week three and four

Question 1

(axelroad and keohane) conditions of international cooperation?

Answer 1

• There is a mutuality of interest (shared goals between states).
• The shadow of the future influences behavior (the expectation of future interactions encourages cooperation).
• The number of participants is manageable (fewer players make cooperation easier).

Question 2

mutuality of interest

Answer 2

• means the players of the game identify when there is a mutual interest in cooperation - it depends not only on my interest but also on others’

Question 3

prisoner’s dilemma

Answer 3

• Each player can either cooperate (C) or defect (D).
• the best outcome for each player occurs when they defect while the other cooperates.
• if both defect, they both receive a lower payoff than if they had cooperated.

Question 4

which game does mutual interest occur

Answer 4

• staghunt: mutual interest in cooperation is strong, as both players can achieve the best outcome by cooperating
• prisoner’s dilemma:
• chicken: in avoiding the worst outcome (mutual destruction).

Question 5

example of the prisoner’s dilemma

Answer 5

Cold War arms race between the U.S. and Russia, where both had the incentive to build more weapons (defect), despite the fact that reducing arms (cooperation) would have been more beneficial for both.

Question 6

stag hunt

Answer 6

• two states can either cooperate to hunt a stag (C) or individually hunt a hare (D).
• hunting the stag requires mutual cooperation, while hunting the hare can be done alone but yields a lower payoff.
• there’s always a risk that one player may choose to defect for short-term gains.
• cooperation requires trust. if both players trust each other, they will cooperate for the best outcome.

Question 7

example of the stag hunt

Answer 7

Paris Climate Agreement, where countries must decide between cooperating to reduce emissions (benefiting all in the long term) or prioritizing their own short-term economic interests at the cost of global well-being.

Question 8

chicken

Answer 8

• two players must choose whether to swerve (cooperate) or stay on course (defect).
• both players risk mutual destruction if they both choose to defect.
• states may choose to cooperate to avoid the worst outcome.

Question 9

deadlock

Answer 9

• cooperation may be less likely due to conflicting interests or irrationality.
• both players have a preference for defecting, leading to a situation where neither player can achieve a better outcome by cooperating
• there is no incentive to cooperate because defection is always the better option, even though mutual defection leads to a less ideal outcome than if cooperation were possible.

Question 10

mutual interest of deadlock

Answer 10

mutual interest in cooperation is minimal or absent

Question 11

example of chicken

Answer 11

Cuban Missile Crisis: where both the U.S. and the Soviet Union faced the risk of nuclear war (mutual destruction) if neither backed down. The mutual interest was in avoiding war, leading to a tense standoff where both sides ultimately chose to de-escalate

Question 12

shadow of the future

Answer 12

• when players expect to interact with each other repeatedly over time, they are more likely to cooperate in the present to ensure mutually beneficial outcomes in the future.
• it creates incentives and shapes behavior.

Question 13

class activity relevance in rounds 5-7

Answer 13

• the threat of retialiation is the key in generate cooperative choices.
• possibility of retaliation increases the benefit of choosing red (cooperation) over blue (defection) and the partner will adjust to your strategy
• one would shift their strategy to defect in the last round when there are no expectations of future interactions.

Question 14

conditions that shape the shadow of the future

Answer 14

• repeated interactions
• reliable information

Question 15

why is understanding the shadow of future important?

Answer 15

• even when two players end up in mutual defection (prisoner’s dilemma) and cooperation is possible with the long shadow of future and appropriate strategies (e.g., tit-for-tat).
• this is a safe description of world politics, and actors often have long-term interactions, regardless of whether they had been cooperative or not
• international institutions provide a long shadow of future with repeated interactions and chances of international cooperation increase

Question 16

what does adebajo argue in post-colonial governance

Answer 16

• Former colonies entered the international system where rules were pre-established.
• The newly independent states sought to reform international institutions that were historically dominated by Western powers.

Question 17

what were the influence the Global South have on the international system (adebajo)

Answer 17

• Political Decolonization
• Economic Decolonization
• Global Human Rights
• Global Security

Question 18

Political Decolonization

Answer 18

• Established the principle of non-alignment, which was focused on maintaining neutrality between the US and Soviet-led groups.
• Supported decolonization processes
• increasing representativeness of the third world.
• laid the foundation for the Non-Aligned Movement (Bandung Conference of 1955).

Question 19

Economic Decolonization

Answer 19

regional integration efforts within the Global South aimed to foster economic cooperation and reduce dependence on former colonial powers

Question 20

Global Human Rights and Security

Answer 20

• they shifted the notion of absolute sovereignty in the 1960s to “Sovereignty as responsibility” and “responsibility to protect” in 1990s during the post-Cold War security crisis and population were at risk.
• the changed the understanding of the sovereignty in the Global South enabled the international community to intervene (humanitarian intervention)

Question 21

how did the change occur in the intl system?

Answer 21

• Political Decolonization developed into the change of Global Human Rights/Security
• The increased representation allowed the doors to be open to other state which results in the shift in sovereignty.

Question 22

what did egel and ward argue?

Answer 22

Weak states challenge the international status quo through positional revisionism (transforming material resources into capital) and subversive revisionism (challenging accepted notions of power).

Question 23

what game is cooperation least likely to emerge

Answer 23

deadlock: lack of incentives for cooperation makes it difficult

Question 23

how can repeated, long-term interactions help states to make cooperative choices?

Answer 23

• helps build trust over time
• incentives for Future Cooperation
• helps states develop reputations based on their past actions.
• potential for future consequences (retaliation or loss of benefits) discourages states from defecting in the present

Question 24

changes of sovereignty implications for international humanitarian interventions?

Answer 24

humanitarian interventions from the international community can be justified in cases of severe human rights violations

Question 25

absolute sovereignty

Answer 25

focused on non-interference in the internal affairs of states

Question 26

Responsible Sovereignty

Answer 26

focused on including the concept of "responsibility to protect" (R2P), which posits that states have a responsibility to protect their populations from mass atrocities