Cases Flashcards

(60 cards)

1
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(J.O. Hooker & Sons v. Roberts Cabinet Co.)

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Renovations involving cabinets. Parties disagreed on who should dispose of cabinets. Primary subject was services and damages were awarded under general contract law. Plaintiff was not allowed to recover for storing the cabinets because it was of no additional expense to him, but he recovered from loss profits and administrative costs Rule: For cases that are mixed services and goods, the law for determining the appropriate award for mixed services and goods is based upon the primary subject of the contract and, when the primary subject is services, the appropriate award is that which would place the non-breaching party in a position that is as good as if there had been no breach (Expectation interest)
Center of gravity

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2
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GROVES V. JOHN WUNDER CO.

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Excavation of sand and gravel breach – Rule: Damages for willful breach of a construction contract, even if there has been substantial performance, are awarded as the cost of completing the failed performance.

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3
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PEEVYHOUSE V. GARLAND COAL MINING CO:

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Remedial work to farm property not performed as promised. Rule- if the economic benefit that would result to the owner from full performance is grossly disproportionate to the cost of performance, damages should instead be limited to the diminution in value resulting to the premises because of the nonperformance.

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4
Q

HAWKINS V. MCGEE- SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 1929:

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Hairy hand case. Expectation damages. Rule- If one party breaches a contract, the nonbreaching party may recover damages based on the difference between the value of the contract as fully performed and the actual value of the nonbreaching party’s present condition, plus any incidental damages reasonably foreseeable to all parties at the time of contract formation.

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5
Q

SULLIVAN V. O’CONNER (1973):

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Nose job case. Plaintiff was allowed to recover for pain and suffering due to her disfigurement and emotional distress. Rule: pain and suffering and emotional distress that flow naturally from a breach are compensable contract damages under either an expectancy or a reliance measure

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6
Q

KGM HARVESTING CO. V. FRESH NETWORK

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Lettuce case. KGM refused to sell the lettuce to Fresh Network and sold at market price to third parties. Fresh Network refused to pay for the lettuce it had already received and purchased lettuce on the open market in order to fulfill its obligations to third parties. Fresh Network recovered cover price. Rule- . A buyer can cover by making in good faith and without unreasonable delay any reasonable purchase of goods in substitution for those due from the seller. In that case, the buyer may recover from the seller as damages the difference between the cost of cover and the contract price. If the buyer is unable to cover or chooses not to cover, the measure of damages is the difference between the market price and the contract price.

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7
Q

HADLEY V. BAXENDALE

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Mill shaft case. Mill shaft broke and delivery was delayed. Hadley never told Pickford that delay in shipping the shaft would result in Hadley’s lost profits, and thus Baxendale is not liable for the consequences of these “special circumstances” that were not reasonably foreseeable at contract formation. Circumstances were not assumed because a mill shaft is not a huge part. Rule- If one party breaches a contract, the other party may recover all damages that are reasonably foreseeable to both parties at the time of making the contract, as well as damages stemming from any special circumstances, provided those circumstances were communicated to and known by all parties at contract formation.

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8
Q

HECTOR MARTINEZ AND CO. V. SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION CO.:

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Delay in shipping of a large excavation machine. Damages from the loss of a machine’s use are a reasonably foreseeable result of delayed transport. Same rule as Hadley

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9
Q

MORROW V. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF HOT SPRINGS

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Failed to warn when safety deposit boxes became available and coins got stolen. Rule- minority opinion The tacit-agreement test says that one agrees to all terms of a contract that can reasonably be assumed to be part of the agreement, but one cannot be liable for special circumstances of which one did not have actual notice.

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10
Q

CHICAGO COLISEUM CLUB V. DEMPSEY ILLINOIS COURT OF APPEALS

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Dempsey breached contract by boxing in another fight. Coliseum was not able to recover for lost profits because they were speculative; it was impossible to know how many spectators would know up to the fight. Rule- In an action for breach of contract, a party can recover only on damages which naturally flow from and are the result of breach.

