Chapter 8 Flashcards

(62 cards)

1
Q

______ both provide important
labor in medical care production and
make key decisions in the health
system

A

Physicians

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2
Q

Hospitals = ‘

A

Doctors’ Workshops’
(Pauly, 1980)

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3
Q

The doctor’s large information
advantage over the patient leads
researchers to question whether the
typical physician is really a ________, or perhaps, at times, even
induces patient demand in order to
increase income.

A

“perfect”
agent

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4
Q

introduced by McGuire and Pauly (1991)

A

BENCHMARK MODEL OF THE
PHYSICIAN’S PRACTICE

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5
Q

-the model captures most of the observed physician behaviors as special cases of a
utility-maximizing physician decision maker. (not just profits)

A

BENCHMARK MODEL OF THE
PHYSICIAN’S PRACTICE

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6
Q

In this benchmark model, the physician gets utility from

A

(1) net income and
(2) leisure, and
(3) disutility from inducement

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7
Q

is the physician’s own efforts to induce patients to buy more
care than appears medically necessary.

A

Inducement –

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8
Q

This last factor introduces the _____ controversy into the model (Q: whether physicians use their knowledge advantage to abuse their
agency role for monetary gain.)

A

supplier-induced demand (SID)

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9
Q

U = U(p, L, I)
where p is the _______ from the practice; L is the ______, and I is
the _______.

A

net income; physician’s leisure time; degree of inducement

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10
Q

With three variables to consider, the physician must consider the willingness to
trade off between three pairs of goals:

A

(1) Net income p and Leisure L;
(2) Leisure L and Inducement I;
(3) Net income p and Inducement I.

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11
Q

determines the slope of this labor
leisure tradeoff.

A

“wage,” w,

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12
Q

-Assume that the work hours return a
constant revenue, w, for each hour worked

A

Tradeoff
between
Income and
Leisure

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13
Q

It follows that higher wage levels w2> w1, and
then w3> w2, will result in ______ rising
income lines.

A

steeper

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14
Q

This pattern is recast in Panel B,
where wage levels (w1, w2, and w3)
and labor are on the axes, in this
case forming the

A

“backward
bending labor supply curve.”

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15
Q

the physician is primarily
motivated by higher wages
to substitute labor for
leisure.

A

SITUATION A’ to B’

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16
Q

The physician’s income effect
dominates this substitution effect.
The physician becomes rich
enough to wish to spend more
time enjoying the income

A

SITUATION B’ to C’

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17
Q

The physician shown would move
along the curves toward point B’.
This implies a wish to compensate
for lost income by working more

A

At C, and wage falls

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18
Q

The model proposes that physicians dislike
inducing patient demand, viewing such
activity as “less than professional.”

A
  1. Tradeoff between Net
    Income and Inducement
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19
Q

The model proposes that physicians dislike
inducing patient demand, viewing such
activity as

A

“less than professional.”

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20
Q

With each unit of induced patient care, the
physician experiences a ______in utility that
must be offset by the extra utility gained from
the extra income that inducement brings.

A

decline

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21
Q

The ______represent the
physician’s preferences.

A

indifference curves

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22
Q

T or F

The indifference curves slope downward
because one of the two “goods,” I, is really
“bad.”

A

F

The indifference curves slope upward
because one of the two “goods,” I, is really
“bad.”

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23
Q

To remain on the same indifference curve, the
physician must gain additional ________to
offset the disutility of engaging in a higher
level of I.

