chapter 12 - EP Flashcards
EP elections
until 1979 MEPs were nominated by national parliaments from among their members (->only pro-integrationist + they had little time for Eu responsibilities)
Article 138 EEC Treaty -> universal suffrage
fixed 5 year basis, but no uniform electoral system
*1999 elections UK used proportional -> proportional in all states in some form
differences EP electoral arrangements:
- varying versions of proportional representation
- voting not on the same day
- variation in nr of citizens MEPs represent
voter turnout has been relatively low + declining. bc:
- EP elections don’t offer prospect of a change of gov., switch in policy, making/unmaking political reputations, don’t stimulate popular interest or political excitement
- election campaigns have little overall coherence or coordination (national contests of secondary sort)
- individuals and political forces that focus attention on national electoral campaigns are more reluctant with EP elections
-> EP elections appear as being much less important than national elections -> limited media interest -> limited visibility
ways for EP to influence nature/content of EU legislative output
- pre-proposal legislative stage: participate in policy discussions with the Commission
- adopt own ideas for suggested legislation:
- adopt own initiative reports (Commission has agreed to follow up on them, if it does not have major objections)
- Article 225 TFEU: EP can request (when there is an EP majority in favor) Commission to submit a proposal on an issue required for implementing the treaties - annual budgetary cycle -> opportunities to exercise legislative influence, requires that the Commission and the Council and the EP work closely together
- EP can influence Commission’s annual work and legislative program:
Commission adopts annual work program -> program is considered by appropriate EP committees -> resolution vote in EP plenary session - legislative powers vary according to legislative procedure applying (depends on what treaty article(s) the proposal is based)
The EU’s legislative procedures
consultation procedure
- EP is asked for an opinion on Commission proposals for legislation -> Commission may decide no matter what the opinion was
- (EP can ask for amendments and threaten to delay consultation)
ordinary legislative procedure (before Lisbon Treaty: co-decision procedure)
=EP most power
- EP co-decision maker with the Council: power to veto legislative proposals -> more bargaining power
- three reading procedure: if Council and EP don’t agree on the first reading, there is a second reading where the Council must defend its common position, if there’s still no agreement there is a third reading with a Conciliation committee (in practice often happens)
consent procedure
(pre-Lisbon: assent procedure)
- EP must consider proposals at a single reading
- veto powers but NO amendments
- only used for special measures, e.g. citizenship-related issues
Parliament and EU legislation - how big of an influence?
impossible to estimate the precise effect of EP deliberations on final legislative acts bc:
- much of EP persuading/lobbying is done informally, not via approving, rejecting and amending legislative proposals
- statistical analyses have problems to determine the extent to which EP amendments are incorporated into final legislation:
hard to distinguish political/technical/procedural amendments + significance of EP amendments varies acc to circumstances + how to count when only a part of an amendment is accepted by the Council
still: EP is centrally involved with Council and Commission in making EU legislation (e.g. visible in the fact that conciliation stage is rare) + EP activity has significant impact on outcome of legislative processes (EP alters rather than blocks)
three weaknesses EP as legislative influence
- no full legislative powers = positive and negative powers are not complete
- EP opinion can be reduced when the Council takes preliminary decisions or adopts common positions in principle or pending of opinion of the EP
- no full powers over ‘administrative’ legislation (has been enlarged by Lisbon Treaty)
EP and EU budget
making of MFFs: multiannual financial frameworks
- agreed every 7 years between Commission, Council and EP
- requires EP endorsement + Lisbon Treaty->consent power
- overall EP not that much power: key actors are the Commission and govs. of member states in the Councils
bc its a hard topic -> long negotiations -> clock is ticking once the EP is reached + member state positions are rigid
making of annual budgets:
EP considerable powers:
- propose ‘modifications’ to compulsory expenditure (agriculture)
- propose ‘amendments’ to non-compulsory expenditure
- approval or rejection, with the Council, over the whole budget
EP control and supervision of the executive - problems
- executives don’t want to be investigated -> protect themselves with constitutional/institutional/political defences
- parliamentarians lack information, specialist knowledge or resources
specific for the EP as parliament:
- policy implementation: Commission not the only/major executive body, also national agencies (reluctant to work with EP investigators)
- blurring roles Commission, Council and European Council (bigger executive role Council and European Council -> less supervisory power EP: has less powers in regards to the Councils)
EP control and supervision of the executive - the Commission
8 main supervisory powers/channels
- Commission President needs to be approved by EP (prior to Lisbon), take in consideration EP election results and needs to be elected by EP (after Lisbon)
-> Spitzenkandidaten - Commissioner-designate is subject to a vote of consent by the EP (three hour personal grilling/hearing before confirmation vote College as a whole)
