Criminal: key cases Flashcards
(179 cards)
1
Q
Warner v Metropolitan Police Commissioner
A
D will be liable for a possession of drugs even if they are mistaken as to what it is they are in possession of (cannabis/scent)
2
Q
R v Jordan
A
Medical conduct in a homicide case will break the chain of causation where it is so grossly negligent as to override the effect of the original crime e.g. administering a antibiotic which the victim is known to have an intolerance towards
3
Q
R v Cheshire
A
Medical conduct in a homicide case will not break the chain of causation where it is merely negligent e.g. the victim developing breathing problems after an operation
4
Q
R v Larsonneur
A
You can be liable merely for the location you find yourself in (situational liability) (deportation from Ireland to England)
5
Q
R v Deller
A
The actus reus must always be proven - even if the defendant asserts that they have conducted it
6
Q
R v Roberts
A
An instinctive ‘fight or flight’ response from the victim will not break the chain of causation so long as it is a proportional response to the defendant’s conduct (jump from car)
7
Q
R v Paggett
A
Third party conduct may break the chain of causation where it is a voluntary and purposeful action (girlfriend as human shield)
8
Q
R v Hayward
A
The ‘thin skull’ rule - the defendant must take their victim as they find them, even if they are unusually sensitive to force (wife dies after being chased and shouted at due to condition)
9
Q
R v White
A
The but for test should establish factual causation; if the death would not have occurred but for the defendant’s conduct, they are liable (spiked drink and heart attack)
10
Q
R v Blaue
A
The victim’s own conduct will not break the chain of causation so long as the defendant’s conduct is still an operative cause of the death (Jehovah’s Witness)
11
Q
R v Kennedy (No 2) - causation
A
A person will not be liable for the death of a person to whom they supply drugs, resulting in an overdose, so long as that person accepted the drugs voluntarily and while well informed
12
Q
R v Evans (Gemma)
A
A person will be liable for the death of a person to whom they supply drugs where, through their conduct, they create an exceptionally dangerous situation and fail to take reasonable steps to eliminate that danger
13
Q
Stone and Dobinson
A
A duty to act exists between people where one has assumed a duty of care for the other in some way e.g. by inviting them to live in their house
14
Q
Gibbons and Proctor
A
A duty to act exists between people in familial relationships, particularly parent-child relationships (mistress given money for child)
15
Q
R v Pittwood
A
A duty to act may arise from contractual obligations e.g. the obligation to close a railway gate
16
Q
R v Miller
A
A duty to act exists where a person has created a dangerous situation e.g. leaving a lit cigarette on a mattress
17
Q
Attorney General (Reference No 3 of 1994)
A
A foetus does not have a life in the sense that it cannot be a victim of homicide (stabbing pregnant girlfriend)
18
Q
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland
A
Turning off a life-support machine is an omission rather an act, and a person is legally dead when they are brain dead (Hillsborough disaster victim)
19
Q
R v Vickers
A
One mens rea for murder is the direct intention to kill or cause GBH; the latter in this case
20
Q
R v Woollin
A
One mens rea for murder is the oblique intention to kill or cause GBH, and a jury may FIND (not infer) intention from foresight of a virtual certainty (thrown baby)
21
Q
R v Lowe
A
For constructive manslaughter, the defendant must have done an act (not an omission e.g. leaving a sick baby untreated)
22
Q
R v Andrews
A
For constructive manslaughter, the defendant’s act must be unlawful, so, for example, overtaking a car would not suffice
23
Q
R v Church
A
For constructive manslaughter, the defendant’s unlawful act must be objectively dangerous e.g. throwing someone into a river
24
Q
R v Dawson and others
A
For constructive manslaughter, the danger involved in the defendant’s unlawful act must be obvious to all sober and reasonable persons (the danger involved in scaring someone with a heart condition would not be obvious to those who did not know of the condition)
25
DPP v Newbury and Jones
For constructive manslaughter, the danger involved in the defendant's unlawful act must be obvious to all sober and reasonable persons e.g. throwing large rocks over a railway bridge
26
R v Adomako
For medical conduct to amount to gross negligence manslaughter, the medic must owe a duty of care, that duty must be breached by their conduct, that breach must cause the death of the patient, and the breach must be grossly negligent e.g. failing to notice a disconnected oxygen tube for 6 minutes
27
R v Doughty
One problem with the old law of provocation was that it set the bar too low for what constituted provoking behaviour e.g. a baby crying
28
R v Malcherek and Steel
Turning off life support does not break the chain of causation where D's conduct caused V to be put on the life support
29
R v Duffy
One problem with the old law of provocation was that it was gender biased. A woman who killed her long-term abusive partner after some consideration i.e. not suddenly, could not apply this defence.
