Year 12 Glossary Flashcards
(264 cards)
1
Q
a posteriori
A
Knowledge of propositions that can only be known to be true or false through sense experience.
2
Q
a priori
A
Knowledge of propositions that do not require (sense) experience to be known to be true or false.
3
Q
ability knowledge
A
Knowing ‘how’ to do something, e.g. ‘I know how to ride a bike’.
4
Q
abstract
A
Theoretical (rather than applied or practical) and removed from any concrete objects or instances.
5
Q
acquaintance knowledge
A
Knowing ‘of’ someone or some place. For example, ‘I know the manager of the restaurant’, or ‘I know Oxford well’.
6
Q
ad hoc
A
A statement or a move in an argument that suits the purpose at hand but has no independent support.
7
Q
analogy
A
Similarity in several respects between different things.
8
Q
analysis
A
Process of breaking up a complex concept, expression or argument in order to reveal its simpler constituents, thereby elucidating its meaning or logical structure.
9
Q
analytic
A
A proposition that is true (or false) in virtue of the meanings of the words. For instance, ‘a bachelor is an unmarried man’ is analytically true, while ‘a square has three sides’ is analytically false.
10
Q
antecedent
A
The proposition that forms the first part of a conditional statement, usually the part of the sentence that comes after ‘if’. E.g. in both ‘If it rains then I will get wet’ and ‘I will get wet if it rains’, the antecedent is ‘it rains’.
11
Q
anti-realism, moral
A
The theory that claims that there are no moral properties. Error theory and moral non-cognitivism are both anti-realist.
12
Q
applied ethics
A
The branch of ethics concerned with the application of normative ethical theories to particular issues, such as lying or stealing.
13
Q
arête
A
An ‘excellence’, or more specifically, a ‘virtue’ – a quality that aids the fulfilment of a thing’s ergon (Aristotle).
14
Q
argument
A
A reasoned inference from one set of claims – the premises – to another claim, the conclusion.
15
Q
assertion
A
The claim that a proposition is true.
16
Q
assumption
A
A proposition accepted without proof or evidence as the basis for an inference or argument.
17
Q
attitude
A
A mental state regarding how the world is or should be. A cognitive attitude, e.g. belief, has a mind-to-world direction of fit. A non-cognitive attitude, e.g. desire, has a world-to-mind direction of fit.
18
Q
begging the question
A
The informal fallacy of (explicitly or implicitly) assuming the truth of the conclusion of an argument as one of the premises employed in an effort to demonstrate its truth.
19
Q
belief
A
Affirmation of, or conviction regarding, the truth of a proposition. E.g. ‘I believe that the grass is green’.
20
Q
Cartesian circle
A
Refers to the circular reasoning Descartes seems to employ regarding clear and distinct ideas and God: Descartes cannot rely on clear and distinct ideas before proving God exists, but he cannot prove that God exists without relying on clear and distinct ideas.
21
Q
Categorical Imperative
A
‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’ (Kant).
22
Q
character
A
A person’s habitual dispositions regarding what they feel, how they think, how they react, the choices they make, and the actions they perform, under different circumstances.
23
Q
character trait
A
An attribute that is exhibited by an individual as a matter of habit, e.g. honesty or being bad-tempered.
24
Q
choice
A
What we decide upon as a result of deliberation, typically giving rise to voluntary action. Deliberate desire regarding something that is in one’s power (Aristotle).
25
circular
An argument is circular if it employs its own conclusion as a premise.
26
claim
A proposition that is asserted or affirmed to be true.
27
clear and distinct ideas
A clear idea is ‘present and accessible to the attentive mind’; a distinct idea is clear and also sharply separated from other ideas so that every part of it is clear (Descartes).
28
cogent
An inductive argument in which the truth of the premises (significantly) raises the probability that the conclusion is true.
29
cogito, the
‘I think’, Descartes' first certain knowledge.
30
cognitivism
A cognitivist account of ethical language argues that moral judgements express beliefs, can be true or false, and aim to describe the world. So ‘lying is wrong’ expresses the belief that lying is wrong, and is either true or false.
31
coherent
A set of statements are coherent if they are consistent and increase each other's probability.
32
common sense
The basic perceptions or understandings that are shared by many (most) people.
33
compatible
Two claims are compatible if they are consistent. Two properties are compatible if it is possible for something to have both of them at once.
34
composition, fallacy of
The informal fallacy of attributing some feature of the members of a collection to the collection itself, or reasoning from part to whole. E.g. ‘sodium and chloride are both dangerous to humans, therefore sodium-chloride (salt) is dangerous to humans’.
