Cases - Semester 1 Flashcards

Question

Biden v Nebraska | standing ## Footnote First, the Court concluded that Missouri has standing to challenge the student-debt relief program. Article III requires a plaintiff to have suffered an injury in fact—a concrete and imminent harm to a legally protected interest, like property or money—that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and likely to be redressed by the lawsuit. Here, the Secretary’s plan would cost MOHELA, a nonprofit government corporation created by Missouri to participate in the student loan market, an estimated $44 million a year in fees, and the harm to MOHELA in the performance of its public function is an injury to Missouri itself. Second, the Court determined that the HEROES Act’s authorization of the Secretary to “waive or modify” existing statutory or regulatory provisions applicable to financial assistance programs under the Education Act does not extend to canceling $430 billion of student loan principal. The Act permits the Secretary to “modify” statutory provisions but only “moderately or in minor fashion” as the term is ordinarily used. The “modifications” challenged here create a novel and fundamentally different loan forgiveness program that Congress could not have intended to permit. And the power to “waive” does not remotely resemble how such power has been used on prior occasions, where it was simply used to nullify particular legal requirements. Third, the Court rejected the Secretary’s argument that the unprecedented nature of the COVID-19 pandemic justified the unprecedented nature of the the debt cancellation plan. Citing its recent decision in West Virginia v. EPA, the Court expressed hesitance that Congress could have intended to confer such authority on the Secretary and not retain it for itself.

Answer 1

The Secretary of Education does not have authority under the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act of 2003 (HEROES Act) to establish a student loan forgiveness program that will cancel roughly $430 billion in debt principal and affect nearly all borrowers. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court. ## Footnote In 2020, then-presidential candidate Joseph Biden promised to cancel up to $10,000 of federal student loan debt per borrower. After winning the election, the Biden administration announced its intent to forgive, via executive action, $10,000 in student loans for borrowers with an annual income of less than $125,000. Nebraska and five other states challenged the forgiveness program, arguing that it violated the separation of powers and the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court dismissed the challenge, finding that the states lacked judicial standing to sue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit enjoined the forgiveness program pending the appeal.

Answer 2

Justice Marshall concluded that regulation of navigation by steamboat operators and others for purposes of conducting interstate commerce was a power reserved to and exercised by the Congress under the Commerce Clause. As interstate navigation fell under interstate commerce, New York could not interfere with it, and the law was therefore invalid. In a concurring opinion, Justice William Johnson argued that the national government had exclusive power over interstate commerce, negating state laws interfering with the exercise of that power. ## Footnote A New York state law gave Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton a 20-year monopoly over navigation on waters within state jurisdiction. Aaron Ogden and other competitors tried to forestall the monopoly, but Livingston and Fulton largely succeeded in selling franchise or buying competitors’ boats. Thomas Gibbons -- a steamboat owner who did business between New York and New Jersey under a federal coastal license – formed a partnership with Ogden, which fell apart after three years when Gibbons operated another steamboat on a New York route belonging to Ogden. Ogden filed suit against Gibbons in New York state court, and received a permanent injunction. The New York state court rejected Gibbons’ argument asserting that U.S. Congress controlled interstate commerce. Question Does the Commerce Clause give Congress authority over interstate navigation?

Answer 3

The Act was constitutional but it did not apply to manufacturing. Manufacturing was not commerce, declared Fuller for the majority; the law did not reach the admitted monopolization of manufacturing (in this case, refining sugar). Although American Sugar had monopolized manufacturing, the Court found no violation of the Sherman Act because the acquisition of the Philadelphia refineries involved intrastate commerce. The trust did not lead to control of interstate commerce and so "affects it only incidentally and indirectly." = Congress could not regulate manufacturing, thus giving state governments the sole power to take legal action against manufacturing monopolies. ## Footnote The Congress passed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890 as a response to the public concern in the growth of giant corporations controlling transportation, industry, and commerce. The Act aimed to stop the concentration of wealth and economic power in the hands of the few. It outlawed "every contract, combination...or conspiracy, in restraint of trade" or interstate commerce, and it declared every attempt to monopolize any part of trade or commerce to be illegal. The E.C. Knight Company was such a combination controlling over 98 percent of the sugar-refining business in the United States. Question Did Congress exceed its constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause when it enacted the Sherman Anti-Trust Act?

Answer 4

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that congressional power under the Commerce Clause justified regulations of the “beef trust.” Writing for the majority, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. broadened the meaning of “interstate” commerce to include actions that were part of the “stream of commerce” where the stream was clearly interstate in character. In this case, the stream ran from farm to retail store and crossed many state lines. The federal government’s victory in this case encouraged it to pursue other antitrust actions, and Congress followed by passing the Pure Food and Drug Act and the Meat Inspection Act in 1906. ## Footnote A "beef trust" developed in Chicago, in which the “Big Six” leading meatpackers agreed not to bid against one another in order to control prices. The trust also pressured the railroads into charging them lower-than-normal rates. In 1902, President Theodore Roosevelt directed his attorney general to bring a lawsuit against the “beef trust” on antitrust grounds pursuant to the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. Question Did Congress have the authority to regulate the meat trust under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act?

Answer 5

Yes. In a 7-2 decision, the Court affirmed the Commerce Court and upheld the ICC order. Congress was granted the power to regulate interstate commerce, which it chose to do through the ICC. This power extended to "matters having such a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic," Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote for the majority. Since the price discrimination adversely affected interstate commerce, "it is immaterial…that the discrimination arises from intrastate rates as compared with interstate rates." Therefore, the railroads' intrastate rates were subject to regulation and the ICC order was valid. ## Footnote The Houston, East and West Texas Railroad and the Texas and Pacific Railway were railroad companies operating rail lines between Shreveport, Louisiana and points in Texas. The Texas Railroad Commission mandated that they charge higher rates on freight travelling between Louisiana and Texas than on freight travelling solely within Texas. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) found that the interstate rates were unreasonable and illegally discriminated against freight traffic originating in Shreveport. The ICC established maximum rates and ordered the railroads to fix their intrastate rate schedules. The railroads challenged the order in United States Commerce Court, alleging that the ICC did not have the power to regulate intrastate commerce. The Commerce Court upheld the ICC order. The railroads then appealed to the Supreme Court. Did the ICC have the power to regulate the railroads' intrastate rates?

Answer 6

**Held (Harlan is giving the majority opinion):** that trafficking lottery tickets constituted interstate commerce that could be regulated by the U.S. Congress under the Commerce Clause. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that lottery tickets were indeed "subjects of traffic," and that independent carriers may be regulated under the Commerce Clause. The Court emphasized the broad discretion Congress enjoys in regulating commerce, noting that this power "is plenary, is complete in itself, and is subject to no limitations except such as may be found in the Constitution." The Court argued that Congress was merely assisting those states that wished to protect public morals by prohibiting lotteries within their borders. **Dissent from Justice Fuller:** akin to a national police power which congress does not have. ## Footnote Facts: involved the act of 1895 “for the suppression of lotteries.” An earlier act (1892) excluding lottery tickets from the mails had been upheld in the case In re Rapier, on the proposition that Congress clearly had the power to see that the very facilities furnished by it were not put to bad use. But in the case of commerce, the facilities are not ordinarily furnished by the National Government, and the right to engage in foreign and interstate commerce comes from the Constitution itself or is anterior to it.

Answer 7

sustained the power of Congress to pass the Pure Food and Drug Act, which prohibited the introduction into the States by means of interstate commerce of impure foods and drugs

Answer 8

sustained the constitutionality of federal human trafficking legislation, whereby the transportation of a woman in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution was forbidden.

Answer 9

Day spoke for the Court majority and found two grounds to invalidate the law. Production was not commerce, and thus outside the power of Congress to regulate. And the regulation of production was reserved by the Tenth Amendment to the states. Day wrote that "the powers not expressly delegated to the national government are reserved" to the states and to the people. In his wording, Day revised the Constitution slightly and changed the intent of the framers: The Tenth Amendment does not say "expressly." The framers purposely left the word expressly out of the amendment because they believed they could not possibly specify every power that might be needed in the future to run the government. ## Footnote The Keating-Owen Child Labor Act prohibited the interstate shipment of goods produced by child labor. Act of September 1, 1916, c. 432, 39 Stat. 675, prohibits transportation in interstate commerce of goods made at a factory in which, within thirty days prior to their removal therefrom, children under the age of 14 years have been employed or permitted to work, or children between the ages of 14 and 16 years have been employed or permitted to work more than eight hours in any day, or more than six days in any week, or after the hour of 7 P.M. or before the hour of 6 A.M. Reuben Dagenhart's father -- Roland -- had sued on behalf of his freedom to allow his fourteen year old son to work in a textile mill. Question Does the congressional act violate the Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, or the Fifth Amendment

Answer 10

a closely divided Court held the RRA to exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause power ## Footnote To assist commerce and labor, Congress passed the Railroad Retirement Act (RRA) in 1934,1 which ordered compulsory retirement for superannuated employees of interstate carriers and provided they receive pensions from a fund comprised of the compulsory contributions from the carriers and the carriers’ present and future employees

Answer 11

In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Hughes, the unanimous Court held that the Act was "without precedent" and was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. The President cannot be allowed to have unbridled control to make whatever laws he believes to be necessary to achieve a certain goal. The law did not establish rules or standards to evaluate industrial activity, meaning Congress failed to provide the necessary guidelines for the implementation of this functionally legislative process. ## Footnote Under the National Industrial Recovery Act, Congress allowed the President to regulate certain industries by distributing authority to develop codes of conduct among business groups and boards in those industries. The Act did not provide standards for the President or the business groups in implementing its objectives. When Schechter Poultry Corp. was indicted for violating a business code governing the poultry industry in New York City, it argued that the law was an unconstitutional violation of the non-delegation doctrine. Question Did Congress unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to the President by giving him power to regulate certain industries without also providing guiding standards?

