Behavioral Flashcards
(84 cards)
Behavioral
Intro
Hogarth 1991
A perspective on cognitive research in accounting
- One cannot directly observe the phenomena of interest, i.e. actual cognitive processes. Instead, cognitive psychologists can develop theories only by observing inputs and outputs. Theories about mediating processes are difficult to construct and test. CRA = Cognitive Research in Auditing.
- Psych JDM work focuses on 3 questions: (1) how well do people perform particular judgmental tasks? (2) how do people perform particular judgmental tasks? (3) how can you help people perform better? CRA is pragmatic in that the identification of mechanisms for coping with human cognitive limitations is a major research goal.
- The study of judgment makes heavy use of both standards and metaphors. Standards are applied to observable outputs (i.e., judgments) whereas metaphors are used in the form of “as if” models of the underlying and unobservable judgmental processes. CRA centers on metaphor choice, grounded in psych vs rational econ.
- Two conditions are necessary for making correct judgments: (1) using the appropriate process, and (2) having the appropriate inputs (i.e. data or knowledge) on which the process acts.
- A multi-dimensional view of auditing in future studies may reveal that professional auditors are quite expert in some domains, but their level of performance in other domains will not differentiate them from relative novices. Auditors are not experts in all tasks and there may be tradeoffs/coordination in areas of expertise for an auditor.
Nelson & Tan 2005
A Judgment and Decision Making Research in Auditing: A Task, Person, and Interpersonal Interaction Perspective
Taks papers motivated by issuance of professional standards
1. Risk assessments
2. Analytical procedures
3. Auditors decisions on having client make adj.
4. Going concern judgments
Person: cognitive limitations leave auditors susceptible to judgment biases
1. knowledge: ability to perform audit & expertise= Experience (ability to acquire knowledge) is not equal to expertise…knowledge plays a imp role.
2. other characteristics
3. cognitive limitations
4. decision aids
Interactions:
1. b/t auditors
2. Auditors & client
3. Auditors & other participants in the financial reporting process
Theory: Task: auditors need to perform numerous task to form an overall opinion
Person: auditors’ attributes (skills & personality) influence their opinions
Interactions: auditors interact with others (other audiors, client personnel, stakeholder) when applying their skills to perform a task that leads to an overall opinion
Experience, Expertise, and Knowledge Effects
Bonner & Pennington 1991
Cognitive processes and knowledge as determinants of auditor expertise
Extend auditor expertise lit by proposing prior mixed results of its effectiveness on performance is due to the task being studied: 1. how auditor aquire knowledge (is the auditor able to acquire the necessary knowledge while performing task) 2. Type of cognitive processing needed for performing specific task
Review: Prior studies find mixed results on auditor expertise & perform.
Owhoso et al. 2002
Error detection by industry-specialized teams during sequential audit review
Independent Variables
* Auditor experience: Manager/Senior
* Industry specialization
* Hierarchical – individual, nominal team, real team
Dependent variable:
Review detection rate of mechanical and conceptual errors
Findings:
Industry Specialist:
Seniors are more likely to detect mechanical errors (align w/ their responsibilities)
Managers are more likely to detect conceptual errors (align w/ skillset)
Non Industry Specialist: little diff in managers and seniors error detection
-Under the current review process (senior review staff & Manager review seniors’ review) auditors are better able to detect mechanical errors in their industry but not non-industry conceptual or mechanical errors
Contribution:
Current review process works when indivs review info. In their specialized industry.
Managers and seniors provide unique attributes to the review process. (both are needed)
Limitation:
Used time as a measure for auditor effort but told participants they should spend equal amount of time on both reviews
Behavioral: Industry Specialist Mixed ANOVA
Griffith 2018
When Do Auditors Use Specialists’ Work to Improve Problem Representations of and Judgments about Complex Estimates
Theory:
Source Credibility: perceived competence & objectivity of a source. Higher credibility=less likely to question source
Elaboration Likelihood Model/epistemic motivation: one’s scrutiny of a message increases with the personal risk and benefits of accurate assessments
Independent Variables:
Specialist relational cue (present/absent): document that clients assertions are aggressive
Experiment 1: measured sourced credility perception
Experiment 2: manipulated engagement risk:
Dependent Variable:
Estimate reasonableness assessment
Problem representation: combine existing knowledge w/ incoming info.
