ADMIN FIN Flashcards
(9 cards)
I. The concept of public office
The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office.15
Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government as “[t]he most important characteristic” in determining whether a position is a public office or not.
The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; – that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer.
Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign functions of government? Certainly, the law did not delegate upon the NCC functions that can be described as legislative or judicial. May the functions of the NCC then be described as executive?
We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power “is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.”17 The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law.
Characteristics public office
Santos vs Secretary of Labor, 22 SCRA 848 - This case reaffirmed that government officials’ heirs cannot inherit their office, but they can claim unpaid salary if the official was legally entitled to it. The court validated Santos’ promotion and ruled that his estate must be paid the salary difference owed to him.
Public office is a public trust. It is personal to the incumbent thereof or appointee thereto. In this sense, it is not property which passes to his heirs. None of the heirs may replace him in that position. It is in this context that we say that the Estate of the deceased Segundo Santos may not press Santos’ claim that he be allowed to continue holding office as Labor Conciliator
This passage emphasizes the idea that holding a public office is not just a privilege but a serious responsibility. It suggests that public officials are entrusted with power by the people and must exercise it with honesty, integrity, and accountability.
The phrase “Public office is a public trust” means that government positions exist to serve the public, not personal interests. Officials are expected to act in the best interest of the people, uphold ethical standards, and avoid corruption.
The second part, “It is personal to the incumbent thereof or appointee thereto,” highlights that this responsibility is deeply tied to the individual who holds the position. It means that a public officer cannot delegate their moral and ethical duty to someone else—they must personally uphold the trust given to them by the public.
In essence, this passage serves as a reminder that public service is a duty, not a privilege, and those in office must always prioritize the welfare of the people over personal gain. What are your thoughts on this?
Appointment v. Designation
It is not disputed that the petitioner was not appointed by the President of the Philippines but only designated by the Minister of Tourism. There is a clear distinction between appointment and designation that the petitioner has failed to consider.
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office.
Designation on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties of an incumbent official … . It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.
De Jure v De facto
A de facto officer is one who is in possession of the office and discharging its duties under color of authority. By color of authority is meant that derived from an election or appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. The difference between the basis of the authority of a de jure officer and that of a de facto officer is that one rests on right, the other on reputation. It may be likened to the difference between character and reputation. One is the truth of a man, the other is what is thought of him.”30 It is the color of authority, not the color of title that distinguishes an officer de facto from a usurper.31 Being a de jure officer, Ong is entitled to receive all the salaries and emoluments appertaining to the position.32
The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following:
1) There must be a de jure office;
2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and
3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.
One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the aforestated elements are present. There can be no de facto officer where there is no de jure office, although there may be a de facto officer in a de jure office.
Defacto doctrine
Application of the De Facto Doctrine
Despite the later questioning of his appointment, the petitioner performed the duties of Vice-Governor for a significant period and was publicly recognized in the role.
Under the de facto doctrine, the actions of an official who served in good faith and was accepted by public error remain valid, even if legal technicalities arise. The principle is based on public policy considerations that prevent injustice and ensure continuity in government functions.
Ruling on Compensation
The passage argues that denying the petitioner his salary for services already rendered would be unjust (iniquitous).
Since he acted in good faith and was recognized as the Vice-Governor, he is entitled to compensation.
Conclusion:
This case reinforces the legal principle that when an official serves in good faith and is recognized as such by both government authorities and the public, their acts should be considered valid. Even if technical issues later arise, fairness dictates that they should not be deprived of benefits for duties performed
Difference between the “term” of office and the “right” to hold an office.
There is a difference between the “term” of office and the “right” to hold an office.
A “term” of office is the period during which an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A “right” to hold a public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities of the office.6 In other words, the “term” refers to the period, duration of length of time during which the occupant of an office is entitled to stay therein, whether such period be definite or indefinite.
Hence, although Section 9, Art. XVII of the New Constitution made the term of the petitioners indefinite,7 it did not foreclose any challenge by the herein petitioners, in an election protest, of the “right” of the private respondents to continue holding their respective offices. What has been directly affected by said constitutional provision is the “term”, not the “right” to the office, although the “right” of an incumbent to an office which he is legally holding is co-extensive with the “term” thereof.
Abolition of an office
Abolition of an office is obviously not the same as the declaration’ that that office is vacant. While it is undoubtedly a prerogative of the legislature to abolish certain offices, it can not be conceded the power to simply pronounce those offices vacant and thereby effectively remove the occupants or holders thereof from the civil service. Such an act would constitute, on its face, an infringement of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure, and will have to be struck down on that account. It can not be justified by the professed “need to professionalize the higher levels of officialdom invested with adjudicatory powers and functions, and to upgrade their qualifications, ranks, and salaries or emoluments.