35
concept
Any abstract notion or idea by virtue of which we apply general terms to things.
36
conclusion
A proposition whose truth has been inferred from premises.
37
conditional
A proposition that takes the form of ‘if …, then …’. The conditional asserts that if the first statement (the antecedent) is true, then the second statement (the consequent) is also true. E.g. ‘If it is raining then the ground is wet’ asserts that if it is true that it is raining, it is true that the ground is wet.
38
conscience
An inner awareness, faculty, intuition or judgement that assists in distinguishing right from wrong.
39
consequent
The proposition that forms the second part of a conditional statement, usually the part of the sentence that occurs after ‘then’. E.g. In both ‘If it will rain then I will get wet and ‘I will get wet if it will rain’, the consequent is ‘I will get wet’.
40
consequentialism, act
The theory that actions are morally right or wrong depending on their consequences and nothing else. An act is right if it maximises what is good.
41
consistent
Two or more claims are consistent if they can both be true at the same time.
42
contingent
A proposition that could be either true or false, a state of affairs that may or may not hold, depending on how the world actually is.
43
contradiction
Two claims that cannot both be true, and cannot both be false. Or one claim that both asserts and denies something. E.g. ‘It is raining and it is not raining’.
44
contradiction in conception
In Kantian ethics, the test for whether we can will a maxim to become universal law can be failed if it would somehow be self-contradictory for everyone to act on that maxim.
45
contradiction in will
In Kantian ethics, the test for whether we can will a maxim to become universal law can be failed if, although the maxim is not self-contradictory, we cannot rationally will it.
46
copy principle, Humean
All simple ideas are copies of impressions.
47
counter-argument
An argument that attempts to establish a conclusion that undermines another argument, or the conclusion of another argument.
48
counterexamples, method of finding
If a theory makes a general claim, such as ‘all propositional knowledge is justified true belief’, we only need to find a single instance in which this is false (a counterexample) to show that the general claim is false and so something is wrong with the theory.
49
counter-intuitive
Something that doesn't fit with our intuition.
50
deduction
An argument whose conclusion is logically entailed by its premises, i.e. if the premises are true, the conclusion cannot be false.
51
definition
An explanation of the meaning of a word. Philosophical definitions often attempt to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the term being defined.
52
deontology
The study of what one must do (deon (Greek) means ‘one must’). Deontology claims that actions are right or wrong in themselves, not depending on their consequences. We have moral duties to do things which it is right to do and moral duties not to do things which it is wrong to do.
53
desirable
1) Worthy of being desired. 2) Capable of being desired.
54
desire
A state of mind that motivates a person to act in such a way as to satisfy the desire, e.g. if a person desires a cup of tea, they are motivated to make and drink a cup of tea.
55
dilemma
Two mutually exclusive and exhaustive options (horns), both of which face significant objections.
56
direct realism
Physical objects exist independently of our minds and of our perceptions of them, and the immediate objects of perception are mind-independent objects and their properties.
57
direction of fit
The direction of the relation between mind and world. In one direction, the mind ‘fits’ the world, as in belief. We change our beliefs to fit the facts. In the other direction, the world ‘fits’ the mind, as in desire. We act on our desires to change the world to satisfy our desires.
58
disanalogy
A point of dissimilarity between two things, something that two things don't have in common.
59
disjunction
An either/ or claim. An example of a disjunction is: ‘Either it will rain or it will be sunny’.
60
disjunctive theory of perception
If something looks a certain way, then one of two quite different things is going on: either I directly perceive a mind-independent physical object that is F or it appears to me just as if there is something that is F, but there is nothing that is F.
61
distinction
A difference or contrast between things.
62
doctrine of the mean
Aristotle's claim that virtue requires us to feel, choose and act in an ‘intermediate’ way, neither ‘too much’ nor ‘too little’, but ‘to feel [passions] at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way’.
63
duties, general/ specific
Duties are obligations we have towards someone or something. General duties are those we have towards anyone, e.g. do not murder, help people in need. Specific duties are those we have because of our particular personal or social relationships, e.g. to keep one's promises or to provide for one's children.
64
duties, perfect/ imperfect
Perfect duties are those we must always fulfil and have no choice over when or how (e.g. do not kill). Imperfect duties are cases in which we have some choice in how we fulfil the obligation (e.g. giving to charity). No specific person can demand that we fulfil an imperfect duty towards them.
