Cases - Semester 2 Flashcards

Question

Pierce v Society of Sisters (1925) | substantive due process

Answer 1

Yes. The unanimous Court held that "the fundamental liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only." ## Footnote The Compulsory Education Act of 1922 required parents or guardians to send children between the ages of eight and sixteen to public school in the district where the children resided. The Society of Sisters was an Oregon corporation which facilitated care for orphans, educated youths, and established and maintained academies or schools. This case was decided together with Pierce v. Hill Military Academy. Question Did the Act violate the liberty of parents to direct the education of their children?

Answer 2

Conclusion In an opinion written by William Orville Douglas, the unanimous Court held that the Act violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that certain crimes, such as embezzlement, were excluded from the Act’s jurisdiction without explanation or reason. Moreover, the Court reasoned that because of the social and biological implications of reproduction and the irreversibility of sterilization operations, compulsory sterilization laws should be subject to strict scrutiny. In his concurrence, Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone stated that he disagreed with the majority opinion’s reliance on the Equal Protection Clause and instead cited the Due Process Clause to prevent Skinner from being sterilized. ## Footnote ■ Oklahoma’s Habitual Criminal Sterilisation Act provided for compulsory sterilisation after a third conviction for a felony involving moral turpitude (but excluded some felonies, like embezzlement)

Answer 3

Justice Holmes for the Court upholding a Virginia court’s judgment ordering that Carrie Buck, a feeble-minded woman, committed to a state mental institution, be sterilised at the age of 18. Procedure granted due process Substantive grounds exist and justify the result He supports eugenics laws P: at the time of Buck, consensus amongst state laws that such eugenics laws were unconstitutional See Smith v Board of Examiners of Feeble-Minded (N.J. 1913) New Jersey SC held that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause. Balance between right of legislature to deal with welfare of society v constitutional rights of the individual The end (procreation of epileptics) was not rationally tied to the means used (sterilisation) Other courts agreed

Answer 4

The Court struck down the Massachusetts law but not on privacy grounds. The Court held that the law's distinction between single and married individuals failed to satisfy the "rational basis test" of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Married couples were entitled to contraception under the Court's Griswold decision. ## Footnote William Baird gave away Emko Vaginal Foam to a woman following his Boston University lecture on birth control and over-population. Massachusetts charged Baird with a felony, to distribute contraceptives to unmarried men or women. Under the law, only married couples could obtain contraceptives; only registered doctors or pharmacists could provide them. Baird was not an authorized distributor of contraceptives. Question Did the Massachusetts law violate the right to privacy acknowledged in Griswold v. Connecticut and protected from state intrusion by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Answer 5

The Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not allow a state to intrude on an individual's decisions on matters of procreation which is protected as privacy rights. ## Footnote Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in which the Court held that it was unconstitutional to prohibit anyone other than a licensed pharmacist to distribute nonprescription contraceptives to persons 16 years of age or over, to prohibit the distribution of nonprescription contraceptives by any adult to minors under 16 years of age, and to prohibit anyone, including licensed pharmacists, to advertise or display contraceptives.

Answer 6

Inherent in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a fundamental “right to privacy” that protects a pregnant woman’s choice whether to have an abortion. However, this right is balanced against the government’s interests in protecting women's health and protecting “the potentiality of human life.” The Texas law challenged in this case violated this right. ## Footnote In 1970, Jane Roe (a fictional name used in court documents to protect the plaintiff’s identity) filed a lawsuit against Henry Wade, the district attorney of Dallas County, Texas, where she resided, challenging a Texas law making abortion illegal except by a doctor’s orders to save a woman’s life. In her lawsuit, Roe alleged that the state laws were unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Question Does the Constitution recognize a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy by abortion?

Answer 7

– Court invalidated portions of a Georgian law requiring that abortions be performed in an accredited hospital, requiring prior approval of abortions by two doctors in addition to the attending doctor – Court found that the best clinical judgment of the attending physician was sufficient = think that if you live in a rural area more difficult of access (quite difficult to satisfy these conditions without driving long hours)

Answer 8

– Court invalidated a requirement that abortions performed after the first trimester be performed in a hospital rather than in outpatient facilities (less expensive) ■ Court found this a significant obstacle to an abortion ■ Court also invalidated a provision mandating a set of detailed guidelines regarding information the attending physician had to convey to the woman (development of the foetus, date of possible viability, complications for abortions) – Court found that much of the information was not designed to inform consent but to persuade the woman not to have the abortion.

Answer 9

– Court (6 to 3) struck down requirement of husband’s written consent for an abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy ■ State could not delegate authority to prevent an abortion during the first trimester – Court also struck down a requirement that an unmarried woman under 18 had to obtain the consent of a parent ■ State could not give a third party an absolute veto ■ But not every minor could give effective consent

Answer 10

- Court (6 to 3) upheld a Ct. regulation granting Medicaid benefits for childbirth but not for medically unnecessary abortions **– Justice Powell for the majority:** strict scrutiny was not warranted because the unequal treatment of abortion and childbirth in the scheme did not interfere with the fundamental right recognised in Roe and upheld the law under deferential ‘rationality’ review

Answer 11

■ Regulations provided that a family planning project funded under the legislation may not provide counselling concerning the use of abortion as a method of family planning or provide referral for abortion as a method of family planning ■ It may not encourage, promote or advocate abortion as a method of family planning ■ Project allowed pregnant women to be provided with information about childbirth and prenatal care, but advised them on inquiry that the project does not consider abortion an appropriate method of family planning

Answer 12

– Court upheld provisions of a Missouri law barring state employees from performing abortions and the use of public facilities for abortions, even where the patient paid for the abortion herself – CJ Rehnquist (5 to 4) ■ Due process clause does not confer an affirmative right to governmental aid ■ It might be different if all health care was provided in state facilities

Answer 13

In a bitter 5-to-4 decision, the Court again reaffirmed Roe, but it upheld most of the Pennsylvania provisions. For the first time, the justices imposed a new standard to determine the validity of laws restricting abortions. The new standard asks whether a state abortion regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an "undue burden," which is defined as a "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability." Under this standard, the only provision to fail the undue-burden test was the husband notification requirement. In a rare step, the opinion for the Court was crafted and authored by three justices: O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. ## Footnote – Pennsylvania law placed various limits on the availability of abortions, such as imposing a mandatory 24-hour waiting period after a woman seeks an abortion before it could be performed, and requiring spousal notification absent a certification that such notice might cause physical injury

