Midterm Vocab

Question 1

Naive Realism

Answer 1

Believe that a sensory experience’s phenomenal character consists in

1) external world objects

2) subject’s perspective upon those obects and properties

Question 2

Naive Realists believe that a sensory experience’s phenomenal character consists in (2)

Answer 2

1) external world objects and their properties.

2) subject’s perspective upon those obects and properties

Question 3

MGF Martin’s 2 main questions

Answer 3

1) Is sensory experience constitutively dependent on the existence of its object?

2) Is sensory experience constitutively sufficient for the existence of its object?

Question 4

Do naive realists believe that sensory experience is dependent on the existence of its object?

Answer 4

Yes

Question 5

Do naive realists think that sensory experience is sufficient for the existence of its object?

Answer 5

No

Question 6

Why don’t naive realists think sensory experience is sufficient for the existence of its object?

Answer 6

(like sense datum theorists) they insist that the sensory experience of an object requires awareness (rather than mere representation) of that object.

Question 7

___ take their account to faithfully capture how things seem to those who reflect upon their sensory experience.

Answer 7

Naive realists

Question 8

What would a naive realist say about the perception of a raspberry bush?

Answer 8

Your sensory experience’s phenomenal character is then determined by

-The raspberry itself
-Those of the raspberry’s properties of which you’re aware
-Perspectival factors (point of view, lighting, etc.)

Question 9

MGF Martin’s “Limits of Self-Awareness” uses the argument _______ to target naive realism and establish it’s insconsistency.

Answer 9

the argument from hallucination

Question 10

Common Kind Assumption

Answer 10

“Whatever kind of mental event occurs when on is veridically perceiving some scene, that kind of event can occur whether or not one is perceiving” Martin 2004, p. 40

Question 11

Experiential Naturalism

Answer 11

Our sense experiences are subject to the causal order, such as physical causes (neuro-physiological causes/conditions) and psychological causes (if disjoint from physical causes)

-Martin

Question 12

What are the two assumptions that MGF Martin identifies in Naive Realism?

Answer 12

1) Common Kind Assumtion
2) Experiential Naturalism

Question 13

What is MGF martin’s argument aganst naive realism (6)

Answer 13

1) When a subject percieves a raspberry bush, she is aware of a bush whose existence does not depend on her awareness of it (mind-independent), and this awareness could not be obtained in the absence of the bush. (Naive realism)

2) The subject experiences the same thing when they perceive the bush vs. when they are hallucinating (Common Kind Assumption).

3) But, the experience of a hallucination must have a sufficient physical cause (Experiential Naturalism)

4) The experience includes awareness of an object for whose existence the experience is sufficient, or the experience does not involve awareness of an object. (from 3).

5) If an experience has an object of awareness for whose existence the experience is sufficient, the object is mind-dependent.

6) (from applying 4 and 5 to 2) the subject who perceives the bush perceives a mind-dependent object, or she is not aware of the object.

Question 14

Why does MGF argue that naive realism is inconsistent?

Answer 14

Because it argues that objects of awareness are simultaneously not objects of awareness, and that they are mind-independent and mind-dependent at the same time.

Question 15

What is the traditional response to MGF Martin’s argument?

Answer 15

Reject premise 1, and therefore reject naive realism.

Question 16

What is a disjunctivist?

Answer 16

Someone who denies the Common Kind Assumption of naive realism.

Question 17

Does disjunctivism entail naive realism?

Answer 17

No, as technically you could reject both the common kind assumption (be a disjunctivist) and naive realism as a whole.

Question 18

Does naive realism entail disjunctivism?

Answer 18

MGF Martin says yes: to be a naive realist you must also be a disjunctivist.

Not everyone agrees

Question 19

What are the causal grounds for accepting the Common Kind Assumption? (4)

Answer 19

1) When a subject sees X, there is some causal condition, C, in the subject’s body which determined the chance of the occurrence of that event of seeing.

2) It is possible given the laws of nature that C should occur in the subject even if no potential object for perception is present in the subject’s environment.

3) Same cause = same effect.
When 2 situations involve the same causal conditions, the chances for the occurence of such an effect are the same in both situations.

4) whatever mental state occurs in 1, the same experience occurs in 2 (Common Kind Assumption)

Question 20

Where does a disjunctivist (and naive realist) resist the causal grounds for the Common Kind Assumption? (3 ways)

Answer 20

-Usually reject the 3rd premise: same proximate cause, same effect.

1) Deny that causal relations between individual events require general causal laws (Anscombe).

ex - A can cause B without a law saying A must cause B

2) Deny causal relations due to the special case of causation between physical events and psychological events (which do not always necessitate laws)

3) Generates the worng result when applied to causes and effects that are relational

Question 21

Relational state of affairs involves _________________

Answer 21

two or more entities standing in specific relations to one another.

Question 22

Relational state of affairs exists only if (2)

Answer 22

1) the relevant entities exist

2) the relevant entities are appropriately situated to enter into the relevant relation.

(these conditions are not always causal conditions)

Question 23

How do relational state of affairs relate to naive realism?

Answer 23

Naive realists believe that seeing an object requires the existence of the object, and that the object be appropriately situated so as to be perceived.