65
emotivism
The theory that claims that moral judgements express a feeling or non-cognitive attitude, typically approval or disapproval, and aim to influence the feelings and actions of others.
66
empirical
Relating to or deriving from experience, especially sense experience, but also including experimental scientific investigation.
67
empiricism
The theory that there can be no a priori knowledge of synthetic propositions about the world (outside my mind), i.e. all a priori knowledge is of analytic propositions, while all knowledge of synthetic propositions is gained through sense experience.
68
empiricism, classical
The theory that all knowledge is gained from experience: All concepts are gained from sense experience or experience of our own minds; and all knowledge of synthetic propositions about the world (outside my mind) is gained through sense experience.
69
end
What an action seeks to achieve or secure, its aim or purpose.
70
end, final
An end that we desire for its own sake, we can't give some further purpose for why we seek it.
71
enumerative induction
The method of reasoning that argues from many instances of something to a general statement about that thing. E.g. the sun has risen in the morning every day for x number of days, therefore the sun rises in the morning.
72
epistemology
The study (-ology) of knowledge (episteme) and related concepts, including belief, justification and certainty. It looks at the possibility and sources of knowledge.
73
equivocation, fallacy of
The use of an ambiguous word or phrase in different senses within a single argument. E.g. ‘All banks are next to rivers, I deposit money in a bank, therefore I deposit money next to a river’.
74
ergon
‘Function’ or ‘characteristic activity’ of something, e.g. the ergon of a knife is to cut, the ergon of an eye is to see.
75
error theory
The theory that moral judgements make claims about objective moral properties, but that no such properties exist. Thus moral judgements are cognitive, but are all false. Moral language, as we mean to use it, rests on a mistake.
76
ethics
The branch of philosophy concerned with the evaluation of human conduct, including theories about which actions are right or wrong (normative ethics) and the meaning of moral language (metaethics).
77
eudaimonia
Often translated as ‘happiness’, but better understood as ‘living well and faring well’. According to Aristotle, eudaimonia is not subjective and is not a psychological state, but an objective quality of someone's life as a whole. It is the final end for human beings.
78
experience machine
Nozick's thought experiment concerning a virtual reality machine which someone plugs into for life. The machine will create the experience of a very happy life, but Nozick argues that we value being in touch with reality more, so we won't choose to plug in.
79
explanation
An intelligible account of why something happens. The thing to be explained (the explanandum) is usually accepted as a fact, and what is used to explain it (the explanans) is usually plausible but less certain.
80
external world
Everything that exists outside of our minds.
81
faculty
A mental capacity or ability, such as sight, the ability to feel fear, and reason.
82
fallacy/ fallacious
An error in reasoning. More exactly, a fallacy is an argument in which the premises do not offer rational support to the conclusion. If the argument is deductive, then it is fallacious if it is not valid. If the argument is inductive, it is fallacious if the premises do not make the conclusion more likely to be true.
83
FALSE
A proposition is false if things are not as it states. E.g. the proposition ‘grass is always purple’ is false, because there is grass that is not purple.
84
felicific calculus
In Bentham's ethics, the means of calculating pleasures and pains caused by an action and adding them up on a single scale. The total amount of happiness produced is the sum total of everyone's pleasures minus the sum total of everyone's pains.
85
first principles
Basic or foundational propositions in an area of knowledge or theory that are not deducible from other propositions.
86
Formula of Humanity
A version of the Categorical Imperative: ‘Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end’ (Kant).
87
function argument
Aristotle's argument that the human good (eudaimonia) will be achieved by performing our characteristic activity (ergon) well. Traits that enable us to fulfil our ergon, which is rational activity, are virtues (arête).
88
Gettier case
A situation in which we have justified true belief, but not knowledge, because the belief is only accidentally true, given the evidence that justifies it.
89
Golden Rule
The moral guideline that says ‘do unto others as you would have them do unto you’.
90
good
In ethics, what is good provides a standard of evaluation and what we should aim at in our actions and lives.
91
hallucination
A non-veridical perceptual experience that is not coherently connected with the rest of our perceptual experience.
92
hallucination, argument from
Against direct realism: The possibility of hallucinatory experiences that are subjectively indistinguishable from a veridical perception means that we don't immediately perceive physical objects, but sense-data.
93
hedonic calculus
See felicific calculus.
94
hedonism
The claim that pleasure is happiness and the only good.
95
Hume's ‘fork’
We can have knowledge of just two sorts of claim: the relations between ideas and matters of fact.
96
hypothesis
A proposal that needs to be confirmed or rejected by reasoning or experience.