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11
Q

ANGELIA TELEVISION LTD. V. REED:

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Actor backed out of movie. Minority view court decided that Angelina could recover pre contract expenditures

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12
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ROCKINGHAM COUNTY V. LUTEN BRIDGE CO

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Building bridge case. Commissioners decided not to honor the contract and directed Luten not to proceed with building the bridge and stated that any further work completed by Luten would be done at the company’s own risk and expense. Luten could not recover for expenses piled up after the notice of breach. Rule- If a nonbreaching party in a contract for services receives notice of another party’s breach, the nonbreaching party must treat the contract as broken when notice is received and cease performance and may then sue for any losses sustained from the breach as well as profits that would have been realized upon performance.

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13
Q

PARKER V. TWENTIETH CENTURY-FOX FILM CORP

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Film producers hired Parker to be lead in Bloomer Girl, then breached and offered her a role in big country big men for the same compensation. Fox Film Corp argued that Parker failed to mitigate damages by not taking big country big men. But that role was not substantially similar to bloomer girl. Rule- The measure of recovery by a wrongfully discharged employee is the amount of salary agreed upon, less the amount the employee has earned or with reasonable effort might have earned from substantially similar employment.

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14
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NERI V. RETAIL MARINE CORP

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Guy backs out of buying a boat after it has already been ordered. Aggrieved party sells to another buyer but sues for full contract price because he could have sold the third party the same boat and made two profits. Rule- If a buyer repudiates a contract with a lost-volume seller, the seller is entitled to the profit the seller would have made from full performance by the buyer, plus reasonable incidental damages associated with resale

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15
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BUSH V. CANFIELD:

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Bush paid $5,000 in advance for flour that was never delivered. Court decided that instead of expectation damages, Canfield should just give back the $5,000 (restitution) Rule: When a party pays an advance under a contract for the delivery of goods, the proper measure of damages in the event of breach is to refund the advance.

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16
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BRITTON V TURNER

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Employee agreed to work for a year for $120 for a year. Employee only worked for 9 months and wanted the value of his work for those nine months. Rule- If an employee voluntarily breaches a contract for labor by failing to continue the agreed employment, the employee is entitled under quantum meruit to the reasonable value of the services provided, unless the contract specifically provides otherwise.

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17
Q

COTNAM V. WISDOM

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Doctors tried to save an unconscious man and his estate refused to pay them for their services. Courts inferred a contract given the circumstances. Rule- Where there is no agreement on which the court may enforce a contract between the parties, as where physicians render services to persons who are unable to contract due to their condition, the court may use the legal fiction of a quasi-contract to require payment for those services

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18
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WASSENAAR V. TOWNE:

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Hotel manager was fired and Hotel paid what was required in the stipulated damages clause. It was not considered a penalty. Rule- A stipulated-damages clause will be upheld if the harm caused by breach was difficult to estimate at the time of contracting and the stipulated damages are not unreasonably disproportionate to such harm.

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19
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LAKE RIVER CORP. V. CARBORUNDUM CO.

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Liquidated damages clause for failure to ship Ferro Carbo on time. Rule- A contract provision that specifies a single unmodifiable sum to be paid as damages for all breaches of the contract, regardless of seriousness, is an unenforceable penalty clause

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20
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LOVELESS V. DIEHL:

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The Loveless’ sold property to the Diehl’s with a call option to purchase the land at any time for $21,000. The Loveless’ breached by stating that they did not intend to sell property to the Diehl’s through the third party. Rule: Equity courts should award specific performance “as a matter of course” and especially when the subject of the contract is real property or an interest in real property.

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21
Q

SCHOLL V. HARTZELL

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Hartzell advertised his old corvette and parts for sale, and Scholl agreed to buy the items and put a deposit on it. Hartzell breached. Specific performance did not apply because Scholl has not acquired the exclusive and immediate right to the car and parts because he has only given a deposit for them, and the parts were not unique enough. Rule- In a replevin action under section 2-716 of the Uniform Commercial Code, an injured party does not have an “exclusive and immediate right” to property for which he has only paid a deposit because the contract is still executory.

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22
Q

SEDMAK V. CHARLIE’S CHEVROLET

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Here there was a breach of an extremely unique corvette, so although plaintiff had only put down a deposit, the court awarded specific performance under Section 2-716 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Rule- Specific performance can be awarded for the sale of a limited edition vehicle if the injured party can establish that it is unique or other proper circumstances exist.

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23
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THE CASE OF MARY CLARK, A WOMAN OF COLOUR

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Defendant hired Mary to be indentured servant and the court would not force her to be. Rule-Specific performance cannot be awarded when the contract is for personal service.