30
R v Clinton
Sexual infidelity on its own is not a qualifying trigger, however it may form part of a background of information amounting to a qualifying trigger (suicidal man taunted about cheating partner)
31
R v Dawes
The fear of serious violence from V will not constitute a qualifying trigger if D incited that violence themselves (sofa lover)
32
R v Asmelash
Self-induced intoxication which does not destroy the mens rea is not a qualifying trigger (drunk argument killing)
33
R v Fagan
The actus reus and mens rea for a crime must occur together. Where this is not obviously true, the actus reus may be understood as a continuing act. Also, a battery may be carried out by an instrument. (Car on foot)
34
R v Thabo Meli
The actus reus and mens rea for a crime must occur together. Where this is not obviously true, the actus reus may be understood as a continuing act. (Hut killing)
35
R v Latimer
The mens rea can be transferred from the intended crime to the actual crime, so long as both crimes have the same mens rea (ricocheting belt)
36
R v Dowds
Alcoholism is a recognised medical condition which would qualify for the defence of diminished responsibility, but voluntary intoxication is not
37
Sweet v Parsley
Increasingly so, courts have made proof of mens rea necessary (cannabis schoolteacher)
38
R v Steane
The courts have been reluctant to define intention to allow for flexibility e.g. to say that Steane did not intent to broadcast Nazi propaganda
39
R v Nedrick
(Old precedent) the jury is entitled to infer intention from foresight of a virtual certainty (paraffin through the letterbox)
40
R v Cunningham
Cunningham recklessness (subjective test): did D foresee the harm and nevertheless run the risk?
41
MPC v Caldwell
Caldwell recklessness (objective test): did D do something which would objectively create a risk, either without considering the risk or deciding to ignore it
42
R v G & R
Caldwell recklessness overturned on the grounds that it is over-inclusive, imposing liability on those who genuinely don't foresee any harm resulting from their actions
43
R v Inglis
Motive is not relevant to conviction (giving disabled son a lethal dose of heroin)
44
R v Kracher
A conditional threat (i.e. if you do X I will do Y) can amount to an assault
45
R v Constranza
Threatening letters can amount to an assault
46
R v Ireland
Silence (heavy breathing down the phone) can amount to an assault
47
Collins v Wilcock
A battery does not have to involve injury (arm grab)
48
R v Thomas
A battery does not have to involve body contact (touching a skirt)
49
R v Santana-Bermudez
A battery can amount from an omission e.g. the omission to warn someone of a sharp object in the pocket into which they are reaching
50
DPP v K
A battery can amount from indirect action e.g. putting acid into a hand dryer so that the next person to use it suffers burns
51
R v Venna
The mens rea for assault occasioning ABH is intention or recklessness as to the assault or battery
52
R v Paramenter
The mens rea for assault occasioning ABH does not include intention or recklessness as to the bodily harm
53
DPP v Smith
The courts are reluctant to define ABH, and they will only define GBH as 'really serious harm'. Also, the cutting of hair can amount to ABH.
