111 MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS FUNDAMENTALS Flashcards

Question

Humanitarian Assistance (HA)

Answer 1

HA operations relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation in countries or regions outside the United States. HA provided by US forces is generally limited in scope and duration; it is intended to supplement or complement efforts of host-nation (HN) civil authorities or agencies with the primary responsibility for providing assistance. DOD provides assistance when the relief need is gravely urgent and when the humanitarian emergency dwarfs the ability of normal relief agencies to effectively respond The US military can respond rapidly to emergencies or disasters and achieve order in austere locations. US forces can provide logistics; command, control, communications, and computers; and the planning required to initiate and sustain HA operations. HA operations may be directed by the NCA when a serious international situation threatens the political or military stability of a region considered of interest to the United States, or when the NCA deems the humanitarian situation itself sufficient and appropriate for employment of US forces. DOS or the US ambassador in country is responsible for declaring a foreign disaster or situation that requires HA. Within DOD, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy has the overall responsibility for developing the military policy for international HA operations. HA operations may cover a broad range of missions. An HA mission could also include securing an environment to allow humanitarian relief efforts to proceed. US military forces participate in three basic types of HA operations: those coordinated by the UN, those where the United States acts in concert with other multinational forces, or those where the United States responds unilaterally. Examples of humanitarian assistance are Operations SEA ANGEL I, conducted in 1991, and SEA ANGEL II, conducted in 1992, to provide assistance in the aftermath of devastating natural disasters in Bangladesh.

Answer 2

These operations provide temporary support to domestic civil authorities when permitted by law, and are normally taken when an emergency overtaxes the capabilities of the civil authorities. Support to civil authorities can be as diverse as temporary augmentation of air traffic controllers and postal workers during strikes, restoration of law and order in the aftermath of riots, protection of life and federal property, or providing relief in the aftermath of a natural disaster. Authority for additional support to law enforcement officials is contained in DOD Directive 5525.5, “DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials,” and permits such support as loan of equipment, use of facilities, training, and transfer of information. Support is constrained in some instances by the Economy Act (31 US Code Section 1535), which may require the requesting agency to provide reimbursement. Limitations on military forces in providing support to civil authorities include, among others, the Posse Comitatus Act, Title 18, US Code Section 1385-- Use of Army and Air Forces as Posse Comitatus. This Act prohibits the use of federal military forces to enforce or otherwise execute laws unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress. Statutory exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act which allow active duty military members to respond to civil disturbances are included under Title 10 Sections 331 to 333: Request from a State (331), Enforcement of Federal Law (332), and Protection of Civil Rights (333). Additional important exceptions to Posse Comitatus are found in Title 10 Sections 371-380. Examples of military support to civil authorities are disaster relief provided during Hurricanes Andrew in Florida and Iniki in Hawaii in 1992, and deployment of troops during a civil disturbance in California in 1992. Under DOD Directive 3025.1, “Military Support to Civil Authorities,” the Secretary of the Army is designated the Executive Agent for MSCA.

Answer 3

Civil or military assistance (other than HA) rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation. Nation assistance operations support a HN by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. Nation assistance programs often include, but are not limited to, security assistance, FID, and HCA. All nation assistance actions are integrated through the US Ambassador’s Country Plan. Security Assistance. Security assistance refers to a group of programs by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Some examples of US security assistance programs are Foreign Military sales, Foreign Military Financing Program, International Military Education and Training Program, Economic Support Fund, and commercial sales licensed under the Arms Export Control Act.* Security Assistance Surges. Security assistance surges accelerate release of equipment, supplies, or services when an allied or friendly nation faces an imminent military threat. Security assistance surges are military in nature and are focused on providing additional combat systems (weapons and equipment) or supplies, but may include the full range of security assistance, to include financial and training support.