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24
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LUMLEY V. WAGNER

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Lumley contracted with Wagner to perform specially at its theater, and asked for a negative injunction to keep Wagner from breaching and performing at another theater. This was granted. Rule- A court of equity may impose a negative injunction on an individual, preventing her from doing something

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25
Dallas Cowboys v. Harris
Dallas cowboys sought a negative covenant to keep Harris from playing with the Texans. The contract stated that Harris was unique. The court said that that was only a matter of opinion and not a material fact. They also said that the evidence for uniqueness was too narrowly defined. Rule- A clause in a contract enjoining a party from performing for others will be enforced if the breaching party possesses exceptional and unique knowledge, skill, and ability in performing the service called for in the contract
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Dickinson v. Dodds:
, John Dodds (defendant) drafted a document that stated his willingness to sell a piece of property to George Dickinson (plaintiff). The document stated that the offer would be open until 9:00 a.m. on June 12, 1874. On Thursday, June 11, Dickinson was informed by his agent that Dodds had changed his mind and actually intended to sell the property to Thomas Allen (defendant). Dickinson immediately went to the home of Dodds’s mother-in-law, where Dodds was staying, and dropped off a document expressing his intent to accept Dodds’s offer to sell the property. Dodds never received this document from his mother-in-law. At 7:00 a.m. on the morning of June 12, Dickinson and his agent both found Dodds at a train station and provided him with duplicate copies of the document accepting Dodds’s offer to sell. Dodds stated that it was too late and he had already sold the property to Allen. Dickenson filed suit for specific performance. The court held that Dodds has validly revoked his offer because there had been no meeting of the minds between the parties, and that Dodds had already decided to sell to Allen instead before he had received Dickinson’s acceptance. It does not matter that Dodds did not communicate his changed state of mind to Dickinson through an express or actual statement, as Dickinson could sufficiently infer this fact through Dodds’s conduct. Rule- An offer may be revoked by the offeror without an express or actual statement of revocation communicated to the offeree provided there has been no meeting of the minds and the offeree is aware of conduct by the offeror demonstrating intent to revoke the offer.
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Embry v. Hargadine, Mattrick Dry Goods Co.:
Embry was hired by Dry goods company under a one year employment contract. Embry stated that he informed McKittrick that if his contract was not renewed, he would leave his position. Embry states that in response to his statement, McKittrick assured him to go about his business without worry. Embry indicated he relied on this statement as a manifestation of intent by McKittrick to reemploy him for an additional year. The court held that Regardless of the parties’ subjective or actual intent, if a reasonable man could infer from their conduct intent to enter into a binding and enforceable contract, a binding and enforceable contract is presumed to exist.
28
Lucy v. Zehmer
Zehmer and Lucy were drinking alcohol in a bar and spent 40 minutes discussing and creating a contract for Lucy to buy Zehmer’s farm. Zehmer and his wife signed it, but when Lucy tried to gain title Zehmer said it was intended to be a joke. The court held that it does not matter that his subjective desire was that the agreement should be a joke, as this was never communicated to Lucy. Rule- The objective, outward expression of a party’s intent to be bound in an agreement, as opposed to that party’s subjective mental assent to the agreement, is all that matters when determining the existence of a valid and enforceable contract.
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Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store Inc
The store made an offer that on a certain date 3 coats worth $100 would be sold on a first come first serve basis to three people for $1. When Lefkowitz came first, the store refused to sell him the coat. The court held that the advertisement by the store for the lapin stole was clear, definite, and explicit, and it left no terms open to negotiation. Rule- An advertisement constitutes a binding offer if it is clear, definite, and explicit, and leaves nothing open for negotiation
30
Leonard v. Pepsico:
Pepsico put out a commercial/advertisement telling customers to earn Pepsi points to buy various things, including an expensive jet. Leonard earned the points and went to get a jet, and Pepsico said it had been a joke. - The court ruled in favor of Pepsi because no reasonable person standing in the shoes of the recipient would have understood that commercial to be a valid contract
31
Nebraska seed v. Harsh
Harsh created an offer to negotiate about seeds.Rule- Acceptance of a proposal to begin bargaining cannot create a contract, even if the proposal was sent to specific persons, rather than to the public generally
32
Empro Manufacturing Co. v. Ball-Co Manufacturing, Inc
