Audit partners Flashcards

(36 cards)

1
Q

Intro

A
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2
Q

Lennox Wu 2018

A review of the archival literature on audit partners.

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Data:
Literature review Review of 54 archival studies published through May 2017 across major accounting journals

IV:
Retrieving data. Wait a few seconds and try to cut or copy again.

DV:
Various audit quality measures (discretionary accruals, going concern opinions, audit fees)

Findings:
“Boom in partner-level research from 1 study by 2006 to 54 by 2017
Mixed evidence on partner tenure effects on audit quality
Partner characteristics (gender, experience, industry expertise) show associations with audit outcomes
Significant methodological limitations including endogeneity issues and measurement errors
Partner compensation schemes and governance mechanisms affect audit quality”

Contribution:
“First comprehensive review of audit partner literature
Identifies key limitations in existing research
Provides framework for understanding partner incentives, characteristics, and governance
Suggests directions for future research including need for better data and research designs”

Notes:
Methodological advancement in audit partner research

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3
Q

The impact of audit partner style on audit quality: Evidence on heterogeneities from fixed effects estimations

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4
Q

Gul et al 2013

Do individual auditors affect audit quality? Evidence from archival data.

A

Data:
Signing auditors (can be partner or senior manager) 1998-2009. who signed multiple audits over multiple year..need for individual fixed effects

IV:
Indiv signing auditors + their demographic characteristics

DV:
AQ: GC, accruals, aggressive reporting, presence of small profit

Findings:
“Indiv auditor characteristics impact AQ.
Partners more conservative than non partners
Graduate degree or western education=more aggressive
Big N auditors=more conservative
Political affiliation=more aggressive

Contribution:
Auditor fixed effects impact audit quality & the effects are only partially explained by auditors demographic chracteristics (educ. Rank, Big N, experience). Show imp. of analyzing AQ at the indiv level & need for more partner level studies

Limitation:
external validity: Chinese audit firms centralized America= decentralized

Relevant Papers:
Betrand and Schoar 2003

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5
Q

Cameran, Campa, and Francis 2022

The relative importance of auditor characteristics versus client factors in explaining audit quality.

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Data:
Archival - Nested fixed effects models, hierarchical linear models, LASSO regression UK listed firms 2009-2015; 5,411 firm-year observations, 665 unique partners

IV:
Audit firm, office, and partner fixed effects; partner demographic variables

DV:
Audit quality proxies (abnormal accruals, restatements, going concern reports)

Findings:
“Partner fixed effects are most important auditor characteristic explaining audit quality
Partner effects explain 24-29% of explained variance vs. 6-9% for offices and 1-4% for firms
Publicly available partner demographics explain little variation beyond fixed effects
Results consistent across Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms”

Contribution:
“Systematic comparison of firm, office, and partner effects on audit quality
Shows partner variation is most important but driven by unobservable characteristics
Challenges usefulness of demographic variables in partner research
Demonstrates need for deeper understanding of partner characteristics beyond public data”

Notes:
Advanced methodological approach to isolating partner effects

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6
Q

Evidence from the disclosure of audit partner identities

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7
Q

Carcello & Li 2013

Costs and benefits of requiring an engagement partner signature: Recent experience in the United Kingdom

A

Data:
UK listed firms 2008-2010

IV:
Pre & Post sign requirement

DV:
“Audit fees
AQ: accruals, meet or beat earnings threshold, issuance of modified reports, ERC”

Findings:
AQ & audit fees increased after partners are required to sgn audit reports

Contribution:
Partner disclosure lead to more conservtism in a less litiguous environment, UK. Increased accountability & transparency

Limitation:
“external validity UK: legal env. Less strict than US
small sample period
Didn’t do diff n diff model??”