In the absence of these non-causal conditions, a neural event that causes an event of seeing in one situation may not in another situation.

Question 24

Naive realists believe that seeing an object requires _________ (2)

Answer 24

the existence of the object, and that the object be appropriately situated so as to be perceived.

Question 25

How do you modify the 3rd premise of MGF’s argument against naive realism, to accommodate relational states of affairs?

Answer 25

3) When two situations involve the same causal conditions, and do not differ in any non-causal conditions for the occurence of some effect, the chances for the occurrence of such an effect are the same in both situations.

(Martin thinks this makes a further problem for disjunctivists/naive realists).

Question 26

What is MGF Martin’s solution to his argument against naive realism? (controversial)

Answer 26

Negative Epistemic Disjunctivism

Question 27

Negative Epistemic Disjunctivism says that for hallucinations whose causes match those of veridical visual experiences, there is nothing more to the phenomenal character of such experiences than _________

Answer 27

that of being indescriminable from the corresponding veridical experiences.

Question 28

How does Martin relate disjunctivism to naive realism

Answer 28

Argues that naive realists must deny the Common Kind Assumption, and therefore be disjunctivists

Question 29

What is the reverse causal argument?

Answer 29

After the 3rd modified premise of the causal argument from before:

4) No non-causal condition obtains in the hallucinatory case which does not also obtain in the veridical case.

5) Whatever kind of experience occurs in the hallucinatory case, it is possible that the same kind of experience occurs in the veridical case.

Question 30

“Screening Off Problem” for disjunctivism

Answer 30

If a kind to which perception belongs is also present when hallucinating, how can the kind to which only the perception belongs play a role in explaining the features/effects of sensory experience?

Question 31

Martin argues for ______ to prevent the screening off problem

Answer 31

Negative Epistemic Disjunctivism (NED)

Question 32

3 important results of Negative Epistemic Disjunctivism

Answer 32

1) Being indiscriminable from a veridical experience is a kind to which both hallucination and veridical experiences belong.

2) Being indiscriminable from a veridical experience is not a property that screens off the characteristic features of veridical experiences.

3) Being indiscriminable from a veridical experience can explain why causally matching hallucinations have a subset of the effects corresponding with veridical experiences.

Question 33

____ take their account to faithfully capture how htings seem to those who reflect upon their sensory experience.

Answer 33

Naive realists

Question 34

How do naive realists think things seem when we perceive something?

Answer 34

It seems that experience presents mind-independent external world objects and their features.

Question 35

two faces of sensory experience

Answer 35

-Metaphysical: what constitutes a sensory experience?
-Phenomenological: explain the determination of phenomenal character.

Question 36

An impure sense datum theorist says that sensory experience consists (at least partly) in _______________.

An experience’s phenomenal character is partly fixed by __________________.

Answer 36

awareness of sense data and their properties.

which sense data it presents and what those sense data are like.

Question 37

A Representationalist says that sensory experience consists partly in ________________.

An experience’s phenomenal character is party fixed by _______________.

Answer 37

representing that things in the world stand a certain way.

how the experience represents things as standing in the world.

Question 38

Sense datum theorists believe sensory experience is dependent on and sufficient for ______________

Answer 38

the existence of its object

Question 39

Representationalist theorists think that sensory experience is ____________ for the existence of its object.

Answer 39

NOT dependent on or sufficient for

Question 40

For sense datum theorists, the Phenomenal Principle entails that sensory experience is sufficient for ______________.

Answer 40

the existence of sense data

Question 41

Sense datum theorists and representationalists agree that sensory experience always has

Answer 41

an object

Question 42

A representationalist allows that we can represent the external world objects, but denies that ___________.

Answer 42

we represent them when we hallucinate; at best we represent an intentional object.

Question 43

A naive realist believes that sensory experience is ___________ the existence of its object.

Answer 43

dependent on but not sufficient for

Question 44

Naive realists take sensory experience’s direct objects to be mind-independent external world objects, but they also insist that sensory experience of an object requires __________.

Answer 44

awareness (rather than mere representation) of an object.

Question 45

Naive realists believe that sensory experience’s phenomenal character consists in _______________.

Answer 45

the external world objects and properties that the experience presents, together with the subject’s perspective upon those objects and properties.

Question 46

Naive realism is a form of

Answer 46

direct realism

Question 47

Naive realism does not entail that any two experiences that present the same objects and properties must possess ___________

Answer 47

the same phenomenal character

Question 48

To a naive realist, sameness of phenomenal character requires both

Answer 48

-Sameness of presented items
-Sameness of perspectival factors

Question 49

Naive realists must deny that two experiences can have the same phenomenal character despite _______.

Answer 49

not presenting the same mind-dependent objects.

Question 50

Naive realism allows that features of a percieving subject can make a ______ (as opposed to ______) difference to sensory phenomenology

Answer 50

Constitutive, causal

Question 51

Perspectival factors do not smuggle _______ or __________ into the naive realist’s account of phenomenal character.

Answer 51

representational content or sense data

Question 52

Campbell argues that naive realism posits experience as a 3-place relation between

Answer 52

-An object
-An experiencer
-A standpoint

Question 53

Campell argues for naive realism by arguing that representationalists cannot ______

Answer 53

Representationalists cannot provide the required explanation of perception’s thought-securing role.