Empro drafted a letter of intent to purchase Ball-Co’s assents and plant, which was signed by both parties. The letter of intent provided general terms and conditions and stated that the agreement in the letter was subject to a later agreement. The court held that this was not a binding contract because the terms were not specific enough and it was subject to a later agreement. Rule- Both parties’ objective manifestations of intent to be bound must be shown for a binding contract to be formed.
33
Arnold Palmer v. Fuqua
Arnold and Fuqua created a memo of intent to create a corporation with varying interest. Before the final agreement Fuqua terminated the negotiations. Here, the court said that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether this memo of intent reflects intent by the parties to be bound in a contract. This is because the memo of intent was not general like Empro, it was specific and contained all the essential elements of a contract
34
Ardente v. Horan
Ardente responded to home offer with further requirements that certain items stay in the house with them. Ardente’s letter of acceptance is conditional and thus operates as a rejection of the Horans’ offer that is incapable of creating a valid contract.
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Step Saver v. Wyse Technology
Step Saver places several orders with Wyse Technology via phone. Then they send the written purchase order, then they receive the shipment order along with an invoice. At this point the offer and acceptance is a complete match. Things go wrong when in that box is a shrink-wrap license with a warranty or merchantability in it, which Step Saver had refused to sign. The court held that under UCC § 2-207, if one party sends a written confirmation of the parties’ agreement, but that writing contains new terms, the writing may be either (1) a conditional acceptance of the contractual offer, meaning the sending party agrees to be in a contract only if the contract contains the new terms, or (2) a proposal to add the new terms to the parties’ existing contract. Here the court held that the shrink wrap license was not a conditional agreement because defendant had never stated that they would not continue in the agreement if these terms were not met
36
ProCD v. Zeidenberg
ProCD (plaintiff) sells a software product known as its SelectPhone database. The product consists of a detailed address directory and is sold to both commercial and non-commercial users. To make more profit, ProCD engages in price discrimination by charging a higher price for commercial users. It enforces its price discrimination scheme by including a license within the software package that limits use of SelectPhone to non-commercial purposes. The license terms are printed in the manual located inside the SelectPhone software packaging, and also pop up on the computer screen whenever the product is run. Matthew Zeidenberg (defendant) purchased SelectPhone and ignored the license agreement. He started his own company to sell the information contained in SelectPhone to commercial users at a cheaper price than that charged by ProCD. Zeidenberg claims that the license package is not enforceable. The court holds that the license was an enforceable contract. Rule- Shrinkwrap licenses included within a product’s packaging are enforceable unless their terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general, such as violating a positive rule of law or being unconscionable.
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Hill v. Gateway 2000
Exact same facts as Pro CD but with a written agreement inside a computer box with 30 days to return it. Rule- Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a purchaser may be bound to terms included in product packaging if the purchaser has an opportunity to review the agreement and reject it by returning the product.
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Klocek v. Gateway
Minority jurisdiction for battle of the forms. Only one form necessary. Klocek ordered a computer from Gateway, and Gateway had a standard term of agreement on the front of the computer that said that if the customer did not return within five days that they agreed to the terms in the agreement. The court held that section 2-207 applies even though Standard Terms included in the package was the only form involved in the transaction. The Standard Terms constitute Gateway’s acceptance of the offer. It is not a counter-offer because Gateway’s acceptance was not made conditional upon Klocek’s consent to the additional terms. Moreover, the additional terms in the Standard Terms are not enforceable because Klocek did not expressly agree to them. Rule- Additional or different terms provided in the acceptance do not become terms of the contract unless acceptance is made expressly conditional upon acceptance of the additional terms or the non-merchant offeror expressly agrees to the additional terms.
39
White v. Corlies & Tifft:
White sent an estimate for work done on Corlies’ office. Corlies sent back a copy of it with slight adjustments, and then sent White a letter that upon this agreement White could start work at once. White purchased supplies and prepared for the work. The next day Corlies retracted the previous letter. The court held that White had not communicated his acceptance to Corlies by performance because Preparatory steps, such as the purchase of materials or preparation of those materials, do not clearly communicate to the offeror that performance has been commenced, because those materials could be purchased for many other purposes unrelated to the agreement between the parties. Rule- To form a binding contract, acceptance by performance must be sufficient to manifest or communicate the acceptance to the offeror.