54
T v DPP
Non-bodily losses can amount to ABH e.g. the loss of consciousness
55
R v Savage
The mens rea for inflicting bodily injury is Cunnningham recklessness
56
R v Eisenhower
'Wounding' is defined as a breaking of the continuity of both layers of the skin
57
A-G ref No 6 of 1980
You can consent to some low levels of violence e.g. those sustained in a child's street fight
58
R v Brown
You cannot consent to the violence involved in sadomasochism
59
R v Wilson
You can consent to having your partner's initials branded on your bum in the privacy of your marital home
60
R v Clarence
(Old law) consent to sex is accompanied by consent to the transmission of STDs
61
R v Dica
Consent to sex is NOT necessarily accompanied by consent to the transmission of STDs (HIV)
62
R v Konzani
Someone can only consent to the transmission of an STD if they are informed about the nature of the disease and the risk they are running (HIV)
63
R v Golding
Consent to sex is not necessarily accompanied by consent to the transmission of herpes unless the transmitee is informed
64
R v Turner (No 2)
Possession can trump legal ownership in terms of whether property is 'belonging to another' (stealing own car from garage)
65
R v Velumyl
Stealing money with the intention to replace it is theft as the exact coins and notes will not be replaced
66
R v Lloyd
If you return property with some of its value remaining, this is not theft (projectionist temporarily taking movies to copy)
67
R v Mitchell
If you abandon property you have appropriated somewhere the owner is likely to find it, this is not theft (abandoned car)
68
R v Ghosh
The test for dishonesty:
1. Was what D did objectively dishonest?
2. Did D realise that what he did would be regarded as objectively dishonest? (surgeon's pay)
69
Ivey v Genting Casinos
The second, subjective limb of the Gosh test should be abandoned (civil case, obiter comment, lower court)
70
R v Dawson and James
'Force' is an ordinary word which should be left to the jury (nudging)
71
R v Bernard
A 'false representation' made contrary to section 2 of the Fraud Act 2006 may be express or implied (e.g. wearing uniform to imply Oxford university attendance)
72
R v Augunas
There is a subjective element to fraud by false misrepresentation: D must know that the representation is, or might be, untrue or misleading
73
R v Valujevs
The test as to whether D has abused a position of power contrary to section 4 of the Fraud Act 2006 is objective
74
R v Morris
Appropriation occurs as soon as any of the rights of the owner of the property are assumed e.g. taking the labels of items in a supermarket
75
R v Gomez
You can appropriate something even if the owner has consented (accepting fake cheques)
76
R v Hinks
You can appropriate something even if the owner has consented (unintelligent man gifting woman sums of money)
77
R v Lawrence
You can appropriate something even if the owner has consented (handing over extortionate taxi fare)
78
R v Atakpu
Something cannot be appropriated twice e.g. if a car is stolen in one country and driven to another, it is not stolen in that second country
79
R v Campbell
Approaching a post office carrying equipment to rob it is a merely preparatory act
80
R v Hale
Appropriation is a continuing act (taking jewellery then tying up)
81
R v Geddes
Lurking around a school's boy's toilet with a knife, rope, and masking tape is a merely preparatory act
82
R v Jones
Holding a gun to someone's head is more than merely preparatory, even though the catch was off and finger not on the trigger
83
R v Tosti
Examining the lock on a barn while carrying cutting equipment is more than merely preparatory
84
R v Jones and Smith
Exceeding the permission you have been given to be on property is trespassing e.g. entering your father's house at night to take a TV
85
Oxford v Moss
Confidential information e.g. exam papers, is not property and therefore cannot be stolen under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968
86
R v Brown
For a burglary conviction, entry into a building need only be 'effective', not 'substantial', and may be done with an instrument (feet outside shop)
87
Anderton v Ryan
You cannot be liable for attempting something impossible (overturned)
88
R v Shivpuri
You can be liable for attempting something impossible e.g. dealing powdered vegetable matter
89
R v Lowe
An omission is likely to be insufficient for an attempts charge
90
R v Khan
For attempted rape, it is sufficient that D was reckless at to whether the victim consented to the sex or not, despite the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 requiring all MR elements to be intended
