Week 9 term 1 Flashcards

(15 cards)

1
Q

What is the central focus when analyzing the behavior of firms?

A

Incentives

The employer must delegate tasks to employees, which involves a Principal-Agent relationship.

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2
Q

Who are the two parties involved in the delegation of a task?

A

Principal and Agent

The Principal delegates the task, while the Agent is the one to whom the task is delegated.

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3
Q

What are the two basic ingredients of incentive theory?

A
  • Conflicting objectives
  • Decentralised information
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4
Q

What is the Principal-Agent problem?

A

Delegating a task to an agent with private information

Agent’s actions are not observed by the Principal, leading to moral hazard.

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5
Q

What does moral hazard refer to?

A

A situation where one party hires another to work on a project, but the effort exerted by the agent is unobservable.

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6
Q

Why is it difficult to write externally enforced contracts specifying compensation based on effort?

A

Agent’s effort is not verifiable/observable.

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7
Q

What are examples of moral hazard?

A
  • Owner-manager relationship
  • Insurance companies and insured individuals
  • Manufacturers and their distributors
  • Teamwork
  • Banks and their borrowers
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8
Q

In the context of moral hazard, what does it mean for an employer to worry about an employee’s effort?

A

The employer cannot observe effort but can observe output.

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9
Q

What is the participation constraint (PC) in the context of contract design?

A

The contract must ensure Bob’s expected payoff is non-negative.

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10
Q

What is the incentive compatibility constraint (IC)?

A

The contract must ensure Bob has no incentive to exert low effort.

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11
Q

What does profit maximization for Ann require?

A

Both the participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint must be satisfied with equality.

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12
Q

What happens if the participation constraint does not hold with equality?

A

Ann can reduce both xs and xf and still make Bob participate.

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13
Q

How can Ann increase her payoff regarding the incentive compatibility constraint?

A

By reducing √xf while keeping it the same, she can still satisfy the constraint.

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14
Q

What does Ann aim to do with her payoff?

A

Ann aims to reduce √x_s while still satisfying the constraint and increasing her payoff.

This relates to profit maximization in economic models.

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15
Q

Under profit maximization, how should the constraints be satisfied?

A

The constraints should always be satisfied as an equality.

This is a key principle in optimization problems.

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