40
Carbolic v. Carbolic Smoke Ball:
The owners of Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. (Carbolic) (defendants) manufactured the Carbolic Smoke Ball and advertised it as a preventative measure against influenza. Carbolic placed an advertisement in several London newspapers saying that 100 pounds would be paid to any person who purchased a Carbolic Smoke Ball and still contracted influenza. The advertisement further stated that Carbolic had deposited 1,000 pounds in a local bank to demonstrate its seriousness in the matter. Carlill (plaintiff) purchased a Carbolic Smoke Ball and later contracted influenza despite using the ball as directed by Carbolic’s instructions. Carlill brought suit to recover the 100 pounds. The court held that by stating that it had deposited 1,000 pounds in a local bank to prove its seriousness in the matter, Carbolic clearly made an offer that was capable of being accepted by any person who bought a Carbolic Smoke Ball, used it as directed, and contracted influenza. Carlill accepted this offer by fulfilling the advertised condition. This acceptance does not fail simply because Carbolic only received notification of the acceptance with notification of the condition’s fulfillment. Advertisements with notice are treated differently. Rule- A general advertisement of an award constitutes an offer that is capable of being accepted and binding the offeror in a valid contract, provided at least contemporaneous notice and some consideration are present.
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Petterson v. Pattberg
Petterson owned a property upon which the defendant owned a bond secured by a mortgage. The mortgage was payable to the defendant in quarterly installments, but the defendant offered to grant Petterson a $780 reprieve on the total mortgage if he paid it off in full by a certain date. Petterson went to defendant’s house with cash prepared to pay off the entire mortgage before the date. Before Peterson tendered any money, the defendant informed him that he had sold the mortgage to a third party and thus revoked his offer. The court held that an offer to enter into a unilateral contract may be withdrawn before the act requested to be done has been performed, even if the offeror knows of the offeree’s intention to accept and revokes at the very last second before acceptance Even though Petterson had money in hand and the defendant knew he was going to perform his end of the agreement, the revocation was still done before Petterson tendered the money and so is valid
42
Hobbs v. Massascoit Whip
The plaintiff shipped eel skins to the defendant and the defendant kept the skins for several months without notifying the plaintiff of whether the defendant had accepted and agreed to pay for the shipment. The skins were eventually destroyed because of this delay. Previously, the plaintiff had shipped skins in the same manner to the defendant about four or five times, and the defendant accepted and paid for the shipment each time. The court held that because of the prior sales between the parties, it was implied that the defendant had to respond to the plaintiff with a rejection if the defendant did not want the skins and was thus rejecting the offer. Rule- Conduct which looks like acceptance is acceptance.
43
Hamer v. Sidway
Uncle promises nephew $5,000 on his 21st birthday if he refrains from drinking and using tobacco. Uncle never paid nephew and dies. The court holds that the fact that Willy gave up some of his rights for this promise is a detriment. He could have been doing all of those things, but he chose not to. The voluntary giving up of your own rights constitutes adequate consideration
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DAHL v. HEM PHARMACEUTICALS CORP.
HEM said that if you submit to our experiment, we will give you a year’s supply of Ampligen at no charge. The court held that they incurred the detriment of being tested upon for HEM’s studies in exchange for the promise of a year’s treatment of Ampligen. Upon completion of the double-blind tests, there was a binding contract.
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Mills v. Wyman
Mills took care of 25-year-old Levi while on a voyage, but Levi died from his illnesses. Wyman, Levi’s father promised to pay Mills for the expenses Mills incurred while taking care of Levi. However, Wyman later refused to pay. The father incurred a detriment by offering to pay for the care and gave a benefit to the good Samaritan. The good Samaritan did not incur an additional detriment or benefit because it was all about past acts. The good Samaritan had already taken care of the boy. The father’s moral duty to take care of his child is not enough to be a bargained for consideration for the plaintiff’s past acts of generosity in caring for his ill son. It is more like a gift. The court limits the application of moral consideration to cases in which a moral obligation had existed.
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Webb v. McGowin
