Arguments

Question 1

Hume’s Argument from Illusion

Answer 1

1. The table appears to shrink in size
2. The table does not in fact change in size
3. Conclusion 1: the subject perceives an image of the table
4. Conclusion 2: the subject does not perceive the table

Question 2

1. The table appears to shrink in size
   2._________________
2. Conclusion 1: the subject perceives an image of the table
3. Conclusion 2: the subject does not perceive the table

Answer 2

The table does not in fact change in size

Question 3

1. The table appears to shrink in size
2. The table does not in fact change in size
3. ______________________
4. Conclusion 2: the subject does not perceive the table

Answer 3

Conclusion 1: the subject perceives an image of the table

Question 4

1. ____________________
2. The table does not in fact change in size
3. Conclusion 1: the subject perceives an image of the table
4. Conclusion 2: the subject does not perceive the table

Answer 4

The table appears to shrink in size

Question 5

1. The table appears to shrink in size
2. The table does not in fact change in size
3. Conclusion 1: the subject perceives an image of the table
4. ________________________

Answer 5

Conclusion 2: the subject does not perceive the table

Question 6

Contemporary Argument from Illusion

Answer 6

1. Perceptual Illusion: There are cases in which a subject has a perceptual experience as of
   something having a property F, but the external world object perceived by the subject is not
   in fact F.
2. Phenomenal Principle: If a subject has a perceptual experience as of something having a
   property F, some thing of which the subject is directly aware actually has F.
3. In the cases described in 1, the external world object the subject perceives is not the F-thing
   of which she is directly aware. [1 & 2]
4. In the cases described at 1, the direct object of a subject’s awareness is something other than
   the external world object she perceives. [3]
5. If we want to claim that illusory and veridical experiences involve direct awareness of different
   sorts of objects, we need a proper reason to believe this claim. [General Methodological Principle]
6. For some veridical experiences, there is an illusory experience which from the subject’s point
   of view is indistinguishable from the veridical experience.
7. How things seem from a subject’s point of view provides no grounds for the claim at 5. [6]
8. Absent some other ground, we must say that illusory and veridical experiences involve
   awareness of the same sorts of objects. [5 & 7]
9. Veridical perceptual experience does not involve direct awareness of (presumably mind-
   independent) external world objects. [4 & 8]

Question 7

1. Perceptual Illusion: There are cases in which a subject has a perceptual experience as of
   something having a property F, but the external world object perceived by the subject is not
   in fact F.
2. Phenomenal Principle: If a subject has a perceptual experience as of something having a
   property F, some thing of which the subject is directly aware actually has F.
3. ______________________
4. In the cases described at 1, the direct object of a subject’s awareness is something other than
   the external world object she perceives. [3]
5. If we want to claim that illusory and veridical experiences involve direct awareness of different
   sorts of objects, we need a proper reason to believe this claim. [General Methodological Principle]
6. For some veridical experiences, there is an illusory experience which from the subject’s point
   of view is indistinguishable from the veridical experience.
7. How things seem from a subject’s point of view provides no grounds for the claim at 5. [6]
8. Absent some other ground, we must say that illusory and veridical experiences involve
   awareness of the same sorts of objects. [5 & 7]
9. Veridical perceptual experience does not involve direct awareness of (presumably mind-
   independent) external world objects. [4 & 8]

Answer 7

In the cases described in 1, the external world object the subject perceives is not the F-thing
of which she is directly aware. [1 & 2]

Question 8

1. Perceptual Illusion: There are cases in which a subject has a perceptual experience as of
   something having a property F, but the external world object perceived by the subject is not
   in fact F.
2. Phenomenal Principle: If a subject has a perceptual experience as of something having a
   property F, some thing of which the subject is directly aware actually has F.
3. In the cases described in 1, the external world object the subject perceives is not the F-thing
   of which she is directly aware. [1 & 2]
4. ___________________
5. If we want to claim that illusory and veridical experiences involve direct awareness of different
   sorts of objects, we need a proper reason to believe this claim. [General Methodological Principle]
6. For some veridical experiences, there is an illusory experience which from the subject’s point
   of view is indistinguishable from the veridical experience.
7. How things seem from a subject’s point of view provides no grounds for the claim at 5. [6]
8. Absent some other ground, we must say that illusory and veridical experiences involve
   awareness of the same sorts of objects. [5 & 7]
9. Veridical perceptual experience does not involve direct awareness of (presumably mind-
   independent) external world objects. [4 & 8]

