Cumulative Review Flashcards
Use to study for the final exam (125 cards)
1
Q
- Mercantilist Era (1492-1815)
A
beginning event: Columbus, ending event: Industrial revolution and end of Napoleon reign, major events: American Revolution, protestant reformation, treaty of Westphalia, French revolution, and 30 years’ war
2
Q
- Golden Era (1815-1914)
A
beginning: end of Napoleonic wars and start of industrial revolution, major: concert of Europe, Pax Britannica, unification of Germany, 1870 Gold Standard ending: war
3
Q
- Thirty years crisis (1914-1945)
A
beginning: assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, major: appeasement of Germany, ww1, great depression, ww2, ending: end of ww2, Treaty of Versailles, Creation of the UN
4
Q
- Cold war (1945-1991)
A
beginning: rebuilding of Europe, USSR and US emerge as powers, major: entire cold war dynamic, Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, ending: fall of USSR
5
Q
- Post-cold war (1991-present)
A
fall of USSR, major events: evolution of IOs, return to market, 9/11, Arab Spring, globalization, Persian Gulf War
6
Q
Mercantilist
A
imperialism, colonialism, mercantilism
Interests- access to markets/resources, ensure own power/control
Interactions- bargaining
Institutions- sovereignty/ Peace of Westphalia
7
Q
Golden
A
prosperity, economic growth, balance of power, free trade
Economic integration, alliance making, trade expansion
Cooperating
Concert of Europe, gold standard
8
Q
30 years
A
war, panic, strife
Rise of power, economic repair, not dying
Bargaining
League of Nations, alliances, treaties
9
Q
Cold War
A
tension, capitalism v. communism, decolonization
Spread ideology
Bargaining
NATO, Warsaw Pact, UN, Bretton Woods, CMEA, World Bank, GATT
10
Q
Post-cold war
A
trade agreements, single super power
Expand trade, security, counter-terrorism, human rights
Cooperating
NAFTA, EU, WTO, IMF
11
Q
Theory
A
a logically consistent set of statements that explains a phenomenon of interests, proposed answer to IR questions, tested, generalizable, falsifiable, and parsimonious
12
Q
actors
A
basic unit for analysis of Int. politics, individuals/groups of people with common interests, strategic, rational
13
Q
Describe rational behind choosing relevant actors
A
contingent on the outcome you are trying to explain, who or what are contributing to the outcome, interests or info that are relevant to what is being analyzed
14
Q
I3
A
Interests- what actors want to achieve through political action
Interactions- the ways in which the choices of 2 or more actors combine to produce political outcomes, cooperation and bargaining
Institutions- set of rules that structure interactions within a relevant community that are known and shared, formal or informal, principles and norms
15
Q
3 types of interests
A
- power/security (30 years crisis, golden era, mercantilist era)
- economic/material welfare (post-cold war, golden era, mercantilist)
- ideational/normative (cold war)
16
Q
Cooperation
A
2 or more actors adopt policies that make at least one actor better off w/o any party becoming worse off
17
Q
Two types of cooperation
A
- Coordination- self-sustaining
2. Collaboration- not self-sustaining, incentive to break agreement
18
Q
3 factors that make collaboration easier
A
- iteration
- number of actors (fewer-better to collab)
- issue linkage and info (more-better)
19
Q
Bargaining
A
actors must chose outcomes that make one better off at the expense of the other (zero sum gain)
20
Q
General purpose of institutions
A
facilitate cooperation and self-enforcement
21
Q
4 ways IOs make self-enforcement easier
A
- Setting standards of behavior
- verifying compliance
- reducing costs of joint decision making
- resolving disputes
22
Q
Bias of IOs
A
IOs contain policy bias, institutions were made by parties whose goals are reflected in those institutions
23
Q
2 reasons why actors comply with IOs
A
- broader cooperation in future, even if outcome is biased
2. less costly to use existing ones rather than cost of creating new ones
24
Q
Realist theory
A
States are selfish and power seeking, act in national interest, anarchic international system, states are unitary, rational actors, and security is the main issue
25
Liberal theory
inherent goodness of actors, societal progress is possible, if a just society is not obtained, it is at the fault of inadequate institutions and a corrupt environment, individuals are not evil, they are corrected by society, democracy and free trade are good institutions, free trade creates interdependencies that raise cost of war, and IOs are important
26
Classical v. Neorealism
1. Classical: there are two types of states: status quo powers that want to keep the system the way it is and revisionist powers that want to upend the system and create one system that benefits them. Conflict happens because people suck, classical realism is largely only concerned with "high politics"-- matters of war and peace or security.
2. Neorealism: doesn't bother to classify states, instead arguing that every state is always trying to change the system in order to maximize their own benefit.