Notes:
Matched UK firms to US & other european firms (where signature is required) and found more conservatism in years after disclosure

Relevant Papers:
Khurana & Raman 2004 & El Ghoul et al 2016 litigous environment impacts perceptions of AQ, this paper & cunningham et al. 2019 show it impacts actual AQ

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8
Q

Aobdia, Castellani, and Richardson 2023

Do investors care who led the audit in the U.S.? Evidence from announcements of accounting restatements.

A

Data:
Event study methodology examining market reactions to restatements US restatements 2017-2022; 965 tainted partner clients, control groups from Audit Analytics, CRSP

IV:
Tainted Partner (partner associated with client restatement)

DV:
Cumulative abnormal returns around restatement announcements

Findings:
“Partner’s non-restating clients experience -0.86 to -1.64 percentage point lower returns when partner associated with restatement
Effect stronger for material restatements (Big R) vs. revisions (little r)
Effect present for both Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors
Market takes time to process information (price drift in longer windows)
Effect emerges 2-3 years after Form AP implementation”

Contribution:
“First evidence that US investors value audit partner disclosures on Form AP
Shows market uses partner track record as signal of audit quality
Demonstrates delayed market reaction suggesting disclosure processing costs
Validates PCAOB’s prediction that partner disclosure would be informative to investors”

Notes:
Effectiveness of audit partner disclosure regulationRetryClaude can make mistakes. Please double-check responses.

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9
Q

Intrinsic partner characteristics

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10
Q

Kallunki et al 2018

IQ and audit quality: Do smarter auditors deliver better audits

A

Data:
Swedish partners 2000-2009

IV:
“Partners IQ level
Controls:prop of public comp, industry spec, Career length, tenure, client size”

DV:
“AQ: GC reporting accuracy (Type 1 issue & shouldnt have, Type 2: opposite), aacruals
Audit fees”

Findings:
Partners IQ level positively correlates with AQ

Contribution:
Cognitive ability of auditors sign impact audit outcomes

Limitation:
“External validity: Sweden men
IQ: measured by required military test taken at the age of 18
Endogeniety concern: better clients may chose partners w. higher IQ”

Notes:
Could examine the results of the authorized competence exams that partners are required to take

Relevant Papers:
Nelson & Tan 2005: individuals cognitive limitations impact their judgments & decisions

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11
Q

Chou et al 2018

The importance of partner narcissism to audit quality.

A

Data:
Taiwanese lead parteners

IV:
Partners narcissism (intrinsic trait): size of signature

DV:
“Actual AQ: accruals, restatements
Perceived AQ: ERCs & borrowing cost (cost of capital)

Findings:
DeFond & Zhang 2014: Auditors supply of AQ based on competence & independence

Contribution:
Narcissistic partners (intrinsic trait) want to be recog as better than others, therfore their AQ is higher than other auditors (more independent not necessarily competent)

Limitation:
“External validity: Taiwan not highliy litigious”

Notes:
endogeneity concern that narcissistic partners get better clients, addressed by including manadatory rotations of partners to diff quality clients

Relevant Papers:
DeFonf & Zhang 2014 & DeAngelo 81

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12
Q

Formative events

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13
Q

He et a 2018

Long-term impact of economic conditions on auditors’ judgment

A

Data:
China partners 2006-2011

IV:
Economic conditions when partner began career

DV:
AQ: modified opinions, issuance audit adjustments (diff b/t client preaudited FS & audited FS)

Findings:
Partners degree of skepticism when making audit decisions correlates with the economic env. at the start of their careers. Start career during economic downturn more skeptical

Contribution:
Auditors’ experiences early in their careers have a imprint on their future actions, in that auditors that experience an economic downturn in the 1st year of their career, are more skeptical (questioning mindset)

Limitation:
External validity China not addressed

Relevant Papers:
Hurtt 2010 profess. Skept is an indiv trait that can change based on env.

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14
Q

Guo et al 2022

Once bitten, twice shy: The importance of audit partners’ first-hand experience with Arthur Andersen’s demise to subsequent auditing style.