Answer 8

In the cases described at 1, the direct object of a subject’s awareness is something other than
the external world object she perceives. [3]

Question 9

1. Perceptual Illusion: There are cases in which a subject has a perceptual experience as of
   something having a property F, but the external world object perceived by the subject is not
   in fact F.
2. Phenomenal Principle: If a subject has a perceptual experience as of something having a
   property F, some thing of which the subject is directly aware actually has F.
3. In the cases described in 1, the external world object the subject perceives is not the F-thing
   of which she is directly aware. [1 & 2]
4. In the cases described at 1, the direct object of a subject’s awareness is something other than
   the external world object she perceives. [3]
5. _______________________
6. For some veridical experiences, there is an illusory experience which from the subject’s point
   of view is indistinguishable from the veridical experience.
7. How things seem from a subject’s point of view provides no grounds for the claim at 5. [6]
8. Absent some other ground, we must say that illusory and veridical experiences involve
   awareness of the same sorts of objects. [5 & 7]
9. Veridical perceptual experience does not involve direct awareness of (presumably mind-
   independent) external world objects. [4 & 8]

Answer 9

If we want to claim that illusory and veridical experiences involve direct awareness of different
sorts of objects, we need a proper reason to believe this claim. [General Methodological Principle]

Question 10

1. Perceptual Illusion: There are cases in which a subject has a perceptual experience as of
   something having a property F, but the external world object perceived by the subject is not
   in fact F.
2. Phenomenal Principle: If a subject has a perceptual experience as of something having a
   property F, some thing of which the subject is directly aware actually has F.
3. In the cases described in 1, the external world object the subject perceives is not the F-thing
   of which she is directly aware. [1 & 2]
4. In the cases described at 1, the direct object of a subject’s awareness is something other than
   the external world object she perceives. [3]
5. If we want to claim that illusory and veridical experiences involve direct awareness of different
   sorts of objects, we need a proper reason to believe this claim. [General Methodological Principle]
6. __________________________
7. How things seem from a subject’s point of view provides no grounds for the claim at 5. [6]
8. Absent some other ground, we must say that illusory and veridical experiences involve
   awareness of the same sorts of objects. [5 & 7]
9. Veridical perceptual experience does not involve direct awareness of (presumably mind-
   independent) external world objects. [4 & 8]

Answer 10

For some veridical experiences, there is an illusory experience which from the subject’s point
of view is indistinguishable from the veridical experience.

Question 11

What is the conclusion of the Contemporary Argument from Illusion

Answer 11

Veridical perceptual experience does not involve direct awareness of (presumably mind-
independent) external world objects.

Question 12

1) If something appears F to some observers and not-F to others, then it is not
inherently/really/in itself F.

Burnyeat argues this is equivalent to

Answer 12

2) If something is inherently/really/in itself F, then it appears F to all observers or it appears
not-F to all.

Question 13

2) If something is inherently/really/in itself F, then it appears F to all observers or it appears
not-F to all.

Burnyeat argues this is equivalent to

Answer 13

1) If something appears F to some observers and not-F to others, then it is not
inherently/really/in itself F.

Question 14

Argument against Phenomenal Internalism (3)

Answer 14

i. Introspective knowledge of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience must
be both certain and infallible.

ii. If a fact does not wholly depend upon a subject’s intrinsic features (e.g. it concerns
some external object), knowledge of the fact is not both certain and infallible.

iii. Either introspection provides no knowledge of phenomenal character, or B is true.

Question 15

McDowell’s argument for representationalism (3)

Answer 15

1. it would be rational for a subject to form a belief only if the content of her belief would bear a suitable relation to contents of those speech acts or mental states in response to which she formed the belief.
2. It is often rational to form beliefs in response to sensory experience (e.g. to believe that
   something is round in response to seeing a round object).
3. Only representationalism affords representational content a fundamental role in sensory
   experience

Question 16

Argument for representationalism from Vision Science (3)

Answer 16

1. According to our best vision science, we perceive the world in virtue of perceptual processing
   that constructs and manipulates representations, and these representations encode
   information about distal or ‘external’ properties (e.g. colours, shapes, etc.).
2. A right account of perception must respect our best science of perception [Methodological
   Naturalism]
   So,
3. Respecting our best vision science requires that visual experiences are representations that
   encode information about external properties.

