China essay plans Flashcards
Yuan Shikai’s Leadership
Contention - YS’s leadership left Ch exactly where it started in terms of fulfilling 3POP + ALSO set dangerous precedent of autocratic leadership/J influence that cont thru JJ’s leadership
BP1 - YS was never committed to revolution/democracy
“He was hardly a revolutionary” (Bianco)
“He had no vision of a new system” (Fairbank)
Pressured 4 GMD cabinet members to resign
Used military support to suppress Second Rev in July 1913
Got $100mil loan from intl lenders → financial ind
Nov 1913 banned GMD
Jan 1914 dissolved nat + prov govts
May 1914 new constit extend pres term from 5→10 yrs + expand power of mil/dip/$
Jan 1916 declare himself emperor
BP2 - H/e YS’s leadership rep first semblance of unity/stability in Ch’s history
“For all his faults, Yuan Shikai had held the country together - a considerable achievement given the size and ethnic diversity of China” (Ryan)
appt loyal supporters as prov leaders
Implement some reforms:
inc crop yield by intro irrigation tech + encouraging breeding hardier livestock
reformed legal system
suppressed opium farming
Impressive considering size + diversity of Ch:
9.6mil sq km
55 diff ethnic grps (a/t 90% = Han)
BP3 - YS’s reign was worse than ineffective
“To enforce and extend his authority, he used martial law, secret police and terror” (Fenby)
Also 21D
21,000 execs in Henan prov in yr following 2nd Rev
21D = inimical to nat self-determination
Extensive rights to econ dev on Manch + Inner Mong
Control over mining in central Ch
Control of Liaodong Pen near K
Right to appoint J officials to Ch govt
Autocratic leadership style → death of YS left power vacuum → return of warlord rule
May Fourth Movement
Contention - important b/c set precedent for govt eff = judged on ability to deliver 3PP ‘nat’ + treatment of citizens BUT extent to which contrib to devt of rev = lim b/c intell/urban prole play sml role in CCP victory
BP1 - M4M = pivotal TP in Ch rev
M4M created “an audience ready to receive, welcome, contest and adapt these ideals” (Mitter)
M4M “encapsulated the frustrations and ambitions of young intellectuals who despaired of the state of the country”
M4M happened b/c planned to commemorate 21D = shameful → revealed that @ ToV J would be given Ger concessions b/c secret deal → student leader arrested
M4M = culmination of anti-C rhetoric of NCM b/c resent nat govt for X delivering ‘nat’ 3PP
100,000 workers in Shanghai stage 1wk general strike in solidarity w/ student leaders
Mvmt spread to 20 prov + 100+ towns/cities
BP2 - M4M = elite movement
“The movement had a very narrow sociological base” (Bianco)
Intell leadership centred around B Uni/NCM leaders = primarily interested in Marxism/anti-C rhetoric → idea of ‘nationalism’ was less ideologically appealing (vs nat = v imp to masses in WWII)
Little involvement in rural areas
Warlord rule = unchallenged until NE = launched 1926
Contention - SY’s significance was the legacy of 3PP as criteria for rev success/ambition, rather than his actions
BP1 - SY’s ideology was radical + shaped definition of rev in Ch
“The great forerunner of the Chinese revolution” - Deng
“One of the most important leaders of the Chinese Revolutionary movement” (Ryan)
Known was the ‘father’ of the rev
1905 SY pub 3PP:
Nationalism: end domination by foreign powers, oust Manchu, Han should rule themselves
PL: improve welfare, regulate agri land ownership, inc st influ in ind, implement single + fairer tax system
Dem: become republic w/ pop elected pres + parliament (modelled on W dem but retain Ch trad of entrance exams into civ service)
3PP = enduring goals thru/out rev - Moise argues CCP won b/c were “struggling for nationalist goals more vigorously and competently than the GMD”
BP2 - H/e SY failed to produce complete unity
“Sun Yat-sen proved unable to consolidate a unified government” (Shane)
1921 SY admit 1912 govt failed b/c X ideological cohesion → 1UF doomed to fail
1923 1UF Li Dazhou explains formed b/c “We cannot afford to have our rev forces divided” → t/f JJ turned on CCP in Shanghai, weakening the 1UF + distrust b/w left faction + CCP = destroyed unity
The Nanjing Decade
Contention - A/t there were attempts to reform, success was varied. This is b/c ND failed to address Ch’s econ/social weaknesses + opened door for J → easily exploited by CCP
BP1 - attempts to reform
GMD made “stunning accomplishments from a position of unenviable weakness” (Kirby)
“China under the Nanjing government was solving her problems, at least on an experimental scale” (Gray)
1927-36 highways inc 606%
1927-36 factories inc x2
1929-36 aircraft x40 bc est nat airline
Est Central Bank of Ch
Devised modern style govt budget
10/23 Eur concessions renounced → Ch has control of customs + tariffs
Ch diplomats part of high-level talks at LoN
BP2 - Failed to address econ/social weaknesses