91
R v Pace and Rogers
All mens rea elements must be intended for an attempts conviction
92
R v Sadique
For the offence of encouraging/assisting one or more of a number of offences, D does not have to believe that every offence will occur - just one or more
93
R v Saik
For the offence of conspiracy, D must have full intention to pursue the course of conduct, even if the substantive offence requires a lesser MR
94
R v Giannetto
The prosecution does not have to specify which out of 'aiding', 'abetting', 'counselling', and 'procuring' it is arguing; or whether the defendant is being charged as a P or A; agreeing/encouraging can amount to aiding and abetting (assassinated wife)
95
State v Tally
The principal does not need to be aware of the accomplice's actions (US case)
96
AG ref. (No 1 of 1975)
The jury should be left to determine the meanings of 'aiding', 'abetting', 'counselling', and 'procuring', looking to their ordinary meanings and case law; to procure is to produce by endeavour
97
R v Bainbridge
Providing equipment could amount to aiding and abetting; for complicity, D must know what kind of offence D is going to commit (oxygen cutting equipment)
98
AG v Able
Providing information could amount to aiding and abetting (distributing leaflets detailing ways to die)
99
R v Kennedy (No 2) - complicity
Lord Bingham: there is no need to prove that the accomplice's act caused the principal to commit the offence
100
R v Stringer
Toulson LJ: some causal link between the accomplice's act and the principal's offence must be proven
101
Rubie v Faulkner
There is liability in complicity for omissions where you have a duty to act e.g. the duty, as a driving instructor, to prevent your pupil from driving dangerously
102
Du Cross v Lambourne
There is liability in complicity for omissions where you have control over the principal e.g. being a passenger in the car which you own and the principal is driving
103
Tuck v Robson
There is liability in complicity for omissions where you have control over the principal e.g. being the landlord of a property in which underage drinking occurs
104
R v Clarkson
Mere non-accidental presence at the scene of a crime is not conclusive of complicity (soldier rape)
105
R v Willett
Mere non-accidental presence at the scene of a crime is not conclusive of complicity (passenger in fatal car accident)
106
R v Coney
Mere presence at the scene of a crime may give rise to complicity liability where there is a reasonable expectation to intervene (boxing match)
107
R v Robinson
Mere presence at the scene of a crime may give rise to complicity liability where it makes the commission of the offence more likely (lookout)
108
Wilcox v Jeffery
Mere presence at the scene of a crime may give rise to complicity liability where it encourages the commission of the offence (applauding illegal saxophonist)
109
Johnson v Youden
For the mens rea of complicity, D must know of all the facts which make P's conduct criminal, including P's mens rea (overpriced house)
110
Maxwell v DPP for Northern Ireland
For the mens rea of complicity, if D knows that P will commit one of a number of offences, it does not matter that D does not know which (terrorist accessory)
111
R v Becerra
For withdrawal to be a successful defence to complicity, it must be sufficient according to how far into the offence D is and communicated effectively e.g. saying 'lets go' and jumping out of a window is insufficient
112
Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen
Foresight that P might kill is sufficient for complicity - D need not intend the killing. Bringing weapons to the scene is an indication of this foresight (burglars) (HK case)
113
R v Powell
Foresight that P might kill or cause GBH is sufficient for complicity - D need not intend the killing (shooting drug dealer)
114
R v English
If there is a 'fundamental difference' between what D intended to do (e.g. hitting someone with a wooden post) and what P intended to do (e.g. stabbing someone), D is not liable in complicity
115
R v Rahman
Foresight that P might kill or cause GBH is sufficient for complicity - D need not intend the killing. It also does not need to be proven within a group who administered the fatal strike (group knife attack)
116
Miller v The Queen
Australia has decided to follow Chan rather than Jogee
117
HKSAR v Chan Kam Shing
Hong Kong has been highly critical of Jogee and follows Chan
118
R v Palmer
D must act innocently and instinctively in self-defence
119
R v Field
There is no duty to avoid conflict. For example, you have no duty to move from a location you know you are likely to be attacked in.