Question 17

1. According to our best vision science, we perceive the world in virtue of perceptual processing
   that constructs and manipulates representations, and these representations encode
   information about distal or ‘external’ properties (e.g. colours, shapes, etc.).
2. ______________________
   So,
3. Respecting our best vision science requires that visual experiences are representations that
   encode information about external properties.

Answer 17

A right account of perception must respect our best science of perception [Methodological
Naturalism]

Question 18

1. ____________________(e.g. colours, shapes, etc.).
2. A right account of perception must respect our best science of perception [Methodological
   Naturalism]
   So,
3. Respecting our best vision science requires that visual experiences are representations that
   encode information about external properties.

Answer 18

According to our best vision science, we perceive the world in virtue of perceptual processing
that constructs and manipulates representations, and these representations encode
information about distal or ‘external’ properties

Question 19

1. According to our best vision science, we perceive the world in virtue of perceptual processing
   that constructs and manipulates representations, and these representations encode
   information about distal or ‘external’ properties (e.g. colours, shapes, etc.).
2. A right account of perception must respect our best science of perception [Methodological
   Naturalism]
   So,
3. __________________________

Answer 19

Respecting our best vision science requires that visual experiences are representations that
encode information about external properties.

Question 20

Campbell’s argument for Naive Realism (6)

Answer 20

1. It is a defining characteristic of thought-like representational contents that they are accessible
   to the subject in multiple ways (for example, a single proposition might be accessible as the
   meaning of a sentence; as the content of a belief; as the conclusion entailed by a series of
   premisses….)
2. If sensory experiences are just a class of mental states with thought-like representational
   contents, the representational content of a sensory experience is accessible to the subject in
   multiple ways: it is a representational content that can be shared by mental states that are not
   sensory experiences.
3. If the representational content of perceptual experience is accessible to the subject in multiple
   ways, having a sensory experience is just one among many ways of being in a mental state that
   has this kind of representational content.
4. The claim that sensory experiences are a class of mental states with thought-like representational contents is inconsistent with the claim that perception plays an essential role
   in enabling us to think about external world objects.
5. Naïve realists can explain how perception plays an essential role in enabling us to think about
   external world objects.
6. Only naïve realists can explain how perception plays an essential role in enabling us to think
   about external world objects.

Question 21

1. It is a defining characteristic of thought-like representational contents that they are accessible
   to the subject in multiple ways (for example, a single proposition might be accessible as the
   meaning of a sentence; as the content of a belief; as the conclusion entailed by a series of
   premisses….)
2. If sensory experiences are just a class of mental states with thought-like representational
   contents, the representational content of a sensory experience is accessible to the subject in
   multiple ways: it is a representational content that can be shared by mental states that are not
   sensory experiences.
3. ______________________
4. The claim that sensory experiences are a class of mental states with thought-like representational contents is inconsistent with the claim that perception plays an essential role
   in enabling us to think about external world objects.
5. Naïve realists can explain how perception plays an essential role in enabling us to think about
   external world objects.
6. Only naïve realists can explain how perception plays an essential role in enabling us to think
   about external world objects.

Answer 21

If the representational content of perceptual experience is accessible to the subject in multiple
ways, having a sensory experience is just one among many ways of being in a mental state that
has this kind of representational content.

Question 22

1. It is a defining characteristic of thought-like representational contents that they are accessible
   to the subject in multiple ways (for example, a single proposition might be accessible as the
   meaning of a sentence; as the content of a belief; as the conclusion entailed by a series of
   premisses….)
2. If sensory experiences are just a class of mental states with thought-like representational
   contents, the representational content of a sensory experience is accessible to the subject in
   multiple ways: it is a representational content that can be shared by mental states that are not
   sensory experiences.
3. If the representational content of perceptual experience is accessible to the subject in multiple
   ways, having a sensory experience is just one among many ways of being in a mental state that
   has this kind of representational content.
4. The claim that sensory experiences are a class of mental states with thought-like representational contents is inconsistent with the claim that perception plays an essential role
   in enabling us to think about external world objects.
5. Naïve realists can explain how perception plays an essential role in enabling us to think about
   external world objects.
6. ________________________

Answer 22

Only naïve realists can explain how perception plays an essential role in enabling us to think
about external world objects.