97
hypothetical reasoning
Working out the best hypothesis that would explain or account for some experience or fact.
98
idea
An object of perception, thought, or understanding. Locke uses the term to refer to a complete thought, taking the form of a proposition, e.g. ‘bananas are yellow’; a sensation or sensory experience, e.g. a visual sensation of yellow; or a concept, e.g. YELLOW.
99
idea, complex
An idea that is derived from two or more simple ideas.
100
idea, simple
A single, uniform conception, with nothing distinguishable within it.
101
idealism, Berkeley's
All that exists are minds and ideas. What we think of as physical objects are, in fact, bundles of ideas. The immediate objects of perception (ordinary objects such as tables, chairs, etc.) are ideas, mind-dependent objects. Esse est percipi (aut percipere) – to be is to be perceived (or to perceive).
102
identical, numerically
One and the same thing. Everything is numerically identical to itself, and nothing else.
103
identical, qualitatively
Two or more things are qualitatively identical if they share their properties in common, for example, two separate copies of the same picture.
104
illusion
A distortion of the senses such that what we perceive is different from what exists.
105
illusion, argument from
Against direct realism: Illusions can be ‘subjectively indistinguishable’ from veridical perception (e.g. a crooked stick in water), so we see sense-data, and not physical objects, immediately.
106
imperative
A command or order. A hypothetical imperative is a statement about what you ought to do, on the assumption of some desire or goal, e.g. if you want to pass your exam, you ought to study hard. A categorical imperative is a statement about what you ought to do, without regard to what you want.
107
impression
What we are immediately and directly aware of, which can either be impressions of ‘sensation’ or impressions of ‘reflection’ (Locke, Hume). Impressions of sensation derive from our senses, impressions of reflection derive from our experience of our mind, including emotions.
108
inconceivable
Impossible to imagine, think or grasp.
109
inconsistent
Two claims are inconsistent if they can't both be true at the same time.
110
indirect realism
We perceive physical objects, which exist independently of the mind, indirectly via sense-data which are caused by and represent physical objects.
111
induction
An argument whose conclusion is supported by its premises, but is not logically entailed by them, i.e. if the premises are true, then this makes it (more) likely that the conclusion is true, but it is still possible that the conclusion is false.
112
infallibilism
To be knowledge, a belief must be certain. If we can doubt a belief, then it is not certain, and so it is not knowledge.
113
inference
Coming to accept a proposition as true on the basis of reasoning from other propositions taken to be true.
114
inference to the best explanation
An inductive argument form where the conclusion presents the ‘best explanation’ for why the premises are true.
115
infinite
Without any bounds or limits. E.g. the natural numbers form an infinite series, the numbers continue in both directions (positive and negative numbers) without any end point.
116
innate
Knowledge or ideas that are in some way built into the structure of the mind, rather than gained from sense experience.
117
innatism, concept
The claim that some of our concepts are innate, not derived from experience, but somehow part of the structure of the mind.
118
innatism, knowledge
The claim that there is at least some innate knowledge, not derived from experience, but somehow part of the structure of the mind.
119
integrity
Acting on and living by the values that you endorse.
120
intention
A mental state that expresses a person's choice. It specifies the action they choose and often their reason or end in acting.
121
intuition
Direct non-inferential awareness of abstract objects or truths.
122
intuition, rational
The capacity to discover the truth of a claim just by thinking about it using reason.
123
intuitionism
The theory that some moral judgements are self-evident, i.e. their truth can be known just by rational reflection upon the judgement itself. Moral intuitions are a type of synthetic a priori knowledge.
124
invalid
Not valid. A deductive argument is invalid if it is possible for the premises to be true while the conclusion is false.
125
involuntary
According to Aristotle, an act is involuntary if it is either forced or done from ignorance that is not culpable (especially if it is regretted once the ignorance is removed).
126
is– ought gap
Hume's claim that judgements about what ought to be the case are very different from judgements about what is the case, and cannot be deduced from them. The claim is made as an objection to moral cognitivism.
127
justice
The principle that each person receives their ‘due’. Aristotle distinguishes between wide and narrow senses. In the wide sense, anything legal is just, and anything illegal is unjust. In the narrow sense, justice is fairness.
128
justice in distribution
Justice concerning who gets which goods and other resources.
129
justice in rectification
Justice concerning how to correct an injustice.
130
justification
What is offered as grounds for believing an assertion.
131
lemma
A claim made part way through an argument.
132
matters of fact
States of affairs, how the world is. According to Hume, they are known through experience and induction, especially causal inference.