Answer 12

The majority found that companies cannot discriminate against employees for exercising their fundamental right to unionize. The Court upheld the Act, reasoning that it was narrowly constructed so as to regulate industrial activities which had the potential to restrict interstate commerce. The majority stated that any significant effect (direct or indirect) on interstate commerce allows Congress to regulate an activity under the Commerce Clause. While the manufacturing process or relationships between labor and management may not have a direct impact on the flow of goods, they have an aggregate impact on commerce. In this case, the potential secession of manufacturing activity due to conflicts between management and labor could potentially impede interstate commerce. However, Hughes carefully limited the opinion to exclude situations in which an activity had such an inconsequential or remote impact on interstate commerce that it exclusively impacted local matters. ## Footnote With the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, Congress determined that labor-management disputes were directly related to the flow of interstate commerce and, thus, could be regulated by the national government. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) charged Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. the country’s fourth largest steel producer, with discriminating against employees who were union members. Question Was the NLRA consistent with the Commerce Clause?

Answer 13

The unanimous Court upheld the FLSA. Relying heavily on the Court's decision in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), Justice Stone affirmed the constitutional power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, which "can neither be enlarged nor diminished by the exercise or non-exercise of state power." The Court held that the purpose of the FLSA was to prevent states from using substandard labor practices to their own economic advantage by interstate commerce. Congress acted with proper authority in outlawing substandard labor conditions since they have a significant impact on interstate commerce. | Hammer v Dagenhart overturned ## Footnote In 1938, Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to regulate many aspects of employment, including minimum wages, maximum weekly hours, and child labor. When a lumber manufacturer, Darby, shipped lumber out of state, he was arrested for violating the FLSA. His charges were dismissed because the federal district court found that FLSA was unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the FLSA’s potential effects on intrastate activities violated the Commerce Clause. Question Was the Act a legitimate exercise of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce?

Answer 14

A unanimous Court upheld the law. In an opinion authored by Justice Robert Houghwout Jackson, the Court found that the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate prices in the industry, and this law was rationally related to that legitimate goal. The Court reasoned that Congress could regulate activity within a single state under the Commerce Clause, even if each individual activity had a trivial effect on interstate commerce, as long as the intrastate activity viewed in the aggregate would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. To this extent, the opinion went against prior decisions that had analyzed whether an activity was local, or whether its effects were direct or indirect. ## Footnote Filburn was a small farmer in Ohio who harvested nearly 12 acres of wheat above his allotment under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. Filburn was penalized under the Act. He argued that the extra wheat that he had produced in violation of the law had been used for his own use and thus had no effect on interstate commerce, since it never had been on the market. In his view, this meant that he had not violated the law because the additional wheat was not subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause. Question Did the Act violate the Commerce Clause?

Answer 15

The Commerce Clause extends the anti-discrimination provisions in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to hotels that host travelers from outside the state. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Clark, the Court held the government could enjoin the motel from discriminating on the basis of race under the Commerce Clause. Since the motel was positioned near Interstates 75 and 85 and received most of its business from outside Georgia, this showed that it had an impact on interstate commerce, which is all that is needed to justify Congress in exercising the Commerce Clause power. ## Footnote Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbade racial discrimination by places of public accommodation if their operations affected commerce. The Heart of Atlanta Motel in Atlanta, Georgia, refused to accept Black Americans. The government sought to enjoin the motel from discriminating on the basis of race under Title II. Question Did Congress, in passing Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, exceed its Commerce Clause powers by depriving places of public accommodation of the right to choose their own customers?

Answer 16

Federal laws like the Civil Rights Act of 1964 apply not only to restaurants that serve interstate travelers, but also to restaurants that use food that has traveled in interstate commerce, which must provide fully equal access to African Americans. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Clark, the Court held McClung could be barred from discriminating against African Americans under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court reasoned that discrimination in restaurants posed significant burdens on "the interstate flow of food and upon the movement on products generally." Furthermore, discrimination also posed restrictions on blacks who traveled from state to state. The Court concluded that the Civil Rights Act was a rational way to protect interstate commerce because it could be expected to reduce the discrimination that undermined it. ## Footnote Ollie McClung argued that his restaurant could not be prohibited from discriminating against African Americans because Congress did not have power under the Commerce Clause to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964. His restaurant, Ollie's Barbecue, was located on a major road in Birmingham, Alabama and was close to an interstate highway. Half of its food came from outside Alabama, although its suppliers were local. It served a meaningful number of customers from outside the state. He argued that his business was small and had no impact on interstate commerce, and that he did provide limited services to African Americans. McClung prevailed in federal district court and received an injunction barring the enforcement of the Civil Rights Act against Ollie's Barbecue. Question Can the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibit discrimination against African Americans by a restaurant?

Answer 17

Held: Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act is within Congress' power under the Commerce Clause to control activities affecting interstate commerce, and Congress' findings are adequate to support its conclusion that loansharks who use extortionate means to collect payments on loans are in a class largely controlled by organized crime with a substantially adverse effect on interstate commerce ## Footnote Petitioner was convicted of "loansharking" activities, i.e., unlawfully using extortionate means in collecting and attempting to collect an extension of credit, in violation of Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. He challenges the constitutionality of the statute on the ground that Congress has no power to control the local activity of loansharking.

Answer 18

Yes. The possession of a gun in a local school zone is not an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The law is a criminal statute that has nothing to do with "commerce" or any sort of economic activity. ## Footnote Alfonzo Lopez, a 12th grade high school student, carried a concealed weapon into his San Antonio, Texas high school. He was charged under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The next day, the state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating a federal criminal statute, the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. The act forbids "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows...is a school zone." Lopez was found guilty following a bench trial and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release. Question Is the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones Act, forbidding individuals from knowingly carrying a gun in a school zone, unconstitutional because it exceeds the power of Congress to legislate under the Commerce Clause?

Answer 19

**Held** that parts of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 were unconstitutional because they exceeded the powers granted to Congress under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Along with United States v. Lopez (1995), it was part of a series of Rehnquist Court cases that limited Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause. Renhquist: indirect economic effect is not enough must be direct + Dissent: regressive interporetation of the Commm clause ## Footnote In 1994, while enrolled at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Virginia Tech), Christy Brzonkala alleged that Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, both students and varsity football players at Virginia Tech, raped her. In 1995, Brzonkala filed a complaint against Morrison and Crawford under Virginia Tech's Sexual Assault Policy. After a hearing, Morrison was found guilty of sexual assault and sentenced to immediate suspension for two semesters. Crawford was not punished. A second hearing again found Morrison guilty. After an appeal through the university's administrative system, Morrison's punishment was set aside, as it was found to be "excessive." Ultimately, Brzonkala dropped out of the university. Brzonkala then sued Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech in Federal District Court, alleging that Morrison's and Crawford's attack violated 42 USC section 13981, part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), which provides a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence. Morrison and Crawford moved to dismiss Brzonkala's suit on the ground that section 13981's civil remedy was unconstitutional. In dismissing the complaint, the District Court found that that Congress lacked authority to enact section 13981 under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, which Congress had explicitly identified as the sources of federal authority for it. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Question Does Congress have the authority to enact the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 under either the Commerce Clause or Fourteenth Amendment?

Answer 20

The Federal Elections Clause does not vest exclusive and independent authority in state legislatures to set the rules regarding federal elections. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. ## Footnote After the 2020 Census, in which North Carolina gained an additional seat in the U.S. House of Representatives and thus required redistricting of the state, North Carolina’s Republican-majority state legislature passed a partisan gerrymander. The map was challenged in state court, and in February 2022, the North Carolina Supreme Court struck down the map for violating the state constitution’s “free elections clause” and other provisions. The legislature proposed a second gerrymandered map, so the court ordered a special master to create a map for the 2022 congressional elections. The legislators asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review based on an argument that the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution gives state legislatures alone the authority to regulate federal elections—the so-called Independent State Legislature theory. Question Under the U.S. Constitution, does the state legislative body, independent of any constraints by state courts or other laws, have sole authority to regulate federal elections?

Answer 21

The Mandatory Repatriation Tax (MRT) does not exceed Congress’s constitutional authority. Congress has the constitutional authority to either tax an entity directly on its income or attribute that income to the entity’s shareholders or partners and tax them instead. It has consistently exercised this power, taxing partners on partnership income, shareholders of S corporations on corporate income, and American shareholders of foreign corporations on certain undistributed income (e.g., through subpart F). The MRT follows this established pattern by attributing undistributed income of American-controlled foreign corporations to their American shareholders and is therefore not meaningfully different from these other longstanding taxes. ## Footnote In 2005, the Moores invested $40,000 in KisanKraft, an Indian company that supplies tools to small farmers, in exchange for 11% of the common shares. KisanKraft is a Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC), meaning it is majority-owned by U.S. persons but operates abroad. Prior to 2017, U.S. shareholders of CFCs were typically taxed on foreign earnings only when those earnings were repatriated to the United States, according to a provision called Subpart F. However, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017 significantly changed this, introducing a one-time Mandatory Repatriation Tax (MRT) that retroactively taxed CFC earnings after 1986, regardless of repatriation. This increased the Moores’ 2017 tax liability by approximately $15,000 based on their share of KisanKraft’s retained earnings. The Moores challenged the constitutionality of this tax, but the district court dismissed their suit, holding that the MRT taxed income and, although it was retroactive, did not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Question Does the 16th Amendment authorize Congress to tax unrealized sums without apportionment among the states?

