Conflict & Natural Resources

Question 1

who said “war makes states, states make war”?

Answer 1

Charles Tilly

Question 2

what are the foundations for the claim “war makes states, states make war”?

Answer 2

boundary dimension:
- boundaries are empirically solidified
- lots of boundaries in Africa are theoretical so no incentive to fight empirical boundaries

taxation & financing:
- developing bureaucracy & establishing a tax base

technological dimension:
- innovation & development happens at a faster rate during war

Question 3

define civil war.

Answer 3

an internal conflict with at least 1,000 combat-related deaths per year (Collier & Hoeffler, 1999)

to distinguish wars from massacres, both government forces and an identifiable rebel organisation must suffer at least 5% of these fatalities

Question 4

what is the collective action problem associated with rebellions?

Answer 4

why do rebels fight when their individual contribution to rebellion is likely to be trivial and the risk of injury they face for participating is significant?

Question 5

why do rebels choose to solve the collective action problem? / why does it not affect them?

Answer 5

political change will produce private benefits for the leaders and their followers

“looting rebellions do not face intrinsic collective action problems because the activity is privately profitable. By contrast, justice rebellions face…problems in collective action” (Collier & Hoeffler, 1999)

Question 6

what is the time inconsistency problem associated with rebellions?

Answer 6

rebels undergo hardships immediately but the rewards of the new order are only in the future

Question 7

what is the common dichotomy given about causes of rebellions?

Answer 7

greed (Collier & Hoeffler) vs grievance (Keen)

Question 8

which scholars are most associated with the ‘greed’ argument?

Answer 8

Collier & Hoeffler, 1999, 2004

Question 9

explain ‘greed’ (economic incentives / natural resources) as the cause of rebellion argument.

Answer 9

complexities of state-building in Africa are heavily tied to the dynamics of economic incentives and natural resources (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004)

these economic incentives manifest notably in conflicts in Africa, where strategic exploitation of resources becomes pivotal

Collier’s most important proxy for economic agenda in civil wars is the share of primary commodity production in GDP

• primary commodity exports significantly heighten conflict risks, particularly when they go beyond the threshold of approximately 33% of GDP - vulnerability of, and danger to, nations overly dependent on such resources (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004)
• “diamond exports from Sierra Leone probably account for the high incidence of conflict in that country” (Collier, 2000, p106)

Question 10

what is the threshold of GDP that primary commodity exports must go beyond to heighten conflict risks?

Answer 10

primary commodity exports significantly heighten conflict risks, particularly when they go beyond the threshold of approximately 33% of GDP - vulnerability of, and danger to, nations overly dependent on such resources (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004)

Question 11

give an example of natural resources playing a role in conflict.

Answer 11

Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA mining diamonds in Angola - critical to the ability of the group to sustain its challenge to the government as it allows the rebels to buy weapons, acquire friends and external support, and serves as a store for wealth (Herbst, 2000)

Question 12

what is the resource curse?

Answer 12

resource Curse: where countries abundant in natural resources, particularly non-renewable resources like minerals and oil, often experience economic challenges, political instability, and social issues rather than reaping benefits from these resources

Question 13

what arguments explain / support the idea of the resource curse?

Answer 13

supported by arguments of economic dependency - countries rich in natural resources become overly dependent on these resources, leading to:

(i) neglect or underdevelopment of other economic sectors

(ii) governance challenges: corruption, rent-seeking behaviour, and weak institutions often accompany resource wealth, as powerful interests seek control over resources

(iii) conflict and instability: armed groups, rebel factions, or even governments might engage in conflicts to gain control over lucrative resources

Question 14

give an example of a country suffering from the ‘resource curse’

Answer 14

Nigeria & Oil Example

oil largely in South Nigeria, so geographically skewed as to where the money is vs where it is not, South more developed than the North, regional divide & because leaders tend to be military from North brings in ethnic dimension

Question 15

what does Norman believe is required to end the resource curse?

Answer 15

ending resource curse requires ending the cycle of state decay that underlies it (Norman, 2012)

means providing resource-rich states with both the incentive and the means to conduct state-building

to cause any appreciable shift in the incentives facing leaders of resource-rich nations, it will be necessary to step beyond voluntary initiatives

Question 16

what are the limitations of the economic incentive argument?

Answer 16

although the wars in Sierra Leone, Angola and Liberia appear to fit into the economic perspective, the conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, and Sudan do not fit at all (Herbst, 2000)

leaders’ actions don’t fit with economic logic (Herbst, 2000)

• why do leaders like Savimbi or Taylor not cash out after they’ve made millions, invest into a hedge fund and retire to more pleasant surroundings?
• why continue to engage in dangerous action? Consequences losing are sever & seem to outweigh the marginal benefit of fighting for another year

Question 17

how does Keen adapt the economic argument?

Answer 17

greed is a vulgar word

Keen says it’s not about excess, rather the people are fighting to survive & because they are marginalised

in this way wars are rational reactions to marginalisation

Question 18

what is Keen’s grievance as the cause of civil war argument?