Another amendment pointed out by public respondents is the revision of the NAPOLCOM’s composition. RA 8551 expanded the membership of the NAPOLCOM from four to five Commissioners by adding the Chief of the PNP as an ex-officio member. In addition, the new law provided that three of the regular Commissioners shall come from the civilian sector who are neither active nor former members of the police or military, and that the fourth regular Commissioner shall come from the law enforcement sector either active or retired. Furthermore, it is required that at least one of the Commissioners shall be a woman.”22 Again, as we held in Mayor, such revisions do not constitute such essential changes in the nature of the NAPOLCOM as to result in an implied abolition of such office. It will be noted that the organizational structure of the NAPOLCOM, as provided in section 20 of RA 6975 as amended by section 10 of RA 8551,23 remains essentially the same and that, except for the addition of the PNP Chief as ex-officio member, the composition of the NAPOLCOM is also substantially identical under the two laws. Also, under both laws, the Secretary of the Department shall act as the ex-officio Chairman of the Commission and the Vice-Chairman shall be one of the Commissioners designated by the President.24
Reorganization
Clearly, the NAPOLCOM continues to exercise substantially the same administrative, supervisory, rule-making, advisory and adjudicatory functions.
Public respondents argue that the fact that the NAPOLCOM is now vested with administrative control and operational supervision over the PNP, whereas under RA 6975 it only exercised administrative control should be construed as evidence of legislative intent to abolish such office. This contention is bereft of merit. Control means “the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the that of the latter.” On the other hand, to supervise is to oversee, to have oversight of, to superintend the execution of or the performance of a thing, or the movements or work of a person, to inspect with authority; it is the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. Thus, the power of control necessarily encompasses the power of supervision and adding the phrase “operational supervision” under the powers of the NAPOLCOM would not bring about a substantial change in its functions so as to arrive at the conclusion that a completely new office has been created.
Public respondents would have this Court believe that RA 8551 reorganized the NAPOLCOM resulting in the abolition of petitioners’ offices. We hold that there has been absolutely no attempt by Congress to effect such a reorganization.
Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.29 Naturally, it may result in the loss of one’s position through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization to be valid, it must also pass the test of good faith, laid down in Dario v. Mison:30
. . . As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in “good faith” if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the “abolition,” which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid “abolition” takes place and whatever “abolition” is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid “abolition” as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.
It is exceedingly apparent to this Court that RA 8551 effected a reorganization of the PNP, not of the NAPOLCOM. They are two separate and distinct bodies, with one having supervision and control over the other. In fact, it is the NAPOLCOM that is given the duty of submitting a proposed reorganization plan of the PNP to Congress.31 As mentioned earlier, the basic structure of the NAPOLCOM has been preserved by the amendatory law. There has been no revision in its lines of control, authority and responsibility, neither has there been a reduction in its membership, nor a consolidation or abolition of the offices constituting the same. Adding the Chief of the PNP as an ex-officio member of the Commission does not result in a reorganization.
No bona fide reorganization of the NAPOLCOM having been mandated by Congress, RA 8551, insofar as it declares the terms of office of the incumbent Commissioners, petitioners herein, as expired and resulting in their removal from office, removes civil service employees from office without legal cause and must therefore be struck down for being constitutionally infirm.
Petitioners are thus entitled to be reinstated to office. It is of no moment that there are now new appointees to the NAPOLCOM. It is a well-entrenched principle that when a regular government employee is illegally dismissed, his position never became vacant under the law and he is considered as not having left his office. The new appointments made in order to replace petitioners are not valid.32
At this juncture, we note that it is alleged by public respondents that on June 30, 1998, Canonizado accepted an appointment by President Estrada as the Inspector General of Internal Affairs Services (IAS) of the PNP, pursuant to sections 40 and 41 of RA 8551 and that he took his oath of office before the President on July 7, 1998. However, this is a mere allegation on the part of public respondents of which this Court cannot take judicial notice. Furthermore, this issue has not been fully ventilated in the pleadings of the parties. Therefore, such allegation cannot be taken into consideration by this Court in passing upon the issues in the present case.
Petitioners also assail the constitutionality of section 4 of RA 8551 insofar as it limits the law enforcement sector to only one position on the Commission and categorizes the police as being part of the law enforcement sector despite section 6 of Article XVI of the Constitution which provides that the police force shall be civilian in character. Moreover, it is asserted by petitioners that the requirement in section 4 that one of the Commissioners shall be a woman has no rational basis and is therefore discriminatory. They claim that it amounts to class legislation and amounts to an undue restriction upon the appointing power of the President as provided under section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.33
In view of our ruling upon the unconstitutionality of petitioners’ removal from office by virtue of section 8 of RA 8551, we find that there is no longer any need to pass upon these remaining constitutional questions. It is beyond doubt that the legislature has the power to provide for the composition of the NAPOLCOM since it created such body. Besides, these questions go into the very wisdom of the law, and unquestionably lie beyond the normal prerogatives of the Court to pass upon.34
WHEREFORE, we grant the petition, but only to the extent of declaring section 8 of RA 8551 unconstitutional for being in violation of the petitioners’ right to security of tenure. The removal from office of petitioners as a result of the application of such unconstitutional provision of law and the appointment of new Commissioners in their stead is therefore null and void. Petitioners herein are entitled to REINSTATEMENT and to the payment of full backwages to be reckoned from the date they were removed from office.35
SO ORDERED.
