412 READINGS Flashcards
Political Economy of Trade Policy Cornick et al -Summary
This chapter discusses the political economy of trade policy, highlighting the BALANCE between the benefits of trade liberalization for overall welfare and the concentrated losses experienced by specific groups. It emphasizes how trade policy is shaped by the interests of BOTH public and private actors, often creating a COMPLEx landscape of support and opposition influenced by economic and political stakes.
Political Economy of Trade Policy Cornick et al - Argument
The authors argue that the durability of trade liberalization depends on CREATING COALITION a broad coalition of winners, while understanding and ADDRESSING CONCENTRATION the concentrated costs for import-competing firms and workers who may resist such policies.
Political Economy of Trade Policy Cornick et al - Conclusion
The chapter concludes that trade policy persistence relies on institutional frameworks and strategic compensation, which can create a stable coalition favoring open markets and trade agreements.
Political Economy of Trade Policy Cornick et al -Math/Evidence
Evidence includes case studies of countries like Chile, Costa Rica, and Brazil, illustrating different approaches to trade liberalization, varying from gradual reductions to protectionist reversals and compensation mechanisms for affected sectors.
Political Economy of Trade Policy Cornick et al -Significance
This chapter is significant because it highlights the critical role of political and economic institutions in shaping trade policy, showing how trade liberalization’s success hinges on managing diverse interests and sustaining economic benefits through stability and strategic adaptation.
Political Economy of Trade Policy Cornick et al - Trade Policy - Interest Group Dynamics
Trade policy often involves high-stakes lobbying from sectors like import-competing firms, exporters, and consumer interest groups, although consumer influence tends to be weak and diffuse.
Political Economy of Trade Policy Cornick et al -Compensation Strategies in Trade Liberalization
Chile example
Chile compensated farmers during Mercosur negotiations to support agriculture, providing public goods like soil management that promoted exports and created a coalition supporting open trade. provided export promotion funds to farmers along with credit guarantees and infrastructure investments
Political Economy of Trade Policy Cornick et al - Case Study - Costa Rica and CAFTA-DR
The CAFTA-DR referendum in Costa Rica revealed strong public division over trade, with the narrow victory of pro-trade forces leading to nearly irreversible trade policy changes despite continued opposition.
Political Economy of Trade Policy Cornick et al -Brazil’s Protectionist Tendencies
Brazil’s industrial sector has historically dominated trade policymaking, resulting in high tariffs and frequent use of anti-dumping measures, supported by an institutional structure favoring protectionism.
Political Economy of Trade Policy Cornick et al -U.S. Trade Policy and the Executive Role
In the U.S., delegation to the executive branch with delegation to president helps individual congresspplTrade Promotion Authority has generally promoted liberalization, although recent trends show volatility influenced by protectionist sentiments in swing states. this could change
Morgan - The Firm - Summary
Morgan examines multinational firms as political actors within the global economy, focusing on their use of lobbying, structural power, and expertise to influence states and international organizations. The chapter categorizes firms by ownership and governance (e.g., shareholder-driven, state-permeated) and by sector, examining how these characteristics shape their strategies for influencing regulatory and market structures worldwide.
Morgan - The Firm - Argument
Morgan argues that multinational firms exert significant influence on international political economy through lobbying, leveraging structural power, and asserting expertise, often aligning their activities with state policies or challenging regulations to enhance their interests.
Morgan - The Firm - Conclusion
The chapter concludes that understanding the international political economy requires recognizing firms’ strategic use of power, shaped by their governance structures and sectoral needs, in influencing state and global regulatory landscapes.
Morgan - The Firm - Math/Evidence
Evidence includes case studies of various multinational firms, categorized by ownership (e.g., state-owned, private equity) and sector, such as technology firms influencing internet regulation and energy firms shaping environmental policy.
Morgan - The Firm - Significance
This analysis is significant as it highlights how multinational firms operate beyond traditional market competition, acting as political entities that shape global governance and economic regimes, often aligning with or pressuring state interests to their advantage.
Morgan - The Firm - Types of Firms - Shareholder-driven vs. Stakeholder-driven
Shareholder-driven firms (e.g., in the US, UK) focus on short-term shareholder returns, while stakeholder-driven firms (e.g., in Germany, Denmark) balance multiple interests, including labor and local government, affecting their approach to regulatory influence.
Morgan - The Firm - State-permeated Firms
Firms with strong state connections (e.g., Chinese and Brazilian firms) use state resources and diplomatic channels to support international expansion, often aligning closely with home-country policy objectives.
Morgan - The Firm - Sector-Specific Influence - Financial MNCs
Financial multinationals (e.g., banks, hedge funds) exert influence by controlling capital flows, creating systemic risks that can impact national policies, as seen in responses to financial crises.
Morgan - The Firm - Platform Companies - FAANGs
Firms like Facebook and Google leverage near-monopoly positions and lobbying to maintain a deregulated internet, facing limited constraints from national governments due to consumer dependence on their services.
Morgan - The Firm - Structural Power of Capital
Multinational firms leverage capital mobility, relocating to favorable environments, which pressures governments to maintain competitive labor and regulatory standards, contributing to a “race to the bottom.”
Blood in the Water - Summary
This article examines Carlsberg’s struggle to retain control of its Russian subsidiary Baltika, which was placed under “temporary management” by the Kremlin in response to Western sanctions. The seizure marks a trend of asset expropriation where the Russian government rewards loyalists with assets previously owned by foreign companies, leaving Carlsberg with nominal ownership but no operational control over its second-largest market.
Blood in the Water - Argument
The article argues that Carlsberg’s experience reflects a broader trend of Russian state interventions in foreign-owned businesses, which increasingly restrict Western companies’ abilities to operate in Russia as the government seizes assets to reward loyalists.
Blood in the Water - Conclusion
Carlsberg’s loss of Baltika exemplifies the risks Western firms face in Russia, as geopolitical tensions drive state actions that undermine business ownership, often with little warning or recourse.