Question 54

6 points of Campbell’s argument for Naive Realism

Answer 54

1. thought-like representational contents that they are accessible to the subject in multiple ways (meaning of a sentence, content of a belief, conclusion of premises, etc.)
2. If sensory experiences are just a class of mental states with thought-like representational contents, the representational content of sensory experience is accessible to the subject in multiple ways.
3. Having a sensory experience is just one way of being in a mental state that has this kind of representational content.
4. The claim that sensory experiences are a class of mental states with thought-like representational contents is inconsistent with the claim that perception plays an essential role in enabling us to think about external world objects.
5. Naive realists can explain how perception plays an essential role in enabling us to think about external world objects.
6. Only naive realists can explain this.

Question 55

How does the argument from hallucination pose a challenge for naive realism

Answer 55

1. During hallucinations, the direct object of a subject’s awareness cannot be an external world object with which she is in perceptual contact.
2. To claim that hallucinations/veridical experiences involve direct awareness of different sorts of objects, we need a proper reason to believe this claim.
3. There are some veridical expereince where the subject’s point of view is indistiguishible from the hallucinatory experience.

**4. How things seem from the subjects point of view provides no grounds that hallucinatory/veridical experiences involve direct awareness of different sorts of objects.
**

5. Absent of some other ground, hallucinatory/veridical experiences involve direct awareness of the same sort of objects.
6. Veridical experience does not involve direct awareness of (presumably mind-independent) external world objects.

Question 56

Representationalism holds that a sensory experience’s phenomenal character is exhausted by __________.

Answer 56

how it represents as standing in the world

Question 57

Representationalists believe that ilusory, veridical and hallucinatory experiences possess _____

Answer 57

a common representational content

Question 58

Representationalists claim that veridical experiences represent objects with which you are in perceptual contact as having ________

Answer 58

properties it in fact has.

Question 59

Representationalists claim that illusory experiences represent the object which you are in perceptual contact as having ___________

Answer 59

Properties it in fact lacks

Question 60

Representationalists claim that hallucinatory experiences represent an object before you, but ______

Answer 60

in fact you are not in perceptual contact with any object.

Question 61

Chalmers says there is a manner of representation specific to __________.

Answer 61

sensory experience.

Question 62

Chalmers says the representational content of sensory experience wholly depends upon ___________.

Answer 62

the intrinsic properties of the perceiving object.

Question 63

Chalmers says one can’t explain the representational content of sensory experience without _________.

Answer 63

appeal to phenomenal character.

Question 64

Chalmers says the constituents of the representational content of sensory experience are NOT _____________.

Answer 64

ordinary objects and their properties

Question 65

Representationalist Argument from Transparency (3) (Tye)

Answer 65

1) A right account ought to respect the transparency of sensory experience.
2) Only representationalism respects the transparency of sensory experience.
3) We ought to accept representationalism.

Question 66

Argument for representationlism, from the explanatory role of sensory experience (3)

Answer 66

1) Veridical/illusory/hallucinatory experiences perform some of the same explanatory roles.

2) Representationalism provides the best account of these explanatory symmetries between these experiences.

3) So, we ought to accept representationalism.

Question 67

What are the candidate roles of all experience (veridical/illusory/hallucinatory)? (3)

Answer 67

1) Justify the same beliefs about the external world.

2) Provide the same reasons for action.

3) any sensory experience of an F object enables a subject to think about F.

Question 68

McDowell argues that only representationalism affords representational content a ___________.

Answer 68

fundamental role in sensory experience.

Question 69

What is the epistemic challenge for opponents of representationalism?

Answer 69

Either accommodate a larger role for representational content or construct an alternative account of why it is rational to form certain beliefs in response to sensory experience.

Question 70

Argument for representationalism, from vision science

Answer 70

1) We perceive the world in virtue of perceptual processing, that constructs/manipulates representations, which encode information about external properties.

2) A right account of perception must respect our best science of perception (Methodological Naturalism)

3) Respecting our best science requires that visual experiences are representations that encode information about external properties.

Question 71

What is an objection to the argument for representationalism from vision science

Answer 71

It presupposes, without argument, an optional view about the relationship between sub-personal perceptual processing and sensory experience.

Question 72

How is representationalism challenged by the possibility of spectrum inversion?

Answer 72

Two people identifying the same coloured object as different colours, despite having the same colour terms, discrimination of objects by colour, etc.

Question 73

How would a sense datum theorist challenge representationalism?

Answer 73

By defending the phenomenal principle

Question 74

What problem does the “screening off” problem pose to naive realists?

Answer 74

Introspection can’t be reliable because what is enough to explain veridical cases is also enough to explain hallucinatory cases.

Question 75

the most recent cause in a causal chain

Answer 75

proximate cause

Question 76

Negative Epistemic Disjunctivism specifically applies to which types of hallucinations?

Answer 76

Hallucinations with matching proximate causes to veridical cases (not all hallucinations)

Question 77

For hallucinations whose proximate causes match those of a veridical visual experience, there is nothing more to the phenomenal character of such experiences than that of being indiscriminible from the corresponding veridical experiences.