Answer 14

– Court annulled a Nebraska law prohibiting late-term ‘dilation and extraction’ abortions without providing for exceptions to preserve the mother’s health – Justice Breyer for the Court (5 to 4)

Answer 15

Justice Kennedy (joined by Roberts, Scalia, Thomas and Alito) for the Court: upheld ban on partial birth abortion (2003 Congressional act)

Answer 16

In applying the substantial burden test, courts must weigh the extent to which the laws in question actually serve the stated government interest against the burden they impose. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority, which held that the provisions of H.B. 2 at issue do not confer medical benefits that are sufficient to justify the burdens they impose on women seeking to exercise their constitutional right to an abortion. ## Footnote In 2013, the Texas Legislature passed House Bill 2 (H.B. 2), which contained several provisions related to abortions. One such provision required that any physician performing an abortion have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of where the abortion was performed, and another provision required that all abortion clinics comply with standards for ambulatory surgical centers. The petitioners are a group of abortion providers who sued the State of Texas seeking to invalidate those provisions in H.B. 2 as they relate to facilities in McAllen and El Paso. The petitioners argued that H.B. 2 denied equal protection, unlawfully delegated lawmaking authority, and constituted arbitrary and unreasonable state action. The district court dismissed the equal protection, unlawful delegation, and arbitrary and unreasonable state action claims and granted declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the two contested provisions of H.B. 2. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the equal protection, unlawful delegation, and arbitrary and unreasonable state action claims and partially reversed the injunctions because the plaintiffs failed to show that they placed a substantial burden in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. Question Should a court's "substantial burden" analysis take into account the extent to which laws that restrict access to abortion services actually serve the government's stated interest in promoting health?

Answer 17

The Fifth Circuit’s judgment, upholding a Louisiana law that requires abortion providers to hold admitting privileges at local hospitals, is reversed. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the plurality opinion on behalf of himself and Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. ## Footnote In June 2014, Louisiana passed Act 620, which required “that every physician who performs or induces an abortion shall ‘have active admitting privileges at a hospital that is located not further than thirty miles from the location at which the abortion is performed or induced.’” Several abortion clinics and doctors challenged Act 620, and while that challenge was pending in the district court, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a “nearly identical” Texas law in Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt (WWH), finding that the Texas law imposed an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to have an abortion while bringing about no “health-related benefit” and serving no “relevant credentialing function.” The district court hearing the challenge to Act 620 accordingly declared Act 620 facially invalid and permanently enjoined its enforcement. The district court made detailed findings of fact and determined that “admitting privileges also do not serve ‘any relevant credentialing function,’” and that “physicians are sometimes denied privileges … for reasons unrelated to [medical] competency.” The district court further determined that the law would “drastically burden women’s right to choose abortions.”

Answer 18

On June 24, 2022, the Court issued a decision that, by a vote of 6–3, reversed the lower court rulings. A smaller majority of five justices joined the opinion overturning Roe and Casey. The majority held that abortion is neither a constitutional right mentioned in the Constitution nor a fundamental right implied by the concept of ordered liberty . ## Footnote **Facts**: Mississippi law provides that ‘except in a medical emergency or in the case of a severe fetal abnormality, a person shall not intentionally or knowingly perform […] or induce an abortion of the unborn human being if the probable gestational age of the unborn human being has been determined to be greater than 15 weeks.”

Answer 19

struck down Virginia’s ban on interracial marriage, mainly on EP grounds. = what renders the statute racially discriminatory is the fact that it proscribes generally accepted conduct if enggaed in by member of different race - the statute only prohibits interracial mariage involving whites ⇒ purpose is to uphold white supremacy. ## Footnote Facts: Mildred Loving (an African-American woman) married Richard Loving (a white man) in DC. On return to Virginia they were convicted of violating Virginia’s criminal ban on miscegenation. Trial judge suspended their one-year jail sentences on condition they leave Virginia and do not return for 25 years. Perfect case for the NAACP.

Answer 20

■ Court again vindicated the right to marry, but via an equal protection route – Court invalidated a Wisconsin law that provided that any resident “having minor issue not in his custody and which he is under an obligation to support by any court order” could not marry without obtaining court approval, which depended on proof that the applicant’s support obligation had been met and the children covered by the support order are not likely to become public charges

Answer 21

Court invalidated a zoning ordinance limiting occupancy of a dwelling to members of a single family, as applied to a grandmother who shared her home with two grandsons who were first cousins rather than siblings = right to determine who your family is

Answer 22

Where the Court (6 to 3) concluded that when applying a Washington statute that granted ‘any person’ the right to petition for child visitation rights ‘at any time’ substantive due process required the state court to give ‘special weight’ to the parent’s preferences

Answer 23

No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the judgment for a 5-4 court. Based on its analysis of common-law tradition, the plurality opinion found that a possible biological father does not have a fundamental right to obtain parental rights after the presumptive father has exercised significant responsibility over the child. ## Footnote – California law establishing a presumption that a child born to the wife is legitimately a child of the marriage, rebuttable only under limited circumstances = mainly matters for inheritance.

Answer 24

**Holding**: Court upheld the statute (5 to 4) as applied to homosexual sodomy. Stayed the law until *Lawrence v Texas* ## Footnote **Facts**: the police officer entered his house while he was having sex. He later discovered that he was charged under the anti-sodomy laws. – Facial challenge to a Georgia law that defined sodomy (this statute did not specify that the participants were in a homosexual relationship) – Felony with up to 20 years in prison

Answer 25

Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that Amendment 2 of the Colorado State Constitution violated the equal protection clause. Amendment 2 singled out homosexual and bisexual persons, imposing on them a broad disability by denying them the right to seek and receive specific legal protection from discrimination. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that oftentimes a law will be sustained under the equal protection clause, even if it seems to disadvantage a specific group, so long as it can be shown to "advance a legitimate government interest." Amendment 2, by depriving persons of equal protection under the law due to their sexual orientation failed to advance such a legitimate interest. Justice Kennedy concluded: "If the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest." ## Footnote **Facts**: Proposed amendment to the state constitution of Colorado that would prohibit gay people from having relationships and get married

Answer 26

**Holding**: the statute is struck down and *Bowers* overruled ## Footnote **Facts**: Contrary to the commonly known facts of the case, when the police arrived and arrested Lawrence and Gardner they were not engaged in sexual activity in violation of the statute. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held that the statute was not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with *Bowers v. Hardwick*, controlling. .

