Epistemology: Basics Flashcards

1
Q

What is Direct Realism and its simplified definition?

A

-The immediate objects of perception are mind-independent objects and their properties

-Objects exist outside the mind and we perceive them directly

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2
Q

What is the argument from illusion (against Direct Realism)?

Issue 1

A

In an illusion I’m experiencing a property (e.g. bentness) but the external object doesn’t really have that property (e.g. the pencil isn’t really bent). So I’m not directly experiencing the external object

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3
Q

What is the argument from perceptual variation (Russell’s table example) (against Direct Realism)?

Issue 2

A

The property I experience can change (e.g. the table looks a different shape depending on where I stand), but the external object does not change. So I’m not directly experiencing the external object

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4
Q

What is the argument from hallucination (against Direct Realism)?

Issue 3

A

In a hallucination I’m experiencing an object (e.g. a pink elephant) but there is no external object there (e.g. there is no pink elephant there). So I’m not directly experiencing the external object

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5
Q

What is the time-lag argument (against Direct Realism)?

Issue 4

A

Because of how long it takes for an image to reach me, I can experience an object (e.g. a distant star) after the object no longer exists (e.g. after the distant star has exploded). So I’m not directly experiencing the external object

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6
Q

What is Indirect Realism and its simplified definition?

A

-The immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects (sense-data) that are caused by and represent mind-independent objects

-We never actually experience the external world. Instead we experience things within our mind and they give us information about the external world (a bit like a map of London giving information about London)

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7
Q

What is Locke’s primary/secondary quality distinction? (Indirect Realism)

A

What we experience is similar to the external world in terms of properties like shape, size, speed - these are called primary qualities - e.g. my idea of squareness is caused by (and resembles) the squareness of the external object.

What we experience is different to the external world in terms of properties like colour, taste, smell - these are called secondary qualities - e.g. my idea of redness is not caused by any redness of the external object (because it has no redness)

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8
Q

What is the argument that it leads to scepticism about the existence of mind-independent objects (attacking ‘realism’)?

Issue 1

A

If this view is right and we never actually experience the external world, then we cannot know that it exists

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9
Q

What is Locke’s argument from the involuntary nature of our experience?

Indirect Realist response 1 to Issue 1 of Realism

A

We can know the external world is causing our experiences rather than them being caused by us. This is because we cannot control our experiences, which we would be able to do if we were the cause

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10
Q

What is the argument from the coherence of various kinds of experience, as developed by Locke?

Indirect realist response 2a to Issue 1 of Realism

A

We can know the external world is causing our experiences. This is because all of our experiences agree with each other. This makes it likely that there is something they agree about - the external world

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11
Q

What is the argument from the coherence of various kinds of experience, as developed by Cockburn?

Indirect realist response 2b to Issue 1 of Realism

A

We can know the external world is causing our experiences. This is because when changes happen with one of our senses, they happen with the others (e.g. something sounding louder and looking bigger as it gets nearer). This makes it likely that there is something ‘out there’ that is changing - something in the external world

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12
Q

What is Russell’s response that the external world is the ‘best hypothesis’?

Indirect realist response 3 to Issue 1 of Realism

A

It is more likely that there is an external world than that there is not:
(1) It explains why things change when we are not looking (e.g. a cat going from being full to being hungry)
(2) We also naturally believe there is an external world, and we have no reason to think anything else
(3) It is the simplest view

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13
Q

What is the argument from Berkeley, that we cannot know the nature of mind-independent objects because mind-dependent ideas cannot be like mind-independent objects?

Issue 2

A

A map of London can give information about London because they are similar enough (they are both physical things). But experiencing things within our mind cannot give us information about the physical external world because they are not similar enough (the mind is non-physical, the external world is physical). So indirect realism is false

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14
Q

What is Berkeley’s Idealism and its simplified definition?

A

-The immediate objects of perception (ie ordinary objects such as tables, chairs, etc) are mind-dependent objects

-There is no external world - only ideas and minds exist

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15
Q

What is Argument 1 for idealism: Berkeley’s attack on the primary/secondary property distinction?

A

Locke argues that because colour experiences vary in a way that experiences of shape do not, that these are different types of property (colour is a secondary quality and shape is a primary quality)

Berkeley claims that shape experience also varies, and so they are the same kind of property. He thinks that they are both, therefore, in the mind

Locke argues that because you can imagine an object without taste, but not without shape, that these are different types of property (taste is a secondary quality and shape is a primary quality)

Berkeley claims that you actually can’t imagine an object without some secondary quality (e.g. colour), and so they are the same kind of property. He thinks they are both, therefore, in the mind

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16
Q

What is Argument 2 for idealism: Berkeley’s ‘master’ argument?

A

It’s impossible to think of anything without it being in your mind, so everything must exist in your mind

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17
Q

What are arguments from illusion and hallucination?

Issue 1 to Argument 2 of Berkeley’s Idealism

A

What makes an illusion or hallucination different from actually experiencing something is whether our experience matches the external world. Idealism thinks there’s no external world, so there seems to be no difference between illusions or hallucinations and actually experiencing something for idealists

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18
Q

What is the theory that idealism leads to solipsism?