Answer 22

The Court held that the Act violated the Constitution since it imposed taxes on personal income derived from real estate investments and personal property such as stocks and bonds; this was a direct taxation scheme, not apportioned properly among the states. Justices John Marshall Harlan, Howell Edmunds Jackson, Edward Douglass White, and Henry Billings Brown dissented from the majority opinion. Justice White argued: “this court should consider itself compelled to go back to a long repudiated and rejected theory of the constitution, by which the government is deprived of an inherent attribute of being – a necessary power of taxation.” Justice Brown wrote: “The decision involves nothing less than the surrender of the taxing power to the moneyed class.” ## Footnote The Constitution gave the states the power to impose direct taxation. The federal government could impose direct taxes as well, but only if those taxes were apportioned among the states in proportion to their representation in Congress. In this case, the Court examined the Income Tax Act of 1894. Question Was the income tax a direct tax in violation of the Constitution (Article I, Section 9, clause 4)?

Answer 23

The Court concluded that the carriage tax was not a direct tax and thus that the carriage tax did not violate the Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 and Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 requirements for the apportioning of direct taxes. The Court reasoned that direct taxes did not include taxes on the possession of goods. ## Footnote In 1794, Congress enacted a tax of sixteen dollars on each carriage owned by an individual or business. Hylton viewed the law as a direct tax in violation of the constitutional requirement that taxes passed by Congress must be apportioned, that is, laid according to the population and the number of representatives from each state. Question Was the carriage tax a direct tax, which would require apportionment among the states?

Answer 24

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, ruling in favor of the Pacific Mail Steam-Ship Company. The Court held that the steamships, being registered and domiciled in New York—their home port—were not subject to taxation under California law merely due to their temporary presence for commercial activities. The Court emphasized that taxation rights are intrinsically linked to the domicile of the property, and ephemeral commercial engagements do not alter the established domicile of the vessels. Consequently, the imposed California taxes were deemed invalid, and the company's payment of such taxes was not voluntary but compelled under protest to avert the sale of one of the ships. ## Footnote The acts of Congress require that every vessel shall be registered by the collector of the district in which is the port nearest to the place where her owner or owners reside. The name of this port must be painted on her stern, in large letters, and every bill of sale of her must be recorded in the office where she is registered. Where a company, incorporated by New York, all the stockholders being residents of that state, owned vessels which were employed in the transportation of passengers, &c., between New York and San Francisco, in California, and between San Francisco and different ports in the Territory of Oregon, all of which vessels were ocean steamships, and duly registered in New York, that they remained in California no longer than was necessary to land their passengers and freight and prepare for the next voyage, these vessels are not liable to assessment and taxation under the laws of California and authorities of San Francisco. They were there but temporarily engaged in lawful trade and commerce, with their sites at the home port, where the vessels belonged and where the owners were liable to be taxed for the capital invested and where the taxes had been paid.

Answer 25

Yes. The Court found that the Child Labor Tax Law was in violation of the Constitution as it intruded on the jurisdiction of states to adopt and enforce child labor codes. Chief Justice Taft argued that the tax law in question did much more than simply impose an "incidental restraint" but exerted a "prohibitory and regulatory effect" in a realm over which Congress had no jurisdiction. Taft feared that upholding this law would destroy state sovereignty and devastate "all constitutional limitation of the powers of Congress and completely wipe out the sovereignty of the states," by allowing it to disguise future regulatory legislation in the cloak of taxes. Chief justice Taft: *“In the light of these features of the act, a court must be blind not to see that the so-called tax is **imposed to stop the employment of children within the age limits prescribed**. Its prohibitory and regulatory effect and purpose are palpable. All others can see and understand this.”* =he refers to Marshall’s pretext passage in McCulloch - he distinguishes between “tax” and “revenue generation” VS “penalty” and “mere regulation” note that Justice Holmes who dissented in *Hammer v Dagenhart (where he thought improper for the judges to inquire abt congress purposes)*, here concurred with Taft J ⇒ does this mean that the invalidation only proper when the bad purpose is obvious? ## Footnote Facts: as an exercise of its taxing powers, Congress enacted the Revenue Act 1919, also called the child labor tax. (note that local economy issues were typically the type of issues left to the states). Hence, companies employing children under 14 would be assessed 10% of their annual profits. D was required to pay $6000 in tax.

Answer 26

The Court upheld the law. Justice Reed argued that the law did not violate a person's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination because under its registration provisions, individuals were "not compelled to confess to acts already committed." The statute simply informed people who wanted to "engage in the business of wagering" that they would be required to "fulfill certain conditions." The Tenth Amendment was not offended as Reed found that the tax produced revenue and was not inconsistent with similar taxes which the Court had previously approved. ## Footnote In 1951, Congress adopted the Gamblers' Occupational Tax Act which required gamblers to register with the Collector of Internal Revenue and levied a tax on their gambling income. Question Did the Act violate the Fifth and Tenth Amendments?

Answer 27

No; Yes, under the Taxing and Spending Clause; Unanswered; Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., largely joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan, authored the majority opinion. The Court reached the following conclusions. | Did the case add a non-coercion criterion to the Dole test? ## Footnote Facts: Congress passed the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on March 23, 2010, to address uninsured Americans consuming unpaid healthcare. The ACA introduced a minimum coverage provision requiring individuals to maintain health insurance or face a tax penalty, expanded Medicaid with conditional federal funding, and mandated employer-provided coverage. Florida and 12 other states, later joined by additional states, the National Federation of Independent Businesses, and individuals Kaj Ahburg and Mary Brown, challenged the ACA in federal court, arguing: The individual mandate exceeded Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause. Medicaid expansions were coercive. The employer mandate violated state sovereignty. The District Court found Brown and two states had standing and ruled the individual mandate unconstitutional under the Commerce and Taxing Powers. It invalidated the entire ACA, deeming the mandate inseverable, while upholding Medicaid expansions and dismissing the employer mandate challenge. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Medicaid and individual mandate rulings but reversed on severability, holding the ACA could survive without the mandate. NB: US has no unified heathcare system. two big federally funded programs on healthcare (on of them is Medicaid), and most states rely on it. => intriduced the individual mandate under the Commerce Power (under the US v Lopez decision).

Answer 28

Majority Opinion on Standing: In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Breyer, the Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the ACA's minimum essential coverage provision because they failed to demonstrate a personal injury traceable to the mandate or likely to be redressed by judicial relief. Individual Plaintiffs: The Court found that individual plaintiffs' alleged injuries, such as past and future payments for coverage, were not "fairly traceable" to the unenforceable mandate, as §5000A(a) no longer imposes a penalty for noncompliance. State Plaintiffs - Direct Injuries: Allegations of increased administrative expenses were found to result from other provisions of the ACA, not §5000A(a), making them irrelevant to the challenge against the individual mandate. Concurring Opinion (Justice Thomas): Justice Thomas agreed with the majority's conclusion that the plaintiffs lacked standing but praised Justice Alito's dissent while declining to adopt it entirely. Dissenting Opinion (Justice Alito): Joined by Justice Gorsuch, Justice Alito argued that the state plaintiffs had standing and that the individual mandate was unconstitutional, as its tax penalty had been reduced to $0, rendering it unsustainable under Congress's taxing power. ## Footnote In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) against a constitutional challenge by characterizing the penalty for not buying health insurance as a tax, which Congress has the power to impose. In 2017, the Republican-controlled Congress enacted an amendment to the ACA that set the penalty for not buying health insurance to zero, but it left the rest of the ACA in place. Texas and several other states and individuals filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging the individual mandate again, arguing that because the penalty was zero, it can no longer be characterized as a tax and is therefore unconstitutional. California and several other states joined the lawsuit to defend the individual mandate. The federal district court held that the individual mandate is now unconstitutional and that as a result, the entire ACA is invalidated because the individual mandate cannot be “severed” from the rest of the Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s conclusion but remanded the case for reconsideration of whether any part of the ACA survives in the absence of the individual mandate. The Supreme Court granted California’s petition for review, as well as Texas’s cross-petition for review. Question Do the plaintiffs in this case have standing to challenge the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which now has a penalty of zero for not buying health insurance? If the plaintiffs have standing, is the individual mandate unconstitutional? If the individual mandate is unconstitutional, is it severable from the remainder of the ACA?

Answer 29

**Held: The Supreme Court held that both Seaborn and his wife were entitled to file separate returns, each reporting half of the community income as their respective income.** ⇒ The Court emphasised that differences in state law could not undermine the uniform geographic application of the federal incom ## Footnote **FACTS**: Seaborn and his wife, residents of Washington State, made separate income tax returns for the year 1927 as allowed by the Revenue Act of 1926. Their accumulated property, including real estate, stocks, and bonds, was considered community property under Washington law, meaning neither spouse owned any separate property or had separate income. The income comprised Seaborn's salary, interest on bank deposits and bonds, dividends, and profits from sales of property. Both Seaborn and his wife reported half the total community income and deducted half of the community expenses on their respective tax returns. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined all income should have been reported under the husband's return and made an additional assessment against him. Seaborn paid the assessment under protest, claimed a refund, and upon its rejection, brought suit. **Issue:** The issue was whether, under the Revenue Act of 1926 and Washington State community property law, Seaborn was required to report the entire community income on his income tax return, or if both spouses were entitled to report half of the community income on their separate returns.

Answer 30

US v Constantine Congress placed a tax on liquor dealers who violate state liquor laws. The Court struck down the relevant portion of the Revenue Act of 1926 as an attempt to punish a state violation through taxation. S v US In Sonzinsky v. United States, the petitioner was convicted for dealing in firearms without paying the required tax under the National Firearms Act of 1934. The Act mandated that every firearm dealer register and pay an annual $200 tax, which the petitioner failed to do. The petitioner argued that the tax was actually a penalty intended to regulate firearms, a power reserved to the states. The petitioner was initially convicted in the District Court for Eastern Illinois, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on the first count, dismissing the second. The petitioner then sought review from the U.S. Supreme Court, specifically challenging the constitutional validity of the statute as applied in his case.The U.S. Supreme Court held that the $200 tax imposed on firearm dealers by the National Firearms Act was a constitutional exercise of Congress's taxing power and not an unconstitutional penalty

Answer 31

In an opinion written by Justice Roberts, the majority declared the Act unconstitutional because it attempted to regulate and control agricultural production, an arena reserved to the states. Congress’ Spending Power (Article I, Section 8) is restricted to situations in which it is being used for the general welfare of the people. Agricultural production historically lies beyond the authority of the federal government to regulate. Although Congress does have the power to tax and appropriate funds, in this case those activities were "but means to an unconstitutional end.” That is, Congress was using the spending power as an enforcement mechanism to control activity that was completely within the authority of the states. Thus, the Act violated the Constitution. | Did Congress exceed its taxing and spending powers with the Act? ## Footnote In the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act, Congress implemented a processing tax on agricultural commodities, from which funds would be redistributed to farmers who promised to reduce their acreage. The Act intended to solve the crisis in agricultural commodity prices which was causing many farmers to go under. Authority to determine which crops would be affected was granted to the Secretary of Agriculture. He decided that one of the crops should be cotton, and Butler received a tax claim as a receivers of the Hoosal Mills Corp., a cotton processor.