120
R v Dadson
D's beliefs and motives are significant in assessing the merits of a self-defence argument (shooting felon police could not have known was a felon)
121
R v Rashford
The defence of self-defence is not unavailable if D was the initial aggressor, so long as V acted disproportionally to that aggression and D responded appropriately (argument killing)
122
R v Keane
The defence of self-defence is not unavailable if D was the initial aggressor, however if V acted proportionally to that aggression and D responded inappropriately, it would be unavailable (one punch)
123
AG ref. (No 2 of 1983)
For self-defence, the attack must be imminent, however this does not mean that it is unlawful to prepare weapons for an anticipated attack which the police are not able to control (shopkeeper in riots)
124
R v Howe
Necessity/duress in unavailable as a defence for murder, including for accessories (gang toilet murders)
125
R v Gotts
Necessity/duress in unavailable as a defence for attempted murder (father orders son to shoot mother)
126
R v Dudley and Stevens
It is never permissible to take another innocent life to save your own, even in the most dire of circumstances e.g. being lost at sea for weeks without food
127
Re A (conjoined twins: surgical separation)
Necessity is unavailable as a defence for doctors if they directly intend to take a life, but not if death is an inevitable consequence of the direct intention to act in their patients' best interest
128
R v Hasan
Duress may be unavailable as a defence where D has voluntarily associated with individuals who are objectively likely to coerce D into offending; the threat must be immediate (escorting company safe)
129
R v Graham
When considering the defence of necessity/duress, we must take an objective approach to the facts and D's conduct; when assessing D's conduct we may not take into account character traits (homosexual lover kills wife)
130
R v Conway
For the defence of duress, D must have acted out of fear of death or serious injury (assassinated passenger Tonna)
131
R v Bowen
When considering whether a 'sober person of reasonable firmness' would have resisted the threats, the court may take into account D's sex, age, disability, and pregnancy
132
R v Shayler
For the defence of duress, the threat may be directed to a person D takes responsibility for (MI5 book - responsible for the safety of the public)
133
R v Pommell
For the defence of duress to be successful, D must stop committing the offence as soon as possible e.g. by not sleeping with an illegal gun in his bed all night
134
Jaggard v Dickinson
D may rely on an intoxicated mistake as part of a defence (wrong house)
135
R v Hatton
D is not able to rely on the intoxicated mistake that an unreasonable amount of force is necessary for the defence of self-defence (sledgehammer stick)
136
R v O'Grady
D is not able to rely on the intoxicated mistake that an unreasonable amount of force is necessary for the defence of self-defence (sleepy drunken fight)
137
AG for Northern Ireland v Gallagher
Intoxication is no defence where D consumed intoxicants in order to give him the courage to commit some offence (drink to kill wife)
138
R v Lipman
If D's intoxication was dangerous, e.g. taking LSD, the defence of intoxication is unavailable (snake fight)
139
R v Hardie
If D's intoxication was not dangerous, e.g. taking valium, the defence of intoxication is available (wardrobe fire)
140
DPP v Majewski
D may not rely on the defence of intoxication if the offence was one of 'basic' as opposed to 'specific' intent e.g. assualt
141
R v Caldwell
Reckless offences are offences of 'basic' intent, and therefore the defence of intoxication is unavailable for them
142
R v Kingston
The intoxication rules only apply where D lacks the necessary mens rea for the offence (drugged indecent assault on child)
143
DPP v Morgan
So long as the defendant honestly believed that the victim had consented, it does not matter that there are no reasonable grounds for that belief (old law)
144
R v H
Touching someone through clothes can amount to sexual assault under section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003
145
R v G
A person under the age of 13 cannot consent to sexual activity. This is a principle of strict liability - so when a 15 year old had sex with a 12 year old who claimed to be 15, he was guilty of rape.
146
R v Williams
A singing teacher had sexual intercourse with his student by telling her that it would improve her singing - this established the non-existence of consent, as he intentionally deceived her as to the purpose of the act contrary to section 76 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003
147
R v Tabassum
A man touched breasts, purporting to be a medical expert conducting breast cancer examinations, which negated the consent given by the women as he intentionally deceived them as to the purpose of the act contrary to section 76 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003
148
R v Flattery
A man told a woman he was conducting 'alternative' treatment for epilepsy on her, when in fact he was having sexual intercourse with her. This negated her consent, given that he intentionally deceived her as to the purpose of the act contrary to section 76 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003
149
R v Jheeta
A woman's boyfriend sent her threatening texts on an anonymous number, and then purported to be the police and required her to have sex with him. This amounted to rape as the court held that the woman had not consented to the sex.
150
R v Devonald
A father went online pretending to be a young woman, and coerced his daughter's ex boyfriend into sending him a video of a sex act for blackmail. This amounted to deception as to the purpose of the act contrary to section 76 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
151
R v Piper
A man was convicted of sexual offences after getting a 15 year old girl into a bikini and measuring her for 'modelling'. This amounted to deception as to the purpose of the act contrary to section 76 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
152
R v Elbekkay
A woman has sex with a man who purported to be her boyfriend, and this was held to be rape as her consent was negated by the fact that the defendant had impersonated her boyfriend contrary to section 76 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
153
R v Olugboja
Consent exists on a spectrum from active desire to reluctant acquiescence
154
R v Bree
What is crucial in sexual offence cases when C was intoxicated at the time, is not the intoxication but the capacity to consent, or lack thereof
155
R v Smith
A soldier stabbed another soldier, who was then dropped twice on the way to hospital where he received very poor treatment and later died. The first soldier was still convicted of his murder, as the stab wound was still an operative cause of death.