Answer 4

These operations normally relocate threatened noncombatants from a foreign country. Although principally conducted to evacuate US citizens, NEOs may also include selective evacuation of citizens from the HN as well as citizens from other countries. NEO methods and timing are significantly influenced by diplomatic considerations. Under ideal circumstances there may be little or no opposition; however, commanders should anticipate opposition and plan the operation like any combat operation. NEOs are similar to a raid in that the operation involves swift insertion of a force, temporary occupation of objectives, and ends with a planned withdrawal. It differs from a raid in that force used is normally limited to that required to protect the evacuees and the evacuation force. Forces penetrating foreign territory to conduct a NEO should be kept to the minimum consistent with mission accomplishment and the security of the force and the extraction and protection of evacuees. Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, the DOS is responsible for the protection and evacuation of American citizens abroad and for guarding their property. This order also directs the DOD to advise and assist the DOS in preparing and implementing plans for the evacuation of US citizens. The US Ambassador, or Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, is responsible for the preparation of Emergency Action Plans that address the military evacuation of US citizens and designated foreign nationals from a foreign country. The conduct of military operations assist implementation of Emergency Action Plans is the responsibility of the geographic combatant commander. Evacuation operations are characterized by uncertainty. Evacuation operations may be directed without warning because of sudden changes in a country’s government, reoriented political or military relationship with the United States, a sudden hostile threat to US citizens from elements within or external to a foreign country, or in response to a natural disaster. Joint Pub 3-07.5, “JTTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations,” provides detailed guidance. Examples of NEO are EASTERN EXIT, conducted in 1991, when US and foreign national personnel were evacuated from Somalia, and QUICK LIFT, also conducted in 1991, when personnel were evacuated from Zaire.

Answer 5

Military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term politicalnsettlement and categorized as peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement operations. PO are conducted in conjunction with the various diplomatic activities necessary to secure a negotiated truce and resolve the conflict. Additional types of MOOTW (e.g., HA and NEO) may complement peace operations. Military PO are tailored to each situation and may be conducted in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after conflict. Peacekeeping Operations. PKO are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreements) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. An example of PKO is the US commitment to the Multinational Force Observers in the Sinai since 1982. Joint Pub 3-07.3, “JTTP for Peace Operations,” (in draft) provides additional information on peacekeeping Peace Enforcement Operations. PEO are the application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. PEO missions include intervention operations, as well as operations to restore order, enforce sanctions, forcibly separate belligerents, and establish and supervise exclusion zones for the purpose of establishing an environment for truce or cease-fire. Unlike PKO, such operations do not require the consent of the states involved or of other parties to the conflict. Examples of PEO are Operation POWER PACK conducted in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the secondary effort in Somalia (UNITAF), 1992-1993. Relationship of Peace Operations to Diplomatic Activities. US military peace operations support political objectives and diplomatic objectives. Military support improves the chances for success in the peace process by lending credibility to diplomatic actions and demonstrating resolve to achieve viable political settlements. In addition to PO, the military may conduct operations in support of the following diplomatic peace activities: Preventive Diplomacy. Preventive diplomacy consists of diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. Military support to diplomacy may, for example, take the form of a preventive deployment. An example is Operation ABLE SENTRY, where US Forces deployed in 1993 to Macedonia in support of the UN effort to limit the fighting in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. Peacemaking. Peacemaking is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to conflict. Military activities that support peacemaking include military-to- military relations and security assistance. Peace Building. Peace building consists of post-conflict actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Military support to peace building may include, for example, units rebuilding roads, reestablishing or creating government entities, or the training of defense forces.