A

Data:
Archival Partner Level US partners that worked at Andersen during Enron scandal

IV:
Partner work history Andersen vs non-andersen based on linked-in

DV:
“AQ: accruals
Audit fees:”

Findings:
Clients of partners who worked ar Andersen for less than 5 years during its collapse have lower accruald and pay larger fees (auditors more conservative). Concentrated at partners working at non big 4

Contribution:
Experience of a traumatic professional event early in their careers makes partners more conservative (stricter audit & don’t accept riskier clients) (imprinting effect). Hot stove: learn from prior experience

Limitation:
“Used linked-in to identify andersen partners posssiblt sample error. However this would bias against them finding results
# of AQ proxies”

Notes:
Matched clients of andersen partners w/ non andersen partners

Relevant Papers:
Davidson and Pirinsky 2019: less profitable insider trading once a trader experience a trading enforcement

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15
Q

Discipline from regulatory and market forces

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16
Q

He et al 2016

Reputational implications for partners after a major audit failure: Evidence from China

A

Data:
Chinese Enron data

IV:
Partner named in scandal, firm named in scandal

DV:
“# of partners that stayed in practice
Type of client audited following scandal
ERC following scandal
Audit fees following scandal”

Findings:
“Former partners of fruadulent audit firm had: 1. fewer clients 2. lower quality clients following the scandal 3. lower audit fees
The firms clients’ experienced lower ERC (perceived AQ) surrounding the scandal “

Contribution:
Show that auditors’ reputation impacts perceived AQ in a nonlitigious environment. Partners have a strong incentive to cross montor other partners

Limitation:
External validity

Notes:
“natural experiment
addressed external validity concerns & explained why china is a good setting
relevant bc US was considering disclosing partners identity
Matched firms
Dropped Hong Kong clients (bc HK is more litigious) & results still held”

17
Q

Li, Qi, Zhang, and Tian 2017

The contagion effect of low-quality audits at the level of individual auditors.

A

Data:
Archival - Longitudinal and cross-sectional analysis with propensity score matching Chinese listed firms 1999-2011; CSMAR database; CICPA auditor profiles

IV:
Individual auditor audit failures (AUDITOR_FAIL_0/10); auditor personal characteristics (gender, education, experience)

DV:
Future audit failures; abnormal accruals (ABS_AB_ACC); audit quality measures

Findings:
“Auditors with prior failures show higher likelihood of future failures (longitudinal contagion lasting 4 years)
Current clients of ““failed”” auditors exhibit lower audit quality (lateral contagion)
No contagion effect across different auditors in same office
Contagion attenuated for female auditors, those with master’s degrees, and more experienced auditors
Office-level contagion disappears when controlling for individual-level effects”

Contribution:
“First to document audit quality contagion at individual auditor level rather than office level
Shows personal characteristics matter for interpreting audit failure signals
Supports mandatory disclosure of engagement partner identities
Demonstrates individual auditors drive quality problems rather than systematic office issues”

Notes:
Supports partner identification disclosure policies; suggests audit firms should monitor individual auditor performance patterns

18
Q

Social Ties

19
Q

Bruynseels & Cardinaels 2014

The audit committee: Management watchdog or personal friend of the CEO.

A

Data:
US listed comp 04-08 post SOX

IV:
Social tie b/t CEO and AC member (friendshio or professional)

DV:
“AQ Measures that need AC input (oversight measures): GC opinions issued, Earnings mmgt (accruals), audit fees (measures number of audit services), internal control weakness

Findings:
“Friendship ST= poorer oversight quality:
CEO purchase fewer audit service, engage in earning mgmt
Auditors likely to issue GC & internal control weaknesses
Professional ST don’t impavct monitoring quality”

Contribution:
AC may appear independent but may not be indpendent due to social ties. These ST can lead inadequate corp governance thru social bonds formed from social ties (social identity theory). More aggressive reporting