Findings:
Specialist use of relational cue increase auditors problem representation and assessment quality but only high risk settings
Contribution:
Situational factors (risk) increase auditors epistemic motivation to incorporate incoming info. from specialist reports into existing knowledge and make better assessments
Bennett & Hatfield 2013
The Effect of the Social Mismatch between Staff Auditors and Client Management on the Collection of Audit Evidence
Theory:
Social Mismatch: people perceive individuals who have an advantage over them as intimidating (age, experience, wealth)
Avoidance Behavior: people avoid undesirable/intimidating situations
Electronic Communication: lowers social pressure compared to in person communication
Independent Variable:
Social mismatch b/t auditor & management (older/similar age, experience, intimidating/neuatral personality)
Communication mode: in person or email
Dependent Variable:
Quality of evidence request and audit conclusion
Findings:
Auditors are less likely to request additional evidence from a more exoerience managers no matter the personality type. Email communication cause auditors to increase requests from more experience managers
Contirubtion:
Show that even though standards and review process should mitigate manager intimidation effects, auditors still avoid interaction with more experienced managers
Bol et al. 2018
The Role of Tacit Knowledge in Auditor Expertise and Human Capital Development
Theory:
Tacit managerial knowledge: soft managerial skill. Comes with experience/not typically taught in school (team management, meeting career goals,communication skills)
Independent Variable:
Tacit knowledge subordinate
Tacit knowledge supervisor
As appendix A shows, this scale presents 10 work-related scenarios with 9–11
options per scenario. Respondents rated each option on a 7-point scale,
with the endpoints being extremely unimportant to extremely important to
success.
Specifically, we measure subordinates’ (supervisors’) tacit knowledge as
the sum of the squared deviations between a subordinate’s (supervisor’s)
ratings and the mean ratings of the panel of partners. As smaller sums indicate
higher tacit knowledge levels, we take the highest observed score
minus the score of the subordinate (supervisor), so that higher values indicate
higher tacit knowledge (TK Subordinate; TK Supervisor).
Dependent Variable:
Auditors’ actual performance evaluations
Promotability
Auditors’ firm commitment
Findings:
Higher tacit knowledge in inexperienced auditors is associated with better promotability and higher annual performance evaluations and the associations are stronger when the supervisor has high tacit knowledge.
Subordinate acquire higher tacit knowledge levels when their supervisors have higher tacit knowledge.
Higher tacit knowledge in subordinates is associated with stronger firm commitment but only if their supervisors also have higher tacit knowledge.
Contribution:
Extend prior studies that measures an auditors’ expertise based on their techniccal knowledge by showing that soft skills (tacit knowledge) also impact their performance evaluaton. Therefore, soft skills should also be incorporated into expertise measures
Order Effects and Comparative-Based Decisions
Frisch 1993
Background
Reasons for Framing Effects
Theory:
Framing effect: subjects often respond differently to different descriptions of the same problem
Contribution:
Extend prior psych studies that show ppl do not always make decisions based on expected utlity by showing that ppl’s decisions are impacted by the way the information is described
Seminal
Rau and Moser 1999
Does performing other audit tasks affect going concern judgments?
Theory:
Simultaneous processing is impacted by the complexity of tasks. This can bias judgement
Online judgment: judgements of simple tasks where information can be updated as encountered
Memory-based judgements: judgement of complex tasks where information is retrieved from long-term memory
Working memory: temporary information storage where information that is currently being processed is held. If too much information is processed simultaneously, individuals’
working memory capacity is met and they are not able process all information. Therefore not all information is transferred into LT memory from working memory
Independent Variable:
Seniors performance of a task other than GC opinion:
-positive task: firm can operate
-negative: firm not operating well
-Control: don’t perform an other task
Task order: (not sign)
Mediator: biased memory
Dependent Variable:
going concern opinion & recall of firm’s positive operation information
Findings:
Seniors that perform a positive other task are more likely to make positive GC opnions and more likely to recall positive firm info. This effect is mediated by seniors’ biased memory
Contribution:
Although standards perceive auditors will recall GC information without bias (b/c auditors are not required to perform GC procedures), auditors store and recall positive information that bias their GC opinion. Contrary to prior studies that suggest negative info. is more salient, this study shows positive info. has a bigger affect on auditors’ GC opinion.