Answer 27

**Held**: The Court held that the state law was constitutional. In an opinion authored by Justice Henry Billings Brown, the majority upheld state-imposed racial segregation. Justice Brown conceded that the 14th Amendment intended to establish absolute equality for the races before the law, but held that separate treatment did not imply the inferiority of African Americans. In short, segregation did not in itself constitute unlawful discrimination. In dissent, John Marshall Harlan argued that the Constitution was color-blind and that the United States had no class system. Accordingly, all citizens should have equal access to civil rights. ## Footnote Louisiana enacted the Separate Car Act, which required separate railway cars for blacks and whites. In 1892, Homer Plessy – who was seven-eighths Caucasian – agreed to participate in a test to challenge the Act. He was solicited by the Comite des Citoyens (Committee of Citizens), a group of New Orleans residents who sought to repeal the Act. They asked Plessy, who was technically black under Louisiana law, to sit in a "whites only" car of a Louisiana train. The railroad cooperated because it thought the Act imposed unnecessary costs via the purchase of additional railroad cars. When Plessy was told to vacate the whites-only car, he refused and was arrested. At trial, Plessy’s lawyers argued that the Separate Car Act violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The judge found that Louisiana could enforce this law insofar as it affected railroads within its boundaries. Plessy was convicted. **Question** Does the Separate Car Act violate the Fourteenth Amendment?

Answer 28

Court struck down regulation that required railroads (but not other defendants) to pay attorneys’ fees to successful plaintiffs in certain cases.

Answer 29

**Held**: A state law which taxes all the income of local corporations derived from business done outside of the State and business done within it, while exempting entirely the income derived from outside the State by local corporations which do no local business, is arbitrary, and violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ■ Classification must be reasonable and not arbitrary, and grounds must have a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation (alike circumstances are treated alike)

Answer 30

Held: Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court, and held that the ordinance was valid. Employing rational basis review, the Court reasoned that the ordinance functioned to limit distractions to motorists. Regarding the Equal Protection Clause challenge, the Court held that a city could ban some advertisements that distracted pedestrians without having to eliminate every distraction. In his concurrence, Justice Robert H. Jackson famously wrote that "there is no more effective practical guarantee against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose on a minority must be imposed generally." ## Footnote **Facts** – Section 124 of the New York City Traffic Regulations ■ No advertising vehicle on any street, but business notices can be put on delivery vehicles as long as the vehicles are engaged in the business of the owner and not mainly for advertising – Appellant is engaged in nationwide express business ■ Operates 1900 trucks in NYC and **sells** exterior of its trucks for advertising, mostly unconnected to its business – State court found that the advertisement distracts and therefore affects road safety ■ Appellants argue unequal treatment between advertisements of products sold by the owner and general advertisements – argued that this distinction is not justified by the aim and purpose of the legislation (both types of advertisements cause distraction)

Answer 31

■ Upheld (5 to 4) Louisiana’s nepotistic pilotage laws granting state certificates only to relatives and friends of incumbents

Answer 32

The Court held that laws may create classifications that are not elegant or “artfully drawn” but that are not unconstitutional. The Constitution would allow Congress to deny windfall benefits to all employees, therefore it was not unconstitutional to deny them to some. The Court also held that the distinctions were not arbitrary, as Congress was attempting to “protect the relative equities of employees and to provide benefits to career railroad employees.” ## Footnote In 1974 Congress passed the Railroad Retirement Act, which restructured the retirement system previously established in 1937. Under the old system, employees who were eligible for both railroad benefits and social security benefits received both, along with an additional “windfall” benefit. Since this system threatened to bankrupt the railroad retirement program, the goal of the new Act was to eliminate some of these benefits. The new Act divided employees into different classes based on their employment history as of January 1, 1975. Employees who had worked for the railroad fewer than 10 years would not receive any windfall benefit. Employees who were already retired and receiving the full benefits would continue to do so. Employees who qualified for the full benefits but had not yet retired would receive the full benefits only if they had a current connection to the railroad industry or had served for 25 years or more. Employees who did not meet these requirements received a lesser windfall benefit. The appellee Gerhard H. Fritz was part of a plaintiff class of former railroad employees who were eligible for the windfall benefits under the old system, but who did not have a current connection to the railroad and had worked fewer than 25 years. Alleging that the Act created an irrational distinction between employees that violated the Due Process Clause, they filed a class action suit in district court. The district court held that such a distinction was not “rationally related” to the goal of ensuring the solvency of the retirement system.

Answer 33

Where Court invalidated an exemption by name of a particular company from a general regulatory scheme. Illionois law imposed financial responsibility requirements on businesses, issuing money orders by American Express was exempt. The exemption was held to be unconstitutional.

Answer 34

Holding: Court overruled Morey as aberrational and returned to a highly deferential approach to economic preferences. ## Footnote The original case involved a 1972 New Orleans ordinance banning all pushcart food vendors in the French Quarter except those who had continuously operated there for eight or more years. Two vendors had done so for twenty years or more and qualified under the grandfather clause. Appellee Dukes had operated a pushcart for only two years and challenged the ordinance, winning in the lower courts.

Answer 35

Holding: Court (7 to 2) departed from this deferential trend by striking down a provision of federal food stamp programme limiting assistance to ‘households’ defined as groups of related persons (worried about hippies using them), despite applying a rationality standard ## Footnote certain households are entitled to food stamps for buying food.

Answer 36

Holding: Struck down the law even though the claimant was not a citzen. The case marks the start of EP analysis – bc there would have been many ways to swat the case on the basis of his lack of nationality. ## Footnote **Facts**: Order No. 156, passed May 26, 1880 ■ SEC. 1. It shall be unlawful, from and after the passage of this order, for any person or persons to establish, maintain, or carry on a laundry within the corporate limits of the city and county of San Francisco without having first obtained the consent of the board of supervisors, except the same be located in a building constructed either of brick or stone. ■ SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person to erect, build, or maintain, or cause to be erected, built, or maintained, over or upon the roof of any building now erected or which may hereafter be erected within the limits of said city and county, any scaffolding without first obtaining the written permission of the board of supervisors, which permit shall state fully for what purpose said scaffolding is to be erected and used, and such scaffolding shall not be used for any other purpose than that designated in such permit. ■ SEC. 3. Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this order shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail, not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Example of Anti-Chinese laws: Many Chinese immigrants were sent to prison, rule that everyone recently released from prison should have their head shaved (vetoed by the mayor of SF) Where there is evidence of specific animus, then this is an exception to the rational review (except where there is a race-based classification)?