Question 23

1. It is a defining characteristic of thought-like representational contents that they are accessible
   to the subject in multiple ways (for example, a single proposition might be accessible as the
   meaning of a sentence; as the content of a belief; as the conclusion entailed by a series of
   premisses….)
2. If sensory experiences are just a class of mental states with thought-like representational
   contents, the representational content of a sensory experience is accessible to the subject in
   multiple ways: it is a representational content that can be shared by mental states that are not
   sensory experiences.
3. If the representational content of perceptual experience is accessible to the subject in multiple
   ways, having a sensory experience is just one among many ways of being in a mental state that
   has this kind of representational content.
4. ________________________
5. Naïve realists can explain how perception plays an essential role in enabling us to think about
   external world objects.
6. Only naïve realists can explain how perception plays an essential role in enabling us to think
   about external world objects.

Answer 23

The claim that sensory experiences are a class of mental states with thought-like representational contents is inconsistent with the claim that perception plays an essential role
in enabling us to think about external world objects.

Question 24

Argument from Hallucination

Answer 24

1. Perceptual Hallucination
2. Phenomenal Principle:
   So,
3. In the cases described at 1, the direct object of a subject’s awareness cannot be an external
   world object with which she in perceptual contact. [1 & 2]
   But,
4. If we want to claim that hallucinatory and veridical experiences involve direct awareness
   of different sorts of objects, we need a proper reason to believe this claim.
5. For some veridical experiences, there is a hallucinatory experience which from the
   subject’s point of view is indistinguishable from the veridical experience.
   Hence,
6. How things seem from a subject’s point of view provides no grounds for the claim at 4.
   [5]
   As a result,
7. Absent some other ground, we must say that hallucinatory and veridical experiences
   involve awareness of the same sorts of objects. [4 & 6]
   So,
8. Veridical perceptual experience does not involve direct awareness of (presumably mind-
   independent) external world objects. [3 & 7]

Question 25

1. Perceptual Hallucination
2. Phenomenal Principle:
   So,
3. ___________________
   [1 & 2]
   But,
4. If we want to claim that hallucinatory and veridical experiences involve direct awareness
   of different sorts of objects, we need a proper reason to believe this claim.
5. For some veridical experiences, there is a hallucinatory experience which from the
   subject’s point of view is indistinguishable from the veridical experience.
   Hence,
6. How things seem from a subject’s point of view provides no grounds for the claim at 4.
   [5]
   As a result,
7. Absent some other ground, we must say that hallucinatory and veridical experiences
   involve awareness of the same sorts of objects. [4 & 6]
   So,
8. Veridical perceptual experience does not involve direct awareness of (presumably mind-
   independent) external world objects. [3 & 7]

Answer 25

In the cases described at 1, the direct object of a subject’s awareness cannot be an external
world object with which she in perceptual contact.

Question 25

1. Perceptual Hallucination
2. Phenomenal Principle:
   So,
3. In the cases described at 1, the direct object of a subject’s awareness cannot be an external
   world object with which she in perceptual contact. [1 & 2]
   But,
4. If we want to claim that hallucinatory and veridical experiences involve direct awareness
   of different sorts of objects, we need a proper reason to believe this claim.
5. ____________________
   Hence,
6. How things seem from a subject’s point of view provides no grounds for the claim at 4.
   [5]
   As a result,
7. Absent some other ground, we must say that hallucinatory and veridical experiences
   involve awareness of the same sorts of objects. [4 & 6]
   So,
8. Veridical perceptual experience does not involve direct awareness of (presumably mind-
   independent) external world objects. [3 & 7]

Answer 25

For some veridical experiences, there is a hallucinatory experience which from the
subject’s point of view is indistinguishable from the veridical experience.

Question 26

1. Perceptual Hallucination
2. Phenomenal Principle:
   So,
3. In the cases described at 1, the direct object of a subject’s awareness cannot be an external
   world object with which she in perceptual contact. [1 & 2]
   But,
4. If we want to claim that hallucinatory and veridical experiences involve direct awareness
   of different sorts of objects, we need a proper reason to believe this claim.
5. For some veridical experiences, there is a hallucinatory experience which from the
   subject’s point of view is indistinguishable from the veridical experience.
   Hence,
6. How things seem from a subject’s point of view provides no grounds for the claim at 4.
   [5]
   As a result,
7. Absent some other ground, we must say that hallucinatory and veridical experiences
   involve awareness of the same sorts of objects. [4 & 6]
   So,
8. _______________________ [3 & 7]

Answer 26

Veridical perceptual experience does not involve direct awareness of (presumably mind-
independent) external world objects.