Answer 6

When necessary, US forces provide protection of US flag vessels, US citizens (whether embarked in US or foreign vessels), and their property against unlawful violence in and over international waters. With the consent of the flag state this protection may be extended to foreign flag vessels under international law. Protection of shipping includes coastal sea control, harbor defense, port security,counter mine operations, and environmental defense, in addition to operations on the high seas. It requires the coordinated employment of surface, air, space, and subsurface units, sensors, and weapons, as well as a command structure both ashore and afloat, and a logistics base. Protection of shipping is accomplished by a combination of operations. Area operations, either land-based or sea-based, are designed to prevent a hostile force from obtaining a tactical position from which to attack friendly or allied shipping This includes ocean surveillance systems that provide data for threat location and strike operations against offending bases or facilities. Threats not neutralized by area operations must be deterred or addressed by escort operations. Generally, escorts are associated with convoys, although individual ships or a temporary grouping of ships may be escorted for a specific purpose. Mine countermeasures operations are integral to successful protection of shipping and are an essential element of escort operations. An example of protection of shipping is Operation EARNEST WILL, the reflagging of Kuwaiti ships in 1987. Environmental defense operations provide for coordinated Coast Guard/DOD response to major pollution incidents both at home and overseas. These incidents have the potential for grave damage to natural resources, the economy, and military operations.

Answer 7

Conducted to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel or human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. These operations are generally sophisticated activities requiring detailed planning in order to execute them, especially when conducting them in denied areas. They may be clandestine, covert, or overt. Other recovery operations may be conducted in friendly areas, particularly when the HN does not have the means to provide technical assistance in conducting the recovery. An example of a recovery operation is OPERATION FULL ACCOUNTING conducted to account for and recover the remains of US service members lost during the Vietnam War.

Answer 8

These operations, designed to demonstrate US resolve, involve increased visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that if allowed to continue may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives. US forces deployed abroad lend credibility to US promises and commitments, increase its regional influence, and demonstrate its resolve to use military force if necessary. In addition, the NCA order shows of force to bolster and reassure friends and allies. Show of force operations are military in nature but often serve both political and military purposes. These operations can influence other governments or politicomilitary organizations to respect US interests as well as international law. A show of force involves the appearance of a credible military force to underscore US policy interests or commitment to an alliance or coalition political concerns dominate a show of force. Military forces conduct these operations within legal and political constraints. The force coordinates its operations with the country teams affected. A show of force can involve a wide range of military forces including joint US military or multinational forces. Additionally, a show of force may include or transition to joint or multinational exercises. As an example of a show of force, Operation JTF-Philippines was conducted by US forces in 1989 in support of President Aquino during a coup attempt against the Philippine government. During this operation, a large special operations force was formed, USAF fighter aircraft patrolled above rebel air bases, and two aircraft carriers were positioned off the Philippines

Answer 9

Strikes are offensive operations conducted to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective for political purposes. Strikes may be used for punishing offending nations or groups, upholding international law, or preventing those nations or groups from launching their own offensive actions. A raid is usually a small-scale operation involving swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. An example of a strike is Operation URGENT FURY, conducted on the island of Grenada in 1983. An example of a raid is Operation EL DORADO CANYON conducted against Libya in 1986, in response to the terrorist bombing of US Service members in Berlin. Joint Pub 3-02, “Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations,” provides specific guidance on amphibious raids

Answer 10

Throughout history, military planners have viewed cities as centers of gravity. As such, in war, cities are something to be either protected or taken away, depending upon one’s perspective (MCDP 1, Warfighting). Cities house the population centers, transportation hubs, seats of government, sources of wealth, centers for industry, information networks, and key nodes of communication within a nation. Recent forecasts based on population statistics and the worldwide migration trend from agrarian to industrialized societies predict that 85 percent of the world’s population will reside in urbanized areas by the year 2025. As the world trend toward urbanization increases, the military significance of cities is likely to increase proportionally. Urbanized areas, themselves, may be significant sources of future conflict. Cities historically are where radical ideas ferment, dissenters find allies, mixtures of people cause ethnic friction, and discontented groups receive media attention. Adversaries may focus on the capture of radio and television stations in an attempt to influence public opinion and attain their political goals. Our political leaders may take advantage to neutralize or stabilize some extremely volatile political situations, or to provide assistance to allies in need of support, by deploying U.S. forces into urban environments.