Limitation:
“Endogeneity concern: only firms w/ weak AC have social ties
doesn’t highlight the positive side of social ties: info sharing
no date restrictions on social ties, could be sample error…THIS WOULD GO AGAINST THEM FINDING RESULTS
need more cross sectional analysis: examine if audit committee chair has social tie with more sign executive”

Notes:
Multiple AQ proxies

20
Q

He et al 2017

Do social ties between external auditors and audit committee members affect audit quality

A

Data:
Chinese data

IV:
Social tie b.t auditors & AC memebers. School ties & professional ties

DV:
Audit fees, propensty to issue modified opinion, report irregularities, firm’s valuation (Tobins Q)

Findings:
“ST= lower AQ: less likely to issue modified opinion, report irregularities, neg tobins Q
Results salient in firms with: ST b/t AC chair & partner & lower corp gov.
Audit fees are higher where ST exist (reciprocity)”

Contribution:
Social ties b/t AC & auditor lead to lower quality audits due to trusting bond formed thru ST.

Limitation:
“External validity
Endogeneity concern: certain types of firms have socia ties

Notes:
Validate external validity concerns bc china is an unique setting where social ties really matter

21
Q

Professional and social networks

22
Q

Bianchi 2018

Auditors’ joint engagements and audit quality: Evidence from Italian private companies.

A

Data:
Archival - Social network analysis using degree centrality measures; OLS and logistic regressions Italian private companies 2008-2011; 2,733 firm-year observations with Board of Statutory Auditors (BSA)

IV:
Auditor connectedness (CONNECTEDNESS) - number of collaborating auditors through joint engagements

DV:
Three audit quality measures: Modified audit opinions (MAO); Abnormal accruals (AAC); Tax-related restatements (TAX_REST)

Findings:
“Better-connected auditors more likely to issue modified opinions
Clients of well-connected auditors have lower abnormal accruals
Lower likelihood of tax-related restatements for well-connected auditors
Benefits stronger when BSA members from different vs. same accounting firms
Network effects incremental to other auditor expertise measures”

Contribution:
“First empirical study of auditor collaboration effects on knowledge transfer and audit quality
Introduces social network analysis to individual auditor research
Shows joint engagements facilitate knowledge sharing among auditors
Supports benefits of mandatory partner disclosure and joint audit arrangements”

Notes:
Supports joint audit arrangements and partner identification policies; demonstrates value of auditor collaboration

23
Q

Pittman, Qi, Zhang, and Zhao 2021

The importance of social networks to individual auditors.

A

Data:
Archival - Manual data collection and social network analysis; instrumental variables; difference-in-differences Chinese listed firms 2000-2014; 18,847 audits by 3,934 auditors; CSMAR and CICPA data

IV:
Alumni networks - Auditor alumni (auditor connections) and Executive alumni (corporate executive connections)

DV:
Audit quality (abnormal accruals, modified opinions, restatements); Client acquisition; Career outcomes (promotions, firm upgrades, retention)

Findings:
“Larger social networks associated with higher audit quality across all measures
Better client acquisition and higher audit fees for well-connected auditors
Enhanced career prospects: more promotions, upgrades to top firms, lower attrition
Auditor alumni more important for audit quality; executive alumni more crucial for business development
Effects persist after controlling for auditor ability and using exogenous network shocks”

Contribution:
“First comprehensive study of individual auditor social networks across multiple career dimensions
Shows social capital enhances both audit quality and career success
Distinguishes between different types of network connections and their specific benefits
Provides evidence for network-based knowledge transfer in auditing profession”

Notes:
Demonstrates importance of social connections in audit profession; supports policies enabling auditor networking and knowledge sharing