Question 27

1. Perceptual Hallucination
2. Phenomenal Principle:
   So,
3. In the cases described at 1, the direct object of a subject’s awareness cannot be an external
   world object with which she in perceptual contact. [1 & 2]
   But,
4. If we want to claim that hallucinatory and veridical experiences involve direct awareness
   of different sorts of objects, we need a proper reason to believe this claim.
5. For some veridical experiences, there is a hallucinatory experience which from the
   subject’s point of view is indistinguishable from the veridical experience.
   Hence,
6. How things seem from a subject’s point of view provides no grounds for the claim at 4.
   [5]
   As a result,
7. _____________________[4 & 6]
   So,
8. Veridical perceptual experience does not involve direct awareness of (presumably mind-
   independent) external world objects. [3 & 7]

Answer 27

Absent some other ground, we must say that hallucinatory and veridical experiences
involve awareness of the same sorts of objects.

Question 28

Martin argues that Naive Realism is inconsistent with two assumptions:

Answer 28

1. Common kind assumption
2. Experiential Naturalism

Question 29

Martin’s Argument against Naive Realism

Answer 29

1. When a subject perceives a raspberry bush, her experience has the bush as a mind-independent
   object of (non-representational) awareness: she is aware of a bush whose existence does not
   depend on her awareness of it, and this awareness could not obtain in the absence of the bush
   [Naive Realism]
   Applying (A) to 1:
2. Whatever kind of experience the subject undergoes when she perceives the bush, the very
   same kind of experience could occur when she is merely hallucinating. [From (A) and 1]
   But
3. The experience the subject has when hallucinating must have a sufficient physical cause [From
   2 and (B)]
   So
4. Either that experience includes awareness of an object for whose existence the experience is
   sufficient, or the experience does not involve awareness of an object [From 3]
   Question: why does Experiential Naturalism generate this result? See what Martin says
   at the top of p. 41.
   However,
5. If an experience has an object of awareness for whose existence the experience is sufficient,
   then that object is mind-dependent [From def. of mind-dependence]
   Now apply 4 and 5 to 2:
6. Either the subject who perceives the bush thereby perceives a mind-dependent object, or she
   is not aware of an object.

Question 30

1. When a subject perceives a raspberry bush, her experience has the bush as a mind-independent
   object of (non-representational) awareness: she is aware of a bush whose existence does not
   depend on her awareness of it, and this awareness could not obtain in the absence of the bush
   [Naive Realism]
   Applying (A) to 1:
2. Whatever kind of experience the subject undergoes when she perceives the bush, the very
   same kind of experience could occur when she is merely hallucinating. [From (A) and 1]
   But
3. The experience the subject has when hallucinating must have a sufficient physical cause [From
   2 and (B)]
   So
4. Either that experience includes awareness of an object for whose existence the experience is
   sufficient, ________________[From 3]
5. If an experience has an object of awareness for whose existence the experience is sufficient,
   then that object is mind-dependent [From def. of mind-dependence]
   Now apply 4 and 5 to 2:
6. Either the subject who perceives the bush thereby perceives a mind-dependent object, or she
   is not aware of an object.

Answer 30

or the experience does not involve awareness of an object

Question 31

1. When a subject perceives a raspberry bush, her experience has the bush as a mind-independent
   object of (non-representational) awareness: she is aware of a bush whose existence does not
   depend on her awareness of it, and this awareness could not obtain in the absence of the bush
   [Naive Realism]
   Applying (A) to 1:
2. Whatever kind of experience the subject undergoes when she perceives the bush, the very
   same kind of experience could occur when she is merely hallucinating. [From (A) and 1]
   But
3. The experience the subject has when hallucinating must have a sufficient physical cause [From
   2 and (B)]
   So
4. Either that experience includes awareness of an object for whose existence the experience is
   sufficient, or the experience does not involve awareness of an object [From 3]
   However,
5. If an experience has an object of awareness for whose existence the experience is sufficient,
   then that object is mind-dependent [From def. of mind-dependence]
   Now apply 4 and 5 to 2:
6. __________________

Answer 31

Either the subject who perceives the bush thereby perceives a mind-dependent object, or she
is not aware of an object.