Answer 11

As the Nation’s force in readiness, forward deployed with expeditionary forces, Marines must be prepared to fight on urbanized terrain. In the past two decades, MAGTFs ranging in size from MEFs (Saudi Arabia, Desert Shield/Desert Storm; Somalia, Restore Hope) through Marine expeditionary units (MEUs) (Beirut, Lebanon; Grenada, Urgent Fury; Somalia, Eastern Exit and Restore Hope) have participated in MOUT. The task-organization and combined-arms aspect of the MAGTF makes it well suited for combat on urbanized terrain. The results of geographical studies show that 60 percent of politically significant urban areas outside allied or former Warsaw Pact territory are located along or within 25 miles of a coastline; 75 percent are within 150 miles; 87 percent are within 300 miles; 95 percent are within 600 miles; and all are within 800 miles. U.S. embassies and diplomatic facilities are primarily located in cities where the host country’s political and economic leadership is concentrated. The Marine Corps will continue to play a prominent role in future evacuations of U.S. citizens, as well as the conduct of peace, counterinsurgency, and contingency operations centered on urbanized areas. Today’s Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) are deployed as part of naval expeditionary forces (NEFs) that maintain a global forward presence for rapid crisis response. These integrated combined-arms forces are part of the Nation’s proven contingency and naval power projection force. Therefore, Marines may find themselves rapidly deployed and employed in actions across the spectrum of military operations. Many of these trouble spots will likely be located in or around large urban centers. In the years since World War II, the United States has employed military force more than 200 times. Of these, four out of five involved naval forces, and the majority of the naval efforts included Marines embarked in amphibious ships. The reasons are straightforward: availability and adaptability. Availability derives from the loiter time of forward deployed forces embarked on amphibious shipping. Adaptability comes from the Marine Corps’ MAGTF organization, doctrine, training, and equipment, which prepare us for expeditionary missions from the sea in support of a variety of missions, including forcible entry. Enhancing our adaptability are the maritime prepositioning forces (MPFs). MPFs provide a rapid buildup of combat and logistics equipment that is joined with Marines on a distant shore, creating a substantial combat force. Despite our availability and adaptability, the prospect of urban warfare combined with an amphibious assault is a complex task, which requires special preparation. At the outset of a developing situation, forward-deployed expeditionary forces can move quickly within range of a crisis that threatens the political stability of a country. Urban intervention operations must often be planned and executed in a matter of hours or days (rather than weeks or months) to take advantage of the internal turmoil surrounding a developing crisis. Navy and Marine forces should anticipate deployment to urbanized areas on a day-to-day basis

Answer 12

Stalingrad (1942-1943) The tenacious Soviet defense of Stalingrad cost the attacking Germans dearly in every way and set up conditions for a decisive counteroffensive. This classic urban battle involved large forces and resulted in innovative urban combat techniques and the creation of the highly successful storm groups (task-organized assault units). (Length of battle: greater than 30 days) (Casualties: 1,630,000+)

Answer 13

Seoul (1950) Following the Inchon landing, U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces recaptured the South Korean capital from the North Koreans. The fighting was unusual in that combat was largely centered on seizure of street barricades rather than buildings. (Length of battle: 6 - 13 days) (Casualties: Marines, 2,383; others, estimated in the thousands)

Answer 14

Quang Tri I and II (1972) An objective of the North Vietnamese 1972 winter-spring offensive was the capture of Quang Tri, the northernmost major city in South Vietnam. The NVA overwhelmed the Army, Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) defenders (I). Later, the city was recaptured (II) by a smaller ARVN force using extensive artillery and air support. The large conventional forces involved on both sides made Quang Tri I and II the major urban battles of the Vietnam War. (Length of battle: Quang Tri I, 6 - 13 days; Quang Tri II, 30 days or greater) (Casualties: battles combined, 30,000+)

Answer 15

Fallujah Iraq (2004) First Battle (4 April-01 May 2004): The largest combat mission since the declaration of the end of “major hostilities”, the First Battle of Fallujah marked a turning point in public perception of the on-going conflict. This was because insurgents, rather than Saddam loyalists, were seen as the chief opponents of U.S. forces. The battle also pushed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi into the public spotlight as the best-known commander of anti-Coalition forces in Iraq, and brought public attention to the concept of a Sunni Triangle. (Length of battle 30 days) (Casualties: 27 U.S. service members were killed).