24
Q

Audit partner tenure

25
Carey & Simnett 2006 ## Footnote Audit partner tenure and audit quality
Data: Austrialian partners 1995 IV: "Length of partners tenure w. client control for 1st 2 years o client: partner has to become familiar w/ client" DV: AQ: propensity to issue modified opinion 4 distressed companies, accrual directions, meet/beat earnings forecast Findings: "As partner tenure increases issuance of GC decrease bigger impact on Non-big N firms No correlation b/t partner tenure & accrual direction Marginal correlation b/t tenure & meet/beat forecast" Contribution: Emphasis that partner rotation may be needed bc AQ may dimish as partners' tenure with client increaases Limitation: External validity: Australia however audit market similar to use most clients audit by Big N Notes: Cross sectional analysis of australia listed companies. Australia good env. bc partner identities have been disclosed for a while
26
Chi et al 2017 ## Footnote The effects of audit partner pre-client and client-specific experience on audit quality and on perceptions of audit quality
Data: Taiwanese lead partners IV: Firm and partner tenure w. client DV: AQ: accruals Findings: Earnings quality positively correlates w/ partner & firm tenure Contribution: Show mandatory partner and firm rotation may have a negative impact on earnings quality, bc earnings quality increases as tenure increases Limitation: "External validit Taiwan # of AQ proxies
27
Facial traits and audit outcomes
28
Hsieh, Kim, Wang, and Wang 2020 ## Footnote Seeing is believing? Executives’ facial trustworthiness, auditor tenure, and audit fees.
Data: "Machine learning facial feature detection algorithm; OLS regression with fixed effects Hybrid Method: Combines archival data analysis with novel computer-based measurement Uses machine learning facial feature detection algorithms to measure executive facial trustworthiness from Google Images Employs traditional archival regression analysis (OLS with fixed effects) Validates computer measurements with human ratings via Amazon Mechanical Turk" US listed companies 2001-2014; Google Images for executive photos, Audit Analytics, Compustat, RiskMetrics IV: Facial trustworthiness composite index (CFO/CEO); Auditor tenure (moderator) DV: Audit fees (natural log) Findings: CFOs with higher facial trustworthiness receive 5.6% lower audit fees in initial engagements; Effect weakens with longer auditor tenure; No association between facial trustworthiness and actual financial reporting quality or litigation risk Contribution: First large-sample evidence of facial appearance effects in audit pricing; Shows auditor cognitive bias rather than rational pricing; Develops novel facial trustworthiness measurement methodology
29
Baugh, Hallman, and Kachelmeier 2022 ## Footnote A matter of appearances: How does auditing expertise benefit audit committees when selecting auditors?
Data: "Logistic regression; Amazon MTurk attractiveness ratings; Partner selection analysis Hybrid Method: Combines archival data with human perception measurements Uses Amazon Mechanical Turk workers to rate audit partner attractiveness from photographs Employs archival regression analysis (logistic regression, OLS) Creates pseudo-samples for partner selection analysis" US Big 4 audits 2017-2020; PCAOB Form AP filings, BoardEx, Compustat, Audit Analytics IV: Partner attractiveness (MTurk ratings) DV: "Partner Attractive (when testing what predicts attractive partner selection) Partner Is Selected (in partner selection analysis) Audit Fees (natural log) Absolute Total Accruals Misstatement (restatement indicator) The paper uses Partner Attractive as both an IV and DV depending on the analysis: As DV: When examining what audit committee characteristics predict selection of attractive partners As IV: When examining effects of partner attractiveness on fees and audit quality" Findings: Audit committees without Big 4 experience more likely to select attractive partners; Attractive partners command fee premiums only from inexperienced committees; No association between attractiveness and audit quality for experienced committees Contribution: Shows expertise mitigates superficial decision-making in auditor selection; Provides evidence on dual-processing theory in audit committee decisions; Demonstrates importance of audit committee expertise
30
Audit firm internal governance
31
Dodgson, Agoglia, Bennett, and Cohen 2020 ## Footnote Managing the auditor-client relationship through partner rotations: The experiences of audit firm partners.