Neorealism extends its approach to all levels of interaction, conflict happens because the anarchical structure of the international system sucks
27
Classical v. Neoliberalism
1. Classical liberalism is a political philosophy which holds that the most important value is individual liberty. Classical liberals believe that the utmost priority would be to maximize individual liberty, while restricting the use of force and coercion (ie government) in order to achieve this. Classical liberalism encompasses the social/economic/political)aspects, defining the basis and the role of government (the legitimacy of a government is with the people, and governments should minimize intervention and adhere to the rule of law), economics (many classical liberals would defend some type of free market system as to maximize individual freedom in the economic sphere) and society (mutual toleration, open discussion, freedom to act as long as nobody else is harmed). Famous examples of classical liberals include Adam Smith and William Gladstone.
2. Neoliberalism is more about laissez faire economics, so economically it is very similar to classical liberalism. It focuses on the markets, deregulation, ending protectionism, and freeing up the markets. While classical liberalism is more of a political philosophy, neoliberalism bases its ideas on neoclassical economics, so it is really a set of ideas for how a free market, as advocated by classical liberalism, can be achieved and maintained.
28
Neorealism I3
Interests: security
Interactions: bargaining
Institutions: pessimistic about institutions, IOs have policy bias
29
Neoliberalism I3
Interests: many, wealth
Interactions: cooperation
Institutions: reduce uncertainty in interactions
30
Differences
Cooperation versus bargaining
Optimism versus pessimism
Wealth versus security
Domestic politics versus unitary state
31
Similarities
States are main actors
Anarchy in the international system
Rationality of actors
32
Describe general intuition behind war-as-bargain model
* Rationalist: a viewpoint for modeling actors’ behavior in which actors choose the best action to pursue their goals, given the expected behavior of others
* Utility maximization through rational & strategic actions
33
Fearon 1995 model
1. Proposed solution (by A to B)
| 2. B accepts, divide (inside option), or rejects, war ensues (outside option)
34
Key insight from the model:
if mutually acceptable proposals exist, why do states go to war?
Impacts on expected utility from war:
1. Resolve (willingness to endure costs of fighting)
2. Capabilities (chance of winning)
35
Three rationalist explanations for war that explain why actors go to war if mutually acceptable proposals always exist
1. incomplete info
2. commitment problems
3. issue indivisibility
36
Incomplete Info
- situation in which states lack info about other states’ resolve and capabilities
- credibility of a threat or alliance plays into incomplete info, bluffing can lead to better outcomes as transparency can eliminate strategic capacity
37
two ways to increase credibility
1. Brinksmanship- threats that generate risk (keep making threats until someone backs down)
2. Tying hands- generate costs to backing out of an agreement or down from a threat,
38
audience costs
negative repercussions from other states or your own for failing to follow through
39
commitment problems
state cannot promise not to revise terms of an agreement in the future, often occurs when bargaining over a source of power
40
Preemptive war
fought with anticipation of an attack from enemy, 1st strike advantage- state that attacks first is at an advantage
41
Preventative war
fought to avoid future shifts in capabilities
42
Issue indivisibility
an issue whose associated good cannot be divided without diminishing the value
43
Four ways probability of war can be reduced
1. Raising the costs of war
2. Increasing transparency
3. Providing outside enforcement of commitments
4. Dividing apparently indivisible goods
44
National v. particularistic interests
National interests are widely shared by a state whereas particularistic interests are narrow interests held by a small number of actors in a state
45
domestic influence on foreign policy
Domestic politics have influence in foreign policy as the benefits of war may be enjoyed by a different group than the one that carries the costs, war may arise as it furthers interests of a group in the state
46
Domestic groups that may benefit from war
1. Leaders- office seeking, benefit from rally effect (people are more supportive of a leader during war or other international crisis such as 9/11, rise in nationalism)
• Diversionary incentive: incentive leaders have to start a crisis to rally support
47
Domestic groups that may benefit from war cont.
2. Bureaucracy- collection of organizations that carry out tasks of governance, influence comes from resources & expert knowledge, they are self-serving and benefit from war can be elevation of status/importance or increased funding
48
Domestic groups that may benefit from war cont.
3. Interest Groups- group of individuals w/ common interests, push for policies that benefit members, benefits could include profit maximization for an economic group or protection/advancement of rights for an ethnic group
4. general public
49
Democratic peace theory
democracies are hesitant to engage in armed conflict with other identified democracies, two qualifiers- transparency and credibility
50
Two general ways democracy may decrease probability of war
1. Accountability- ability to punish or award leaders for decisions (free and open elections)
2. Democratic institutions (require transparency and free press to prevent spread of incomplete info)
51
Election mechanism
political implications of losing/winning a war are more relevant for democratic leaders than autocratic ones, costs of war are higher for such actors because they are office seeking
52
why do states form alliances?
to signal common interests to one another (allies & enemies), help members cooperate militarily in war, bias towards allies winning in a conflict, members share common interests
53
Bandwagoning
a strategy in which states align with the strongest state in a conflict (common goal/gain)
54
Balance of power
a strategy in which states align against a strong state to balance the power and deter the strongest state (common fear/threat)
55
how do alliances affect the probability of war?
by either fighting together to increase chances of winning (promise) or signaling resolve/ raising the costs of war (threat)
56
Three ways credibility can be improved (threat)
1. Decrease costs of joining fight
2. Increase benefits of joining fight
3. Increase costs of not joining fight (abandonment)
57
entrapment
For a promise, credibility can lead to entrapment, where states are too confident that allies will help, may act more aggressive in negotiations
58
Four conditions for alliance success
1. Common interests exist
2. It is desirable for allies to help/intervene
3. Belief in rescue (by allies and enemies)
4. Reduce risk of entrapment
59
why do states form CSOs?