Bhattacharjee et al 2007
The Cascading of Contrast Effects on Auditors’ Judgments in Multiple Client Audit Environments
Theory:
Context based effects: same target can be evaluated differently based on the context in which it is judged. (framing effect) Prior experience impacts your current judgment
1. Contrast effect: target is rated different from the context. (more common in ambiguous settings)
2. Assimilation: halo effect:target is rated similar to context
Memory-based judgements: judgement of complex tasks where information is retrieved fromlong-term memory
Common information bias: we overweigh the common aspects of comparisons versus the unique characteristics of each thing being compared
Independent Variable:
Auditor prior client assessments: no prior client, prior client w/ strong or weak internal controls
Depdendent Variable:
Auditor assessment of current auditor’s internal controls & documented support for current auditor
Findings:
Auditors are highly susceptible to contrast effects: assessments of prior client influenced
auditors’ assessments of current clients’ related process and auditors’ current client documentation. If prior client IC is strong current client is rated less favorably & vice verse.
Prior clients’ assessment also impacts auditors’ assessment of current client’s process that indirectly relates to the auditors’ prior client’s assessment. Cascading of contrast effects
Contribution:
Advances prior accounting and psychology literature by demonstrating the cascading of contrast effects onto subsequent indirectly related decisions
Arnold et al. 2022
The effect of past performance and task type on managers’ Target Seeting Decisions: An Experimental Investigation
Theory:
1. Motivated reasoning theory - The authors argue that managers engage in self-serving interpretations of information by attributing performance success to permanent factors and performance failure to transitory ones. This is based on Kunda’s (1990) work on motivated reasoning, where an individual’s motivation to arrive at a desired conclusion leads to biased interpretations of available information.
2. Attribution theory - The authors draw on Weiner’s work (1986, 2000, 2018) to argue that ability is perceived as a more stable cause for success than effort, which affects how managers interpret performance outcomes.
3. Fairness theory - They incorporate perspectives on fairness from Weiner and Kukla (1970) and Farwell and Weiner (1996) to explain how managers perceive the fairness of rewarding or punishing employees for performance that is attributed to effort versus ability.
4. Economic ratcheting theory - The authors reference economic perspectives on target ratcheting from work by Weitzman (1980) and Laffont and Tirole (1988) to establish baseline expectations about how targets should adjust symmetrically when performance deviates from targets.
Independent Variable:
* Past performance: Exceeding the prior year’s target vs. missing the prior year’s target.
- Task type: ability-driven vs. effort-driven.
Dependent Variable:
* Difference between the new target set by the manager and the prior year’s target.
- Difference between the new targets set for the stronger vs. weaker performing employee.
Findings:
Managers adjust targets more upwards when prior target exceeded versus missed. Interaction shows this asymmetry is greater for ability-driven versus effort-driven tasks. Target difference between employees is greater when task ability-driven vs. effort-driven. Interaction shows this effect attenuated when prior target missed vs. exceeded. Supplemental analysis provides evidence of self-serving reasoning by managers.
Contribution:
This paper contributes to research on target ratcheting by showing ratcheting asymmetry is contingent on task type. This paper provides experimental evidence on asymmetric ratcheting where prior empirical findings have been mixed and it sheds light on the underlying psychological processes and biased reasoning behind ratcheting behavior. It also highlights the importance of considering whether tasks are more ability-driven or effort-driven in understanding managers’ target decisions. It suggests the need for more nuanced approaches in understanding target-setting behavior in managerial contexts.
Asay et al 2017
The Effects of Out‐of‐Regime Guidance on Auditor Judgments About Appropriate Application of Accounting Standards
Theory:
1. Contrast effect: target (IFRS) is rated different from the context (GAAP). (more common in ambiguous settings)
2. Assimilation: halo effect:target is rated similar to context
Independent Variable:
GAAP standard present or absent
IRS standard vague or nonexisting & participants do or don’t make GAAP decisioon before making final decision based on IFRS
Dependent Variable:
Auditor judgment more in line with GAAP or IFRS
Findings:
Contrast effect found. Auditors make judgements under IFRS that a mgmt assertion that is allowed under IFRS is more acceptable after reading a GAAP standard that doesn’t allow it.
When participants are not aware of the true IFRS guidance, the contrast effect weakens and their decisions are based on GAAP standards (assimilation effect)
Contribution:
As more firms become multinational, standard setters should be aware that difference in accounting standards can result in a contrast effect on auditors judgement where the target standard is overvalued.
