

Title: Crazy like a fox? Are leaders with reputation for madness more successful at international coercion a. Author(s)?

Answer 26

Roseanne W. McManus or McManus, 2019

Question 27

# Crazy like a fox, McManus 2019 This reading addresses what main issue?

Answer 27

The whole idea about this paper is to assess if "madman theory" actually holds any weight. People often think that being viewed as mentally unstable can help a leader coerece foregin adversaries becuase you seemingly are more risk-acceptant and costs arent as harmful to you. So the authors want to test this theory emprically.

Question 28

# Crazy like a fox, McManus 2019 What makes this paper different from others?

Answer 28

McManus empirically tests madman theory which is the idea that one deviates from "normal" payoffs or that they have decision making that is more likley to make a leader use force. So they idea is measuring percived madness. Mcmanus does this by introuducing a perception-based measure of leaders' international repurations for madness based on new reports so they have the first large N test of the mad-man theory and examine the effect of reputations for madness on both general deterrence and crisis bargaining.

Question 29

# Crazy like a fox, McManus 2019 What did the author(s) do to address this issue?

Answer 29

To understand this issie, mcmanus argues that the biggest drawback of percived madness is a commitment problem. In order to be credible, you need to not only credibly threaten attack, but you have to be able to credibly threaten not to attack following compliance. So given the idea that you deviate from normal payoffs (mad man theory) in a way that makes you more liekly to use force, it is difficult for a mad man to credibly commit not to attack which means that leaders with a reputation for madness are at a disadvantage in coercive bargaining. but the madenss dispalyed might overpower the ability to credibly commit so percived madness can also increase the probability of successful general deterrence becuase the risk of an insanely aggressive response should dissuage potential challengers. But we need to be able to see if this hold across a large sample of individuals, and

Question 30

How did the author(s) address this issue?

Answer 30

McManus claims that a leader's percived madness will eventuhally begin to outweight the benefits and if a certain level of madness is necessary to give a threat of credibiility, then any increase in strength of a leaders madeness reputation up to that level is an assest. If you're percived to be beyond that level. That is to say though, a more modeerate repuation for maddness is actually more beneficial if you want to achieve coercive success. McManus also claims, however, that a rep for madness is less likely to be beneficial if the country has greater relative military strength To support these claims, McManus measures madness based off of public perceptions in the media and does this by tallying the number of times a leader is referred to in the press using a set of adjectives they beleiev indicate madness.

Question 31

What are the major findings of the paper?

Answer 31

McManus finds that there is little empriical support for the madman theory. That is the effect of perceived madness is purely harmful, though he suggests that a slight madness repuation can be beneficial when a leader's country is sufficiently powerful.

Question 32

What are the implications of this paper and their methodology?

Answer 32

What this implies is that leaders should be cautious about cultivating a reputation for madness. A madness reputation may have benefits in crisis bargaiaing if the leader commands a strong military and is able to control the madness enough to avoid becomoing too strong.

Question 33

Title: No substitute for Experience: Presidents, Advisers, and Information in Group Decision Making a. Author(s)?

Answer 33

Elizabeth N. Saunders or Saunders 2017

Question 34

This reading addresses what main issue?

Answer 34

Sunders is intersted in understanding how the traits and biases of a leader aggregate. So the idea behind this paper is to show that groups matter and elite expereince matters. So in the event of war, how does the balance of foreign policy experience among leaders and advisers affect decision making. That is, saunders is interested in when and how biases matter and how they aggregate. To understand how elite experiences influences decision makign, and how do groups made of up individuals with varying levels of experience and political power make decisions.

Question 35

What makes this paper different from others?

Answer 35

This paper is different from others becasue it shows how poltiics can affect groups, And shows how that balance of experience influences the assessment and mitigation of risks in war.

Question 36

What did the author(s) do to address this issue?

Answer 36

In order to understand these questions and address the aggregation problem, Saunders uses two cases for the Iraq war but also provides a principal-agenet framework where if a principal has high levels of experience and the agents do as well, there is no imbanace resulting in controlled risk. If both are low, there is no imbalance and competent risk, if the pricipal has low experience and the agents high, there is imbalance and excess risk, and if the pricipal is high and the agents low, it is centralized risk.

Question 37

What are the major findings of the paper?

Answer 37

The idea behind this is that exepereince can serve as a monitoring device, but when you have less exerpeice it leads to less effective monitoring becuase you arent perceived to be well incofmed. An experienced leaders can also affect bias among experienced advisers by facilitating delegation which helps fraw on the expertise and information of ageents. Delegation can give agents discretion over policy and therefore incentivise them to gather info but credibly commiting to delegation is challenging. Successful dlegation may result in policies that diverge fromt he pricipal's preferences. What experience can do for a pricipal is that it can emable credible delegatio by rendering information non-invertible. So agenets who serve an inexperienced pricipals may beleieve they are unliekly to grasp difficult concepts and mayeb be more likely to believe they have authority. Expereince aslso can shape decisison making bias by affective whether and how divergent viewpoints are incorporated into decision making. Group polarization can emerge from a limited argument pool these problems can be mitigated by diversifying advice. So presidents might want to appoint experienced indivisuals who are more liekly to take an alternative view and diversifying the argument pool