Answer 32

No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that Congress, acting indirectly to encourage uniformity in states' drinking ages, was within constitutional bounds. The Court found that the legislation was in pursuit of "the general welfare," and that the means chosen to do so were reasonable. The Court also held that the Twenty-first Amendment's limitations on spending power were not prohibitions on congressional attempts to achieve federal objectives indirectly. The five percent loss of highway funds was not unduly coercive. Set out the Dole test (check if a condition attached by congress to a legislation under the spending clause is constitutional): * 'in pursuit of the general welfare' * the condition does not induce the states to violate some other provision of the Constitution and, therefore, be independently barred (consider this issue by asking whether a state could enact the condition on its own, in the absence of the incentive of a federal spending program, without violating the constitution) * The condition must be unambiguous (allow the state to make an informed decision) * The condition must be related to some federal interest ## Footnote In 1984, Congress enacted legislation ordering the Secretary of Transportation to withhold five percent of federal highway funds from states that did not adopt a 21-year-old minimum drinking age. South Dakota, a state that permitted persons 19 years of age to purchase alcohol, challenged the law. Question Did Congress exceed its spending powers, or violate the Twenty-first Amendment, by passing legislation conditioning the award of federal highway funds on the states' adoption of a uniform minimum drinking age?

Answer 33

The Supreme Court held that the tax imposed by the Social Security Act was constitutional. It did not violate the Tenth Amendment nor unconstitutionally coerce states into adopting unemployment compensation laws. ## Footnote Under the Social Security Act’s unemployment compensation program, employers are required to pay a federal tax, but receive a 90 percent credit on the tax if they contribute to a state unemployment compensation fund that meets federal requirements. Steward Machine Company, an Alabama corporation, paid a tax as required by the Social Security Act but later sought a refund, arguing that the statute conflicted with the Constitution. Both the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the tax's validity. The Social Security Act imposed an excise tax on employers based on the total wages paid, with provisions for credits if contributions were made to state unemployment funds under certain conditions.

Answer 34

In this case the Court sustained the old-age benefits provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935. Writing for the majority, Justice Benjamin Cardozo adopted an expansive view of the federal taxing and spending power. He judged the old-age benefits provisions of the Social Security Act constitutional pursuant to Article I, section 8 of the Constitution. In response to the claim that the Tenth Amendment prohibited Congress's use of the taxing and spending power to raise revenue for a purpose traditionally reserved to the states, Cardozo pointed out that the Social Security Act was born in response to a “nation-wide calamity” that was unsolvable without a concerted federal effort (p. 641). If some states funded programs and some did not, Cardozo speculated, indigents would flock to the funding states just as industry would flee those states to avoid the requisite new payroll taxes. | Does Title II of the Social Security Act violate the Tenth Amendment? ## Footnote Title II of the Social Security Act established what the act referred to as "Federal Old-Age Benefits" for individuals over the age of 65. Shareholders challenged the title, arguing that it violated the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and should be void.

Answer 35

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that State employees may recover money damages in federal court in the event of the State's failure to comply with the FMLA's family-care provision. The Court reasoned that Congress both clearly stated its intention to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court under the FMLA and acted within its authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting prophylactic, rather than substantively redefining, legislation. "In sum, the States' record of unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of, gender-based discrimination in the administration of leave benefits is weighty enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic [section] 5 legislation," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist ## Footnote William Hibbs, an employee of the Nevada Department of Human Resources, sought leave to care for his wife under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to take up to 12 workweeks of unpaid leave annually for the onset of a "serious health condition" in the employee's spouse. The Department granted Hibbs's request for the full 12 weeks of FMLA leave and, after he had exhausted that leave, informed him that he must report to work by a certain date. When Hibbs failed to do so, he was fired. Pursuant to FMLA provisions creating a private right of action "against any employer" that "interfered with, restrained, or denied the exercise of" FMLA rights, Hibbs sued in Federal District Court, seeking money damages for FMLA violations. The District Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred the FMLA claim. The Court of Appeals reversed. Question May an individual sue a State for money damages in federal court for violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993

Answer 36

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that suits in federal court by state employees to recover money damages by reason of the state's failure to comply with Title I of the ADA are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Chief Justice wrote for the majority that "in order to authorize private individuals to recover money damages against the States, there must be a pattern of discrimination by the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Congress must be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation." ## Footnote William Hibbs, an employee of the Nevada Department of Human Resources, sought leave to care for his wife under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to take up to 12 workweeks of unpaid leave annually for the onset of a "serious health condition" in the employee's spouse. The Department granted Hibbs's request for the full 12 weeks of FMLA leave and, after he had exhausted that leave, informed him that he must report to work by a certain date. When Hibbs failed to do so, he was fired. Pursuant to FMLA provisions creating a private right of action "against any employer" that "interfered with, restrained, or denied the exercise of" FMLA rights, Hibbs sued in Federal District Court, seeking money damages for FMLA violations. The District Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred the FMLA claim.

Answer 37

see with the other 14A cases

Answer 38

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the commerce clause gave Congress authority to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana, despite state law to the contrary. Stevens argued that the Court's precedent "firmly established" Congress' commerce clause power to regulate purely local activities that are part of a "class of activities" with a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The majority argued that Congress could ban local marijuana use because it was part of such a "class of activities": the national marijuana market. Local use affected supply and demand in the national marijuana market, making the regulation of intrastate use "essential" to regulating the drug's national market. The majority distinguished the case from Lopez and Morrison. In those cases, statutes regulated non-economic activity and fell entirely outside Congress' commerce power; in this case, the Court was asked to strike down a particular application of a valid statutory scheme. ## Footnote In 1996 California voters passed the Compassionate Use Act, legalizing marijuana for medical use. California's law conflicted with the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which banned possession of marijuana. After the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) seized doctor-prescribed marijuana from a patient's home, a group of medical marijuana users sued the DEA and U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft in federal district court. The medical marijuana users argued the Controlled Substances Act - which Congress passed using its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce - exceeded Congress' commerce clause power. The district court ruled against the group. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the CSA unconstitutional as it applied to intrastate (within a state) medical marijuana use. Relying on two U.S. Supreme Court decisions that narrowed Congress' commerce clause power - U.S. v. Lopez (1995) and U.S. v. Morrison (2000) - the Ninth Circuit ruled using medical marijuana did not "substantially affect" interstate commerce and therefore could not be regulated by Congress. Question Does the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801) exceed Congress' power under the commerce clause as applied to the intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana for medical use?

Answer 39

No. The Court constructed its opinion on the old principle that state legislatures are not subject to federal direction. The Court explained that while Congress may require the federal government to regulate commerce directly, in this case by performing background-checks on applicants for handgun ownership, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not empower it to compel state CLEOs to fulfill its federal tasks for it - even temporarily. The Court added that the Brady Bill could not require CLEOs to perform the related tasks of disposing of handgun-application forms or notifying certain applicants of the reasons for their refusal in writing, since the Brady Bill reserved such duties only for those CLEO's who voluntarily accepted them. ## Footnote This case involved the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (1993), which required state and local law enforcement officers to perform background checks on individuals purchasing firearms. The law required state officers to enforce certain aspects of the federal regulatory scheme, and the question was whether Congress could compel state officers to carry out federal mandate Using the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I as justification, can Congress temporarily require state officers to regulate handgun purchases by performing those duties called for by the Brady Bill's handgun applicant background-checks?

Answer 40

Held, war power sustains legislation; war power does not end with hostilities. ## Footnote Title II of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947 permitted Congress to regulate rents pursuant to its war powers which were activated by the start of World War II. Cloyd W. Miller Co. (plaintiff) challenged the act against Woods (defendant) in federal district court on the ground that Congress’ ability to regulate rents based on its war power ended with the Presidential Proclamation terminating hostilities on December 31, 1946. This proclamation brought about “peace-in-fact” despite not actually terminating the war itself. The district court agreed and held Title II unconstitutional. Additionally, it concluded that even if the war power did not end with the Presidential Proclamation, Congress did not act under it because it did not say so. Woods appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Answer 41

In a 7-to-2 decision authored by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Court upheld the exercise of the treaty power and found no violation of the Tenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that the national interest in protecting wildlife could be protected only by national action. The Court further reasoned that the Supremacy Clause (Article VI, Clause 2) renders treaties the “supreme law of the land,” a finding that trumps any state-level concerns with regard to the provisions of any treaty. The Supremacy Clause further implied that the treaty provisions were not subject to questioning by the states under the process of judicial review. * Stands for proposition that states have no power to limit treaty power * within the treaty-making power conferred by Art. II, § 2, of the Constitution * ## Footnote In December 1916, the United States and Great Britain entered into a treaty to protect a number of migratory birds in the U.S. and Canada. Congress passed the Migratory Bird Treaty Act in 1918 in order to facilitate enforcement of the treaty. When Ray P. Holland, the U.S. Game Warden, threatened to arrest citizens of Missouri for violating the Act, the state of Missouri challenged the treaty. The state argued that the constitution gave Congress no enumerated power to regulate migratory bird hunting, and thus the regulation of such hunting was the province of the states according to the Tenth Amendment. Question Did the treaty infringe upon rights reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment?