Negotiation
Gibbins et al 2001
Evidence About Auditor-Client Management Negotiation Concerning Client’s Financial Reporting
Findings:
Created a model of auditor/client negotiations
Negotiations impact Financial Statements materially, partners state negotiations are a normal part of their practice, expertise is crucial
Contribution:
Highlight the need for future negotiation studies bc even though the FS belobgs to mgmt, mgmt constantly negotiates with auditors to ensure the FS isnt materially mistated
Seminal
Sanchez et al 2007
The effect of auditors’ use of a reciprocity based strategy on auditor-client negotiations
Theory:
Reciprocity: if someone provides a person w/ a gift or favor that person is obligated to return the favor
Independent Variables:
Negotiation strategy: noc concessions, high or low # of concessions,
Dependent Variables:
Client’s willingness to make an income decreasing adjustment, satisfaction w/ client, & willingness to retain client
& auditors’ perception of the above constructs
Findings:
Client is more willing to make an unfavorable adj., are satisfied and will retain the auditor when the auditor shows that they are conceding other adjs even though the waived adj are immaterial. The results are also found when the material adj is subject. Eventhough clients willigness to make the unfavorable adj. is not influenced by the number of conceded adj. auditors believe it would be
Contribution:
Auditors can employ a concession negotiation tactic to influence management feelings of receprocity to the auditor. The existence of a concession more important than the number of concessions
Kang 2019
Are Audit Committees More Challenging Given a Specific Investor Base? Does the Answer Change in The Presence of Prospective Critical Audit Matter Disclosures?
Theory:
Theory of helping behavior identify dependency: individuals’ helping behaviors are motivated by the social cue of the severity of others’ need for aid
Theory of social responsibility norm: belief that individuals are expected to help those in need.
Independent Variable:
Investor Sophistication
Presence or Absence of a CAM (critical info communicated to AC)
Mediator: AC members’ perception of their oversight duty to investors
Dependent Variable:
# of probing ques. AC member asked to mgmt & auditor
Findings:
AC members ask more probing questions when investors are unsophisticated versus sophisticated
The presence of a CAM amplifies AC members’ propensity to ask probing questions
The above results are driven by AC members’ perceived oversight duty to investors (mediation).
Contribution:
Extends research on CAM disclosures by showing that their existence increases AC effort> (Validate PCAOB goal)
-Shed light that AC members’ oversight behavior is driven by their fiduciary duty to protect unsophisticated investors
Bame-Aldred & Kida 2007
A Comparison of Auditor and Client Negotiation Decisions
Theory:
Auditors and clients will most likely have different reporting goals during negotiations
Independent Variable:
Professional Type:
1. Client/Accountant
2. Auditor
Dependent Variable:
Likelihood of using a negotiation tactic, initial negotiation position (goal profit & limit profit (floor/ceiling)), perception of other parties’ negotiation position
Findings:
Clients are more flexible and more likely to consider & predict the other parties’ position compared to auditors. Both parties use problem solvig tactics
Contribution:
Extend accounting literature on negotiation because prior studies had not compare the negotiation decisions and tactics of auditor and clients when faced with the same negotiation context. Show auditors are less flexible than clients & clients use more tactics
Probabilistic Judgment, Heuristics, and Biases
Tversky and Kahneman 1981
Background
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Theory:
Framing effect: subjects often respond differently to different descriptions of the same problem
Prospective theory: decision makers evaluate alternatives to decisions RELATIVE to a reference point
Reflection effect: Info. presented in a Gain perspective= risk avoiding, Info. presented in a Lose perspective= risk taking
Contribution:
Develop prospect theory and framing effect
Sullivan and Kida 1995
The Effect of Multiple Reference Points and Prior Gains and Losses on Managers’ Risky Decision Making,
Theory:
Prospect Theory: with multiple potential reference points
House money effect: ppl are more risk seeking after experiencing a gain
Break even effect: ppl are more risk avoiding following a loss unless the more risky option can alleviate the loss
Independent Variables:
Alternative investment decisions relation 2 reference points: 1. below both (loss perspective) 2. above both (Gain persective) 3. between both
Previous outcomes: gains or loss
Stage 2: possibility of eliminating prior losses or gains
Depdendent Variable:
Riskiness of managers’ investment decision: outcome certain (less risky)/ uncertain outcome=risky
Findings:
Gain perspective= risk advere
Loss perspective = no finding of risk seeking when options are close to 1 reference point
Options in between= risk avoiding & risk seeking bahvior found
When prior losses are presented: managers avoid risk when the riskier option can not eliminate the prior loss, but there is also no support that they seek risk when the riskier option could alleviate the prior loss
Prior Gain= risk avoidance. (no house money effect)
Contribution:
Extend Proepect Theory based acct. research by showing ppls behavior can change when given multiple reference points & prior losses impact their behavior