Wittgenstein Flashcards
(10 cards)
Explain the picture theory of language as presented in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. How does this theory aim to define the limits of meaningful discourse?
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein proposes that propositions are logical pictures of reality. A proposition mirrors the structure of the world and represents a possible state of affairs.
For example, “The cat is on the mat” corresponds to a specific arrangement of objects. Only propositions that can be empirically verified are meaningful.
This theory sets the boundary of meaningful discourse at what can be logically and empirically represented—rendering metaphysical or ethical claims technically nonsensical.
Discuss Wittgenstein’s claim that “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” What implications does this have for philosophical questions about ethics, aesthetics, and metaphysics?
This statement concludes the Tractatus and reflects Wittgenstein’s view that language is limited to expressing empirical facts. Questions about ethics, aesthetics, and metaphysics cannot be expressed in logically structured, verifiable propositions and are thus outside the bounds of meaningful language. While not meaningless in everyday terms, they are nonsensical in the technical sense and must be shown or lived rather than said.
How does Wittgenstein’s later philosophy in Philosophical Investigations critique the assumptions of the Tractatus, particularly regarding the nature of meaning and reference?
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein rejects the idea of a fixed logical structure of language and the notion that meaning is derived from reference.
He critiques the picture theory as too rigid and instead argues that meaning arises from use. Language is seen as a set of practices embedded in human activity, and words function differently depending on context.
This marks a shift from a representational to a pragmatic view of language.
What is a “language game” according to Wittgenstein? Illustrate the concept with examples and explain how it shifts our understanding of meaning.
A language game is a rule-governed activity where language is used in specific contexts—such as giving orders, playing chess, or joking. Each game has its own rules and purposes, and words gain meaning from their role within these games.
For example, “checkmate” only makes sense in chess. This concept shifts meaning from a static reference to a dynamic, context-dependent practice.
Define “form of life” in Wittgenstein’s later thought. How does this concept relate to the possibility of mutual understanding across different cultures or species?
A form of life is the shared natural and cultural background that makes language games possible. It includes biological capacities and social practices.
Language is only intelligible within a form of life. Mutual understanding requires shared forms of life; without them, communication may fail. Wittgenstein illustrates this with the idea that “If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.”
What is the significance of Wittgenstein’s critique of the Augustinian theory of language? How does the “blocks, pillars, and slabs” example challenge the denotative theory of meaning?
Wittgenstein critiques the Augustinian view that language is about naming objects. In the “blocks, pillars, and slabs” example, a builder teaches an assistant words not by naming, but through practical use in construction. This shows that meaning arises from participation in an activity, not from associating words with mental images or objects—challenging the denotative theory of meaning.
Explain Wittgenstein’s concept of “family resemblances.” How does this idea challenge the search for essential definitions in philosophy?
Wittgenstein argues that many concepts, like “game,” lack a single essence and are instead connected by overlapping similarities—“family resemblances.”
Just as family members may share traits without all having one in common, concepts can be related without strict definitions.
This challenges the philosophical pursuit of necessary and sufficient conditions for concepts.
What is the rule-following problem in Wittgenstein’s later work? How does he respond to the sceptical challenge that rules are open to arbitrary interpretation?
The rule-following problem arises from the idea that any action can be interpreted to fit a rule. Wittgenstein responds that rule-following is not private but public—it depends on shared customs and practices.
For example, a stop sign has meaning because of the social practice of obeying it, not because of its shape alone. Rules gain meaning through communal use.
Why does Wittgenstein argue that a private language is impossible? What does this argument reveal about the social nature of meaning and understanding?
Wittgenstein argues that a private language—understood only by a single individual—is impossible because language requires public criteria for correctness.
Without others to verify usage, there’s no distinction between following a rule and thinking one is. This shows that meaning and understanding are inherently social, grounded in shared practices.
Evaluate the claim that “meaning is use” in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. How does this perspective alter traditional views on language, thought, and communication?
“Meaning is use” reflects Wittgenstein’s view that words gain significance from how they are used in context. This challenges traditional views that tie meaning to reference or mental images. Instead, meaning is practical, social, and contextual.
Understanding language involves engaging in shared activities, not decoding symbols—reshaping how we think about communication and thought.