“Beneath the Nationalist government’s veneer of progress lay fundamental problems of social and economic injustices” (Hsu)
“The Chinese people groaned under a regime that was Fascist in every quality except efficiency” (Fitzgerald)
Top-heavy pol system was rife w/ corruption:
1931-32 69.5K reports of infringements/poor efforts (corruption) by GMD off → only 268 found at fault + 13 off. Sacked
Slow transfer of taxes from prov to nat govts
Prov have ‘special taxes’ e.g. Guansu 44 diff taxes
Collecting tax yrs in advance e.g. Sichuan prov 1971 tax collected in 1933
Taxes 11x higher in some prov → extra pocketed by officials
Life was hard for ordinary ppl
24,000 comm + 155,000 LW symp arrested + ‘reformed’ during ND
NLM → ‘pried into ppl’s lives’ + enforced violently by Blue Shirts
80% budget allocated to mil
BP3 - Japanese invasion
“Its fate was determined from the first by the menace of Japanese militarism” (Fairbank), which GMD X resist in early days
By 1937 GMD only control 8 prov
1931 J assume control of Manch → declare ind from Ch Feb 1932 + est puppet st “Manchuko” → Ch lose key ind hub
1935 JJ agree to give J 5 more prov
By this point = too late to combat J invasion (60% of JJ’s best troops die in defence of Shanghai Aug 1937)
The Long March
Contention - A/t LM was a defeat in a practical sense, it est ideological foundations + solidified M’s leadership → allowed it to rebuild in Yenan
BP1 - LM was traumatic
“Nightmare of death and pain” (Spence)
A “huge defeat for the Communist movement in China” (Karl)
Only 7-8K survived
Lost southern base of JS
Great Snowy Mountains → ill-dressed + slipped to death down ravines
High Grasslands = one big swamp → swallowed ppl + horses whole, forced to eat weeds, faeces + boiled belt, dysentry + diarrhea were endemic
Arrived in Yenan = very poor + no industry
BP2 - LM enabled rise of M
“The LM made Mao had ‘made’ Mao a man that joined ideas with action” (Terrill)
“Mao was the prophet who would lead survivers through the wilderness” (Meisner)
At Zunyi Conference (Jan 1936) M regained influ in party criticism of 28B/Braun’s handling of 5EC + beginning of LM = supported by x2 Pb + Zheng → led LM in ‘central triad of leadership’ w/ Z + W
Renamed 1st front army = red army → rebuilt RA culture like in JS → “the biggest armed propaganda tour in history” (Snow) - “The LM is also a seeding machine, it has sown seeds in eleven provinces which will sprout…and yield a crop in the future”
LM veterans remained key part of M’s inner circle thru CR/every Ch leader until 1990s was LM vet
BP3 - LM had psychological benefits for the communists’ cause
“Ultimate test of survival amidst death” (Meisner) → forged LM spirit
“The LM is a manifesto” (Mao, Dec 1935)
LM spirit = struggle/courage/sacrafice/ingenuity is necessary for progress = developed into the ‘yenan way’
YS = self-sufficient - RA grow 40% of food needs, womens’ associations make most of clothing, comm creches + welfare systems cared for the needy
‘Mass line’ = cadres must be humble + live hardships of peasants
The Sino-Japanese War
Contention - A/t war weakened GMD, it was their lack of willingness to combat J rather than lack of competency that enabled rise of CCP (i.e. Ch ppl surrounded by atrocities on all sides and CCP was only alt)
BP1 - GMD bore the brunt of WWII
“Nationalist China was doomed by the Sino-Japanese War” (Ryan)
“So depleted physically and spiritually that it was manifestly incapable of coping with the new challenges of the postwar era” (Hsu)
”The Nanjing government might have ridden the crest of modernisation, but its fate was determined from the first by the menace of Japanese militarism” (Fairbank)
JJ lost 60% of best troops in Shanghai 13 Aug 1937
300,000 killed in Rape of Nanjing Dec 1937 - Jan 1938
NRA = 5mil troops in industrial/agriculturally rich heartland of Ch vs 1936 RA = 92,000 troops in rural backwaters
BP2 - Failures of the GMD
“War puts every belligerent power to the test and shows up outmoded regimes for what they really are” (Bianco)
“Jiang’s unwillingness to confront J brought his govt into disrepute” (Ryan)
Conscription = tragedy (Bianco)
1.5/3mil deaths in WWII = b/c of neglect
Conscripted soldiers = tied up naked w/ rope to stop escape
7 June 1938 GMD blew up dykes of Yellow River w/out warning to delay J’s advance → 500,000 drowned + destroyed crops in 3 prov → contrib to Henan famine (killed 2-3mil)
Abandoned Nanjing → X attempt to stop murder of 300,000 ppl
GMD were “more concerned with maintaining its political supremacy than in driving the Japanese out of China” (Brooks Anderson, NYT correspondent)
Stockpiling LL aid
Corruption:
30% aid end up on black market
Pay delivered in lump sums → officers pocket extra for troops who died/deserted
BP3 - Success of the CCP in embodying the nationalist cause
