3.4.2 Property Dualism- The Zombie arguement Flashcards
(15 cards)
Who is the zombie arguement by?
and what was he also the theorist of?
David Chalmers
The distinction between the easy and hard problem of consciousness
Summarise the difference between the hard and easy problem of consciousness
examples of questions arising from each problem
What does the zombie arguement argue against?
physicalism
What is a zombie (in the philosophical sense)
clarified by Amy Kind
a creature that is microphysically identical to a human being and thus produces behaviour that is indistiguishable from that of a normal human being- but lacks any sort of conciousness in the phenomenal sense.
Outline the basic form of the zombie arguement
p1) We can coherently imagine zombies
p2) Zombies are possible
C) Physicalism is false*
*confusion point for me
*physicalism is false because if you could have a physical creature that had all the physical stuff that i do but not concious stuff while being a physical molecular copy of me, then conciousness isn’t part of the physical stuff (because it would be there seeing it is an atomic copy of me… but it’s not.)
State the zombie arguement formally
P1) I can concieve of zombies
P2) If zombies are concievable, then they are metaphysically possible
C1) Zombies are metaphysically possible
P3) If zombies are metaphysically possible then consciousness is non-physical*
C2) Conciousness is non physical
C3) so there is something which is non physical
C4) So physicalism is false.
*If conciousness was physical they would have it
How is the zombie arguement one for property dualism? (leading on from ZA argueing physicalism is false)
Physicalism desribes the universe as completely physical, so if physicalism is true, a possible world that is an exact physical duplicate of our world (the actual world) will be an exact duplicate of our world* in all respects*. (including mental states and properties)
Physicalism says everything is phsyical or supervenes on something physical so there can be no difference in mental properties without a difference in physical properties (like how changing the painting A Starring nights atoms would result in different asthetics, and asethetics of identical STarry nights could not be different if the atoms were the same)
So for phsyicalism, it is metaphysically impossible for two worlds to have the same physical properyies and different mental properties, because physical properties determine the mental properties (superviene)
Thus, if there is a possible world (concievable) that is an exact physical duplicate of ours but is different in any way (eg different phenomenal properties) then physicalism is false, If 2 phsyically identical worlds have different properties of consciousness those properties of consciousness don’t depend on physical properties.
What are the three criticisms of the zombie arguement?
- a philosophical zombie is not concievable
- what is concievable may not be metaphysically possible
- what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the real world
Briefly explain the first objection: a philosophical zombie is not concievable
DENY p1
physicalists may argue that if we had enough knowledge of the pghysical we would be able to understad what we currenlty call ‘qualia’ in purely physicalist terms
and once we understand qualia as such it becomes inconcievable for 2 physically identical beings not to have identical qualia and so the zombie arguement fails.
good property dualism qualia link
Which philosopher provided an analogy about consciousnnes being a physical thing and what did he say.
Dan Dennet
Just as health is not a physical thing but a state that arises from the proper functioning of biological processes, consciousness is not a distinct entity (as dualism says) but an emergenet result of brain activity.
(perhaps we will learn in the future, to understand qualia as such)
Briefly explain the second objection: Zombies are not metaphysically possible
Not everything that is concievable without contradiction (logically possible) is metaphysically possible. (Like water not being H2O as Saul Kripke points out)
What did Saul Kripke say about metaphysical possibility?
Water being H2O is not an analytic truth; people haven’t always known that. It is conceivable for water to be H3O; it is not contradictory in the same way a five sided triangle is.
(Zombies existsting is conceivable without contradiction)
Hence while it is easy to think that water could be some other molecule in a different universe it cannot be, H2O is water; it is metaphysically impossible for it to be anything else, the reduction is ontological not analytic.
Kripke gave the term rigid designator (necessary metaphysical claim) to these things which have an idenity that holds true in every possible world
What is Stephen Yablo’s response to objection 2? (That what is concievable is not always metaphsyically possible)
He describes us falsely beleiving water need not be H2O as a modal error. But he questions whether we should conclude that because of that we should conclude that there is nothing to be gained from modal logic. Yablo argued that concievability confers prima facie justification for the modal belief in question.
He draws analogy with perception, which like concievability to metaphysical is also a fallible source of knowledge. He argues in the case of perception the possibility of error and illusions does not keep us from assigining prima facie justification for beleifs based on perception.
So the possibility of modal error in conceivability does not undermines the thesis that conceivability provides prima facie evidence for possibility.
modal beleif is how things could or should be gievn some constraints
Briefly explain objection 3: What is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the real world
Physicalists could argue that what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about reality.
Explain the response to objection 3- that what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about reality
In arguing that, physicalism is confining their beliefs to our world only. In which case, it is possible for physicalism to be false in some universes and true in others, including ours.
Referring to conciousness in the way makes it sound like a contingent claim, something that may be the case, or may not be. However physicalism claims that it is an essential and defining feature of consciousness that it is reducible to or supervenient on the physical and that because of this, this feature would be the case across all possible worlds.
Therefore physicalism believes consciousness is what Kripke calls a rigid designator. So this objection fails.