Issue 2 to Argument 2 of Berkeley’s Idealism

A

Berkeley’s idealism leads to the problematic conclusion that no minds other than mine really exist

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19
Q

What are problems with the role played by God in Berkeley’s Idealism (including how can Berkeley claim that our ideas exist within God’s mind given that he believes that God cannot feel pain or have sensations)?

Issue 3 to Argument 2 of Berkeley’s Idealism

A

For Berkeley, God plays the role of always perceiving all ideas, which explains how things exist even when I am not perceiving them.

One problem with this is that our ideas are often of sense experiences e.g. I feel pain or hear birds, but Berkeley says that God, being completely different to humans, cannot have sense experience (God could not feel pain or hear birds)

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20
Q

What is Innatism?

A

There are ideas that have always been in our minds

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21
Q

What is the argument for innatism from Plato (ie the ‘slave boy’ argument)?

A

The slave boy has knowledge of a geometry rule. This can’t have come from experience as he has had no experience of this geometry rule. So this knowledge must be innate

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22
Q

What is the argument for innatism from Leibniz (ie his argument based on necessary truths)?

A

I have knowledge of truths that must be true in every possible case e.g. everything has to have a cause. This can’t have come from experience, as I haven’t experienced every possible case and experience only tells me what happens to be the case. So this knowledge must be innate

23
Q

What is Locke’s argument against innatism?

Empiricist response 1

A

If an idea e.g. everything has a cause were innate, everyone would know this idea. But there are no ideas that everyone (including children) know. So there are no innate ideas

24
Q

What is the mind as a ‘tabula rasa’ (the nature of impressions and ideas, simple and complex concepts)?

Empiricist response 2

A

No ideas are innate. Instead, our minds are a ‘blank slate’ when we are born.
We get simple ideas like ‘red’ or ‘circle’ from our senses, and other complex ideas like ‘apple’ from our senses or can be made from these simple ideas

25
Q

What is the meaning of ‘intuition’ and ‘deduction’ and the distinction between them?

A

Intuition and deduction (for Descartes) are both a priori - they give us knowledge that’s not based on experience

-Intuition is knowledge that’s self-justified. It doesn’t need an argument
-Deduction is knowledge that comes from a valid argument

26
Q

What is Descartes’ notion of ‘clear and distinct ideas’ ?

A

-Clear: I can access the idea immediately
-Distinct: I don’t get it confused with other ideas

Clear and distinct ideas are known by intuition

27
Q

What is Descartes’ cogito as an example of an a priori intuition?

A

-Cogito = I know I exist

-A priori = I know I exist (not on the basis of experience)

Intuition- I know I exist without an argument

28
Q

What are Descartes’ arguments for the existence of God?

A

-Ontological: God is perfect. If something is perfect, it must exist. God must exist

-Cosmological: The only explanation for the fact that I have an idea of an infinite being is that God put it there. The only explanation for the fact that I carry on existing is God. So God exists

29
Q

What are Descartes’ arguments for his proof of the external world?

A

The world outside my mind exists because (1) I naturally think it does, (2) God exists and (3) God wouldn’t deceive me

30
Q

Why are Descartes’ arguments a priori deduction?

A

[ontological/cosmological/external world] are a priori deductions because they are valid arguments using knowledge that isn’t based on experience

31
Q

What is a response to Descartes’ cogito?

Empiricist response 1

A

It’s not possible to know if a self exists, all that can be known is the existence of lots of individual mental states

32
Q

What are responses to Descartes’ arguments for the existence of God and his proof of the external world (including how Hume’s Fork might be applied to these arguments)?

Empiricist response 2

A

-The ontological argument fails: We cannot know something exists just by thinking about it - we need experience of it. So any argument that says we can know God exists through thinking alone must be wrong.

-The cosmological argument fails: Nothing we can think of, and nothing we can experience, gives us good reason to think that everything has to have a cause. So this part of Descartes’ argument is wrong.

-The proof of the external world fails: we cannot know the external world exists just by thinking about it

All the responses above are based on Hume’s idea that all knowledge of what exists is from experience (he calls this ‘matters of fact’, e.g. ‘the table exists and is brown’) - we can’t get this knowledge just by thinking about it. The knowledge that we get just by thinking about it is just true by definition (he calls this ‘relations of ideas’ , e.g. ‘triangles have 3 sides’)

33
Q

What is philosophical scepticism and the distinction between philosophical scepticism and normal incredulity?

A

-Philosophical scepticism: doubting beliefs in such a way that the doubt can’t be removed (says the sceptic)

-Normal incredulity: doubting beliefs in such a way that the doubt could be removed (by checking)

34
Q

What is the role/function of philosophical scepticism within epistemology?

A

Philosophical scepticism shows that our normal reasons for thinking we know things aren’t good enough - it challenges us to search for whether there are any good reasons for knowledge

35
Q

What is the distinction between local and global scepticism and the (possible) global application of philosophical scepticism?