Answer 77

Negative Epistemic Disjunctivism

Question 78

Martin exploits the naive realist’s response to the ______________ to reconstruct a Reverse Causal Argument that, together with the screening off problem, commits naive realist disjunctivists to: ___________

Answer 78

Causal Argument for the Common Kind Assumption, Negative Epistemic Disjunctivism

Question 79

Pure representationalism

Answer 79

View where sensory experience’s phenomenal character (how things seem to a subject) is exhausted by the experience’s representational content

Question 80

Pure representationalism

Answer 80

View where how things seem to a subject is just how the subject’s experience represents the world as being.

Question 81

Representationalists (or intentionalists) follow Anscombe in holding that a fundamental account of sensory experience must include __________.

Answer 81

an attribution of intentional content to that experience.

Question 82

Impure representationalists may allow _____________ into their fundamental account of sensory experience.

Answer 82

non-content elements

Question 83

Supervenience Claim

Answer 83

Claim that there can be no difference between sensory experiences (in the same sense modality) without a difference in their representational contents.

Question 84

What are the 4 questions of representationalism that Chalmers identifies

Answer 84

1. Is there a manner of representation specific to perceptual experience?
2. Can one explain the representational content of perceptual experience without appeal to phenomenal character?
3. Does the representational content of perceptual experience wholly depend on the intrinsic properties of the perceiving subject?
4. are the constituents of representational content of perceptual experience ordinary objects and their properties?

Question 85

An experience provides direct awareness of an entity iff ________________.

Answer 85

a right account of what it is like for the subject to have the experience is an account in terms of awareness of the entity and its properties.

Question 86

Pure sense data theorist argues a right account of what it is like for the subject to have a sensory experience must _____________.

Answer 86

be given purely in terms of awareness of sense data and their features.

Question 87

Impure sense datum theorist argues a right account of what it is like for the subject to have a sensory experience must be ____________

Answer 87

given partly in terms of awareness of sense data and their features.

Question 88

Negative Transparency Thesis

Answer 88

Reflection upon visual experience does not reveal the presence of ordinary objects of sense perception

Question 89

Positive Transparency Thesis

Answer 89

Introspective reflection upon visual experience does reveal the presence of ordinary objects of sense perception

Question 90

Negative Transparency Thesis is incompatible with any sense datum theory on which introspection must ________ (2)

Answer 90

i) always reveal sense data

ii) make us aware of them as not identical to ordinary objects

Question 91

Sense datum theory cannot explain the consequence of Positive Transparency Thesis, namely the fact that ___________.

Answer 91

visual experience seems to (and sometimes actualy does) involve the presence of ordinary objects.

Question 92

An _____ may look for additional resources in ________

Answer 92

Representationalist,
Anscombe’s notion of intentional or representational content

Question 93

Key difference between Anscombe’s intentionalism and sense datum theory

Answer 93

Sense datum theorists argue that a subject is aware of an object because they are standing in relation of awareness to the object, whereas Anscombe denies this and argues instead that the subject is not aware of the object but rather has an appropriate relation of awareness to their experience having relevant content

Question 94

Anscombe’s invocation of intentional content and intentional objects was initially introduced as a way of resisting __________

Answer 94

the phenomenal principle

Question 95

Pure representationalism think sensory experience’s phenomenal character is exhausted by _________.

Answer 95

the experience’s representational content

Question 96

Anscombe’s intentionalism is a type of ______

Answer 96

Representationalism

Question 97

Phenomenal character

Answer 97

How it feels from the perspective of the subject having the experience

Question 98

Perceptual illusion

Answer 98

When a subject perceives an object, but that object seems to be a way it isn’t

Question 99

Abnormal lighting conditions resulting in a subject seeing a red ball as orange is an example of a _________

Answer 99

Perceptual illusion

Question 100

Perceptual hallucination

Answer 100

When it seems to a subject as if she perceives an object, but there is in fact no object that she perceives

Question 101

Perceptual experience (or sensory experience) is _________.

Answer 101

a conscious perceptual episode

Question 102

Seeing a dance, hearing a symphony, touching a tortoise are all examples of ______

Answer 102

Perceptual experience (or sensory experience)

Question 103

Phenomenal character is __________.

Answer 103

the way the experience seems from the
subject’s point of view.

Question 104

Hume’s argument from illusion (4)

Answer 104

1. The table appears to shrink in size as you get further away from it.
2. The table does not in fact shrink in size.
3. Conclusion 1: the subject perceives an image of the table.
4. Conclusion 2: the subject does not perceive the table.

Question 105

If one accepts the Phenomenal Principle, how can they apply it to Hume’s argument about the shrinking table? (2)

Answer 105

1. The subject must perceive something which has in fact shrunk in size.
2. This cannot be the table itself.

Question 106

When someone sees a table shrinking, what does Hume think they are seeing?

Answer 106

The image of the table is shrinking

Question 107

What is a problem with Hume’s argument from illusion of the shrinking table?

Answer 107

Why could the subject not
perceive both an image of the table—whatever that is—and the table itself?

Question 108

A subject’s perceptual experience involves direct awareness of an object iff __________

Answer 108

A right account of what it is like for the subject to have the experience is an account in terms of awareness of the object and the object’s properties.