Answer 37

In a 6-3 opinion, the Court reversed the Second Circuit and held that the Transit Authority's policy was not unconstitutional or illegal under the Civil Rights Act. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens described Beazer's statistical argument as "weak", as the 81 percent statistic did not relate to methadone users specifically. The Court recognized the public safety interest in keeping narcotics users from working for NYTA. The narcotics rule was an allowable policy choice made by NYTA, and any specific exemption for methadone users from the narcotics rule would have been "costly" and "imprecise." Justice Lewis Powell wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. ## Footnote Carl Beazer and Jose Reyes were employees of the New York Transit Authority (NYTA). Both were heroin addicts undergoing methadone treatment. NYTA maintained a policy against hiring anyone using narcotics. Methadone was considered a narcotic, and both Beazer and Reyes were terminated after NYTA learned of their methadone use. Beazer and Reyes filed a class action against the Transit Authority, alleging that NYTA's policy discriminated against blacks and Hispanics. They cited a statistic showing that 81 percent of suspected violations of NYTA's policy were black or Hispanic. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled for Beazer, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this decision. Question Did the New York Transit Authority's prohibition against the hiring of anybody using methadone violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Answer 38

**Holding**: Rare case in which the Court could find no real connection between a classification and its purposes, even under rational-basis review – Court (unanimous) struck down aspects of the West Virginia property tax system. West Virginia Constitution establishes a general principle of uniform taxation so that all property is to be taxed in proportion to its value. For years beginning in 1975 the County tax assessor valued Allegheny Pittsburgh’s real property on the basis of its recent purchase price. Court concluded that the assessment system violated EPC. ## Footnote Facts here: Virgina sets general principles of uniform taxation (arbitrary) - market values may be difficult to establish in small places. For years the WV county, valued his business on the basis of his recent purchase price => challenged it.

Answer 39

– Court upheld California’s Proposition 13, imposing property taxation rates based on the price of property at the time of acquisition. This system discriminated among classes of property owners based on the duration of their property ownership (a factor not obviously related to relevant grounds of property taxation). This favoured longer-term property owners over newer property owners

Answer 40

Held: ■ Successful EPC challenges by a class of one where plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and where there is no rational basis for difference in treatment ■ EPC protects against intentional and arbitrary discrimination whether by express terms of the statute or its improper execution ■ Here irrational requirement for 33-foot easemen ## Footnote – Olech, a homeowner, sued the Village of Willowbrook alleging a breach of the EPC, as the village required a 33-foot easement as a condition of connecting her house to the municipal water supply, when the village had only required a 15-foot easement from other property-owners seeking similar access – Court addressed the issue as one of **irrationality** without regard for motive or animus (= essentially what is the ends that these means are trying to achieve)

Answer 41

"Yes. Strong, writing for the majority, declared that to deny citizen participation in the administration of justice solely on racial grounds "is practically a brand upon them, affixed by law; an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others." ## Footnote Facts: A West Virginia law declared that only whites may serve on juries. Question Does the state law barring blacks from jury service violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Answer 42

Held: CJ Hughes (for the majority) ruled that the state was obliged to furnish Gaines within its borders facilities for legal education substantially equal to those which the State there offered for persons of the white race. In the absence of such facilities, Gaines was entitled to be admitted to the existing state law school – This was confirmed in Sipuel v Oklahoma (1948) ## Footnote Facts: Gaines, a black applicant, had been refused admission to the University of Missouri Law School because of his race. Missouri argued that pending the establishment of a black law school in the state, it would pay Gaines’s tuition in an out of state school

Answer 43

– Court required the admission of blacks to the University of Texas Law School even though the state had recently established a law school for blacks – CJ Vinson (for the Court) found no substantial equality in the educational opportunities offered white and black law students by the State. UoT law school was superior in resources and facilities in every respect, far greater prestige. Black law school excludes 85% of the population (white people) with whom the petitioner will have to interact as member of the Texan bar – the networking opportunities were excluded form Afro-Americans.

Answer 44

Held –– CJ Vinson found that the restrictions impaired the ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange of views with other students and generally to learn his profession ## Footnote Black student who had been admitted to a state university’s graduate state programme not offered at the state’s black school, but had been required to sit in separate sections in or adjoining classrooms, library and cafeteria.

Answer 45

Held: Separate but equal educational facilities for racial minorities is inherently unequal, violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that “separate but equal” facilities are inherently unequal and violate the protections of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that the segregation of public education based on race instilled a sense of inferiority that had a hugely detrimental effect on the education and personal growth of African American children. Warren based much of his opinion on information from social science studies rather than court precedent. The decision also used language that was relatively accessible to non-lawyers because Warren felt it was necessary for all Americans to understand its logic. ## Footnote ■ Facts – Cases come from various states (Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia and Delaware). In each case black minors want to get admission to the public schools of their community on a non-segregated basis. In each case they have been denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation. Their cases were rejected by lower courts on the basis of Plessy. They argue that segregated public schools are not equal and cannot be made equal (=inherently discriminatory) and therefore they are deprived of equal protection of the laws

Answer 46

Held: The Fifth Amendment's guarantee of "liberty" protected by due process also guaranteed racial equality in public education in the District of Columbia. In a unanimous decision authored by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court found that racial discrimination in the public schools of Washington, DC, denied blacks due process of law as protected by the Fifth Amendment. Noting the legal peculiarities of DC, Justice Warren recognized that the Fifth Amendment (which applied to the District) did not contain an Equal Protection Clause, while the Fourteenth Amendment. Lacking an equal protection standard to invalidate the District's segregation, Warren creatively relied on the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of "liberty" to find the segregation of the Washington, DC, schools unconstitutional. The Supreme Court decided this case on the same day as Brown v. Board of Education, which overshadowed it. Its most important legacy is the concept of reverse incorporation and the application of the same anti-discrimination principles to state and federal governments. ## Footnote The D.C. Board of Education denied a petition by a group of parents in Anacostia to racially integrate John Phillip Sousa Junior High School. The following year, in 1950, the parents sought admission to the all-white school for 11 African-American children. When the request was again denied by the Board, a Howard University law professor brought a lawsuit. The claim was dismissed by the trial court. Question Did the segregation of the public schools of Washington D.C. violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Answer 47