- EP can dismiss the College (not individual Commissioners) by motion of censure (2/3 majority)
- e.g. Santer College vote of censure failed, but Santer agreed to create special committee to investigate allegations fraud, nepotism and mismanagement -> critical report -> Santer College collectively resigned 1999
- succeeding Commission Presidents have indicated to support EP request of dismissal of individuals - discuss the annual general report of the Commission (no significance)
- Commission needs to submit annual accounts of preceding financial year to the EP and the Council, EP gives a discharge
- remits of EP standing committees are broad enough to allow them to attempt to exercise supervisory functions if they choose (but little resources + Commission doesn’t encourage investigation)
- EP can establish special committees and committees of interest on almost any subject
- EP can ask the Commission questions
EP control and supervision of the executive - the Council
EP less able to control/supervise the Council than the Commission:
- Council is main meeting place member states gov., to make them responsible to the EP would be unacceptably supranational
- diff to establish continuous relationship between Council and EP as the Council’s composition is ever changing
- Council politicians often cautious about being open with the EP in sensitive policy areas (e.g. AFSJ, CFSP, EMU)
amount of access EP gets to the Council depends on attitude Council Presidency
set points of contact:
- Presidency Council appears before EP plenaries at the beginning and end of term of 6-month office (=institutionalized with Lisbon Treaty)
- ministers from the Presidency usually attend EP committees that deal with their spheres of responsibility at least twice during their country’s presidency
- ministers from the Presidency regularly attend EP plenaries
- EP can ask questions of the Council through the Presidency
EP control and supervision of the executive - The European Council
= small control/supervision role: European Council largely outside TFEU framework, meets very little, intergov. nature
regular contact with EP only when:
- opening session European Council meetings: EP resident addresses the summit to inform it of the views of MEPs on current issues
- Head of Gov. of the Council Presidency appears before the EP at the ‘end of term’ European Council meeting (formalized by Lisbon Treaty)
=What this all adds up to is that the EP can exert
very little direct influence on the European Council,
let alone control over what it does.
EP control and supervision of the executive - other bodies
- ECB: EP must be consulted on the nominees for Bank’s President, Vice-President, and Executive Board members (confirmation hearings)
- executive boards of some of the EU agencies, e.g. European Environment Agency, European Medicines Agency
- Court of Auditors: EP is consulted on the appointment of members (committee hearings and vote, but sometimes negative opinions EP have been ignored by the Council)
- European Ombudsman: appointed by the EP (Council no input at all)
political parties and the EP
three main levels
- transnational federations: loosely organised transnational federations grouped around general principles, based on affiliation by national parties (loose policy coordination, few joint activities EP elections)
*Spitzenkandidat system to strengthen federations, has been strongly opposed by many national leaders
- European People’s Party (EPP) = center-right
- Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) = liberal parties
- Party of European Socialists (PES) = center-left parties - political groups in the EP
- national parties
- most candidates are chosen by national parties (->reflect national party concern)
- EP elections essentially national election campaigns by national parties
- national party groups exist within the political groups of the EP
political groups in the EP
rules now: at least 25 MEPs drawn from at least 1/4 member states necessary to form a group
groups bc: ideological identification + organisational benefits
(non-attached members are protected, but in practice can be disadvantaged)
- 7-9 groups
- group formation and composition is highly fluid
- political groups have significant internal divisions (ideological and national)
- there are also intergroups on particular issues
factors making for looseness and limited ability of EP political groups to control/direct their members:
- heterogeneity
- national attachments
- institutional setting: MEPs no for/against reaction bc no gov. to sustain or attack like national parliaments
- structural: political groups are not as structured/united/cooperative/expected as political parties in national legislatures
- MEPs have claims on loyalties and votes that can compete with claims of the political groups
still: political group membership is normally the most important factor correlating with how MEPs vote
political balance EP history + significance
1979-1989: nominal center-right
1989-1994: nominal left-green
1994-1999: no nominal majority
1999-2014: center-right
2014-: centrist majority working against anti-establishment parties
significance is not as great as often in national parliaments bc:
- important issues can divide groups
- many matters that come before the EP cut across traditional left-right divisions
- EP frequently attempts to avoid being divided along left-right lines when it votes (bc you often need absolute majority)
- most EU decision making processes are characterised by bargaining and compromising -> MEPs used to cutting deals and compromising
Hix and Hoyland: ideological voting has increased, EP has come to vote more on ideological grounds than on national grounds