133
maxim
A personal principle that guides our decisions, e.g. ‘to get a good education’ (Kant).
134
meaning, descriptive
The aspect of the meaning of a sentence that asserts something about the world and can be evaluated as true or false.
135
meaning, emotive
The aspect of the meaning of a sentence that expresses or evokes an emotion.
136
meaning, prescriptive
The aspect of the meaning of a sentence that acts either to command or commend. For example, the prescriptive meaning of ‘lying is wrong’ might be ‘do not lie’.
137
meaningful
Having a linguistic (semantic) meaning.
138
means
What is done to achieve an end. Instrumental means are actions done to achieve some further, independent end, e.g. chopping vegetables in order to eat them. Constitutive means are those which are done as achieving the end, e.g. relaxing on the beach is a way of having a good holiday.
139
metaethics
The philosophical study of what morality is, enquiring into the meaning of moral language, the metaphysics of moral values, the epistemology of moral judgements, and the nature of moral attitudes.
140
metaphysics
The branch of philosophy that asks questions about the fundamental nature of reality. Meta- means above, beyond or after; physics enquires into the physical structure of reality.
141
mind-dependent
Depending on a mind for existence or definition, e.g. ideas are mind-dependent.
142
mind-independent
Not depending on a mind for existence or definition. According to realism in perception, physical objects are mind-independent; according to moral realism, moral properties are mind-independent (in some important way).
143
morality
The rules, ideals and expectations governing fundamental aspects of human conduct. It concerns right and wrong, good and bad, in human action and character.
144
motive
A mental state or consideration that inclines someone to act in a certain way. Someone's motive could be a reason for acting, an end, or a desire.
145
naturalism, moral
A form of moral realism that claims that moral properties are natural properties. According to reductive naturalism, moral properties are identical with certain properties that can be identified through sense experience and science, e.g. the claim that goodness is happiness understood as pleasure (a psychological property). According to non-reductive naturalism, moral properties are natural – related to human nature – but not a kind of property that science can investigate, e.g. the good life is eudaimonia (a complex psychological, rational and normative property).
146
naturalistic fallacy
According to Moore, the mistake of identifying moral good with any natural property.
147
necessary
A proposition that must be true (or if false, it must be false), a state of affairs that must hold.
148
necessary condition
One proposition is a necessary condition of another when the second cannot be true while the first is false. For example, being a man is a necessary condition of being a bachelor, as if you are not a man you cannot be a bachelor.
149
nihilism
The view that there are no moral values.
150
no false lemmas
The ‘no false lemmas’ condition is sometimes added to the tripartite theory of knowledge and says that for something to count as knowledge it must be the case that you did not infer it from anything false.
151
non-cognitivism
The theory that claims that moral judgements express non-cognitive attitudes. Moral judgements do not make claims about reality and are not true or false (they are not fact-stating).
152
non-naturalism, moral
A form of moral realism that claims that moral properties are not natural properties.
153
non-voluntary
According to Aristotle, an action is non-voluntary if it is done from ignorance and if the ignorance is lifted, the agent does not regret the action.
154
normative
Relating to ‘norms’, rules or reasons.
155
normative ethics
The branch of ethics concerned with developing theories concerning what (e.g. which actions, which character traits, which intentions) is right or wrong, good or bad.
156
objection
A claim or argument that is given as a reason against the truth of another claim or argument.
157
objective
Independent of what people think or feel. A claim is objectively true if its truth does not depend on people's beliefs.
158
Ockham's razor
The principle that states that we should not put forward a hypothesis that says many different things exist when a simpler explanation will do as well. ‘Do not multiply entities beyond necessity’. A simpler explanation is a better explanation, as long as it is just as successful.
159
ontology
The study (-ology) of what exists or ‘being’ (ont).
160
open question argument
Moore's argument that identifying the property ‘good’ with any other property is never correct because whether that property is, in fact, good is an open question (logically, it can receive a yes or no answer), whereas whether some property is itself is not an open question.
161
paradox
A claim or set of claims that are contradictory but present a philosophical challenge, e.g. ‘This sentence is false’ (if the sentence is true, it is false; if the sentence is false, it is true).
162
partiality
Favouring some people, e.g. family and friends, over others.
163
passions
In Aristotle, bodily appetites (for food, drink, sex, etc.), emotions, desires, and any feelings accompanied by pleasure or pain.
164
perception
Awareness of apparently external objects through use of the senses.
165
perception, immediate objects of
What we are directly aware of in perception, which may be physical objects or sensations of these.