Answer 16

A joint American, Iraqi and British offensive in November and December 2004, considered the highest point of conflict in Fallujah, Iraqi War. It was led by the U.S. Marine Corps against Iraqi Insurgency stronghold in the city of Fallujah and was authorized by the U.S.- appointed Iraqi Interim Government. The U.S. military called it “some of the heaviest urban combat U.S. Marines have been involved since the Battle of Hue City in Vietnam in 1968. (Length: of battle, greater than 30 days) (Casualties: Coalition Forces had suffered 107 killed and 613 wounded during operation Phantom Fury).

Answer 17

Operation Moshtarak (Dari for Together or Joint) was an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) pacification offensive in the town of Marjah, Helmand Province, Afghanistan. It involved 15,000 American, Afghan, Canadian, Estonian, Danish and British troops and constituted the largest joint operation of the War in Afghanistan up to that point and aimed to remove the Taliban from Marjah and eliminate the last Taliban stronghold in central Helmand Province. The main target of the offensive was the town of Marjah, which had been controlled for years by the Taliban as well as drug traffickers. Although Moshtarak was described as the largest in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, it was originally supposed to be the prelude to a much larger offensive in Kandahar that would follow Moshtarak by several months. However ISAF chose to heavily publicize the operation before it was launched, comparing its scope and size to the 2004 Second Battle of Fallujah, in the hopes that Taliban fighters in the town would flee. The operation was also designed to showcase improvements in both the Afghan government and Afghan security forces. ISAF claimed that the operation was "Afghan-led" would use five Afghan brigades. General Stanley A. McChrystal, the commander of ISAF, also promised that following the offensive ISAF would install a "government in a box" in Marjah. Although initially successful, ISAF and the Afghans failed to set up a working government in the town, leading to a successful resurgence by the Taliban; 90 days into the offensive General McChrystal famously referred to it as a "bleeding ulcer". In October the town was still described as "troubling”, but by early December 2010 the fighting there was declared "essentially over". (Length of battle: 11 months). The number of coalition casualties could not be disclosed; however, intelligence sources in the early days of the fighting estimated 120 Taliban fighters killed.

Answer 18

Large concentrations of noncombatants (civilians) can greatly impede tactical operations and have the following effects on military operations: Mobility Firepower Security Obstacle Employment

Answer 19

Mobility Noncombatants attempting to escape the battle space, can block military movement. Commanders plan routes to be used by civilians and seek the assistance of the civil police in refugee control.

Answer 20

Firepower The presence of noncombatants can restrict the use of firepower. Areas may be designated no-fire areas to prevent noncombatant casualties. Other areas may be limited to small-arms fire and grenades. The control of fire missions may be complicated by the requirement for positive target identification. Detailed guidance on the use of fires in the presence of noncombatants is promulgated by the MAGTF commander. In the absence of guidance, the general rules of the law of land warfare apply.

Answer 21

Security The presence of noncombatants increases security requirements in an urban environment to preclude: Noncombatants entering defensive areas, pilferage of equipment, sabotage, terrorism

Answer 22

Obstacle Employment The presence and movement of noncombatants will influence the MAGTFs commander's obstacle plan. Minefields may not be allowed on designated refugee routes or, if allowed, must be guarded until the passage of refugees is completed. The use of booby-traps may be curtailed until noncombatants have been evacuated. Commanders need to review and understand current national and international treaties concerning the employment of mines and booby-traps.

Answer 23

Operational Maneuver from the Sea Focuses on an operational objective. Uses the sea as maneuver space. Generates overwhelming tempo and momentum. Pits strength against weakness. Emphasizes intelligence, deceptions, and flexibility. Integrates all organic, joint, and combined assets.

111 MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS FUNDAMENTALS Flashcards

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