Question 109

Perceptual Illusion:

There are cases in which a subject has a perceptual experience as of something having the property F, but ___________

Answer 109

the external object perceived by the subject is not in fact F.

Question 110

Phenomenal Principle:

If a subject has a perceptual experience as of something having a property F, _____________

Answer 110

some thing of which the subject is directly aware actually has F.

Question 111

What is the Contemporary Argument from Illusion (9)

Answer 111

1. Subject perceives something with property F, but external world object being perceived is not in fact F.
2. Phenomenal principle.
3. In 1, the external world object the subject perceives is not the F-thing of which she is directly aware.
4. In 1, the direct object of awareness is something other than the external world object.
5. To claim illusory and veridical experiences involve direct awareness of different sorts of objects, we need a proper reason to believe this.
6. For some veridical experiences, there is an illusory experience which is indistinguishable to the subject from veridical experience.
7. How things seem to the subject provides no grounds for claim 5.
8. Absent some other ground, illusory and veridical experiences involve awareness of the same sort of objects.
9. Therefore, veridical experience does not involve direct awareness of mind-independent external world objects.

Question 112

Why do we need a proper reason to believe that illusory and veridical experiences involve direct awareness of different sorts of objects?

General Methodological Principle

Answer 112

General Methodological Principle

Question 113

Russell’s argument from Conflicting Appearances

Answer 113

As the colour of the table will seem different to different points of view (conflicting appearances), the colour cannot be inherent to the table.

We must deny that the table itself has any one particular colour.

Question 114

What is a key problem in Russell’s argument from Conflicting Appearances - the colour of the table?

Answer 114

the implicit assumption that if an object has a particular colour,
it must in every context look the same way.

Question 115

How does Russell’s Conflicting Appearances table example compare to Hume’s argument from illusion?

Answer 115

Thus it becomes
evident that the real table, if there is one, is not the same as what we immediately experience
by sight or touch or hearing.’

Also agrees with the phenomenal principle.

Question 116

Contemporary responses to the argument from illusion usually seek to preserve what is often known as ________

Answer 116

direct realism

Question 117

Direct realism states that our sense sometimes _________.

Answer 117

provide direct awareness of ordinary physical objects.

Question 118

What are the 4 options for someone who wishes to resist the argument from illusion?

Answer 118

A. Deny the Phenomenal Principle.

B. Reject Hume’s move from 3 to 4.

C. Reject Hume’s move from 6 to 7.
insist that how things seem from the subject’s point of view provides grounds for insisting that even reflectively indistinguishable veridical and illusory experiences have direct objects of different sorts

D. Reject the move from 5 and 7 to 8.
Insist that we have some non-first-personal reason to hold that the indistinguishable veridical and illusory experiences have direct objects of different sorts.

Question 119

Anyone who accepts the Phenomenal Principle is a _______ theorist.

Answer 119

Sense-datum theorist.

Question 120

Sense Datum Theory accepts _________________

Answer 120

the phenomenal principle, and posits sense datum to serve as the direct objects of awareness that instantiate the properties we perceive.

Question 121

Sense-data theorists posit that sense data cannot be _____

Answer 121

ordinary objects or their surfaces, since we are meant to be directly aware of sense data even when we’re hallucinating.

Question 122

Adverbialism

Answer 122

rejects the phenomenal principle, but refuses to posit a new thing (i.e., sense data) to serve as the required direct object.

Question 123

Adverbialism holds that perceived properties are __________ of experience itself.

Answer 123

adverbial modifications

Question 124

Adverbialism

Answer 124

View that, to perceive F isn’t to perceive an F thing, but to perceive F-ly

Question 125

What is the problem with adverbialism

Answer 125

Many Properties Problem:

Adverbialists seem unable to explain the difference between seeing a red square and a blue diamond, and seeing a blue square and a red diamond.

In each case, the subject perceives red-ly, square-ly, etc.

Question 126

Which theories are the two most prominent attempts to reject the phenomenal principle, and block the argument from illusion at the first step?

Answer 126

Representationalism and Naive Realism

Question 127

The traditional reaction to the argument from illusion is to accept the argument’s conclusion that our senses ___________

Answer 127

do not provide direct awareness of external world objects.

Question 128

What are the 3 traditional camps of reaction to the argument from illusion?

Answer 128

1. Indirect Realism
2. Phenomenalism
3. Idealism

Question 129

All 3 traditional camps of reaction to the argument from illusion (indirect realism, phenomenalism, idealism) reject ______

Answer 129

Direct realism

Question 130

Because indirect realism, phenomenalism, and idealism reject direct realism, they accept that ____________

Answer 130

our senses make us indirectly aware of
ordinary external world objects by making us directly aware of images, representations, sense-data, or some other suitable intermediary.

Question 131

Proponents of Indirect realism accept the following 2 claims:

Answer 131

1. The direct objects of perception are (presumably mind-dependent) entities that have qualitative properties.
2. A sensory experience is veridical when it is caused by an external world object whose properties match the qualitative properties of the experience’s direct object.

Question 132

What is a problem with indirect realism?

Answer 132

How does this view secure access to the external world? (threat from skepticism).

