5. Migrations

Question 1

Q: What is the split-stream model?

Answer 1

A stock grows in a given, common area and splits itself between economic zones of two (or more) countries. Each part of the stock remains in the zone to which it has migrated while it is fished, and then what is left in each zone migrates back to the growth area and grows and breeds as a unit.

Stock splits can either be:
a) Random or deterministic
b) Size-dependent

Question 2

Q: Should each country get a share of TAC equal to the share of the stock in its zone (zonal attachment)?

Answer 2

This is not necessarily credible; a «small» player could be better off in a non-cooperative solution.

Question 3

Question: What is the basis of the theory discussed in the text regarding fisheries management?

Answer 3

Answer: The theory is grounded in the economic and strategic aspects of fisheries management, particularly looking at situations where multiple countries with different interests and power levels are involved. It uses a game theoretical approach to understand this problem, focusing on the concepts of cooperative vs. non-cooperative strategies and their impact on fisheries management.

Question 4

Question: What does the Zonal Attachment Principle imply, and when does it not work?

Answer 4

Answer: The Zonal Attachment Principle implies a connection between a country’s stake in the fisheries and its cooperation in management. However, it doesn’t always work due to potential inequalities, specifically when G(S°) is less than S+G(S).

Question 5

Question: How is the critical value of 1-alpha calculated in the context of the Zonal Attachment Principle? What conclusion can be drawn from this?

Answer 5

Answer: The critical value of 1-alpha is calculated using a growth function as provided in the text. The conclusion drawn is that minor players often need to be offered a larger share of cooperative profits than corresponds to their share of the stock.

Question 6

Question: How does cost sensitivity relate to resource exploitation?

Answer 6

Answer: When the cost per unit of fish caught is sensitive to the size of the stock, a minor player would leave some fish in his zone. It would not be profitable to catch all due to high costs.

Question 7

Question: What has been the progress of fisheries management since the 200-mile zone establishment?

Answer 7

Answer: There has been progress in fisheries management, especially in economically advanced countries. However, many developing countries still face deteriorating fish stocks.

Question 8

Question: What does the text suggest about rights-based management regimes?

Answer 8

Answer: The text mentions a study suggesting that rights-based management regimes, which involve individual transferable quotas, have been successful. The total limit on the catch and its effective enforcement is crucial for the biological status of fish stocks.

Question 9

Question: How does international cooperation play out in the context of fisheries management, according to the text?

Answer 9

Answer: The text provides examples focusing on mackerel, herring, and blue whiting in the Northeast Atlantic. It discusses the negotiation of catch limits, the impact of negotiations failing to produce all-inclusive agreements, and the concept of uncoordinated fishing.

Question 10

Question: What happens when formal agreements are not signed between countries involved in fisheries management?

Answer 10

Answer: The text proposes that countries often cooperate informally when formal agreements aren’t signed. These unilateral decisions don’t necessarily lead to harmful outcomes or stock depletion.

Question 11

Question: What happens when countries engage in uncoordinated fishing, and how does this impact dominant and minor players?

Answer 11

Answer: When countries engage in uncoordinated fishing, this typically results in severe depletion of stocks. This effect is particularly notable when the cost per unit of fish is insensitive to the stock size, and the dominant country has a share close to or below a half.

Question 12

Question: In the context of international fisheries management, what is meant by the term ‘rights-based management’?

Answer 12

Answer: Rights-based management refers to management regimes that include individual transferable quotas. This type of management has been found to be the most successful in improving fisheries management, and its continued introduction is deemed the most promising avenue to further improvement.

Question 13

Question: What are some characteristics of the fisheries of mackerel, herring, and blue whiting in the Northeast Atlantic?

Answer 13

Answer: These species migrate extensively, passing through the exclusive economic zones of various entities. Each year, catch quotas and their distribution are negotiated for these species. When these negotiations do not result in an agreement signed by all, the countries involved often cooperate informally.

Question 14

Question: What evidence is there that countries involved in fisheries management cooperate informally when formal agreements are not reached?

Answer 14

Answer: When negotiations on catch quotas do not result in a formal agreement, there is no apparent tendency for stock levels to fall in subsequent years. In fact, statistical analysis indicates that fishing mortality tends to increase in years with formal agreements in place, suggesting that countries are still cooperating informally when no formal agreement is reached.

Question 15

Question: How does the cost per unit of fish caught relate to the size of the stock?

Answer 15

Answer: There is evidence that the cost per unit of fish caught is not very sensitive to the size of the stock. As long as any shoals remain, there will be enough to fill up a boat. This implies that the cost per unit of fish caught doesn’t increase significantly even when the stock size decreases.