156
R v Dear
A man repeatedly slashed the man who allegedly sexually assaulted his daughter. The man then reopened his wounds in a suicide attempt, and died. The first man was convicted as his slashes were still an operative cause of death, and the reopening of them was not deemed a novus actus interveniens
157
R v Hayes (Tom Alexander)
Applying the Ghosh test of dishonesty to a conspiracy to defraud case, the court rejected the proposal that the jury should look to the normal standards of honesty within the banking industry - everyone should be held to the same standard
158
R v Rook
For the offence of counselling or procuring, D does not need to intend for P to commit the offence, so long as they foresee it as a risk; the fact that D was absent on the day of the offence was not sufficient for a successful application of the defence of withdrawal
159
R v Tyrell
A person for whose protection an offence has been created cannot be convicted of aiding and abetting a person who commits the offence against her. So a girl under 16 could not be convicted of aiding and abetting a male who had sex with her.
160
R v Matthews and Alleyne
The Woollin criteria is a rule of evidence - you may find intention from virtual certainty (threw man into river expecting him to swim, but he drowned)
161
R v Stephenson
A recklessness test must incorporate some subjective element in order to account for those who are incapable of foreseeing risk (schizophrenic hay fire)
162
R v Parker
Someone may be reckless if they 'close their mind' to the risk (angry telephone)
163
R v Simcox
For diminished responsibility, 'substantial' (within 'substantially impaired D's ability...') means 'more than trivial or insignificant'
164
R v Dietschmann
Where the effect of D's recognised mental disorder is heightened by alcohol, D must establish that without the drink the abnormality would have substantially impaired his abilities for the defence of diminished responsibility
165
R v McShane
Assisting suicide is criminalised so as to protect vulnerable individuals from malicious persuasion
166
R v Mowatt
For ss. 18 and 20 the court need only prove that D intended/was reckless as to some harm, no matter how minor
167
R v Emmett
You cannot consent to having your breasts lit on fire
168
Laskey at el v UK
The House of Lords decision in Brown was a justifiable infringement of Article 8
169
R v Raphael
An intention to permanently deprive is ‘to treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of the other’s rights’
170
DPP v Withers
A conspiracy to commit a non-criminal offence such as a tort, or breach of contract cannot amount to a criminal conspiracy
171
R v Mehta
An agreement in conspiracy is ‘a shared criminal purpose or design in which all have joined, rather than merely similar or parallel ones’
172
R v Broad
If the parties agree to leave some of the details to resolve at a later date, this may be sufficient for liability for conspiracy
173
R v Jackson
For conspiracy, were the parties to carry out their intended actions, it must necessarily lead to an offence - driving example
174
McCann and others v UK
Force used in self-defence must be no more than 'absolutely necessary' and 'strictly proportionate'
175
Hudson and Taylor
For the defence of duress by threats, the threat should neutralise the will of the accused at the moment when the crime was committed; a "present immediate threat" means that the fear is present to the mind of the victim, not that the threatener is physically present (witnesses)
176
R v Clegg
A soldier who shot at a joyrider as he was driving away was not able to use the defence of self-defence after the passenger was killed as he was not in danger
177
R v Quayle
Individuals cannot invoke the defence of necessity in order to get around the word of parliament e.g. by self-prescribing illegal drugs on the basis that they are necessary to cure an illness; the duress must come from some external source and there must be an imminent danger of physical injury (not just pain)
178
R v Misra & Srivastava
The Adomako test is not circular, does not allow the jury to set the standard of acceptable medical conduct, and does not infringe Articles 6 (fair trial) and 7 (retrospectivity) of the ECHR
179
R v Gullefer
Conduct will amount to more than merely preparatory once the 'defendant embarks upon the crime proper'