Question 133

Proponents of Phenomenalism accept 3 claims:

Answer 133

1. The direct objects of perception are (presumably mind-dependent) entities that have qualitative properties.
2. A sensory experience is veridical when the counterfactuals about what the subject would experience if conditions were different in relevant respects are true.
3. Every external world proposition is true or false.

Question 134

Counterfactual

Answer 134

A conditional statement of the form ‘If p were the case, q would be the case’

Question 135

What is the problem with phenomenalism?

Answer 135

What in the world makes the relevant counterfactuals true?

Question 136

How can Phenomenalism’s 2nd claim about counterfactuals be further explained

Answer 136

a sensory experience as of a red object is veridical iff the counterfactuals
associated with ‘There is a red object in front of me’ are all true

Question 137

Who is a phenomenalist?

Answer 137

Mill

Question 138

Who is an idealist?

Answer 138

Kant

Question 139

Proponents of ______ accept phenomenalisms 1st and 2nd claim but reject 3

Answer 139

Idealism

Question 140

Phenomenalism and idealism are often classed together as an alternative to classic indirect realism, why?

Answer 140

since these views insist that the physical world is not properly distinct from perception’s direct objects (i.e. sense data or impressions or whatever).

Question 141

What does Elizabeth Anscombe identify as Hume’s mistake in moving from premise 1 and 2 to 3 in the Argument from Illusion?

Answer 141

A failure to recognize certain special features of intentional mental states.

Question 142

What is the ‘problem of intentionality’ that Anscombe addresses?

Answer 142

X’s thinking of Y constitutes a relation between X and Y when Y exists, but not when Y doesn’t.

but

X’s thinking of Y is the same sort of thing whether Y exists or not.

Something plainly has to be given
up here; what will it be?

Question 143

How do Anscombe’s examples of Manish and Santa Clause highlight the problem of intentionality:

1) Elizabeth wants Manish to give her a bottle of water

(2) Elizabeth wants Santa Claus to give her a pony

Answer 143

In both cases, Elizabeth is in the cognitive activity of “wanting.”

In 1, she stands in a relation to Manish, but in 2 she does not.

Question 144

What are Anscombe’s 3 linguistic marks of intentionality? (intentional mental states)

Answer 144

1) Failure of Truth-Functionality
2) Failure of Substitutivity
3) Failure of Existential Generalization

Question 145

What is Anscombe’s ‘Failure of Truth-Functionality?

Answer 145

The sentence “________ believes that p’ “
does not exhibit truth functionality as

3) Elizabeth believes that Toronto is north of Whitehorse.
(4) Elizabeth believes that Barack Obama won the 2008 US Presidential Election.

(3) might be true even though ‘Toronto is north of Whitehorse’ is false, while (4) is false despite
‘Barack Obama won the 2008 US Presidential Election’ is true.

Question 146

The extension of a sentence is a _______

Answer 146

truth value

Question 147

The extension of a singular term in a sentence is _______

Answer 147

the object it stands for

Question 148

The extension of a set of a one-place predicate is _____

Answer 148

the set of objects that the predicate is true of.

Question 149

failure of substitutivity

Answer 149

when the substitution of co-extensional expressions (e.g. co-referring names) does not preserve truth.

Question 150

Why is the following set of sentences an example of Anscombe’s ‘failure of substitutivity’?

(5) Elizabeth believes that Toronto is north of Whitehorse
(6) Toronto is identical with the largest city in Canada
(7) Elizabeth believes that the largest city in Canada is north of Whitehorse

Answer 150

the truth of (5) and (6) do not guarantee
the truth of (7)

Question 151

Why is the following an example of Anscombe’s ‘failure of Existential Generalization’

(8) Elizabeth believes that someone will get her a pony
(9) There is someone who Elizabeth believes will get her a pony

Answer 151

Not only does (9) not follow from (8), it also fails to follow from ‘Elizabeth believes that Santa Claus will get her a pony’.

Question 152

To Anscombe, ‘intentional object’ is synonymous with _______

Answer 152

intentional entity

Question 153

Does Anscombe take there to be a special class of entities which are the ‘intentional objects’?

Answer 153

No

Question 154

What are Anscombe’s 2 uses of the word ‘see’

Answer 154

1) takes a material object.
“S sees an F” means there’s some F-thing that S sees.

2) takes an intentional object
“S sees an F” does not necessarily mean there is an F-thing that S sees.

Question 155

Anscombe’s seeing of material objects applies to _______ cases.

Answer 155

Veridical cases

Question 156

Anscombe’s seeing of intentional objects applies to ________ and ______ cases

Answer 156

Illusory and hallucinatory

Question 157

when a subject is victim of an illusion and reports seeing something red, Anscombe argues that it is true that the subject sees something red, but ______________

Answer 157

only on the reading of ‘see’ on which the red thing is an intentional object of the subject’s sensory experience.

Question 158

_______ follow in Anscombe’s footsteps

Answer 158

Representationalists

Question 159

What is a central problem for Anscombe? (2)

Answer 159

why should we ever say that sensory experience is in the business of representing the world as being some way?

Is it enough that the view provides an escape
route from the argument from illusion?

Question 160

Argument from Conflicting Appearances

Answer 160

The argument from illusion is a specific instance of this.

Question 161

“If something appears F to some observers and not-F to others, then it is not inherently/really/in itself F.”