A

net income

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24
Q

higher curves
are

A

preferred

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25
QUESTION: Do Physicians Respond to Financial Incentives?
Yes
26
The _____assumes that physicians seek profits among other goals
benchmark model
27
There is ample evidence that suggests physicians do respond to profit incentive
One sort of evidence describes physician output changes when facing clearly different reimbursement methods. Studies also suggest that physicians respond to income pressures on their practice by striving to increase their incomes. Analysts have found that OB/GYN physicians will recommend caesarean section, a more lucrative treatment, when their practice incomes are threatened by competition
28
One sort of evidence describes physician output changes when facing clearly different ______
reimbursement methods.
29
, a fixed total payment (Nassiri and Rochaix, 2006).
capitation
30
In Norway, patients are required to register with a physician, creating a patient list for each physician. Physicians with short lists tend to grow their lists more than average during the next five years to make up for reduced income
(Iversen, 2004).
31
Analysts have found that OB/GYN physicians will recommend caesarean section, a more lucrative treatment, when their practice incomes are threatened by competition
(Gruber and Owings, 1996)
32
On becoming ill, consumers hire health care professionals to serve as ____
agents
33
is where professionals have a great deal more knowledge of the subject at hand than the consumer.
Agency
34
When parties have unequal knowledge, we refer to the problem as
asymmetric information.
35
In medicine, we identify the physician as the_____, and the patient as the _____
agent; principal
36
POLICY CONCERN: Out of _____, physicians may violate their roles as agents
self-interest
37
Health economists have defined the _______as ones who make those choices and recommendations on behalf of the patients that the patients themselves would have made if they had the same information
“perfect agents”
38
We will describe physicians who knowingly induce their patients to consume other than this optimal amount of care as being in
violation of agency.
39
Does all supplier induced demand entail violation?
NO.
40
Modeling Supplier Induced Demand REASONS:
(1) First, one wishes to understand the motivations of physicians, how their incentives affect their practice. (2) Second, models help to understand the data we observe
41
Modeling Supplier Induced Demand ASSUMPTION
▪ let us acknowledge that the asymmetric information advantages give the physicians the power to misuse their agency relationship with the patient to personal advantage. ▪ Note that the physician depicted at equilibrium E1 has chosen to induce demand by OIE1. ▪ If such inducement is very common, it may be very difficult to detect because when everyone induces, it becomes normal.
42
if all physicians in the market behaved like our individual physician, an increase in the supply of physicians would lead to
an increased aggregate quantity of care.
43
WHo proposed a “fee test” to address this confusion, claiming that a rise in physician fees to a level higher than before the supply increase could be caused only by inducement.
Uwe Reinhardt
44
Uwe Reinhardt proposed a _______to address this confusion, claiming that a rise in physician fees to a level higher than before the supply increase could be caused only by inducement.
“fee test”
45
Economists who first proposed the SID criticism of physician behavior formulated the “target income hypothesis”
(Evans, 1974).
46
Economists who first proposed the SID criticism of physician behavior formulated the _____(Evans, 1974).
“target income hypothesis”
47
This argues that physicians have desired incomes that they strive to achieve or to restore whenever actual income falls below the targets.
“target income hypothesis”
48
This _____is a special case of the benchmark model, though a relatively extreme one
target income model
49
suggests that for the physicians in question, income becomes not merely the main thing but the only thing
Target income behavior
50
The McGuire-Pauly synthesis tells us that the size of the income effect is critical to understanding and identifying SID behavior. A lower profit rate, m, has two offsetting effects on inducement
1. Substitution effect: 2. Income effect:
51
The _____synthesis tells us that the size of the income effect is critical to understanding and identifying SID behavior. A lower profit rate, m, has two offsetting effects on inducement: 1. Substitution effect: If inducement is less profitable (smaller m), providers would do less inducement, that is, substitute away from it. 2. Income effect: Decreased income would make inducement more desirable
McGuire-Pauly
52
If inducement is less profitable (smaller m), providers would do less inducement, that is, substitute away from it
1. Substitution effect:
53
Decreased income would make inducement more desirable
2. Income effect:
54
For inducement to increase, a ______ on inducement must be large enough to overcome the negative substitution effect on inducement.
positive income effect
55
T or F Analysts will find it hard to conflate inducement with one or more of the many marketing practices common to virtually all firms.
F Analysts will find it easy to conflate inducement with one or more of the many marketing practices common to virtually all firms.
56
Marketing 4P’s:
Product, Place, Price, Promotion.
57
argued that much of the observed variation relates closely to the degree of physician uncertainty with respect to diagnosis and treatment.
Wennberg (1984)
58
The physician’s habits of treatment choices, beliefs about efficacies, and patterns of practice are seen as
“style.”
59
Practice style probably varies among physicians due to an
incomplete diffusion of information on medical technologies.
60
(PPACA) Stands for
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
61
____depicts the physician as someone who positively values net income and leisure, and dislikes inducing patient demand. It shows that a physician may respond to increased competition by greater effort at inducement.
Our benchmark model
62
The model also shows that to support the supplier-induced demand (SID) hypothesis, the physician’s income effect must be positive and substantial
benchmark model