Question 16

Question: What happened to the Norwegian spring-spawning herring around 1970, and what lesson was learned from this?

Answer 16

Answer: The Norwegian spring-spawning herring suffered a collapse around 1970. This event served as a stark reminder of the consequences of overfishing, and it’s a lesson that the countries involved in fisheries management do not seem eager to repeat.

Question 17

Question: How have the advances in fisheries management been since the establishment of the 200-mile zone?

Answer 17

Answer: There have been improvements in the state of world fisheries, especially in economically advanced countries. The average biomass for assessed stocks has increased since the beginning of the century and was higher than the maximum sustainable yield in 2016. However, in many developing countries, the status of fish stocks continues to deteriorate.

Question 18

Question: What is the zonal attachment principle in the context of fisheries economics?

Answer 18

Answer: The zonal attachment principle refers to a country’s proportionate stake in fish stock based on the amount of that stock present in its exclusive economic zone.

Question 19

Question: Why doesn’t the zonal attachment principle always ensure cooperative behavior among countries?

Answer 19

Answer: The principle may not work if the growth function of a country’s stock, G(S°), is less than the sum of a fixed stock, S, and its growth function, G(S). This means that a country may have less incentive to cooperate if it sees potential for greater benefit from its individual growth.

Question 20

Question: How does cost sensitivity influence the exploitation of fish stocks?

Answer 20

Answer: When the cost per unit of fish is sensitive to the size of the stock, a country, especially a minor player, may leave some fish in their zone uncaught. This is because it wouldn’t be profitable to catch all fish due to increasing costs per unit.

Question 21

Question: What has been the impact of the establishment of the 200-mile zone on world fisheries?

Answer 21

Answer: The establishment of the 200-mile zone has led to advances in fisheries management, with the average biomass for assessed stocks increasing since its establishment. However, improvements have been mainly seen in economically advanced countries, while fish stocks in many developing countries continue to deteriorate.

Question 22

Question: What is rights-based management and why is it seen as successful?

Answer 22

Answer: Rights-based management refers to a management strategy involving individual transferable quotas. It’s considered successful because it provides a balance between economic efficiency and sustainable fishing practices by enforcing a limit on the total catch.

Question 23

Question: How do negotiations around catch quotas work in an international setting and what happens when they fail?

Answer 23

Answer: In an international setting, catch quotas and their distribution are negotiated annually. When these negotiations fail to reach a formal agreement, countries often resort to informal cooperation and unilateral decision-making. Surprisingly, this doesn’t necessarily lead to harmful outcomes or severe stock depletion.

Question 24

Question: What does the text imply about the relationship between the cost per unit of fish caught and the size of the fish stock?

Answer 24

Answer: The text suggests that the cost per unit of fish caught is not very sensitive to the size of the stock. In other words, even if the size of the fish stock decreases, the cost to catch each fish does not significantly increase.

Question 25

Question: Explain how game theory is used to model interactions between countries in the management of fisheries.

Answer 25

Answer: Game theory in fisheries management helps to analyze strategic interactions between countries. Each country is considered a player with its own interests and strategies. The analysis primarily focuses on the dynamics of cooperative and non-cooperative strategies, and how they impact the management of fish stocks. This model helps predict how countries might behave under different conditions and can guide policy-making for more sustainable and equitable outcomes.

Question 26

Question: Describe an example from the text that illustrates how to calculate critical values using a growth function in the context of fisheries management.

Answer 26

Answer: In the given example, the growth function used is logistic, and specific parameters (a = 1, K =1, r=0.05) are used. The critical value of 1-x is calculated using Equation (7.14) in relation to the cooperative solution. Here, S°=0.475 is calculated from the given conditions, and the result is graphically represented in Figure 7.3. This example demonstrates that the minor player typically must be offered a larger share of the cooperative profits than corresponds to their share of the stock.

Question 27

Question: Based on the text, how has fisheries management progressed since the establishment of the 200-mile zone?

Answer 27

Answer: The establishment of the 200-mile zone has led to noticeable progress in fisheries management. According to the text, the average biomass for assessed stocks has increased since the early years of this century, with 2016 showing biomass higher than the maximum sustainable yield. The improvements are, however, skewed, with advances mainly observed in economically advanced countries and continued deterioration of fish stocks in many developing countries.

Question 28

Question: What is the impact of rights-based management regimes on fisheries management, and what does it mean by “rights-based management”?

Answer 28

Answer: Rights-based management regimes refer to the use of individual transferable quotas in managing fish stocks. These systems have shown success in improving fisheries management by balancing economic goals with sustainability concerns. The key to their success lies in establishing a suitable overall limit on the total catch and enforcing it effectively.