Data: Semi-structured interviews with qualitative analysis 20 U.S. audit firm partners (2015-2016) from Big 5 firms with 21-37 years experience IV: Partner rotation process management practices (relationship partners, client preference assessment, shadowing periods, post-rotation monitoring) DV: Auditor-client relationship quality and partner rotation effectiveness Findings: "Partner rotation is an extended process, not a discrete event Firms extensively manage client relationships through assigned relationship partners Client preferences heavily influence partner selection (seeking ""purple squirrel"" candidates) Extensive shadowing periods (6-12 months) before formal rotation Post-rotation monitoring through relationship partners and satisfaction surveys Assignment is not random - firms gauge client preferences for partner characteristics" Contribution: "Reveals partner rotation as complex, relationship-managed process rather than simple switching Shows potential tension between regulatory intent (fresh perspective) and firm practices (continuity) Documents extensive client input in partner selection process Provides insights into ""black box"" of how rotations actually occur in practice" Notes: This paper opens the black box on partner rotation implementation, showing the gap between regulatory intent and actual practice, with important implications for auditor independence and the effectiveness of rotation requirements.
32
Aobdia and Petacchi 2019 ## Footnote Consequences of low-quality audits for engagement partners: The importance of audit firm quality control systems.
Data: Archival - Logistic regression; Proprietary PCAOB data analysis US public companies 2008-2013; Proprietary PCAOB partner data, Audit Analytics, Compustat IV: Client restatements; Audit firm quality control deficiencies (moderator) DV: "Partner turnover; New partner quality SWITCH (indicator for partner replacement) NRESTMT (number of restatements associated with new partner in prior 1-3 years) NPART1 (number of PCAOB inspection deficiencies associated with new partner)'" Findings: Restatements increase partner turnover for both restating (43%) and non-restating clients (26%); Firms with deficient quality controls don't replace low-quality partners from non-restating clients; Effective quality controls ensure high-quality replacement partners Contribution: First US evidence on partner-level reputational consequences; Shows internal governance can substitute for external transparency; Demonstrates importance of audit firm quality control systems in partner management
33
Ethics and risk tolerance
34
Amir et al 2014 ## Footnote The association between individual audit partners’ risk preferences and the composition of their client portfolios
Data: Swedish partners IV: Auditors personal criminal convistions DV: Partner risk tolerance: Client portfolio: clients finacial ratiosm board composition, accruals, & goodwill writeoffs Findings: Clients of partners with criminal records have greater financial (finanical rations), governance (board composition), & reporting risk (acruals & goodwill writeoffs). They also pay larger audit fees Contribution: Partners off the job behabior may explain their on the job risk tolerance Limitation: criminal convictions are speeding tickets
35
Mandatory partner rotation
36
Pittman, Stein, and Valentine 2023 ## Footnote The importance of audit partners’ risk tolerance to audit quality.
Data: Archival analysis with background checks 649 unique U.S. audit partners with 4,516 client-year observations (2017-2020); PCAOB Form AP data with third-party background checks IV: Partner risk tolerance (measured by legal infractions after age 30) DV: Multiple audit quality proxies: misstatements, F-score, missed material weaknesses, discretionary accruals, audit fees, timely loss recognition Findings: "16% of partners (104/649) had legal infractions, mostly traffic violations Partners with infractions associated with: higher misstatements, larger F-scores, more missed material weaknesses, less timely loss recognition, lower audit fees No effect on discretionary accruals Effects concentrated in non-Big 4 firms and offices without industry expertise Risk-tolerant partners conduct lower quality audits" Contribution: "First to link partner personality traits (risk tolerance) to audit quality in U.S. Shows individual partner characteristics matter for audit outcomes Demonstrates that off-the-job behavior predicts professional performance Provides empirical support for partner identification requirements" Notes: This paper significantly advances our understanding of what drives variation in audit quality at the partner level, showing that innate personality traits like risk tolerance have measurable effects on professional audit performance, particularly in environments with weaker monitoring.