. Chief Justice Fred Vinson, writing for the court, held that the differential treatment given to McLaurin was itself a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause: "Such restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession." McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents (1950) signaled that the Supreme Court would no longer tolerate any separate treatment of students based on their race. ## Footnote The case began when the University of Oklahoma denied George W. McLaurin admission to its graduate program in education, citing the segregation statute, which made it a misdemeanor to operate a school in which both Blacks and whites were taught. McLaurin filed suit in federal court in Oklahoma City. In an opinion marked by balance, even caution, a three-judge panel struck down the law, to the extent that it prohibited McLaurin from attending the University of Oklahoma. Even though the university could no longer deny McLaurin a place in school, it tried to segregate him on campus. He had to sit by himself in a separate section of the classroom, sit at a separate desk in the library, and sit at a different table (and sometimes eat at different times) from the rest of the students in the cafeteria. The federal court in Oklahoma City upheld the discrimination, observing that the Constitution "does not abolish distinctions based upon race . . . , nor was it intended to enforce social equality between classes and races." Such reasoning, though common in courts up to that time, was about to lose all legitimacy.

Answer 48

In a signed, unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Arkansas officials were bound by federal court orders that rested on the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education. While the Court noted that the school board had acted in good faith, that most of the problems stemmed from the official opposition of the Arkansas state government to racial integration in both word and deed, it was constitutionally impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause to maintain law and order by depriving the black students of their equal rights under the law. More importantly, the Court held that since the Supremacy Clause of Article VI made the U.S. Constitution the supreme law of the land, and Marbury v. Madison made the Supreme Court the final interpreter of the Constitution, the precedent set forth in Brown v. Board of Education was the supreme law of the land and was therefore binding on all the states, regardless of any state laws contradicting it. The Court therefore rejected the contention that the Arkansas legislature and Governor were not bound by the Brown decision. Justice Frankfurter wrote a concurring opinion. ## Footnote The Governor and the Legislature of Arkansas openly resisted the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education. On February 20, 1958, five months after the integration crisis involving the Little Rock Nine, members of the school board (along with the Superintendent of Schools) filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, urging suspension of its plan of desegregation. The relief the plaintiffs requested was for the African American children to be returned to segregated schools and for the implementation of the desegregation plan to be postponed for two and a half years. The district court granted the school board's request, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. Question Were Arkansas officials bound by federal court orders mandating desegregation?

Answer 49

Held: Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., writing for a unanimous court, reversed the court of appeals to the extent it affirmed the district court. The Supreme Court held that the “freedom of choice” plan was not a sufficient step to bring about a desegregated unitary school system. While the freedom of choice plan may work in some situations, school districts must provide a plan that works to dismantle the segregated system in their district. ## Footnote Facts: New Kent County had two schools that taught students elementary through high school. Prior to 1965, New Kent school taught all white students, while George W. Watkins school taught all African American students. After Brown v. Board of Education, the school district implemented a “freedom of choice” plan, where all students could choose which school they wanted to attend. While the school district did not prevent anyone from attending the school they wanted to, only a few African American students transferred to New Kent and no white students transferred to George W. Watkins. Several students and parents from the school district brought this action against the school district, arguing that the plan did not adequately integrate the school system. The district court upheld the plan. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, but remanded the case for a more specific order concerning desegregation of teachers. Question Does the “freedom of choice plan” violate equal protection where evidence shows that the plan is not likely to bring about desegregation?

Answer 50

**Held**: Court affirmed the district court’s order with unanimous opinion by CJ Burger: – In a system with a history of segregation, need for remedial criteria of sufficient specificity to assure a school authority’s compliance with its constitutional duty requires a presumption against schools that are substantially disproportionate in their racial composition – Courts have broad discretion to use gerrymandering of school districts and attendance zones ## Footnote **Facts**: In Charlotte, NC, a metropolitan area, which had been wholly segregated, the district adopted a court approved desegregation plan, including geographic zoning and free transfers – Lower court appointed its own expert and accepted this plan, which involved some redrawing of district lines as well as some busing of elementary school students in both direction

Answer 51

Held: The Court modified and remanded the lower court decision and held that when part of a school system is found to be segregated, a "prima facie case of unlawful [systematic] segregative design" becomes apparent. The school district involved assumes the burden of proving that it operated without "segregative intent" on a system-wide basis. This case is significant because it represents one of the first instances in which the Court identified segregation in northern schools. ## Footnote Petitioners proved that for nearly ten years since 1960 the Denver, Colorado school system implemented an unconstitutional policy of racial discrimination by operating a segregated school system. The defense argued, and the District Court held, that even though one part of the Denver system was guilty of segregation, it did not follow that the entire system was segregated as well. Question Did the segregation in Denver involve all of the city's schools and violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Answer 52

Held: In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that "[w]ith no showing of significant violation by the 53 outlying school districts and no evidence of any interdistrict violation or effect," the district court's remedy was "wholly impermissible" and not justified by Brown v. Board of Education. The Court noted that desegregation, "in the sense of dismantling a dual school system," did not require "any particular racial balance in each 'school, grade or classroom.'" The Court also emphasized the importance of local control over the operation of schools ## Footnote Facts: A suit charging that the Detroit, Michigan public school system was racially segregated as a result of official policies was filed against Governor Milliken. After reviewing the case and concluding the system was segregated, a district court ordered the adoption of a desegregation plan that encompassed eighty-five outlying school districts. The lower court found that Detroit-only plans were inadequate. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the metropolitan plan. This case was decided together with Allen Park Public Schools v. Bradley and Grosse Pointe Public School System v. Bradley. Question Did federal courts have the authority to impose a multi-district desegregation plan on schools outside the Detroit area?

Answer 53

Held: The Court held that the District Court "abused its discretion" by imposing a specific tax increase. The Court also held, however, that the modifications of the District Court's order made by the Court of Appeals satisfied "equitable and constitutional principles governing the District Court's power...." The majority found that court orders directing local governments to levy their own taxes were "plainly" judicial acts within the powers of federal courts. When a constitutional justification existed, courts had the authority to order tax increases despite statutory limitations. The Court reasoned that "[t]o hold otherwise would fail to take account of the obligations of local governments, under the Supremacy Clause, to fulfill the requirements that the Constitution imposes on them." ## Footnote In order to combat segregation in public schools in compliance with court directives, the Kansas City, Missouri School District (KCMSD) sought to enhance the quality of schools and to attract more white students from the suburbs. The KCMSD's ability to raise taxes, however, was limited by state law. After determining that the District did not have alternative means of raising revenue for the program, federal district judge Russell G. Clark ordered an increase of local property taxes for the 1991-92 fiscal year. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision, but ruled that the courts should enjoin state tax laws that prevented the District from raising the necessary funds and allow the state to set tax rates. Question Did the court order to increase property taxes violate Article III, the Tenth Amendment, or principles of federal/state comity?