Webb saved McGowin’s life by falling with a brick at a lumber mill, keeping it from hitting McGowin but leaving him permanently injured. McGowin promised to pay Webb every two weeks, and he did until he died. But his estate refused to continue this promise. The court held that McGowin received a material benefit when Webb saved McGowin from grievous harm, likely serious injury or death. McGowin acknowledged this benefit, promise to pay Webb for the remainder of his life, and did so until his death eight years later. Webb suffered severe bodily injuries from his actions undertaken to save McGowin’s life. Thus, McGowin’s promise to pay biweekly payments to Webb is a valid, enforceable contract and is not barred by the statute of frauds. Rule- If a promisee confers upon a deceased promisor a benefit that is material and substantial and that is conveyed upon the person of the promisor and not merely his estate, the promisee is entitled to recognition and compensation from the promisor’s estate either by an executed payment or an executory promise to pay.
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Alaska Packers v. Domenico
Alaska Packers hired fishers to sail between San Franciso and Alaska and catch salmon for $50 and $60 and two cents per salmon. The fishermen went on strike and demanded $100, so Alaska Packers signed a new contract agreeing to the price but failed to pay it. The court found for the company because there was no consideration with the new contract because the fishers were not actually incurring any other detriment or benefit other than what they were already obligated to do. Rule- If parties enter a new agreement under which one party agrees to do no more than he was already obligated to do under an existing contract, the new agreement is unenforceable for lack of consideration.
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Brian Construction v. Brighenti:
The plaintiff was assigned a contract to construct a post office building. The plaintiff then entered into a subcontract with the defendant to perform all excavation necessary to complete the job. The defendant started work, but encountered considerable rubble where he was excavating and had to excavate much more than was contemplated in the contract. The rubble was not known or anticipated by the plaintiff or the defendant at the time they made the contract, and the labor and cost to remove it was not included in the contract. The parties orally agreed that the defendant would get rid of the discovered rubble in exchange for an increased contract price. However, eventually the defendant stopped work and refused to continue. The plaintiff brought suit. The court held that the agreement was legally binding because the rubble was unforeseen by both parties at the time of the contract, and it would have been a substantial burden to the defendant to remove it. Rule- When an unforeseen, burdensome condition arises during the performance of a contract, the promise of additional compensation in return for the promise to do the additional work is a separate, valid agreement.
49
Dyer v. National By-Products
The employer orally agrees to keep Dyer employed for the rest of his life so longas he did not sue them for personal injury for the loss of his foot at work. Dyer was later laid off and sued. The court held that further evidence was needed but talked about the two approaches. Rule- Forbearance from filing an unmeritorious legal claim that the party in good faith believes is valid constitutes sufficient consideration for a settlement agreement.
50
Ricketts v. Scothorn
Scothorn quit her job and left her profession as a bookkeeper after her grandfather gave her a promissory note promising to pay her $2,000 on demand and 6 percent annual interest. At the time of giving her the note, her grandfather stated that he did not want his grandchildren to work, and upon receiving the note, Scothorn quit her job. He did not pay it all before his death and his executor refused. The court held that the grandfather He must have known that in giving Scothorn the promissory note, she was likely to give up her employment and leave her profession in reliance on the promissory note. Rule- Equitable estoppel prevents a promisor from revoking an otherwise unenforceable gratuitous promise if the promisee foreseeably and reasonably relied on the promise to her detriment. They used equitable estoppel here but applied principals of promissory estoppel
51
Greiner v. Greiner
Frank Greiner was disinherited by his father. When Frank’s brother died, their mother, Maggie Greiner (plaintiff), inherited considerable property from the brother. Maggie wanted to use some of that property to place Frank on equal footing with her other sons who had not been disinherited by the father. Maggie promised Frank that if he moved back to the county where Maggie lived, then she would give him land for a home. He packed up and moved and made considerable improvements to the land. Maggie never made a deed and later sued Frank for recovery of the property. The court held that , promissory estoppel renders the promise binding. Maggie should reasonably have expected her promise to induce Frank to move and establish himself on the 80-acre tract, which he did. He also reasonably relied on Maggie’s promise when making improvements to the property and incurring expenditures. Further, the trial court could reasonably conclude that requiring Maggie to execute the promised deed in Frank’s favor was necessary to avoid injustice.
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Webster St. v. Sheridan
Boys that were minors and unable to pay rent to the apartment that they signed a lease to. The court held that there was no necessity because the boys had homes to go back to.
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