Burnyeat argues that this is equivalent to __________, by the rule of contraposition.

Answer 161

“If something is inherently/really/in itself F, then it appears F to all observers or it appears not-F to all.”

Question 162

“If something is inherently/really/in itself F, then it appears F to all observers or it appears
not-F to all.”

Burnyeat thinks this wording of the claim is _________

Answer 162

Manifestly implausible, which is why theorists avoid it.

Question 163

What is Burnyeat’s “Window Model”

Answer 163

Looking through the eyes is like looking through a window. Should be transparent, with no pane at all. Nothing between the perceiver and the thing he perceives.

Question 164

Burnyeat says that “At the core of perceptual experience is an unmediated knowing” and the problem of conflicting appearances is solved when __________.”

Answer 164

a suitable story has been told about the objects of this knowing.

Question 165

Burnyeat argues that that __________ seems to escape us, and “we look
through it and see nothing but the blue…. When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous

Answer 165

which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact (consciousness)

Question 166

diaphaneity thesis

Answer 166

following Moore, those who accept that perception is ‘diaphanous’ hold that
there can be no difference in the conscious character of two sensory experiences without a difference in the respective objects of awareness

Question 167

Burnyeat thinks our commitment to the window model is the product of __________________

Answer 167

an unreasoned (and unreasonable) myth buried deep in the human psyche

Question 168

1) If something appears F to some observers and not-F to others, then it is not
inherently/really/in itself F.

Burnyeat thinks we find this plausible because of our ____________

Answer 168

tacit commitment to the window model

Question 169

(Burnyeat’s) window model arguably
entails the Phenomenal Principle. If there can be nothing between the perceiver and what she perceives, then the _____________ must be exhaustively explained by a specification of entities that serve as objects of sensory awareness.

Answer 169

conscious character of a subject’s sensory experience

Question 170

The phenomenal principle entails that any sensory experience—veridical, illusory, or hallucinatory—must be such that it involves direct awareness of ___________

Answer 170

whatever has those qualities the experience seems to present.

Question 171

According to sense-datum theorists, what are the direct objects of awareness that have the qualities an experience seems to present?

Answer 171

Sense-data

Question 172

What is the difference between a sense-datum theorist and a direct realist?

Answer 172

Direct realists hold that sensory experiences sometimes provide direct awareness of ordinary physical objects, whereas many sense datum theorists believe they only provide direct awareness of sense-data

Question 173

When are sense-data mind-dependent, and why?

Answer 173

In cases of hallucination there are no
mind-independent external objects encountered, and yet the Phenomenal Principle entails that a subject remains directly aware of a sense datum.

Question 174

Does the phenomenal principle entail that the direct objects of sensory awareness are exhausted by sense data? Why?

Answer 174

No.

An experience provides direct awareness of an entity (i.e. the entity is a ‘direct object
of awareness’) iff a right account of what it is like for the subject to have the experience is an
account in terms of awareness of the entity and its properties.

Question 175

Pure Sense Datum Theory

Answer 175

Theory that a right account of what it is like for the subject to have a sensory
experience must be an account given purely in terms of awareness of sense data and their features.

Question 176

Impure Sense Datum Theory

Answer 176

Theory that a right account of what it is like for the subject to have a sensory experience must be an account given only partly in terms of awareness of sense data and their features

Question 177

The ‘argument from the transparency of sensory experience’ challenges _____ and supports ______

Answer 177

Challenges sense-datum theory, and supports representationalism.

Question 178

Thesis that states that introspective reflection upon visual experience does reveal the
presence of ordinary objects of sense perception (e.g. deer, elm trees, and so on)

Answer 178

Positive Transparency Thesis

Question 179

Diaphaneity Thesis

Answer 179

Thesis that states that there can be no difference in the conscious character of two sensory experiences without a difference in the respective objects of awareness

Question 180

Negative Transparency Thesis is incompatible with any sense datum theory on which introspection must

Answer 180

(i) always reveal sense data and (ii) make us aware of them as not identical to ordinary objects.

Question 181

What is Peacocke’s ‘problem of the additional characterization’

Answer 181

You can see two trees two distances apart from you, and tell they are the same size despite the closer one taking up more space in your visual field than the other

Question 182

Peacocke’s ‘problem of additional characterization’ is an argument against _______________________

Answer 182

Pure representationalism

Question 183

1. Is there a manner of representation specific to perceptual experience?

Why does this question arise to Chalmers?

Answer 183

experiences that differ only in the focus of a subject’s attention

i.e. differ in phenomenal character but not representational content

Question 184

2. Can one explain the representational content of perceptual experience without appeal to
   phenomenal character?

Why does this question arise to Chalmers?

Answer 184

because representationalists must explain the difference between conscious and non-conscious representation (i.e. representation with and without phenomenal character).

Question 185

Blindsight is perception without

Answer 185

conscious awareness

Question 186

What is the hard problem of consciousness

Answer 186

The problem of explaining the place of consciousness within the physical world

Question 187

Chalmers is a __________

Answer 187

representationalist

Question 188

3. Does the representational content of perceptual experience wholly depend upon the intrinsic properties of the perceiving subject?

Why does this question arise to Chalmers?