Answer 54

Held: Chief Justice William Rehnquist delivered the opinion for a 5-3 court. The Court held that the "federal supervision of local school systems [has always] been intended as a temporary measure to remedy past discrimination." Once a school system demonstrates earnest compliance with an injunction, the federal court can consider removing it. The district court's finding in 1977 that the plan had achieved its goal of racially "unitary" schools was not sufficiently clear to dissolve the 1972 injunction. Instead, the district court could remove the injunction upon finding that "that the school system was being operated in compliance with the Equal Protection Clause, and that it was unlikely that the Board would return to its former ways." If the Board satisfied these goals, the district court could remove the injunction and consider the SRP separately and on its own merits. ## Footnote Facts: In 1972, a federal district court issued an injunction ordering the Board of Education of Oklahoma City to implement the "Finger Plan," which bused black students to white schools. In 1977, the district court withdrew its enforcement of the plan, declaring that the Board had complied with the plan and reached "unitary" racial composition. In 1984, the Board passed the Student Reassignment Plan (SRP), which lessened busing in an effort to reduce travel time for black students. The group that originally protested segregation sought to restore the court-ordered desegregation, claiming that the school system again became segregated. The district court declined, but on appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that the injunction was never formally removed. On reconsideration, the district court again declined to restore the injunction because it found the original "Finger Plan" unworkable. The Court of Appeals reversed. Question If a federal court deems that an injunction to desegregate schools has achieved its goals, can that court permanently dissolve the injunction?

Answer 55

The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Florida statute denied equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and was therefore invalid. ## Footnote Facts: Court invalidated a criminal adultery and fornication statute prohibiting cohabitation by interracial unmarried couples. In McLaughlin v. Florida, a Florida statute criminalized the act of an unmarried interracial couple habitually living in the same room at night. This law singled out interracial couples, as no equivalent statute penalized the same conduct for couples of the same race. McLaughlin and his partner, an interracial couple, were convicted under this statute. They appealed their conviction, arguing that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the conviction, relying on the precedent set by Pace v. Alabama, which allowed racial distinctions in certain statutes. The case was subsequently appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case and review the constitutionality of the Florida statute

Answer 56

Holding: Court reversed (relying on Loving v Virginia). ## Footnote Facts: Custody battle between Palmore and Sidoti (both white) after divorce. Initially Palmore the mother was awarded custody of three-year old daughter, but when she remarried an African-American man, the state court awarded custody to the father ‘in the best interest of the child’. Trial court argued that daughter will suffer from social stigma.

Answer 57

Held: – Court (5 to 3) held that strict scrutiny must be applied to a state policy of segregating prisoners by race even where preventing racial gang violence was the justification. ## Footnote California prisoner Garrison Johnson alleged in federal district court that the California Department of Corrections used race to assign temporary cell mates for new prisoners. Johnson alleged this violated the U.S. Constitution's equal protection clause. The district court and a federal appellate court ruled against Johnson. The appellate court pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Turner v. Safley, which said a relaxed standard - as opposed to a "strict scrutiny" standard - should be used to determine whether prison regulations are constitutional. The prison's policies were "reasonably related to the administrators' concern for racial violence and thus must be upheld," the appellate court wrote. Question Is a state's practice of temporary racial segregation of state prisoners subject to strict scrutiny?

Answer 58

This policy put in place by President Roosevelt was challenged and upheld. ## Footnote Facts: Internment of more than 100,000 US or non-US citizens of Japanese origin in camps during WW II. President issued Executive Order after Pearl Harbour (but there was no evidence of disloyalty) whereby military commanders on the West Coast could impose restrictions for any person. In reality the orders mandated internment (Japanese had to report to relocation centres and from there were deported to camps). Loss of property and brutal conditions in camp.

Answer 59

In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects those beyond the two classes of white or Negro, and extends to other racial groups in communities depending upon whether it can be factually established that such a group exists within a community. ## Footnote Pete Hernandez, an agricultural worker, was indicted for the murder of Joe Espinoza by an all-Anglo (white) grand jury in Jackson County, Texas. Claiming that Mexican-Americans were barred from the jury commission that selected juries, and from petit juries, Hernandez' attorneys tried to quash the indictment. Moreover, Hernandez tried to quash the petit jury panel called for service, because persons of Mexican descent were excluded from jury service in this case. A Mexican-American had not served on a jury in Jackson County in over 25 years and thus, Hernandez claimed that Mexican ancestry citizens were discriminated against as a special class in Jackson County. The trial court denied the motions. Hernandez was found guilty of murder and sentenced by the all-Anglo jury to life in prison. In affirming, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that "Mexicans are...members of and within the classification of the white race as distinguished from members of the Negro Race" and rejected the petitioners' argument that they were a "special class" under the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, the court pointed out that "so far as we are advised, no member of the Mexican nationality" challenged this classification as white or Caucasian. Question Is it a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause to try a defendant of a particular race or ethnicity before a jury where all persons of his race or ancestry have, because of that race or ethnicity, been excluded by the state?

Answer 60

Held: Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that "Hawaii's denial of Rice's right to vote in OHA trustee elections violates the Fifteenth Amendment," in creating a race-based voting qualification. "A state may not deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race, and this law does so," Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court. The court rejected the state's argument that the voting limitation was one based on ancestry, not race. In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for himself and Ruth Bader Ginsburg that the majority's decision "rests largely on the repetition of glittering generalities that have little, if any, application to the compelling history of the state of Hawaii." ## Footnote Facts: The Hawaiian Constitution limits the right to vote for the nine trustees of the state agency known as the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA). The agency administers programs designed for the benefit of two subclasses of Hawaiian citizenry, "native Hawaiians," defined as descendants of not less than one-half part of the races inhabiting the Islands before 1778, and "Hawaiians," defined as descendants of the peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands in 1778. Only "Hawaiians" may vote in the statewide election for the trustees. Harold Rice, born in Hawaii and a Hawaiian citizen, does not have the requisite ancestry to be a "Hawaiian" under state law. However, Rice applied to vote in OHA trustee elections. After Rice's application was denied, he sued Hawaiian Governor Benjamin J. Cayetano, claiming that the voting exclusion was invalid under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Federal District Court granted the state summary judgment. The court examined the voting qualifications with the latitude applied to legislation passed pursuant to Congress' power over Indian affairs, and found that the electoral scheme was rationally related to the state's responsibility to utilize a part of the proceeds from certain public lands for the native Hawaiians' benefit. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that Hawaii "may rationally conclude that Hawaiians, being the group to whom trust obligations run and to whom OHA trustees owe a duty of loyalty, should be the group to decide who the trustees ought to be." Question Does the Hawaiian Constitutional provision, which limits the right to for the trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs to qualified "Hawaiians," violate the Fifteenth Amendment by creating a race-based voting qualification?

