berkeley’s idealism Flashcards
1
Q
idealism
A
- everything that exists is a mind or dependant on a mind
- ‘to be is to be perceived’
- the view that there are no mind independent objects
- this view is anti realist
- (there are only ideas of trees, not actual trees - mind independent objects don’t exist)
2
Q
arguments for idealism
A
- if physical objects are separate from their qualities, then they are inconceivable
- mind independent reality can’t be supported by experience
- indirect realism leads to scepticism
- the master argument
- the simplicity of idealism
3
Q
the objects of perception
A
- what is perceived is perceived immediately
- the causes of this aren’t themselves perceived but inferred
- everything that is a quality
- each sense perceives types of qualities
- nothing in addition to qualities is perceived
- Berkeley is saying that qualities are the only thing we truly encounter
- anything else must be reasoned to, we never perceive it
4
Q
only qualities are perceived
A
- each sense perceives types of qualities
- when we perceive physical objects, we don’t perceive anything in addition to its primary and secondary qualities
- therefore, everything we perceive is either a primary or a secondary quality
- both primary and secondary qualities are mind dependent
- therefore, the objects of perception are entirely mind dependent
5
Q
only qualities exist
A
- a ‘material substratum’, if distinct from its primary and secondary qualities, is never perceived
- it is indescribable and inconceivable
- nothing in experience supports its existence because we only perceive qualities
- positing matter leads to scepticism about the world
- therefore, only qualities exist and not matter
6
Q
simplicity and empiricism
A
- idealism can be claimed to be the most simple theory and the one that best respects empiricism
- there are two kinds of thing we are directly aware of: mind and ideas
- idealism is simple because it explains everything in terms of the minimum number of kinds of things (indirect realism posits minds, idea and matter)
- idealism respects empiricism because it doesn’t seek to explain the world in terms of things we don’t have experience of
7
Q
objection: appeal to the stone
A
- this is not a serious object, it is a fallacy
- it is when you reject something merely because it sounds absurd
8
Q
objection: unpercieved objects don’t exist
A
- when objects are not being perceived, then they don’t exist
- I still exist even when no one is perceiving me
9
Q
response of the objection that unperceived objects don’t exist
A
- objects exist in the mind of god and are therefore always being perceived
- ideas we perceive are not just caused by god’s mind, but exist in god’s mind (though not perceived by god)
10
Q
objection: on god
(idealism)
A
- the existence and role of god is not assumed but reached by argument
- what I perceive is in my mind, not god’s mind
- god can’t have the sort of perceptual experiences I have
- god doesn’t perceive as I do, and doesn’t undergo sensations (eg pain)
- the ordinary objects of my perception change and go out of existence, but god’s mind is said to be unchanging and eternal
- therefore, what I perceive count be part of god’s mind
11
Q
response to the objection on god
A
- what I perceive is a copy of the idea in god’s mind
- the ideas of physical objects exist in god’s mind not as perceptions but as part of god’s understanding
- so, while god doesn’t feel pain, he knows what it is for us to feel pain
- what I perceive, which changes, is what god wills me to perceive and ‘things …may properly be said to begin their existence…when god decreed they should become perceptible to intelligent creatures.’
- the whole of creation exists in god’s mind, eternally
12
Q
objection: illusions
(idealism)
A
- we perceive ideas, therefore there must be an idea that corresponds to the illusion
- eg if we perceive a pencil that is crooked, then there must be a crooked pencil
- the idealist can’t claim our perception is misleading because (according to the idealist), the perception is all there is
- it follows that there is a distinction between appearance and reality so, it is not the case that to be is to be perceived and therefore idealism is false
- idealism fails in its claim that to be is to be perceived, which means it is not the case that the objects of perception are mind-dependent ideas
13
Q
response to the illusions objection
(idealism)
A
- illusions are real but misleading
- we aren’t misperceiving in an illusion (eg the pencil really is crooked)
- but this is not typical circumstances, so we can easily be misled
- (eg) the pencil would not appear crooked if we took it out of the water; the pencil would not feel crooked
- the correct this we should say that the pencil looks crooked
- Berkeley denies the inference from the stick looking bent to the claim that the stick really is straight
- this is a confusion over what Berkeley meant by ‘to be is to be perceived’; to be bent is merely to look bent, not to possess a quality of bentness
14
Q
objection: hallucinations
A
- Berkeley distinguishes imagination from perception because imagination is in our control but perception isn’t
- hallucinations are not in our control so what distinguishes the from perception
15
Q
response to the hallucinations objection
A
- hallucinations are not always in our control but are caused by our minds (unlike perception)
- hallucinations can sometimes be identified because they dim, irregular and confused
- they do not cohere with the rest of nature
- hallucinations lack logical connection to the rest of our experience; however, this response is unsuccessful because some hallucinations might be logically connected to the rest of our experience (e.g if you have a fever dream)