Answer 42

Yes, No. Roberts delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority, holding that federal law generally does not encroach on states' authority to regulate local matters. The Court ruled that the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act must be interpreted narrowly, as there was no evidence Congress intended it to apply expansively. The Court emphasized the need to respect the division of power between federal and state governments and found that the statute's language did not encompass the facts of this case. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, concurred in the judgment but criticized the majority for overstepping by interpreting Congress’ intent. Scalia argued that while the statute did cover Bond's actions, it was overly broad and infringed on states' rights, rendering it unconstitutional. Justice Thomas, in a separate concurrence joined by Scalia and Alito, contended that Congress’ treaty enforcement power is limited to international matters and cannot override state sovereignty. Justice Alito also wrote separately, asserting that the statute exceeded Congress’ treaty powers and was therefore unconstitutional. ## Footnote Carol Anne Bond worked for the chemical manufacturer Rohm and Haas. When she learned that her friend Myrlinda Haynes was pregnant and that Bond's husband was the father, she used her connections with the chemical company to obtain the means for revenge. She stole and purchased highly toxic chemicals that she applied to Haynes' doorknobs, car door handles, and mailbox. Haynes suffered a minor burn, and after contacting a federal investigator, Bond was identified as the perpetrator. She was charged with several violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (Act). In the district court, Bond moved to dismiss the case and argued that Congress did not have the authority to enforce the Act because it subverted states' rights in violation of the Tenth Amendment. The district court denied the motion, and Bond conditionally pled guilty with the understanding that she could continue to appeal the decision regarding the validity of the Act. She was sentenced to six years in prison. Bond renewed her challenge to the Act in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which held that Bond did not have standing to appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision and held that the case must be considered on its merits. The case was remanded back to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3d Circuit. The Court of Appeals held that the Act was within Congress' power to enact and enforce.

Answer 43

Held: It was within the authority of Congress, under its power to regulate the relations of the United States with foreign countries, to provide in § 401(e) that anyone who votes in a foreign political election shall lose his American citizenship, and the judgment is affirmed. ## Footnote In proceedings to deport a person born in the United States, the Government denied that he was an American citizen on the ground that, by voting in a Mexican political election and remaining outside of the United States in wartime to avoid military service, he had lost his citizenship under § 401(e) and (j) of the Nationality Act of 1940, as amended. He sued for a judgment declaring him to be a citizen but was denied relief.

Answer 44

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, overruling Perez v. Brownell (356 US 44), the Court held that Congress has no general power to revoke American citizenship without consent. Noting the special bond between Americans and their government, a bond that protects every citizen against all manner of destruction of their rights, the Court held that only citizens themselves may voluntarily relinquish their citizenship. This sacred principle applies equally to natural and naturalized citizens. As such, Section 401(e) violated both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. ## Footnote After immigrating to the United States from Poland in 1912, Beys Afroyim became a naturalized American citizen in 1926. In 1950, Afroyim went to Israel where he voted in that country's 1951 governmental elections. In 1960, Afroyim applied for renewal a of his American passport. The State Department informed him that he had forfeited his American citizenship by virtue of Section 401(e) of the 1940 Nationality Act which stipulates that citizens of the United States shall "lose" their citizenship upon voting in a foreign state's political elections. Afroyim challenged the constitutionality of Section 401(e). On appeal from a district court's summary judgment favoring Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Afroyim certiorari. Question Does Section 401(e) of the 1940 Nationality Act, revoking U.S. citizenship to persons who vote in other countries' elections, violate either the Fifth Amendment right to Due Process or the Fourteenth Amendment, under which naturalized citizens are granted national citizenship?

Answer 45

The Supreme Court ruled that U.S. citizen civilians outside the United States cannot be tried by military tribunals and are entitled to constitutional protections (Bill of rights), including the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, even for crimes committed abroad. Justice Hugo Black, writing for the majority, emphasized the dangers of undermining constitutional protections for expediency. Justice Felix Frankfurter, concurring, rejected a strict interpretation of the Constitution, instead proposing a balancing test to determine when military dependents might fall under court-martial jurisdiction. Justice John Marshall Harlan II also concurred, advocating for a case-by-case approach to determine the due process owed to military dependents, especially in capital cases. In dissent, Justice Tom C. Clark, joined by Justice Harold Burton, argued for maintaining military court jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the armed forces, citing historical practice and practical concerns, such as logistical challenges and the strain on federal courts. Clark warned the decision could lead to unnecessary costs and inefficiencies. ## Footnote Mrs. Covert killed her husband on an airbase in England. Pursuant to a “status-of-forces” executive agreement with England, she was tried and convicted by US court-martial without a jury trial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). She petitioned a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that the conviction violated her Fifth & Sixth Amendment rights to be tried by a jury after indictment by a grand jury. Question Do American citizens abroad retain the rights granted to them by the Bill of Rights thus rendering Article 2(11) of the United State Code of Military Justice unconstitutional?

Answer 46

By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court decided that it did not when it came to revenue and administrative issues. In those instances, territories like Puerto Rico were not subject to the Constitution, only to the power of Congress. The Court insisted, however, that with regard to fundamental rights the Constitution did follow the flag. Justice John Marshall Harlan (1833–1911), in dissent, held that Congress was always bound to enact laws, including those for territories, within the authority of the Constitution, and that it was inimical to republican government to think that the Congress could act outside that. Therefore, the Constitution applied in its full power to Puerto Rico, and Congress could not impose any duty, impost, or excise that departed from the rule of uniformity established by the Constitution. ## Footnote Samuel Downes, whose company had imported oranges into the port of New York from Puerto Rico and had been forced to pay import duties on them. He sued George R. Bidwell, U.S. customs inspector for the port of New York. Because the duties would not have been charged if the oranges had been imported from another state, Downes argued that the tax violated Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, which requires that “all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.” This seemingly mundane business matter raised a much more significant question: Did the Constitution follow the flag?

Answer 47

No. In a unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice Harlan Fisk Stone, the Court concluded that the conspirators, as spies without uniform whose purpose was sabotage, violated the law of war and were therefore unlawful enemy combatants. Noting that Congress had, under the Articles of War, authorized trial by military commission for unlawful enemy combatants, the Court therefore determined that the President had not exceeded his power. Furthermore, the Court asserted that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments "did not enlarge the right to jury trial" beyond those cases where it was understood by the framers to have been appropriate. Therefore, because the amendments cannot be read "as either abolishing all trials by military tribunals, save those of the personnel of our own armed forces, or, what in effect comes to the same thing, as imposing on all such tribunals the necessity of proceeding against unlawful enemy belligerents only on presentment and trial by jury," the rights of the conspirators were not violated. ## Footnote The cases involve Operation Pastorius, a failed Nazi sabotage mission in June 1942. Eight German agents trained in sabotage traveled to the U.S. via submarine, landing in New York and Florida with explosives. Two agents, Burger and Dasch, backed out, and Dasch surrendered to the FBI, leading to the arrest of all eight. Under orders from President Franklin Roosevelt, the men were tried by a military commission, found guilty, and sentenced to death. Dasch and Burger's sentences were commuted to life imprisonment for cooperating. Seven conspirators challenged the commission's legality, arguing it violated their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Their habeas corpus petitions were denied in federal court, prompting an appeal to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case in a special term. Did the President exceed his authority in ordering a trial by military commission for the German saboteurs, thereby violating their rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments?

Answer 48

The United States Supreme Court held that the federal Constitution does not confer a right of personal security or immunity from military trial and punishment on alien enemies engaged in the hostile service of a government at war with the United States. The "aliens" concerned were German Nationals who were confined in the custody of the United States Army in Germany following their conviction y a military commission of having engaged in military activity against the United States in China after the surrender of Germany. The Court stated that the military authorities have a jurisdiction, during or following "hostilities" to punish those guilty of offenses against the laws of war, and the German Nationals did not have the right to a writ of habeas corpus. ## Footnote The United States Supreme Court held that the federal Constitution does not confer a right of personal security or immunity from military trial and punishment on alien enemies engaged in the hostile service of a government at war with the United States. The "aliens" concerned were German Nationals who were confined in the custody of the United States Army in Germany following their conviction y a military commission of having engaged in military activity against the United States in China after the surrender of Germany. The Court stated that the military authorities have a jurisdiction, during or following "hostilities" to punish those guilty of offenses against the laws of war, and the German Nationals did not have the right to a writ of habeas corpus.

Answer 49

The Court held that the subcommittee's questions were indeed pertinent to the authorized investigation into Communist infiltration into Southern industry and Communist Party propaganda activities. The Court also determined that Braden's First Amendment rights were not violated by the inquiry. Thus, the conviction was affirmed. ## Footnote In the Supreme Court case Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961), the facts revolve around Carl Braden, who was called to testify before a House Un-American Activities Committee subcommittee in Atlanta, Georgia, on July 30, 1958. During his testimony, Braden refused to answer six specific questions concerning his alleged involvement with Communist activities, asserting that the questions were not pertinent to the subcommittee's inquiry and that they infringed on his First Amendment rights. Following his refusal, Braden was indicted, tried, and convicted under 2 U.S.C. § 192 for failing to answer these questions. His conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeals, and the case subsequently reached the Supreme Court.