Question 32

1. When a subject perceives a raspberry bush, her experience has the bush as a mind-independent
   object of (non-representational) awareness: she is aware of a bush whose existence does not
   depend on her awareness of it, and this awareness could not obtain in the absence of the bush
   [Naive Realism]
   Applying (A) to 1:
2. Whatever kind of experience the subject undergoes when she perceives the bush, the very
   same kind of experience could occur when she is merely hallucinating. [From (A) and 1]
   But
3. The experience the subject has when hallucinating must have a sufficient physical cause [From
   2 and (B)]
   So
4. Either that experience includes awareness of an object for whose existence the experience is
   sufficient, or the experience does not involve awareness of an object [From 3]
   However,
5. ____________________ [From def. of mind-dependence]
   Now apply 4 and 5 to 2:
6. Either the subject who perceives the bush thereby perceives a mind-dependent object, or she
   is not aware of an object.

Answer 32

If an experience has an object of awareness for whose existence the experience is sufficient,
then that object is mind-dependent

Question 33

1. When a subject perceives a raspberry bush, her experience has the bush as a mind-independent
   object of (non-representational) awareness: she is aware of a bush whose existence does not depend on her awareness of it, and ____________________________
   [Naive Realism]
   Applying (A) to 1:
2. Whatever kind of experience the subject undergoes when she perceives the bush, the very same kind of experience could occur when she is merely hallucinating. [From (A) and 1]
   But
3. The experience the subject has when hallucinating must have a sufficient physical cause [From
   2 and (B)]
   So
4. Either that experience includes awareness of an object for whose existence the experience is
   sufficient, or the experience does not involve awareness of an object [From 3]
   Question: why does Experiential Naturalism generate this result? See what Martin says
   at the top of p. 41.
   However,
5. If an experience has an object of awareness for whose existence the experience is sufficient,
   then that object is mind-dependent [From def. of mind-dependence]
   Now apply 4 and 5 to 2:
6. Either the subject who perceives the bush thereby perceives a mind-dependent object, or she
   is not aware of an object.

Answer 33

this awareness could not obtain in the absence of the bush

Question 34

Causal Argument for the Common Kind Assumption

Answer 34

i. there is some proximate type of causal condition, C, in the subject’s body which determined the chance of the occurrence of that even of seeing.
ii. Possible that C should occur in the subject even if no potential object for perception is present in the subject’s environment
iii. Same Proximate Cause, Same Effect: Where two situations involve the same proximate causal
conditions, then the chances for the occurrence of such an effect are the same in both
situations.
So,
iv. Whatever kind of experience occurs in the situation described by 1, the same kind of
experience occurs in the situation described at 2. [From i-iii]

Question 35

i. When a subject sees a raspberry bush, there is some proximate type of causal condition, C, in
the subject’s body which determined the chance of the occurrence of that even of seeing.
ii. It is nomologically possible—namely possible given the laws of nature—that C should occur
in the subject even if no potential object for perception is present in the subject’s environment
iii. Same Proximate Cause, Same Effect: Where two situations involve the same proximate causal
conditions, then the chances for the occurrence of such an effect are the same in both
situations.
So,
iv. Whatever kind of experience occurs in the situation described by 1, _______________ [From i-iii]

Answer 35

the same kind of
experience occurs in the situation described at 2.

Question 36

i. When a subject sees a raspberry bush, there is some proximate type of causal condition, C, in
the subject’s body which determined the chance of the occurrence of that even of seeing.
ii. It is nomologically possible—namely possible given the laws of nature—that C ___________________
iii. Same Proximate Cause, Same Effect: Where two situations involve the same proximate causal
conditions, then the chances for the occurrence of such an effect are the same in both
situations.
So,
iv. Whatever kind of experience occurs in the situation described by 1, the same kind of
experience occurs in the situation described at 2. [From i-iii]

Answer 36

should occur
in the subject even if no potential object for perception is present in the subject’s environment

Question 37

i. When a subject sees a raspberry bush, there is some proximate type of causal condition, C, in
the subject’s body which determined the chance of the occurrence of that even of seeing.
ii. It is nomologically possible—namely possible given the laws of nature—that C should occur
in the subject even if no potential object for perception is present in the subject’s environment
iii. Same Proximate Cause, Same Effect: _____________________
So,
iv. Whatever kind of experience occurs in the situation described by 1, the same kind of
experience occurs in the situation described at 2. [From i-iii]

Answer 37

Where two situations involve the same proximate causal
conditions, then the chances for the occurrence of such an effect are the same in both
situations.