Answer 188

Because of a dilemma between three claims accepted by most representationalists:

A. An experience’s representational content constitutes its phenomenal character.

B. The phenomenal character of perceptual experience wholly depends upon the intrinsic
properties of the perceiving subject. [‘Phenomenal Internalism’]

C. The representational content of perceptual experience does not wholly depend upon the
intrinsic properties of the perceiving subject. [‘Semantic Externalism’]

Question 189

Chalmers _______ that the representational content of perceptual experience does not wholly depend upon the
intrinsic properties of the perceiving subject. [‘Semantic Externalism’]

Answer 189

rejects

Question 190

Phenomenal Internalism

Answer 190

The phenomenal character of perceptual experience wholly depends upon the intrinsic properties of the perceiving subject.

Question 191

‘Semantic Externalism’

Answer 191

The representational content of perceptual experience does not wholly depend upon the
intrinsic properties of the perceiving subject.

Question 192

What is the argument for denying phenomenal internalism (B)? (2)

Answer 192

i. Introspective knowledge of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience must
be both certain and infallible.

But,

ii. If a fact does not wholly depend upon a subject’s intrinsic features (e.g. it concerns
some external object), knowledge of the fact is not both certain and infallible.

So,
iii. Either introspection provides no knowledge of phenomenal character, or B is true.

Question 193

Does Chalmers think that the constituents of the representational content of perceptual experience ordinary objects
and their properties? Why?

Answer 193

No.

He thinks it possible for two subjects to undergo veridical perceptual experiences with the same phenomenal character that
nevertheless involve perceptual contact with distinct properties

Question 194

What is Martin’s Common Kind Assumption?

Answer 194

in our everyday perceptual experiences, we typically take the perceptual environment to be a common or shared one.

we assume that our perceptual experiences are, by default, about the same external world that others perceive, and we can communicate and share our experiences because they refer to this shared reality.

our perceptual experiences are fundamentally relational, and they automatically connect us to a shared external world

Question 195

Disjunctivism

Answer 195

view that perceivers can be in distinct cognitive states when they have veridical perceptions and when they have non-veridical perceptions

i.e., reject common kind assumption

Question 196

Disjunctivism maintains that veridical experiences are epistemically privileged, while non-veridical experiences

Answer 196

do not provide knowledge of the external world.

Question 197

Disjunctivism has a “positive” epistemic status because it maintains that if a perceptual experience is veridical, it _____________

Answer 197

directly gives the perceiver knowledge about the external world.

Question 198

What is the “Negative” part of Negative Epistemic Disjunctivism?

Answer 198

veridical perceptual experiences do not provide any epistemic advantages over non-veridical perceptual experiences in terms of knowledge about the external world.

Question 199

Key difference between disjunctivism and Negative Epistemic Disjunctivism

Answer 199

Like standard disjunctivism, negative epistemic disjunctivism acknowledges the difference between veridical and non-veridical perceptual experiences.

However, it claims that both types of experiences fall short of providing direct knowledge about the external world.

Question 200

Representationalism say how things see to a subject is __________________

Answer 200

just how the subject’s
experience represents the world as being

Question 202

Does the phenomenal principle alone entail that a right account of what it is like for the subject to have a sensory experience is an account given purely in terms of awareness of sense data and their features?

Answer 202

No, impure sense datum theory exists.

Question 203

Why do representationalists deny the phenomenal principle?

Answer 203

To represent something as F does not require the existence of an object that is F

Question 204

Tye’s argument for representationalism

Answer 204

We should accept representationalism because it is the only view that respects the transparency of sensory experience.

Argument depends on which transparency claim.

Question 205

McDowell’s Argument for Representationalism

Answer 205

Representationalism explains why it is rational to form beliefs in response to sensory experience, and opponents of representationalism will need to answer this epistemic challenge for their own view.

Question 206

Why is the Reverse Causal Argument’s conclusion different than the common kind assumption?

“Whatever kind of experience occurs in a causally matching hallucination, it is possible that the same kind of experience occur in the matching veridical case.”

Answer 206

An experience may belong to multi kinds at once.

Veridical perception can belong to a kind that is not present in hallucination (as per rejection of CKA), and another kind which is present in the hallucination (as per this argument’s conclusion).

Question 207

A disjunctivist can accept the conclusion to the Reverse Causal Argument only if they can make sense of _________

Answer 207

The most specific kind to which a causally matching hallucination belongs is also a kind to which the matching perception belongs

WITHOUT that kind being the most specific king to which perception belongs.

Question 208

Why is the “screening off problem” called this?

Answer 208

In a Disjunctivist account, the features distinct of veridical cases risk being screened off from explaining the features of veridical cases.

I.e., In a causal chain of experience, there are distinct features of veridical experience that occur after the point in the causal chain where hallucination could occur. As they occur after this point in the causal chain, they cannot explain the difference between veridical and hallucinatory cases, as to arrive at this point in the causal chain means you have already passed the point where hallucination could occur. Thus, they are screened off from explaining veridical experience.

Question 209

What does a disjunctivist need, to solve the screening off problem?

Answer 209

A specific kind present in hallucination and present (although NOT the most specific kind) to the corresponding veridical experience.

Must make room for the asymmetry between how phenomenal characters of the respective experiences are explained.