‘The Party was functioning very much as a nationalist organisation; indeed, it was struggling for nationalist goals more vigorously and more competently than the GMD” (Moise)
Almost ‘every major area of the Nationalist military weakness was an area of Red Army strength’ (Bianco)
M declare CCP would launch ind attack vs J on 20 Aug 1937 regardless of outcomes of 2UF negotiations
Conscription considered an honour b/c morale was high w/ Yenan spirit
CCP est Uni fo Anti-J resistance → attract intell disill w/ GMD (censorship in ‘Free China’)
During LM RA told peasants they would ‘march north to fight the Japanese’
The Chinese Civil War
Contention - A/t CCP’s commitment to anti-J resistance helped build solid support base that put them in good pos entering CW, GMD’s incompetence at governing + complicity in atrocities → depeleted morale/inc desperation for change
BP1 - WWII built CCP’s pop support base = invaluable for CW success
“The CCP’s greatest ally was the Japanese army” b/c atrocities meants ppl had “no recourse but to seek the Red Army’s protection” (Bianco)
Conscription in Lib areas = honour → built RA from 92,000 in 1936 → 800,000 in 1945
During LM CCP told peasants they would ‘march nth to fight the J’ = ID CCP w/ nat cause
GMD ‘saving the nation by the winding path’ but abandoned Nanjing → 300,000 ppl killed
BP2 - GMD’s atrocities → pop resentment + low morale → doomed CW
“The NRA was continually beaten because it had no soul” (Belden)
“Atrocities alienated the Nationalists” (Lynch)
‘Saving nation by the winding path’ → X morale b/c only options = to stay and die or flee
By 1938 the Nat “could not get the idea of offensive into their heads” (Gen Stilwell)
7 June 1938 1.5/3mil deaths in WWII = b/c of neglect
Conscripted soldiers = tied up naked w/ rope to stop escape
7 June 1938 GMD blew up dykes of Yellow River w/out warning to delay J’s advance → 500,000 drowned + destroyed crops in 3 prov → contrib to Henan famine (killed 2-3mil)
BP3 - GMD had already proven themself incapable of governing
“Hyper-inflation during the CW undermined everyday lives and ruined the lives of tens of millions” (Fenby)
Prices rose avg 237% 1942-44
Inflation reached 1000% by time CCP took power in 1949 → mass suffering b/c ord ppl X afford basic goods e.g. cotton, coal, oil, rice
Rampant corruption → end of US LL aid 1947
30% aid end up on black market
Pay delivered in lump sums → officers pocket extra for troops who died/deserted
Consolidation of power/mass campaigns
Contention - a/t harsh, CCP mostly effective at consolidating power in early years by addressing threats to power dir + actively involving public
BP1 - land reform key for consolidating power b/c demo commitment to rev ideals, wedded peasants to new rev order + proved effectiveness of fear as device of control
“Peasants who killed with their bare hands were wedded to the new revolutionary order” (Dikotter)
LF “both fulfilled an essential rev ideal + actively involved [peasants] in the rev mvmt” (Ryan)
½ Ch land changed hands
Peasant landholdings inc 47%
2-5mil LL killed
Speak Bitterness
Agitated by party cadres → witness terror
BP2 - mass campaigns refined CCP’s strategy for complete ideological cohesion + state control
“The CCP held a monopoly on the truth” (Fenby)
the CCP saw their campaigns as ‘educational’ rather than vindictive, with the aim of producing ‘correct thoughts’ that → correct political and social behaviours (Meisner)
“Scare the educated class out of their liberal Western attitudes” (Chang & Halliday)
Thought reform = struggle sessions = “Auschwitz of the mind” (Spence)
Spy culture → kids inform on peasants → observation
HFC → M denounce ‘poisonous weeds’ + distinguish b/w antag + non-antag (On Contradictions)
BP3 - Korean War gave sense of urgency - made CCP feel weak
“China became a miliatarised society” (Lynch)
Pragmatic importance = threat on border + mass suffering (900K casualties + 500K killed)
Ideologically motivating
→ Agrarian Reform Law
→ US = “chief capitalist” → gave credibility to CCP’s cause b/c harking back to history of foreign dom
Change/continuity for peasants
Contention - A/t CCP made social structure change, suffering continued + experiences varied
BP1 - peasants were diverse group
“many hardworking peasants indutitably got richer, while others were pushed to the margins of subsistence”
e.g. diff exp of CR
BP2 - peasants still lacked agency
“the state became the ultimate LL” (Fairbank)
“Even at the best of times, they could never hope to improve their lot” (Chang and Halliday)
- M belied peasants needed to be directed + controlled (Ryan)
- confined to PCs/villages thruout period
BP3 - suffering cont at hands of govt mistakes
famine = “Mao made catastrophe” (Fairbank)
- 30 mil ppl die - similar to 500K ppl die b/c GMd blow up Yellow River
- CCRM 1.5mil ppl die = “the most violent aspect of the CR” (Kraus)
Change/continuity for Chinese society broadly