166
perceptual variation, argument from
Against direct realism: Different people perceive the same physical object differently. Therefore, what each person perceives is how the object appears to them. This appearance is mind-dependent sense-data. Physical objects are therefore not perceived directly.
167
permissible
An action that is neither morally forbidden nor required (obligatory).
168
physical object
Material objects, including things like tables, books, our own bodies, plants, mountains.
169
plausible
Fits with what else we already know.
170
pleasures, higher and lower
According to Mill, one pleasure is higher than another if almost everyone who is ‘competently acquainted’ with both prefers one over the other. Higher pleasures include thought, feeling and imagination, while lower pleasures involve the body and senses.
171
possible
Capable of happening/ existing/ being the case. If something is possible, it could be true.
172
practical ethics
See applied ethics.
173
practical reason
Reasons and reasoning concerned with what we can change, and with making good choices.
174
practical wisdom (phronesis)
An intellectual virtue of practical reason, ‘a true and reasoned state or capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man’ (Aristotle). It involves knowledge of what is good or bad in general and what is good in a particular situation, and the abilities to deliberate well and act on that deliberation.
175
predicate
The part of a sentence or clause containing a verb or adjective, and stating something about the subject. E.g. in ‘Jane is happy’ the predicate is ‘is happy’.
176
premise
A proposition that, as part of an argument, provides or contributes to a reason to believe that the conclusion is true.
177
prescriptivism
The non-cognitive theory that moral judgements are prescriptive, that is, moral judgements provide commands and recommendations about how to act.
178
preservation of truth
Valid deductive arguments preserve truth, meaning that when the premises are true, anything that logically follows from them will also be true.
179
primary quality
Properties that are ‘utterly inseparable’ from a physical object, whatever changes it goes through, even if it is divided into smaller and smaller pieces. The object has these properties ‘in and of itself’. Locke lists extension (he also talks of size), shape, motion, number and solidity as primary qualities.
180
proof
The demonstration of the truth of a proposition using a valid deductive argument from known or certain premises to that proposition as its conclusion.
181
property
An attribute or characteristic of an object. E.g. the property of being green, or being tall.
182
property, moral
An attribute or characteristic of an object that is ethically normative, e.g. goodness or being a virtue.
183
property, natural/ non-natural
Natural properties are those that we can identify through sense experience and science. Non-natural properties cannot be analysed in terms of or reduced to natural properties.
184
property, relational
A characteristic that something has only in relation to another thing. E.g. ‘Pete is taller than Bob’, or ‘Alice loves Jack’.
185
proposition
A declarative statement (or more accurately, what is claimed by a declarative statement), such as ‘mice are mammals’. Propositions can go after ‘that’ in ‘I believe that …’ and ‘I know that …’.
186
propositional knowledge
Knowing ‘that’ some claim – a proposition – is true or false, e.g. ‘I know that Paris is the capital of France’.
187
prove
To demonstrate that a proposition is true by giving a valid deductive argument from known or certain premises to that proposition as the conclusion.
188
queerness, argument from
Mackie's argument that moral properties, understood as non-natural properties, are (metaphysically and epistemologically) puzzling and improbable, which is a reason to believe they do not exist.
189
rationalism
The theory that there can be a priori knowledge of synthetic propositions about the world (outside my mind) gained through rational insight and reasoning.
190
rationalism, classical
The theory that there can be a priori knowledge of synthetic propositions about the world (outside my mind) that is innate and then developed through rational insight and reasoning. The concepts involved in innate knowledge are also thereby innate.
191
realism, moral
The theory that claims moral judgements are made true or false by objective moral properties that exist and are mind-independent (in some sense).
192
reason
A statement presented in justification for a claim. A good reason in some way raises the probability that the claim is true.
193
reasoning
The process of thinking about something in a logical way, in particular, drawing inferences on the basis of reasons.
194
reductio ad absurdum
A form of argument that shows that some claim leads to a contradiction.
195
reflection
Locke: Our experience of ‘the internal operations of our minds’, gained through introspection or an awareness of what the mind is doing. More generally, thinking.
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relations of ideas
Hume: Relations of ideas are established by pure thought or reflection and are ‘intuitively and demonstratively certain’. The negation of a relation of ideas is a contradiction.
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relativism
The theory that some area of discourse, e.g. concerning truth, knowledge or morality, is ‘relative to’ a society or person. According to relativism, a proposition may be true ‘for’ one person but not another; or an action may be morally right in one society but not another.