Question 29

Question: Explain the implications of uncoordinated fishing and the negotiation failures around total allowable catch on fish stock levels, based on the text.

Answer 29

Answer: The text suggests that uncoordinated fishing and negotiation failures may not necessarily lead to a severe decimation or total depletion of fish stocks. In the absence of a formal agreement, countries often resort to informal cooperation or unilateral decisions. These quotas may not be ideal, but they have historically not been large enough to cause a precipitous fall in future catches or trigger serious retaliations.

Question 30

Question: Explain the concept of the zonal attachment principle in the context of fisheries management, and describe a situation where it might not work.

Answer 30

Answer: The zonal attachment principle implies a connection between a country’s stake in the fisheries (its share of the stock) and its cooperation in management. However, the principle might not always work. For instance, a situation where the growth at the cooperative solution (G(S°)) is less than the cooperative stock level plus its growth (S+G(S)) could lead to an imbalance, making the principle ineffective.

Question 31

Question: Describe the impact of cost sensitivity on the exploitation of fish stocks.

Answer 31

Answer: If the cost per unit of fish caught is sensitive to the size of the stock, a minor player would likely leave some fish in his zone. Catching all the fish would not be profitable due to the high cost per unit, especially when the stock size decreases. This situation could influence the overall management and sustainability of the fish stocks.

Question 32

Question: Discuss the role of international cooperation in managing migratory fish species based on examples from the text.

Answer 32

Answer: The text provides examples of migratory species (mackerel, herring, and blue whiting) in the Northeast Atlantic and discusses the negotiation of catch limits among several entities, including the European Union, the Faeroe Islands, Norway, Iceland, and Greenland. These negotiations, along with those involving the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission, illustrate the challenges and importance of international cooperation in managing migratory fish species.

Question 33

Question: Analyze the effect of the lack of formal agreements on the management of fisheries.

Answer 33

Answer: The text suggests that even in the absence of formal agreements, the fish stock levels do not necessarily deplete drastically. Countries often resort to informal cooperation or unilateral decisions that are relatively modest and do not lead to harmful outcomes or stock depletion. This indicates that formal agreements, while helpful, are not the only means of successful fisheries management.

Question 34

Question: What is the role of individual transferable quotas in fisheries management, and how do they contribute to the biological status of fish stocks?

Answer 34

Answer: Individual transferable quotas are a central aspect of rights-based management regimes. They help achieve economic efficiency and can significantly improve the status of fish stocks. The total limit on the catch and its effective enforcement is crucial for the biological status of fish stocks, and transferability helps maintain these limits.

Question 35

Question: Describe the cooperative and non-cooperative strategies that the two countries might adopt in managing their fisheries. How do these strategies affect the overall fish stocks?

Answer 35

Answer: In a cooperative strategy, the two countries work together to manage the fisheries, potentially optimizing the total yield and sustainability of the fish stocks. However, in a non-cooperative strategy, each country makes decisions based on its self-interest, often leading to over-exploitation and potential depletion of the fish stocks.

Question 36

Question: In a situation where G(S°)<S+G(S), what challenges might arise between the two countries, and how could these be addressed?

Answer 36

Answer: When the growth at the cooperative solution is less than the cooperative stock level plus its growth, this could result in inequalities between the countries. One way to address this might be to offer the minor player (the country with a smaller share of the stock) a larger share of the cooperative profits to encourage cooperation.

Question 37

Question: How does the zonal attachment principle affect the competition between the two countries, and what factors could influence its effectiveness?

Answer 37

Answer: The zonal attachment principle ties a country’s stake in the fisheries to its cooperation in management. However, it might not work if there are disparities, such as G(S°)<S+G(S), which could lead to competition and conflict. Factors influencing its effectiveness include the distribution of the fish stocks, the cost per unit of fish caught, and the willingness of the countries to cooperate.

Question 38

Question: Discuss how cost sensitivity might influence the competition between the two countries in managing their fish stocks.

Answer 38

Answer: If the cost per unit of fish caught is sensitive to the size of the stock, it could influence the strategies the countries adopt. A country might decide to leave some fish in its zone if catching all is not profitable, which could affect the competition and cooperation between the countries in managing the shared resource.

Question 39

Question: How might the absence of formal agreements affect the relationship and potential competition between the two countries?

Answer 39

Answer: The absence of formal agreements might lead to uncoordinated fishing, potentially increasing competition and conflict between the countries. However, the text suggests that even in the absence of formal agreements, countries often resort to informal cooperation or unilateral decisions that are relatively modest and do not lead to harmful outcomes or stock depletion. This indicates that competition can be managed, even without formal agreements.