Answer 50

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court found that the degree of control exercised by the United States over the Guantanamo Bay base was sufficient to trigger the application of habeas corpus rights. Stevens, using a list of precedents stretching back to mid-17th Century English Common Law cases, found that the right to habeas corpus can be exercised in "all ... dominions under the sovereign's control." Because the United States exercised "complete jurisdiction and control" over the base, the fact that ultimate sovereignty remained with Cuba was irrelevant. Further, Stevens wrote that the right to habeas corpus is not dependent on citizenship status. The detainees were therefore free to bring suit challenging their detention as unconstitutional. ## Footnote Two Australians and 12 Kuwaitis were captured by the American military in Pakistan or Afghanistan during the United States' War on Terror. The captives were transported to the American military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. When their families learned of the arrests, they filed suit in federal district court seeking a writ of habeas corpus that would declare the detention unconstitutional. They claimed that the government's decision to deny the men access to attorneys and to hold them indefinitely without access to a court violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The government countered that the federal courts had no jurisdiction to hear the case because the prisoners were not American citizens and were being held in territory over which the United States did not have sovereignty (the Guantanamo Bay base was leased from Cuba indefinitely in 1903, and Cuba retains "ultimate sovereignty"). The district court agreed with the government, dismissing the case because it found that it did not have jurisdiction. The US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the district court's decision. Question Do United States courts have jurisdiction to consider legal appeals filed on behalf of foreign citizens held by the United States military in Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba?

Answer 51

Yes and no. In an opinion backed by a four-justice plurality and partly joined by two additional justices, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote that although Congress authorized Hamdi's detention, Fifth Amendment due process guarantees give a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant the right to contest that detention before a neutral decisionmaker. The plurality rejected the government's argument that the separation-of-powers prevents the judiciary from hearing Hamdi's challenge. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concurred with the plurality that Hamdi had the right to challenge in court his status as an enemy combatant. Souter and Ginsburg, however, disagreed with the plurality's view that Congress authorized Hamdi's detention. Justice Antonin Scalia issued a dissent joined by Justice John Paul Stevens. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented separately. ## Footnote In 2001, Yaser Hamdi, a U.S. citizen captured in Afghanistan and accused of fighting for the Taliban, was declared an "enemy combatant" and detained without trial. After being transferred to a military prison in Virginia, Hamdi's father filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing the detention violated Hamdi’s Fifth Amendment due process rights. The district court ordered the government to provide evidence supporting the "enemy combatant" designation but was met with government resistance. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s order, ruling that separation of powers required judicial deference to the Executive Branch's wartime decisions. It held that the judiciary was ill-equipped to oversee military conduct and should respect the Executive's determination of enemy combatant status. Did the government violate Hamdi's Fifth Amendment right to Due Process by holding him indefinitely, without access to an attorney, based solely on an Executive Branch declaration that he was an "enemy combatant" who fought against the United States? Does the separation of powers doctrine require federal courts to defer to Executive Branch determinations that an American citizen is an "enemy combatant"?

Answer 52

Yes and no. The Supreme Court, in a 5-to-3 decision authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, held that neither an act of Congress nor the inherent powers of the Executive laid out in the Constitution expressly authorized the sort of military commission at issue in this case. Absent that express authorization, the commission had to comply with the ordinary laws of the United States and the laws of war. The Geneva Convention, as a part of the ordinary laws of war, could therefore be enforced by the Supreme Court, along with the statutory Uniform Code of Military Justice. Hamdan's exclusion from certain parts of his trial deemed classified by the military commission violated both of these, and the trial was therefore illegal. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito dissented. Chief Justice John Roberts, who participated in the case while serving on the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, did not take part in the decision. ## Footnote Facts of the case Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Osama bin Laden's former chauffeur, was captured by Afghan forces and imprisoned by the U.S. military in Guantanamo Bay. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court to challenge his detention. Before the district court ruled on the petition, he received a hearing from a military tribunal, which designated him an enemy combatant. A few months later, the district court granted Hamdan's habeas petition, ruling that he must first be given a hearing to determine whether he was a prisoner of war under the Geneva Convention before he could be tried by a military commission. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the decision, however, finding that the Geneva Convention could not be enforced in federal court and that the establishment of military tribunals had been authorized by Congress and was therefore not unconstitutional. Question May the rights protected by the Geneva Convention be enforced in federal court through habeas corpus petitions? Was the military commission established to try Hamdan and others for alleged war crimes in the War on Terror authorized by the Congress or the inherent powers of the President?

Answer 53

A five-justice majority answered yes to each of these questions. The opinion, written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, stated that if the MCA is considered valid its legislative history requires that the detainees' cases be dismissed. However, the Court went on to state that because the procedures laid out in the Detainee Treatment Act are not adequate substitutes for the habeas writ, the MCA operates as an unconstitutional suspension of that writ. The detainees were not barred from seeking habeas or invoking the Suspension Clause merely because they had been designated as enemy combatants or held at Guantanamo Bay. The Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's ruling and found in favor of the detainees. Justice David H. Souter concurred in the judgment. Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Antonin Scalia filed separate dissenting opinions. ## Footnote In 2002, Lakhdar Boumediene and five other Algerians were detained by Bosnian police on suspicion of plotting to attack the U.S. embassy. Classified as enemy combatants, they were sent to Guantanamo Bay. Boumediene filed a habeas corpus petition alleging constitutional and legal violations. The District Court dismissed the claims, asserting that as an alien detained abroad, Boumediene had no habeas rights. The D.C. Circuit upheld this, but the Supreme Court reversed in Rasul v. Bush, extending habeas rights to Guantanamo detainees. In 2006, the Military Commissions Act (MCA) barred federal courts from hearing habeas cases for enemy combatants. Boumediene challenged the MCA’s applicability and constitutionality under the Suspension Clause, which protects habeas rights unless suspended during rebellion or invasion. The D.C. Circuit upheld the MCA, ruling that the Suspension Clause only applies as it was understood in 1789, excluding foreign detainees at overseas bases like Guantanamo. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to reconsider the case after initially declining review.

Answer 54

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the President did not have the authority to issue such an order. The Court found that there was no congressional statute that authorized the President to take possession of private property. The Court also held that the President's military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces did not extend to labor disputes. The Court argued that "the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker." ## Footnote In April of 1952, during the Korean War, President Truman issued an executive order directing Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to seize and operate most of the nation's steel mills. This was done in order to avert the expected effects of a strike by the United Steelworkers of America. Question Did the President have the constitutional authority to seize and operate the steel mills?

Answer 55

The case established the precedent that treaties, which are described in the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution as "the supreme law of the land" equal to any domestic federal law, do not hold a privileged position above other acts of Congress. Hence, other laws affecting the "enforcement, modification, or repeal" of treaties are legitimate. ## Footnote Pursuant to the Immigration Act of 1882, officers from the customhouse in the Port of New York began collecting a tax from ships of fifty cents for each immigrant aboard. Multiple ship owners sued because they were transporting Dutch immigrants, and the Netherlands had a treaty with the United States that seemed to prohibit the tax.

Answer 56

The Court upheld the rulings of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in a 6-3 opinion written by Chief Justice John G. Roberts. The Court held that the signed Protocol of the Vienna Convention did not make the treaty self-executing and, therefore, the treaty is not binding upon state courts until it is enacted into law by Congress. Furthermore, Chief Justice Roberts characterized the presidential memorandum as an attempt by the executive branch to enforce a non-self executing treaty without the necessary Congressional action, giving it no binding authority on state courts. ## Footnote Jose Medellin, a Mexican national, was convicted and sentenced to death for participating in the gang rape and murder of two teenage girls in Houston. Medellin raised a post-conviction challenge arguing that the state had violated his rights under the Vienna Convention, a treaty to which the United States is a party. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention gives any foreign national detained for a crime the right to contact his consulate. After his petition was ultimately dismissed by the Supreme Court (see Medellin v. Dretke ), Medellin's case returned to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Medellin's argument rested in part on a ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) holding that the U.S. had violated the Vienna Convention rights of 51 Mexican nationals (including Medellin) and that their convictions must be reconsidered. Medellin argued that the Vienna Convention granted him an individual right that state courts must respect, a possibility left open by the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon. Medellin also cited a memorandum from the President of the United States that instructed state courts to comply with the ICJ's rulings by rehearing the cases. Medellin argued that the Constitution gives the President broad power to ensure that treaties are enforced, and that this power extends to the treatment of treaties in state court proceedings. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected each of Medellin's arguments and dismissed his petition. The court interpreted Sanchez-Llamas as standing for the principle that rulings of the ICJ are not binding on state courts. The Texas court stood by its position that allowing Medellin to raise the Vienna Convention issue after his trial would violate state procedural rules, and that those rules were not supplanted by the Convention. The President had no authority to order the enforcement in state court of an ICJ ruling, because that would imply a law-making power not allocated to him by the Constitution.

Answer 57

Without oral argument, the divided justices found that the case was not justiciable. Rehnquist led a group of four others who believed that the issue involved a political question, namely, how the President and Congress would conduct the nation's foreign affairs. Justice Powell did not find the case ripe for judicial review. He reasoned that since Congress had not formally challenged Carter's authority, technically there was no conflict for the Court to resolve. Justice Renhquist plurality opinion ⇒ the case presented a nonjusticiable political question because “it involves the authority of the President and the conduct of our country’s foreign relations” + this is ‘the dispute between coequal branches of govt’. ## Footnote President Jimmy Carter acted without congressional approval in ending a defense treaty with Taiwan. Question Did Congress have a constitutional role to play in the termination of the treaty?