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reliabilism
The theory that you know that p if p is true, you believe that p, and your belief is caused by a reliable cognitive process.
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represent
A relation of one thing (e.g. sense-data) to another (e.g. physical objects) established by an accurate and systematic correlation of the first to the second.
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resemblance
A relation of similarity (in properties or appearance) between two things, e.g. sense-data and physical objects.
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responsibility, moral
Accountability for the actions one performs and the consequences they bring about, for which a moral agent can be justly praised or blamed. Moral responsibility is commonly held to require the agent's freedom to have done otherwise.
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right reason (orthos logos)
In Aristotle, the standard for judging whether a character trait or an action conforms to the mean. Virtues and right actions are in accordance with ‘right reason’.
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rights
Justified moral demands regarding how other people may treat us, especially the freedoms (e.g. from harm) or benefits (e.g. education) they ought to provide. We are entitled to our rights in the sense that others have a moral obligation to respect them.
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sceptical
Not easily convinced, or having doubts or reservations. (Not to be confused with scepticism.)
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scepticism
The view that our usual justifications for claiming our beliefs amount to knowledge are inadequate, so we do not in fact have knowledge.
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scepticism, global
Scepticism about all knowledge claims, especially concerning the existence and nature of anything outside the mind.
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scepticism, local
Scepticism about some specific claim, or more commonly, about some area/ branch of supposed knowledge.
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scope
The extent or range over which something applies, e.g. the scope of this glossary is the AQA syllabus for epistemology and moral philosophy.
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secondary principles
In Mill, moral ‘rules of thumb’ that, if followed, generally produce happiness, e.g. ‘tell the truth’. Mill argues that we have learned secondary principles through human history, through trial and error.
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secondary quality
Properties that physical objects have that are ‘nothing but powers to produce various sensations in us’. Locke lists ‘colours, sounds, tastes, and so on’, later adding smells and temperature.
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self-evident
A proposition that can be known just by rational reflection on that proposition.
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sensation
Our experience of objects outside the mind, perceived through the senses.
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sense experience
Experiences given to us by our senses.
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sense-data (singular sense-datum)
Mental images or representations of what is perceived, the ‘content’ of perceptual experience. If sense-data exist, they are the immediate objects of perception and are ‘private’, mind-dependent mental things.
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senses
Capacities that give us experience of the external world. They include sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch and bodily awareness.
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sensible quality
A property that can be detected by the senses.
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sentience
The ability to feel, perceive or experience subjectively, in particular the capacity to experience pleasure and pain.
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signposts
Sentences that indicate what the text is about, what has been, is being, or will be argued. E.g. ‘I will now argue that …’.
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simulated killing
The dramatisation of killing within a fictional context, e.g. in video games, films and plays. It is not merely the description of a killing, as in a novel, but a fictional enactment of killing that the audience or gamer can see and hear.
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skill analogy
The analogy between virtues and practical skills. In Aristotle, virtues are said to be like practical skills because we learn both through practice (what we do), not (just) theory; and we gain an expertise that is sensitive to individual situations.
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solipsism
The view that only oneself, one's mind, exists. There are no mind-independent physical objects and there are no other minds either.
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sophism
The use of plausible arguments that are actually fallacious, especially when someone dishonestly presents such an argument as if it were legitimate reasoning.
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soul
In Aristotle, that part of the person that relates to mind and life. According to Aristotle, the soul has three parts – a part relating to being alive, a part characterised by desires and emotions that are responsive to reason, and rational intellect.
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sound
A deductive argument is sound if it is valid with true premises.
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speciesism
Unfair discrimination on the basis of what species something belongs to.
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stealing
Taking someone else's property with no intention of returning it and without their permission (or without the legal right to do so).
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subjective
That which depends upon the personal or individual, especially where it is supposed to be an arbitrary expression of preference.
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subjectivism
The theory that moral judgements assert or report approval or disapproval, e.g. ‘Murder is wrong’ means ‘Most people disapprove of murder’.
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subjectivism, speaker
The theory that moral judgements assert the approval or disapproval of the speaker, e.g. ‘Murder is wrong’ means ‘I disapprove of X’. Therefore, whether a moral judgement is true or false depends on the attitudes of the speaker.
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sufficient condition
One proposition is a sufficient condition for another when the first cannot be true while the second is false. For example, being a dog is sufficient for being an animal, because something can't be a dog without also being an animal.
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synthetic
A proposition that is not analytic, but true or false depending on how the world is.
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systematic correlation
A relationship between two things whereby a change in one is always accompanied by a change in the other.