Question 38

Reverse Causal Argument

Answer 38

i. When a subject sees a raspberry bush, there is some proximate type of causal condition, C, in
the subject’s body which determined the chance of the occurrence of that even of seeing.
ii. It is nomologically possible—namely possible given the laws of nature—that C should occur
in the subject even if no potential object for perception is present in the subject’s environment
iii. Modified Same Proximate Cause, Same Effect: Where two situations involve the same
proximate causal conditions, and do not differ in any non-causal conditions for the occurrence
of some kind of effect, then the chances for the occurrence of such an effect are the same in
both situations.
iv. No non-causal condition obtains in the situation described at (ii)—a situation in which the
subject is victim of hallucination—which does not also obtain in the situation described at
(i)—a case of veridical perception.
So,
v. Whatever kind of experience occurs in the situation described by (ii), it is possible that the
same kind of experience occurs in the situation described at (i).

Question 39

i. When a subject sees a raspberry bush, there is some proximate type of causal condition, C, in
the subject’s body which determined the chance of the occurrence of that even of seeing.
ii. It is nomologically possible—namely possible given the laws of nature—that C should occur
in the subject even if no potential object for perception is present in the subject’s environment
iii. Modified Same Proximate Cause, Same Effect: Where two situations involve the same
proximate causal conditions, and do not differ in any non-causal conditions for the occurrence
of some kind of effect, then the chances for the occurrence of such an effect are the same in
both situations.
iv. No non-causal condition obtains in the situation described at (ii)—a situation in which the
subject is victim of hallucination—which does not also obtain in the situation described at
(i)—a case of veridical perception.
So,
v. ___________________

Answer 39

Whatever kind of experience occurs in the situation described by (ii), it is possible that the
same kind of experience occurs in the situation described at (i).

Question 40

Johnston’s Argument Against Negative Epistemic Disjunctivism

Answer 40

1. It is possible to undergo a causally matching hallucination as of a red flower
2. If a subject has never seen red before, undergoing the hallucination described at 1 would permit her to know, of red, what it is like (e.g., more similar to purple than to green).
   But,
3. It is impossible to explain our capacity to acquire the knowledge described at 2 from
   hallucination—original de re knowledge of a sensible quality—if negative epistemic
   disjunctivism is true.
   So,
4. Negative epistemic disjunctivism is false.

Question 41

1. It is possible to undergo a causally matching hallucination as of a red flower (i.e., a
   hallucination which by Martin’s lights would be indiscriminable through reflection alone
   from a veridical experience of a red flower)
2. If a subject has never seen red before, undergoing the hallucination described at 1 ______________, what it is like (e.g., more similar to purple than to green).
   But,
3. It is impossible to explain our capacity to acquire the knowledge described at 2 from
   hallucination—original de re knowledge of a sensible quality—if negative epistemic
   disjunctivism is true.
   So,
4. Negative epistemic disjunctivism is false.

Answer 41

would permit her to know, of red

Question 42

1. ________________(i.e., a
   hallucination which by Martin’s lights would be indiscriminable through reflection alone
   from a veridical experience of a red flower)
2. If a subject has never seen red before, undergoing the hallucination described at 1 would permit her to know, of red, what it is like (e.g., more similar to purple than to green).
   But,
3. It is impossible to explain our capacity to acquire the knowledge described at 2 from
   hallucination—original de re knowledge of a sensible quality—if negative epistemic
   disjunctivism is true.
   So,
4. Negative epistemic disjunctivism is false.

Answer 42

It is possible to undergo a causally matching hallucination as of a red flower

Question 43

How does Sethi preserve naive realism

Answer 43

Sethi insists that when
you perceive a red chair, for instance, the instance of redness you perceive depends for its instantiation
upon both your mind and the chair itself, which makes it mind-independent; by contrast, when you
hallucinate a red chair, Sethi allows that while there is an instance of redness, it depends for its
instantiation only upon your mind, and so the instance is mind-dependent