A

-Local (philosophical) scepticism is philosophical scepticism about some particular piece/type of knowledge e.g. whether we can know that God exists

-Global (philosophical) scepticism is philosophical scepticism about all knowledge (e.g. the kind of doubt caused by thinking there might be an evil demon deceiving us about everything)

36
Q

What is Descartes’ first sceptical argument of the three waves of doubt: Illusion?

A

My senses have deceived me in the past in the case of illusions (e.g. seeing a pencil look bent in water). So I can’t trust knowledge that comes from my senses

37
Q

What is Descartes’ second sceptical argument of the three waves of doubt: Dreaming?

A

I can’t be sure that I’m not dreaming, so I can’t trust any knowledge of the external world

38
Q

What is Descartes’ third sceptical argument of the three waves of doubt: Evil Demon?

A

I can’t be sure that I’m not being deceived about everything by an evil demon, so I can’t trust any knowledge (including knowledge of maths and geometry)

39
Q

What is Descartes’ own response to the challenge of scepticism?

A

Descartes solves the issue of scepticism about the external world by basing his knowledge that there is an external world on his knowledge that there is a God who wouldn’t deceive him into thinking there was such a world if there wasn’t. So we can have knowledge of the external world

40
Q

What are empiricist responses (Locke, Berkeley and Russell) to the challenge of scepticism?

A

-Locke solves the issue of scepticism about the external world using (a) argument from the involuntary nature of our experience and (b) his argument from the coherence of various kinds of experience

-Berkeley avoids the issue of scepticism about the external world by arguing that it does not exist

-Russell solves the issue of scepticism about the external world by arguing that the external world is the ‘best hypothesis’

41
Q

What is the reliabilism response to challenge of scepticism?

A

Reliabilists do not think that you need to be able to justify your beliefs in order to have knowledge. They just think that the belief needs to be true and to have been produced using a reliable process. This means you can know the external world exists even if you are unable to justify this claim, so long as your true beliefs are in fact caused by the external world (even if you don’t know this!)

42
Q

What is the distinction between acquaintance knowledge, ability knowledge and propositional knowledge?

A

-Acquaintance knowledge is knowing of things because you’ve had contact with them e.g. knowing Dave or the taste of pineapple

-Ability knowledge is knowing how to do something e.g. knowing how to ride a bike

-Propositional knowledge is knowing a true statement e.g. knowing that it is raining

43
Q

What is the nature of definition (Zagzebski) and how propositional knowledge may be analysed/defined?

A

We should treat ‘knowledge’ like it has a real objective definition, not just a subjective definition

44
Q

What is the tripartite view: Propositional knowledge is defined as justified true belief?

A

For something to count as knowledge, it must be a justified, true, believed

Each of these things is needed for knowledge, and together they are enough for knowledge

45
Q

Why is justification not a necessary condition of knowledge?

Issue 1

A

You can know something without having a justification (person who guesses dates)

46
Q

Why is truth not a necessary condition of knowledge?

Issue 1

A

You can know something that isn’t true (scientists knew that atoms couldn’t be split)

47
Q

Why is belief not a necessary condition of knowledge?

Issue 1

A

You can know something that you don’t believe (student correct but doubted answers in exam!)

48
Q

What is it where the conditions are not sufficient – cases of lucky true beliefs?

Issue 2

A

There are times when you can have a justified true belief, but it isn’t knowledge. Getting the right time from a broken clock is a justified true belief but it isn’t knowledge - it’s just luck. So these three things aren’t enough for knowledge

49
Q

What is example 1 that Smith’s belief that the person who gets the job has 10 coins in his pocket?

Example 1 of Issue 2 of JTB

A

Smith has a justified true belief that the person who gets the job has 10 coins in his pocket but this isn’t knowledge - it is just luck. So these three things aren’t enough for knowledge

50
Q

What is example 2 that Smith’s belief that either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona?

Example 2 of Issue 2 of JTB

A

Smith has a justified true belief that either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona, but this isn’t knowledge - it is just luck. So these three things aren’t enough for knowledge

51
Q

What is response 1 to issue 2: strengthen the justification condition (ie infallibilism)?

Response 1 to issue 2 of JTB

A

In order to have knowledge, the justification has to be perfect (impossible to doubt) (which it wasn’t in the Gettier case)

52
Q

What is response 2 to issue 2: add a ‘no false lemmas’ condition (J+T+B+N)

Response 2 to issue 2 of JTB

A

In order to have knowledge, the justification needs to not be based on anything false (which it was in the Gettier case)

53
Q

What is response 3 to issue 2: replace ‘justified’ with ‘reliably formed’ (R+T+B) (ie reliabilism)

Response 3 to issue 2 of JTB

A

In order to have knowledge, the belief needs to have been produced using a reliable process (which it wasn’t in the Gettier case)

54
Q

What is response 4 to issue 2: replace ‘justified’ with an account of epistemic virtue (V+T+B)

Response 4 to issue 2 of JTB

A

In order to have knowledge, the person needs to have used their skills of knowing (rather than just getting it right accidentally/luckily as they did in the Gettier case)