Binmore and Shaked - Experimental Economics Flashcards

(8 cards)

1
Q

What do they say about preduction as it realtes to science vs economics?

A

Scientists also attach much importance to replication which is something that can’t be done as it relates to data gathered in economic laboratories.

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2
Q

They observe that Fehr and Schmidt don’t keep the distribution of parameters constant. What is the issue with this?

A

Fitting a model to new data is not the same thing as predicting new data with a model whose parameters have been calibrated with exisiting data.

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3
Q

What is evidence that there is limited predictive power in key games?

A

The model struggles to explain the persistent decline in cooperation rates over time, even among inequity averse participants (in public goods game without punishment).

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4
Q

What were they concerns around the conclusions made in public goods game without punishment?

A

That Fehr and Schmidt chose only to predict the partner design (repeated interaction, final round) rather than the standard stranger design (one shot).

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5
Q

What are the concerns that Binmore and Shaked have on refinement?

A

The experimental games used by Fehr and Schmidt often involve mutliple equilibria. The selection of a specific eqm might reflect beliefs or fairness expectations rather than utility from inequity aversion.

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6
Q

How do they claim that Fehr and Schmidt distort the empricial distribution types as it relates to three contract games?

A

Fehr and Schmidt drop 30% of the subject pool (those with “outlier” parameters) to align with their theory, and so makes cross game comparisons invalid.

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7
Q

What is their preferred explanation for explaining some of the behaviour observed?

A

Favor explaining behavior in terms of social norms triggered by experimental framing. They cite the work of Henrich et al. (including Fehr) on cross-cultural differences in economic behavior, which suggests that culturally determined behavior and exposure to market economies are correlated, potentially supporting a social norm explanation over hardwired, culture-independent utility functions.

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8
Q

What is an issue with backward induction claimed by these authors?

A

Widely considered a poor predictor of experimental behaviour by game theorists - not always robust.

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