Braidotti Flashcards
(10 cards)
What are the core assumptions of humanism as critiqued by Braidotti, and why does she argue they are no longer tenable in the contemporary context?
Humanism assumes that humans are rational, conscious, autonomous beings capable of moral reasoning, scientific understanding, and historical progress. It posits humans as the source of moral value and natural rights, and as distinct from and superior to nature.
Braidotti critiques this view for being exclusionary (e.g., Foucault and Wynter’s critiques), complicit in ecological destruction (e.g., Moore), and inadequate in the face of 20th-century atrocities (e.g., Arendt). She argues that technological and scientific developments have destabilised the notion of a fixed human nature, making humanism obsolete.
Compare and contrast transhumanism, antihumanism, and posthumanism. How does Braidotti’s posthumanism differ in its orientation toward human nature, technology, and critique?
Transhumanism seeks to enhance human capacities through technology, aiming for a future ‘transhuman’ stage. It intensifies humanist ideals like reason and progress.
Antihumanism critiques humanism’s assumptions, viewing the ‘universal human’ as a construct of power. It remains reactive and critical.
Posthumanism, Braidotti’s position, builds on antihumanism but moves beyond critique. It embraces the present, affirms technological entanglement, and reimagines subjectivity and ethics without returning to humanist ideals.
Explain the philosophical significance of ‘difference’ in the French tradition Braidotti draws upon. How does this concept challenge traditional metaphysical notions of identity?
The philosophy of difference, especially in Deleuze, rejects the privileging of identity and representational thought. Identity is seen as a temporary actualisation of ongoing processes of becoming. Difference is primary—there is no essence or transcendent source behind it. This challenges dualisms (e.g., man/woman, human/animal) and the idea that philosophy should define stable essences. Instead, being is understood as flux and transformation.
What is the ‘nomadic subject’ in Braidotti’s philosophy? How does it redefine the self in terms of becoming, embodiment, and relationality?
The nomadic subject is a self conceived not as a unified ego but as a confluence of symbolic, organic, and non-organic processes of becoming. It is materially embedded, affective, and relational. This subjectivity displaces the centrality of the ego and embraces transformation, multiplicity, and interconnection. It reflects Braidotti’s ontology of difference and her rejection of fixed identity.
Discuss the role of ‘Zoe’ in Braidotti’s new materialism. How does this concept help dismantle the human/non-human binary and reframe our understanding of life?
‘Zoe’ refers to life as a generative force shared by all living and non-living matter. It undermines the distinction between human life (seen as complex and creative) and non-human matter (seen as inert).
Braidotti uses this concept to argue that non-human matter is also self-organising and creative (e.g., octopuses, fungi). This reframing supports a posthuman ethics and ontology that recognises the vitality of all matter.
What does Braidotti mean by ‘becoming-planetary’? Illustrate this concept through the three dimensions she proposes: becoming-earth, becoming-animal, and becoming-machine.
Becoming-planetary is Braidotti’s ethical and existential response to posthumanism. It involves:
Becoming-earth: Developing a geo-centred subjectivity that blurs the boundary between society and nature.
Becoming-animal: Rejecting species hierarchies, recognising the animal within us, and living with animals in less exploitative ways.
Becoming-machine: Embracing our technological entanglement (e.g., cyborgs, smartphones) and blurring the line between organic and inorganic.
How does Braidotti integrate insights from contemporary science into her philosophical framework? Why is this integration important for her posthumanist project?
Braidotti draws on new natural sciences to support her ontology of becoming and difference. She sees evolution, neuroscience, and synthetic biology as evidence of the creativity and complexity of non-human matter. This integration helps dismantle human exceptionalism and supports her claim that identity is a product of dynamic, material processes. It also aligns philosophy with empirical insights, reinforcing her posthumanist ethics.
In what ways does Braidotti’s posthumanism propose an ethical reorientation? What are the challenges or contradictions involved in formulating a posthuman ethics?
Braidotti proposes a bio-centred egalitarianism that rejects anthropocentrism and affirms interdependence with non-human others. Ethics should be based on relationality and mutual becoming.
However, critics argue that posthuman ethics still relies on human capacities (e.g., moral judgement) and may struggle to address urgent political issues like climate change or genocide without reintroducing human-centred values.
Critically assess the claim that posthumanism, while rejecting human exceptionalism, still relies on distinctively human capacities such as imagination and moral reasoning. Is this a contradiction?
Yes, this is a potential contradiction. While posthumanism seeks to decentre the human, it still appeals to human faculties to imagine and enact posthuman futures. As Kate Soper notes, posthumanism addresses humans and relies on their unique capacities to respond ethically. This tension suggests that posthumanism may not fully escape the humanist framework it critiques.
To what extent can Braidotti’s posthumanism be reconciled with political and legal frameworks based on human rights? What tensions or possibilities arise from this intersection?
Posthumanism challenges the anthropocentric basis of human rights by questioning the notion of a fixed, universal human subject. This creates tension with legal systems grounded in individual rights.
However, it also opens possibilities for expanding rights to non-human entities and rethinking justice in ecological and relational terms. The challenge lies in balancing posthuman ethics with practical political commitments.