Answer 58

No. The Court noted that the proceedings against Powell were intended to exclude and not expel him from the chamber. That is an important distinction to recognize since the House does have the power under Article I, Section 5 to expel members. However, expulsion was not the purpose of the proceedings in this case. After analyzing the Framers' debates on this issue, Chief Justice Warren concluded that since Powell had been lawfully elected by his constituents and since he met the constitutional requirements for membership in the House, that the chamber was powerless to exclude him. ## Footnote Facts of the case Adam Clayton Powell pecked at his fellow representatives from his unassailable perch in New York's Harlem. Powell had been embroiled in controversy inside and outside Washington. When Powell failed to heed civil proceedings against him in New York, a judge held him in criminal contempt. His problems were only beginning. He won reelection in 1966 but the House of Representatives voted to exclude him. Question May the House of Representatives exclude a duly elected member if the member has satisfied the standing requirements of age, citizenship and residence as articulated in Article I Section 2 of the U.S. Constitutio

Answer 59

No. A unanimous Court held that the question of whether or not the Senate rule violated the U.S. Constitution was nonjusticiable since the Impeachment clause expressly granted that the "Senate shall have sole Power to try any impeachments." The clause laid out specific regulations that were to be followed and as long as those guidelines were observed the courts would not rule upon the validity of other Senate procedures regarding impeachments. Chief Justice William Rehnquist observed that while the Supreme Court was the "ultimate intrepreter of the Constitution," a matter would be deemed nonjusticiable when there was "a constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department." ## Footnote Walter Nixon, a Federal District Judge, was convicted of a felony, making false statements to a grand jury. The House of Representatives voted three articles of impeachment; impeachment in the Senate followed. In accordance with Senate Rule XI, a Senate committee heard the evidence and reported its findings. The full Senate convicted Nixon and sought to remove him from office. Nixon challenged Senate Rule XI in federal court on the ground that the rule violated the impeachment clause of the Constitution, which declares that "the Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments." The lower courts deemed the issue nonjusticiable and declined to intervene in the dispute. Question Is Nixon's claim -- that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial Clause -- justiciable, i.e., appropriate for judicial resolution?

Answer 60

Noting that the Equal Protection clause guarantees individuals that their ballots cannot be devalued by "later arbitrary and disparate treatment," the per curiam opinion held 7-2 that the Florida Supreme Court's scheme for recounting ballots was unconstitutional. Even if the recount was fair in theory, it was unfair in practice. The record suggested that different standards were applied from ballot to ballot, precinct to precinct, and county to county. Because of those and other procedural difficulties, the court held, 5 to 4, that no constitutional recount could be fashioned in the time remaining (which was short because the Florida legislature wanted to take advantage of the "safe harbor" provided by 3 USC Section 5). Loathe to make broad precedents, the per curiam opinion limited its holding to the present case. Rehnquist (in a concurring opinion joined by Scalia and Thomas) argued that the recount scheme was also unconstitutional because the Florida Supreme Court's decision made new election law, which only the state legislature may do. Breyer and Souter (writing separately) agreed with the per curiam holding that the Florida Court's recount scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause, but they dissented with respect to the remedy, believing that a constitutional recount could be fashioned. Time is insubstantial when constitutional rights are at stake. Ginsburg and Stevens (writing separately) argued that for reasons of federalism, the Florida Supreme Court's decision ought to be respected. Moreover, the Florida decision was fundamentally right; the Constitution requires that every vote be counted. ## Footnote Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, and concurrent with Vice President Al Gore's contest of the certification of Florida presidential election results, on December 8, 2000 the Florida Supreme Court ordered that the Circuit Court in Leon County tabulate by hand 9000 contested ballots from Miami-Dade County. It also ordered that every county in Florida must immediately begin manually recounting all "under-votes" (ballots which did not indicate a vote for president) because there were enough contested ballots to place the outcome of the election in doubt. Governor George Bush and his running mate, Richard Cheney, filed a request for review in the U.S. Supreme Court and sought an emergency petition for a stay of the Florida Supreme Court's decision. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review and issued the stay on December 9. It heard oral argument two days later. Question Did the Florida Supreme Court violate Article II Section 1 Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution by making new election law? Do standardless manual recounts violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution?

Answer 61

No. In an 8-to-1 decision, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the Court vacating the judgment and remanding the case to the trial court for further consideration on the merits. Roberts argued that Zivotofsky's claim did not involve a political question and is thus justiciable. Resolution of Zivotofsky's claim would require the Judiciary to vindicate Zivotofsky's statutory rights, a matter within its competence to resolve. Reaching a decision is not simple, however. A full airing on the merits will frame the issues for further review. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Stephen Breyer joined Part I of Justice Sonia Sotomayor's opinion. She wrote separately to emphasize that the inquiry required by the political question doctrine was more demanding than the majority suggested with its opinion. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. filed a special concurrence. He noted that determining the constitutionality of an Act of Congress could present a political question, but he did not think that the narrow issue before the court fell into that category of cases. Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed a dissenting opinion. He wrote that a decision would touch upon several very sensitive foreign policy matters and that adjudication of the petitioner's claim would require the courts to answer a political question as defined by the Court's decision in Baker v. Carr. ## Footnote Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky is a United States citizen born on October 17, 2002 in Jerusalem. In December 2002, Zivotofsky's mother filed an application for a Consular Report of Birth Abroad and a United States passport for petitioner, listing his place of birth as "Jerusalem, Israel." United States diplomatic officials informed petitioner's mother that State Department policy required them to record "Jerusalem" as petitioner's place of birth, which is how petitioner's place of birth appears in the documents he received. On his behalf, Zivotofsky's parents filed this suit against the Secretary of State seeking an order compelling the State Department to identify petitioner's place of birth as "Jerusalem, Israel" in the official documents. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed the complaint after concluding that petitioner lacked standing, and that the complaint raised a nonjusticiable political question. United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that petitioner had standing and that a more complete record was needed on the foreign policy implications of recording "Israel" as Zivotofsky's place of birth. On remand, the State Department explained, among other things, that in the present circumstances if "Israel" were to be recorded as the place of birth of a person born in Jerusalem, such "unilateral action" by the United States on one of the most sensitive issues in the negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians "would critically compromise" the United States' ability to help further the Middle East peace process. The district court again dismissed on political question grounds. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Zivotofsky's claim is foreclosed because it raises a nonjusticiable political question.

Answer 62

The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the tariff was constitutional since it delegated only discretionary power to the President. Although the Supreme Court ruled against Marshall Field, it unequivocally affirmed the importance of the “nondelegation doctrine,” which forbids Congress giving away its powers to other branches. It proclaimed, “That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution.” (Harlan J) ## Footnote Facts Concerns the constitutionality of a congressional delegation of authority to the President as part of the Tariff Act of 1890, commonly known as the Mckinley Tariff. The act sets the rates for taxes on different things like foods and clothes that are brought into the country. Several import businesses, including Marshall Field & Co., the defendant, argued that the tariff represented an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the President.

Answer 63

Wyoming’s statehood did not abrogate the Crow Tribe’s 1868 federal treaty right to hunt on the “unoccupied lands of the United States”; the lands of the Bighorn National Forest did not become categorically “occupied” when the forest was created. **Sotomayor writing for the majority:** - The Crow Tribe’s hunting rights under the 1868 Treaty did not expire upon Wyoming’s statehood. - Bighorn National Forest did not become categorically “occupied” within the meaning of the 1868 Treaty when the national forest was created. **Dissent, Alito**: *In seeking review in this Court, Herrera framed this case as implicating only a question of treaty interpretation.... there is no reason to reach the treaty interpretation question... I would not reach the treaty-interpretation issue.* ## Footnote In 2014, Wyoming charged petitioner Clayvin Herrera with off-season hunting in Bighorn National Forest and being an accessory to the same. The state trial court rejected Herrera’s argument that he had a protected right to hunt in the forest pursuant to the 1868 Treaty, and a jury convicted him. On appeal, the state appellate court relied on the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 73 F. 3d 982— which in turn relied upon this Court’s decision in Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U. S. 504—and held that the treaty right expired upon Wyoming’s statehood

Answer 64

Partisan gerrymandering claims are not justiciable because they present a political question beyond the reach of the federal courts. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the 5-4 majority opinion. Federal courts are charged with resolving cases and controversies of a judicial nature. In contrast, questions of a political nature are “nonjusticiable,” and the courts cannot resolve such questions. Partisan gerrymandering has existed since prior to the independence of the United States, and, aware of this occurrence, the Framers chose to empower state legislatures, “expressly checked and balanced by the Federal Congress” to handle these matters. While federal courts can resolve “a variety of questions surrounding districting,” including racial gerrymandering, it is beyond their power to decide the central question: when has political gerrymandering gone too far. In the absence of any “limited and precise standard” for evaluating partisan gerrymandering, federal courts cannot resolve such issues. ## Footnote A three-judge district court struck down North Carolina’s 2016 congressional map, ruling that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the map and that the map was the product of partisan gerrymandering. The district court then enjoined the state from using the map after November 2018. North Carolina Republicans, led by Robert Rucho, head of the senate redistricting committee, appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. Question Do the plaintiffs in this case have standing to pursue their partisan gerrymandering claims? Are the plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymandering claims justiciable? Is North Carolina’s 2016 congressional map an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander?

Answer 65

The Constitution does not require Congress to make Supplemental Security Income benefits available to the residents of Puerto Rico. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court reversing the lower court. Two precedents dictate the answer to the question presented in this case. In Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978), the Court held that Congress’s decision not to extend Supplemental Security Income (SSI) to Puerto Rico did not violate the constitutional right to interstate travel because Congress had a rational basis for that decision (that residents of Puerto Rico were exempt from paying federal taxes). And in Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980), the Court held that Congress’s differential treatment of Puerto Rico did not violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because it had the same rational basis for doing so. Applying these two precedents to the present case, the Court concluded that because Congress had a rational basis for the differential treatment, it was not required to extend SSI benefits to the residents of Puerto Rico. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion to suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause is a better basis for prohibiting the federal government from discriminating on the basis of race than the so-called equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. ## Footnote Congress established the Supplemental Security Income program in 1972 to provide cash benefits to low-income people who are 65 or older and have disabilities. The program extends to residents of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the unincorporated territory of the Northern Mariana Islands, but not to those living in Puerto Rico. Jose Luis Vaello-Madero was born in Puerto Rico in 1954 and moved to New York in 1985. In 2012, he started receiving SSI payments after he experienced severe health problems, and in 2013, he moved back to Puerto Rico to help care for his wife. In 2016, the Social Security Administration (SSA) informed Vaello-Madero that because he had moved back to Puerto Rico, it was terminating his SSI benefits. Moreover, the federal government filed a lawsuit in federal court in Puerto Rico to recover over $28,000 in benefits it had paid Vaello-Madero between 2013 and 2016 when he was living in Puerto Rico. The district court ruled for Vaello-Madero, finding, among other things, that the exclusion of Puerto Rico violated the equal-protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. Question Did Congress violate the Fifth Amendment by establishing the Supplemental Security Income program in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the Northern Mariana Islands, but not in Puerto Rico?