Answer 61

The unanimous Court held that the Alabama legislature violated the Fifteenth Amendment. Justice Frankfurter admitted that states are insulated from judicial review when they exercise power "wholly within the domain of state interest." However, in this case, Alabama's representatives were unable to identify "any countervailing municipal function" the act was designed to serve. The Court believed that the irregularly shaped district was drawn with only one purpose in mind: to deprive blacks of political power. ## Footnote – For an example of inference of discriminatory motive from circumstantial evidence of extreme racially disparate impact, see Alabama law redefining the city boundaries of Tuskegee was a device to disenfranchise blacks in breach of 15th amendment ■ Change of Tuskegee resulted in removing from the city all save only four or five black voters while not removing a single white voter

Answer 62

Facts: Court found racially discriminatory purpose in a law that made no facial advertence/reference to race. Decision found closing of public schools unconstitutional in one of the counties involved in the first group of school desegregation cases decided together with Brown. Public school closing scheme included grants of public funds to white children to attend private schools

Answer 63

The SC did not find the measure unconstitutional. ## Footnote The city of Jackson, Mississippi, closed all of its public swimming pools, as opposed to integrating them. Originally there were five public pools, but the city closed four of them, and surrendered its lease to the fifth pool to the lessor, the YMCA, which continued to operate the pool privately and on a segregated basis. Hazel Palmer, mother of a freedom rider who was arrested at the bus station, and other black citizens filed suit against the city under the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection and under the Thirteenth Amendment, on the grounds that the city's actions created a "badge or incident" of slavery. The lower courts found no constitutional violation.

Answer 64

In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the procedures and written personnel test did not constitute racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court found that the Clause was designed to prevent official discrimination on the basis of race; laws or other official acts that had racially disproportionate impacts did not automatically become constitutional violations. The Court reasoned that the D.C. Police Department's procedures did not have discriminatory intent and were racially neutral measures of employment qualification. ## Footnote After the applications of two blacks were rejected by the District of Columbia Police Department, the two men filed suit against Mayor Walter E. Washington. The men alleged that the Department's recruiting procedures, including a written personnel test, discriminated against racial minorities. They claimed that the test was unrelated to job performance and excluded a disproportionate number of black applicants. Question Did the recruiting procedures violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Answer 65

Perhaps. After finding that MHDC had proper federal standing, since it acted on behalf of black plaintiffs who stood to suffer direct and measurable injuries from Arlington's denial, the Court held that it failed to establish Arlington's racially discriminatory intent or purpose. While indicating that Arlington's zoning denial may result in a racially disproportionate impact, the evidence did not show that this was Arlington's deliberate intention. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further consideration. ## Footnote The Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (MHDC) contracted with the Village of Arlington Heights ("Arlington") to build racially integrated low-and moderate-income housing. When MHDC applied for the necessary zoning permits, authorizing a switch from a single-to a multiple-family classification, Arlington's planning commission denied the request. Acting on behalf of itself and several minority members, MHDC challenged Arlington's denial as racially discriminatory. On appeal from an adverse district court decision, the Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme Court granted Arlington certiorari. Question Was Arlington Height's denial of a zoning request, necessary for the creation of low-and moderate-income housing, racially discriminatory in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?

Answer 66

Holding – Court (6 to 3) affirmed lower court findings of racially discriminatory vote dilution from circumstantial evidence surrounding an at-large election system in Burke County (Georgia) and upheld an order mandating a switch to single-member districts ## Footnote ■ facts – Burke County had a population of about 20,000 of which half were black – Whites constituted a slight majority of the voting age population – In 1978 6,373 persons were registered to vote, of whom 38% were black – Burke County Board of Commissioners governs the county ■ Created in 1911 (under state law) and consists of 5 members elected at large to concurrent 4 year terms by all qualified voters in the county

Answer 67

**Holding:** – SC struck down a facially neutral law found in fact to reflect racially discriminatory purpose (the weight of the evidence of the intention of discrimination was enough to strike it down) – Decision relied on evidence of starkly disparate impact and on circumstantial historical evidence form which discriminatory intent could be inferred – Decision invalidated a section of the Alabama Constitution adopted in 1901 disenfranchising all persons convicted of crimes involving ‘moral turpitude’ ## Footnote Facts: Underwood, a white person, and Edwards, a black person, were blocked from the voter roles because each had been convicted of presenting a worthless check ■ Both brought suit claiming that the misdemeanours included within the provision were intentionally adopted to disenfranchise blacks on account of their race. The federal district court rejected their claim, but the court of appeals reversed – Based on Arlington Heights, the court of appeals found that ■ discriminatory intent was a motivating factor for the provision. In the absence of the racially discriminatory motivation the law would not have been enacted

Answer 68

**– Justice Kennedy** for the majority ■ a disparate impact claim that relies on a statistical disparity must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant’s policy or policies causing that disparity ■robust causality requirement would prevent situations where disparate impact liability causes race to be used and considered in a pervasive way such that serious constitutional questions are raised ## Footnote alleged that the TExas HDept allocated low-income housing tax credits in a way that concentrated affordable housing in predominantly minority areas perpetuating racial segregation – disparate impact claims were cognisable under the Fair Housing Act

Answer 69

he Supreme Court held that by discarding the exams, the City of New Haven violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Court rejected the Fire Department’s defence that it chose to invalidate the results to avoid disparate impact liability ## Footnote White and Hispanic candidates for promotion in the New Haven, CT fire department sued various city officials in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut when the New Haven Civil Service Board (CSB) failed to certify two exams needed for the plaintiffs' promotion to Lieutenant and Captain. The CSB did not certify because the results of the test would have promoted a disproportionate number of white candidates in comparison to minority candidates. The plaintiffs argued that their rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e, and the 14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause were violated. The federal district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. It reasoned that the CSB, by refusing to certify the results of the promotional exam, was trying to fulfill its obligations under the rules utilized by the plaintiffs in their argument and therefore was protected in its actions. Question 1) Can a municipality reject results from an otherwise valid civil service exam when the results unintentionally prevent the promotion of minority candidates? 2) Does 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e permit federal courts to relieve municipalities from having to comply with local laws that require strict compliance with race-blind merit selection procedures?