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tabula rasa
Latin for ‘blank slate’. Locke claims that at birth our mind is a tabula rasa, meaning we have no innate knowledge or ideas.
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tautology
A statement that repeats the subject in the predicate, that ‘says the same thing twice’. E.g. ‘Green things are green’.
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theoretical reason
Reasons and reasoning concerned with what we can't change and what is true.
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thought experiment
A philosophical method designed to test a hypothesis or philosophical claim through imagining a hypothetical situation and coming to a judgement.
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time-lag argument
Against direct realism: Because it takes time for us to perceive physical objects, we don't see them directly. For example, as light takes 8 minutes to reach the earth from the sun, if you look at the sun you are actually seeing it as it was 8 minutes ago. Therefore, you are not perceiving the sun directly.
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tripartite view of knowledge
Justified true belief is necessary and sufficient for propositional knowledge (S knows that p if and only if S is justified in believing that p, p is true, and S believes that p).
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TRUE
A proposition is true if things are as it states. E.g. the proposition ‘the grass is green’ is true if the grass is green, and otherwise it is false.
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tyranny of the majority
The unjust exercise of power by a majority of people over a minority who have different values or desires, e.g. outlawing a minority religion because most people want it outlawed.
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unanalysable
Not subject to analysis.
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universal
A statement that applies to all/ every member of a class or domain. E.g. ‘All whales are mammals’ and ‘Every boy likes ice cream’.
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universalise
To apply to everything/ everyone.
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unperceived objects
Objects that exist when not perceived by anyone.
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unsound
A deductive argument is unsound if it is either invalid or has at least one false premise.
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utilitarianism, act
The theory that only happiness is good, and the right act is that act that maximises happiness. Hedonist act utilitarianism understands happiness in terms of the balance of pleasure over pain.
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utilitarianism, preference
The theory that we should maximise happiness, which is understood not in terms of pleasure and pain, but in terms of the satisfaction of people's preferences.
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utilitarianism, rule
The theory that only happiness is good, and the right act is that act that complies with those rules which, if everybody followed them, would lead to the greatest happiness (compared to any other set of rules).
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utility
The property of an object or action in virtue of which it tends to produce happiness.
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utility, principle of
The defining principle of act utilitarianism: ‘that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question’ (Bentham).
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valid
An argument in which, if the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true. In this case, we say that the conclusion is entailed by the premises. Only deductive arguments can be valid.
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value judgement
A judgement regarding whether something is good or bad in some way.
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value theory
Any theory about what is good, e.g. a utilitarian value theory claims that only happiness is good.
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veridical
A proposition that is true or an experience that represents the world as it actually is.
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verification principle
The principle that all meaningful claims are either analytic or empirically verifiable (Ayer). A statement is analytic if it is true or false just in virtue of the meanings of the words. A statement is empirically verifiable if empirical evidence would go towards establishing that the statement is true or false.
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vice
A trait that is morally bad. Aristotle argues that vices are dispositions to feel or choose not in the mean, but either too much or too little.
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virtue
Traits or states of a person that enable them to achieve some good purpose, especially living a morally good life. Aristotle argues that virtues are traits in accordance with reason, and distinguishes virtues of intellect and virtues of character.
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virtue epistemology
S knows that p if and only if p is true, S believes that p, and S's belief that p is the result of S exercising their epistemic/ intellectual virtues; in Zagzebski's definition, S knows that p if S believes that p and S's belief arises from an act of intellectual virtue.
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virtue ethics
The normative theory that starts from the question of what it is to be a good person, then derives an account of morally right action as what a good person would do. Aristotle argues that a good person has the virtues, which enable them to achieve eudaimonia.
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virtue, epistemic/ intellectual
A skill, ability or trait of the mind or person that contributes to the good end of gaining knowledge and forming true beliefs.
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voluntary
According to Aristotle, we act voluntarily when we act as we choose. We know what we are doing, and we bring it about ourselves.
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waves of doubt
Descartes' three arguments supporting scepticism. The first, an argument from illusion, throws doubt on always believing what our senses tell us. The second, an argument from dreaming, throws doubt on all sense perception, and therefore on the nature of reality. The third, the possibility that an evil demon is deceiving us, throws doubt on all judgement, including the existence of a physical world and the truths of mathematics.
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will, good
In Kant, the good will is the will that is motivated by duty, which Kant argues means that it chooses in accordance with reason. It is the only thing that is morally good without qualification.
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will, the
Our ability to make choices and decisions. Our wills are rational; that is, we can make choices on the basis of reasons.
