Competition Law Cases Flashcards Preview

EU Law > Competition Law Cases > Flashcards

Flashcards in Competition Law Cases Deck (49):
1

SGL

Company refused to give information on anti-competitve behaviour so fined under Directive 1/2003

2

Elevators Escalators Cartel

Fined bigtime

3

Synthetic Rubber Cartel

Fined bigtime - some got lower fines for whistle blowing, some got higher for repeat offending

4

Hofner

Undertakings = any entity engaged in econ activity regardless of its legal status and way its financed

5

Package Tours World Cup

Fifa and Italian FA are undertakings under Art 101

6

Motosykletistiki (MOTEO)

Undertakings BECAUSE it engaged in econ activity regardless of legal status and way its financed

7

Maschinenbau

Breach of Art 101(1) allowed because was trying to break into new marker under Art 101(3)

8

Anic Partecipazioni

EC doesnt need to establish whether it is Art 101(1) or Art 101(2) breach

9

Treuhand

Dont actually need to be party to cartel agmt or operate in same market to be caught - active contribution and causal link is enough

10

Tepea

Agmt = oral or written

11

Hercules Chemicals

Undertakings just need to express joint intention

12

Bayer

Unilateral behaviour is generally not an agmt

13

Vereniging

Recommendations made by Trade Associations to members can be decisions falling under Art 101(1)

14

Transocean Marine Paint

Would compliance with recommendations have significant influence on competition within relevant market

15

ANSEAU

Decision by trade association that goods distributed exclusively under common label is decision under Art 101(1)

16

Dysetuffs

Defines concerted practise as:
Coordination without having reached a proper agreement which effectively swaps practical cooperation for risks of competition

17

Ahlstrom Wood Pulp Cartel

Conduct was NOT enough to be concerted practise

18

STM

To fall under Art 101(1) must be forseeable that the agreement may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade
Art 101(3) rule of reason is adopted

19

Costen Sarl

Effect on trade can be increase or decrease in trade. Territorial restriction

20

Pronuptia de Paris

Effect on trade can be a franchise agreement
Art 101(3) rule of reason is adopted

21

Brasserie de Haecht

Collective effect of lots of small agreements can affect trade
Must examine the whole market to determine if Art 101(1) has been breached

22

ICI Polypropelene

Horizontal agreement formed by producers at the same level of industry

23

United Brands Co

Vertical agreements controlling each level of production
Analysis of Relative Product Market said bananas are unique
Dominance = has power to act independently of competitors and customers
Only had 50% market share but rest of market was so fragmented it was dominant
Brand identification with chiquita trademark can be dominance

24

European Night Services

Requires full analysis of market, product, economic conditions etc to determine whether Art 101(1) has been breached

25

Volk v Vervaecke

Established de minimis defence

26

Courage v Crehan

Application of competition law to UK.Tied house arrangements with pub

27

Manfredi [and Courage]

National laws in MS can be rendered redundant in order to ensure EU competition law is fully effective
Any individual can claim cimpensation for harm from causal relationship between harm and agreement/practise prohibited under Art 101

28

Societa Italiana Vetro Italian Flat Glass

Caught under Art 102 using dominant market position.Price fixing to eliminate competition between them, controling and stabilizing market artificially

29

Continental Cans

Relative Temporal Market was important - relatively easy for rival can manufacturers to break into market
Region of Germany was substantial part of internal market for RGM

30

Hilti

Held dominant market position based on Relative Product Market analysis - nail guns are fairly unique
Market for consumables (replacement nails) is separate to nail gun market, Hilti was dominant in both separately
RGM was the whole internal market because significant price different in different MS despite low transport costs - the differences were purely Hilti's fault

31

Microsoft

Using IP rights to prevent entrance to market caught by Art 102. Bundling, locked technical aspects preventing other software being used

32

Hugin

Separate market for spare parts for cash registers BUT Hugin is dominant in that market so refusal to supply spare parts to other cash register owners = abuse
South West England NOT substantial part of internal market for RGM

33

Michelin

Tyres for different types of heavy vehicle are not interchangeable SO had dominant market position
One member state can be a substantial part of market for RGM

34

Boosey & Hawkes

Marketing strategy used defined a separate market for British brass band instruments

35

BPB Industries Gypsum

Precise definition of market is not necessary - ECJ will just look at whether the undertaking had market power or not rather than the RPM

36

BT

UK was substantial part of internal market for RGM

37

RTE McGill TV Guide

Ireland was substantial part of internal market for RGM
Refusing to give info on program schedule to competitors = abuse

38

Alsatel

Region of France NOT substantial part of internal market

39

Sealink Harbours

Holyhead port was subtantial part of internal market
Used control of port to give better better sailing times to its ferries = abuse

40

Tetrapak

Huge relative market share = dominance

41

Akzo

Huge relative market share = dominance
Used predatory pricing as abuse of dominance

42

Hoffman la Roche

Superior technology can mean dominance
Sophisticated distribution systems can lead to dominance
Fidelity rebates = abuse
Undertakings need to be allowed to explain their actions as a defence to accusations of breach

43

Intel

70% market share and rebates for buying less of competitors products was breach of Art 102

44

Commercial Solvents CSC

Refusal to supply competitor with material necessary to make end-product = abuse

45

British Leyland

Breach can exist even if behaviour only MIGHT affect trade

46

Garden Cottage Foods

National courts can take role judging decisions of NCAs concering enforcement of competition law

47

British American Tobacco

Art 101(1) used to catch anti-competitive mergers

48

Airtours

Commission blocked merger
Conditions for collective dominance:
Market must be suffieciently transparent so each memeber of oligopoly can monitor how other members are behaving
Must be adequate punishment mechanisms to ensure members compliance over time
Forseeable reaction of consumers and current/future competitors could not hazard the policy

49

Independent Music Publishers

Commission made objective grounds in favour of merger