Answer 66

No. The Court held that neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified, presidential privilege. The Court granted that there was a limited executive privilege in areas of military or diplomatic affairs, but gave preference to "the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of justice." Therefore, the president must obey the subpoena and produce the tapes and documents. Nixon resigned shortly after the release of the tapes. ## Footnote Facts of the case A grand jury returned indictments against seven of President Richard Nixon's closest aides in the Watergate affair. The special prosecutor appointed by Nixon and the defendants sought audio tapes of conversations recorded by Nixon in the Oval Office. Nixon asserted that he was immune from the subpoena claiming "executive privilege," which is the right to withhold information from other government branches to preserve confidential communications within the executive branch or to secure the national interest. Decided together with Nixon v. United States. Question Is the President's right to safeguard certain information, using his "executive privilege" confidentiality power, entirely immune from judicial review?

Answer 67

The Court held that the president had validly used his Article I power to call out the militia, that he had sole authority to decide whether or not a situation permitting use of the statutory power existed, and that this decision was “conclusive upon all other parties” (as the states). The case set a major precedent in support of President Abraham Lincoln's decision to assemble troops in the cause of defending the national union. ## Footnote Complying with an order from President James Madison during the War of 1812, the New York governor called out some militia companies. Mott, a private in one of those companies, refused to obey the order; he was court-martialed and fined for this refusal. Martin, a U.S. Marshal, seized Mott's property to enforce the judgment when Mott did not pay the fine. Mott brought a civil suit to recover his property.

Answer 68

Yes. The Court held that the President "is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts." This sweeping immunity, argued Justice Powell, was a function of the "President's unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of separation of powers and supported by our history." ## Footnote Facts of the case In 1968, Fitzgerald, then a civilian analyst with the United States Air Force, testified before a congressional committee about inefficiencies and cost overruns in the production of the C-5A transport plane. Roughly one year later he was fired, an action for which President Nixon took responsibility. Fitzgerald then sued Nixon for damages after the Civil Service Commission concluded that his dismissal was unjust. Question Was the President immune from prosecution in a civil suit?

Answer 69

Overrules Bowers v Hardwick (1986) = concerned homosexual sex – there was a statute that criminalized sodomy. => right to privacy does not extend to consensual sex cf. Due process clause + 14A No, yes, and yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause. After explaining what it deemed the doubtful and overstated premises of Bowers, the Court reasoned that the case turned on whether Lawrence and Garner were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause. "Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government," wrote Justice Kennedy. "The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual," continued Justice Kennedy. ## Footnote Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered John Lawrence's apartment and saw him and another adult man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Lawrence and Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held that the statute was not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), controlling. Question Do the criminal convictions of John Lawrence and Tyron Garner under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law, which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex couples, violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws? Do their criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Should Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), be overruled?

Answer 70

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that standards of decency have evolved so that executing minors is "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. The majority cited a consensus against the juvenile death penalty among state legislatures, and its own determination that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for minors. Finally the Court pointed to "overwhelming" international opinion against the juvenile death penalty ## Footnote Facts of the case Christopher Simmons was sentenced to death in 1993, when he was only 17. A series of appeals to state and federal courts lasted until 2002, but each appeal was rejected. Then, in 2002, the Missouri Supreme Court stayed Simmon's execution while the U.S. Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, a case that dealt with the execution of the mentally disabled. After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that executing the mentally disabled (or "mentally retarded" in the vernacular of the day) violated the Eighth and 14th Amendment prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment because a majority of Americans found it cruel and unusual, the Missouri Supreme Court decided to reconsider Simmons' case. Using the reasoning from the Atkins case, the Missouri court decided, 6-to-3, that the U.S. Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, which held that executing minors was not unconstitutional, was no longer valid. The opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky had relied on a finding that a majority of Americans did not consider the execution of minors to be cruel and unusual. The Missouri court, citing numerous laws passed since 1989 that limited the scope of the death penalty, held that national opinion had changed. Finding that a majority of Americans were now opposed to the execution of minors, the court held that such executions were now unconstitutional. On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the government argued that allowing a state court to overturn a Supreme Court decision by looking at "evolving standards" would be dangerous, because state courts could just as easily decide that executions prohibited by the Supreme Court (such as the execution of the mentally ill in Atkins v. Virginia) were now permissible due to a change in the beliefs of the American people.

Answer 71

Yes. The Court held that the law violated the principle of nondiscrimination as it treated out-of-state waste differently than waste produced within the state. Since New Jersey could not demonstrate a legitimate reason for distinguishing between foreign and domestically produced waste, it was clear to the Court that the state had "overtly moved to slow or freeze the flow of commerce for protectionist reasons." ## Footnote Facts of the case A New Jersey law prohibited the importation of most "solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State." Question Did New Jersey's waste importation law violate the Commerce Clause?

Answer 72

**Held**: “To permit Madison to adopt a regulation not essential for the protection of local health interests and placing a discriminatory burden on interstate commerce would invite a multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive of the very purpose of the Commerce Clause.” per Mr Justice Clark Majority (Clark) says it is important to act, otherwise very purpose of Commerce Clause destroyed ## Footnote Facts: a municipal ordinance requiring all milk sold in Madison to be pasteurized at an approved plant within 5 miles of the city, unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce. Did the Madison ordinance unconstitutionally interfere with interstate commerce?

Answer 73

**Held**: SCOTUS held that Clarkstown's ordinance violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. **Per Justice Kennedy:** We have interpreted the Commerce Clause to invalidate local laws that impose commercial barriers or discriminate against an article of commerce by reason of its origin or destination out of State. The Commerce Clause presumes a national market free from local legislation that discriminates in favor of local interests. The law is basically a financing measure, to keep the town sponsored facility in business. ## Footnote Facts: a private recycler with business in Clarkstown, New York, sought to ship its non-recyclable waste to cheaper waste processors out-of-state. Clarkstown opposed the move, and the company then brought suit, raising the unconstitutionality of Clarkstown's "flow control ordinance," which required solid wastes that were not recyclable or hazardous to be deposited at a particular private company's transfer facility.The ordinance involved fees that were above market rates.

Answer 74

No. The Court voted 6-3 to affirm the Second Circuit and uphold the ordinance. Chief Justice John Roberts's majority opinion distinguished the Oneida- Herkimer ordinance from previous ordinances that were struck down by the Court by emphasizing that the favored waste-disposal facilities were publicly operated. The majority found that "[t]he flow control ordinances in this case benefit a clearly public facility, while treating all private companies exactly the same." After deeming the ordinance nondiscriminatory, the Court balanced its burden on commerce against its financial, health, and environmental benefits. The Court found that it imposed only an "incidental burden." The majority declined to "rigorously scrutinize" the economic effects of the ordinance, preferring to leave the policy analysis to local government. The dissent by Justice Alito would have held that the ordinance discriminated against commerce and was thus unconstitutional. ## Footnote Oneida and Herkimer counties adopted a local "flow control" ordinance requiring locally-produced garbage to be delivered to local publicly-owned facilities. The United Haulers Association filed suit in federal district court, arguing that by prohibiting the export of waste and preventing waste haulers from using less expensive out-of-state facilities, the ordinance ran afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court has held that the Commerce Clause forbids any state law that regulates interstate commerce. The District Court ruled against United Haulers and held that the ordinance was constitutional because it did not discriminate against out-of-state businesses. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the ordinance imposed a slight burden on interstate commerce, the effect was outweighed by the ordinance's local benefits.

Answer 75

Holding The Supreme Court held that Alaska's requirement was not authorized by Congress and thus violated the Commerce Clause. The Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had previously upheld the state's requirement. The court deemed unconstitutional Alaska's inclusion of a requirement that purchasers of state-owned timber process it within state before it was shipped out of state. According to a plurality opinion by Justice White, Alaska could not impose "downstream" conditions in the timberprocessing market as a result of its ownership of the timber itself. ## Footnote South-Central Timber Development, Inc., an Alaska corporation engaged in logging and exporting timber primarily to Japan, challenged Alaska's requirement that timber harvested from state lands must undergo primary manufacture within the state before being exported. This requirement was included in the contractual terms for timber sales and aimed to promote local industry by mandating partial processing of timber within Alaska. The state argued that this stipulation helped to establish local industries and manage forest resources sustainably while offering the timber at a reduced price

Answer 76

Justice Marshall concluded that regulation of navigation by steamboat operators and others for purposes of conducting interstate commerce was a power reserved to and exercised by the Congress under the Commerce Clause. As interstate navigation fell under interstate commerce, New York could not interfere with it, and the law was therefore invalid. In a concurring opinion, Justice William Johnson argued that the national government had exclusive power over interstate commerce, negating state laws interfering with the exercise of that power. ## Footnote A New York state law gave Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton a 20-year monopoly over navigation on waters within state jurisdiction. Aaron Ogden and other competitors tried to forestall the monopoly, but Livingston and Fulton largely succeeded in selling franchise or buying competitors’ boats. Thomas Gibbons -- a steamboat owner who did business between New York and New Jersey under a federal coastal license – formed a partnership with Ogden, which fell apart after three years when Gibbons operated another steamboat on a New York route belonging to Ogden. Ogden filed suit against Gibbons in New York state court, and received a permanent injunction. The New York state court rejected Gibbons’ argument asserting that U.S. Congress controlled interstate commerce. Question Does the Commerce Clause give Congress authority over interstate navigation?

Cases - Semester 1 Flashcards

(103 cards)