Answer 70

In a 5–4 decision, the Court upheld the travel ban. Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the majority, ruled that the president had broad authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act to restrict entry into the U.S. for national security reasons. The Court also found that the policy was facially neutral regarding religion and that the government provided a sufficient national security justification for the ban. ## Footnote On January 27, 2017, President Donald Trump signed Executive Order No. 13,769 (EO-1), which, among other things, suspended entry for 90 days of foreign nationals from seven countries identified by Congress or the Executive as presenting heightened terrorism-related risk

Answer 71

Held: Supreme Court had held that race could be considered as one factor among many( and it can be a positive factor) in admissions to achieve diversity, as long as it was not the sole criterion or used in a rigid quota system. This established the precedent for race-conscious admissions policies that was later upheld in cases like Grutter v. Bollinger (2003). ## Footnote Facts: Challenged the admission decision bc 16 places had been set aside for minority students. Apparently, Bakke did not do well in the entrance exam as well.

Answer 72

Holding – In a 5–4 decision, the Court ruled in favor of the University of Michigan. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the majority, held that the law school had a compelling interest in achieving a diverse student body and that its admissions policy was narrowly tailored to meet this goal (student benefits from a a diverse student body – there is a compelling interest allowing a race-conscious admission policy) ## Footnote Facts: University of Michigan Law School's admissions policy, which considered race as one of many factors in a holistic review process. Barbara Grutter, a White applicant who was denied admission, sued the law school, claiming that its use of race in admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Answer 73

Holding: In a 6–3 ruling, the Court determined that Harvard's use of race as a factor in admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision overturned previous precedents, like Grutter v. Bollinger (2003), which had upheld limited race-conscious admissions policies (Overruled Grutter but not Bakke). ## Footnote Facts: The case was brought by Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA), an organization that opposes race-based affirmative action. They argued that Harvard's admissions policies discriminated against Asian American applicants by holding them to higher academic standards and penalizing them based on subjective criteria, such as personal ratings (advantaged African Americans). Harvard University argued that race was one of many factors considered in a holistic evaluation system. They maintained that this approach was necessary to achieve diversity on campus, which benefits all students (the Bakke Argument).

Answer 74

Held: In a 5-to-4 decision written by Justice Charles Evans Hughes, the Court held that the establishment of minimum wages for women was constitutional. Echoing Muller v. Oregon (1908), the majority ruled that the state may use its police power to restrict the individual freedom to contract. The decision overruled Adkins and marked the Court's departure from the expansive view of the freedom to contract. The decision is generally regarded as having ended the Lochner era, a period in American legal history in which the Supreme Court tended to invalidate legislation aimed at regulating business. While Justice Hughes wrote the opinion, the stark doctrinal shift resulted from Justice Owen Josephus Roberts changing his perspective on this issue. According to Hughes, President Franklin Roosevelt's reelection in 1936 and the impressive achievements of the New Deal caused Roberts to abandon his affiliation with the Court's conservative justices. In dissent, Justice George Sutherland implicitly criticized Roberts for changing sides and argued that politics and public opinion should not impact the Court’s understanding of the Constitution. ## Footnote Under Washington state law, the Industrial Welfare Committee and Supervisor of Women in Industry set a minimum wage of $14.50 for each work week of 48 hours. Elsie Parrish, an employee of the West Coast Hotel Company, received an amount less than this wage. Parrish brought a suit to recover the difference between the wages paid to her and the minimum wage fixed by state law. In ruling for the hotel, the lower court relied on Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923), in which the Court struck down a minimum wage law for working women. Question Does a minimum wage law for women violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Answer 75

Held: In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the legislation was not an ex post facto law. The Court drew a distinction between criminal rights and "private rights," arguing that restrictions against ex post facto laws were not designed to protect citizens' contract rights. Justice Chase noted that while all ex post facto laws are retrospective, all retrospective laws are not necessarily ex post facto. Even "vested" property rights are subject to retroactive laws. ## Footnote Facts: Mr. and Mrs. Caleb Bull, the stated beneficiaries of the will of Norman Morrison, were denied an inheritance by a Connecticut probate court. When the Bulls attempted to appeal the decision more than a year and a half later, they found that a state law prohibited appeals not made within 18 months of the original ruling. The Bulls persuaded the Connecticut legislature to change the restriction, which enabled them to successfully appeal the case. Calder, the initial inheritor of Morrison's estate, took the case to the Supreme Court. Question Was the Connecticut legislation a violation of Article 1, Section 10, of the Constitution, which prohibits ex post facto laws?

Answer 76

he Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to marry as one of the fundamental liberties it protects, and that analysis applies to same-sex couples in the same manner as it does to opposite-sex couples. Judicial precedent has held that the right to marry is a fundamental liberty because it is inherent to the concept of individual autonomy, it protects the most intimate association between two people, it safeguards children and families by according legal recognition to building a home and raising children, and it has historically been recognized as the keystone of social order. Because there are no differences between a same-sex union and an opposite-sex union with respect to these principles, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees the right of same-sex couples to marry as the denial of that right would deny same-sex couples equal protection under the law ## Footnote Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. The plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process. Question (1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex? (2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state?

Answer 77

No. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the three-justice plurality. The plurality held that this case was not about the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions, but rather about whether the voters of a state can choose to prohibit the use of race preferences in the decisions of governmental bodies, specifically with respect to school admissions. The plurality held that the attempt to define and protect interests based on race ran the risk of allowing the government to classify people based on race and therefore perpetuate the same racism such policies were meant to alleviate. While voters may certainly determine that some race-based preferences should be adopted, it is not the role of the courts to disempower the voters from making such a choice. If certain issues were decided to be too sensitive to be addressed by voters, it would be denying the voters their right to debate and act through the lawful democratic process. ## Footnote Does an amendment to a state's constitution to prohibit race-and sex-based discrimination and preferential treatment in public university admission decisions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Cases - Semester 2 Flashcards

(101 cards)