Answer 18

conflict often stems from grievances whether these be societal or political and are often rooted in feelings of neglect and lack of respect and representation

Question 19

which scholar is associated with the grievance argument?

Answer 19

Keen, 2005

Question 20

which country does Keen use as an example for his grievance argument?

Answer 20

Sierra Leone

Question 21

explain Keen’s Sierra Leone example as supporting the grievance argument.

Answer 21

violence has often been a way of communicating grievances

• failure to address grievances by providing alternative channels for expression has exacerbated the sense of alienation among sections of the population
• helps to explain participation of children who felt that ‘nobody was helping them, listening to them, giving them hope’

extremity of need is widely seen as feeding into the violence

• e.g. infant mortality rate at 316 children per 1000

collapse of essential services, including education and healthcare not only propelled the conflict but also suffered extensive damage during the war

• e.g. primary education enrollment fell from 52% before the war to 42% in 2000
• e.g. more unqualified than qualified teachers in most districts
• only 4% of the entire population of Tonkolili District had access to sanitation, and only 12% had access to a protected water source

Question 22

how does social cohesion and ethnic allegiance play into the grievance argument?

Answer 22

ethnic & religious diversity within organisations tends to reduce their ability to function

rebellions often hinged on rebels use and manipulation of ethnicity, cultural symbols and propaganda

only one of the proxies for grievance survives into the baseline regression, namely ethnic dominance (Collier & Hoeffler, 1999)

• ethnic dominance: If political allegiance is based on ethnicity and one ethnic group has a majority. The incentive to exploit the minority increases the larger the minority, since there is more to extract (Collier, 2001)
• if a country is characterised by ethnic dominance its risk of conflict is nearly doubled

Question 23

give an example of social cohesion and ethnic allegiance contributing to a rebellion.

Answer 23

Ethiopia example

while popular insurrections were common in both Bale and Tigray (Ethiopia), only the Tigrayan movement succeeded in developing into a major insurgency (Tereke, 1990)

hinged on TPLF’s determination and organisation talent using cultural symbols, propaganda, and coercion to mobilise masses

Question 24

how does weak government play into the grievance argument? how has it changed the type of rebellion?

Answer 24

shift in the evolution of Africa’s wars came with the growing difficulties that the leaders of regimes faced in policing their own political associates (Collier & Hoeffler)

• leaders’ loss of control over the allocation of patronage resources, coupled with the weakening of state institutions needed to generate revenues, gave licence to heads of rival factions to appropriate resources and build their own patronage networks

central reason for why looting rebellions have become more frequent is not because rebel movements have become weaker. Rather, it is because states have become weaker (Herbst, 2000)

• rebellions are now against weak and disintegrating independent governments rather than strong settler states
• rebel leaders choose path of least resistance and can rely increasingly on coercion and looting

Question 25

how do ideological factors affect chances and outcomes of rebellions?

Answer 25

significant evidence that rebel leaders themselves believe that ideology is an important motivational force for their followers (Herbst, 2000)

some rebellions have devoted significant time and effort to political indoctrination, this is a cost that given the collective choice framework would not be acceptable unless the leaders thought it useful

Eritrean Example

• Eritrean People’s Liberation Army had a curriculum of political and military training that lasted 6 months (Pateman, 1998)

Question 26

which scholar offers ideology & coercion as motivating factors for rebellions?

Answer 26

Herbst, 2000

Question 27

how does coercion affect rebellions?

Answer 27

rebels devote substantial attention to separating people, usually but not always men, from their communities so that they have control over them

increasing role of the child soldier, now endemic in many African conflicts, demonstrates increasing role of coercion rather than economic incentives (Herbst, 2000)

• more than 120,000 children under 18 are currently involved in conflicts in Angola, Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville, DRC, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan & Uganda (Save the Children, 1999)
• children accounted for 15% of Liberia’s demobilised fighters (Ellis, 1999)

Sierra Leone Example

• in Sierra Leone, youth were conscripted and encamped for military training, local primary school buildings being pressed into service as camp headquarters

Mozambique Example

• a typical RENAMO practice in Mozambique was to take a boy soldier back to his village and force him to kill someone he knew. After the murder, there was no chance of the boy every being able to return to the village (Cohn & Goodwin-Gill, 1994)

Question 28

give examples of the role of coercion in rebellions.

Answer 28

Sierra Leone Example

• in Sierra Leone, youth were conscripted and encamped for military training, local primary school buildings being pressed into service as camp headquarters

Mozambique Example

• a typical RENAMO practice in Mozambique was to take a boy soldier back to his village and force him to kill someone he knew. After the murder, there was no chance of the boy every being able to return to the village (Cohn & Goodwin-Gill, 1994)

Question 29

can the cause of civil war be boiled down to one factor?

Answer 29

generally & majority no

almost all rebel leaders use economic incentives to motivate their followers as well as political indoctrination, ethnic mobilisation and coercion (Herbst, 2000)

as rational entrepreneurs of violence, rebel leaders decide to use the combination of motivations that is most likely to be effective given the state they are facing and the terrain of their country (Herbst, 2000)