States form collective security organizations (CSOs) to promote peace and security amongst members and the world
60
General purpose of CSOs
ensure peaceful changes to the status quo, supposed neutrality of intervention
61
Three ways in which CSOs impact peaceful SQ changes
1. Aggressor punishment (raises cost of aggression)
2. Mediation (forum for mediation, raises transparency)
3. Outside enforcement (raise credibility of promises)
62
Two major problems w/CSOs
1. Member differences (satisfaction or dislike for status quo may impact bias in CSO)
2. Collective action problem ( international peace is a public good, self-enforcement is necessary but CSOs can’t force members to do things)
63
Two conditions for CSO success
1. Common interests exist (especially among powerful states)
| 2. Willingness to pay costs of intervention
64
CSOs v. alliances
(see study guide for chart)
65
Six principal organs of the UN
1. General Assembly
2. Security Council
3. Secretariat and Secretary General
4. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
5. International Court of Justice (ICJ)
6. Trusteeship Council (suspended)
66
UNGA
created by chapter IV (4), universal (all 193 members of UN), 1 state gets 1 vote, simple majority, abstention counts in total # of votes
67
UNSC
created by chapter V (5), P5 + 10 temporary members, P5: US, UK, France, Russia, China, P5 has absolute veto, 1 vote for all members, supermajority plus unanimity among P5
Due to veto power of P5, rulings often reflect power struggles between the East and the West, unanimous votes are uncommon, closet veto
68
Peacekeeping
maintain peace already established by parties via negotiation (1st generation)
69
Peace enforcement
military intervention against aggressor states, intended to reverse cross-border aggression (collective security)
70
2nd generation peacekeeping or peacemaking
un forces intervene without a prior cease-fire having been established
71
Success of UNSC military operations?
UNSC military operations have been successful in keeping the peace in certain situations, although it is often difficult to get adequate troops or to get the p5 to agree to deploy troops.
72
Free Trade
trade policy that does not restrict imports or exports, it is the idea of the free market as applied to international trade
73
Protectionism
imposition of barriers (tariffs, quotas, or other restrictions) to limit imports, protects domestic producers
74
Understand economic logic for why free trade is said to be beneficial; protectionism, bad
```
Free trade implications:
1. National economy benefits (increase growth, wealth)
2. Consumers benefit (increase savings)
Protectionism implications:
1. Raises domestic price of a good
2. Reduces economy’s overall efficiency
```
75
Explain a country’s national comparative advantage (i.e., why are some goods imported and others exported?)
comparative advantage occurs when country/firm produces one good more efficiently than other goods such that its resources are most efficiently employed in this activity. Comparison in other economic activities it could’ve allocated resources towards. Countries maximize wealth by producing and exporting what they produce most efficiently (specialize + export what costs less to produce, import products that are costly to produce)
76
Heckscher-Ohlin Trade Theory: a country will…
Export goods that make use of its abundant resources
| Import goods that make use of its scarce resources
77
Identify two domestic factors impacting trade policy
1. Interests/ organization of domestic groups
| 2. Regime type (democracy)
78
Identify and describe the two models of trade-policy interests; identify groups for/against free trade in each model
Social classes (factors of production)
o Stolper-Samuelson model: protection benefits scarce factors of production (in a labor scarce country, restriction of importation of labor helps)
Pro-free trade: abundant factors of production
Anti-free trade: scarce factors of production
Sector/industry
o Ricardo-Viner Model: specific factors model, some factors of production are tied to their industry (industry specific), emphasizes sector in which factors of production are employed, over the nature of the factor. Countries can only trade goods, not factors of production. Here only the mobile production factor (labor) can be used in the production of both goods and can therefore move between sectors.
Pro-free trade: export- oriented sectors
Anti-free trade: import- oriented sectors (consumers)
79
Identify, describe the two international factors impacting trade policy
1. Global strategic setting: interactions among countries and how these interactions create incentives that promote trade liberalization or protectionism, tariffs are levied strategically
2. Presence of formal institutions
80
Understand general purpose of all trade institutions
Promote bilateral, regional, or international trade cooperation/liberalization
81
Describe how trade institutions achieve their purpose (specifically the WTO)
1. Clear definition of trade discrimination (standards of behavior)
o Safeguard clause in WTO charter (but MFN’d, tariffs can be raised on a country that has caused an import surge, but tariffs are also levied on all countries)
o Anti-dumping duties- deals with businesses dumping
o Countervailing duties- deals with countries subsidizing
2. Self-reporting, complaints (verifying compliance)
3. Trade rounds (decrease costs of join decision making)
o Doha round
4. Dispute settlement body (dispute resolvement)
82
Know the two major global trade institutions
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 1947
| 2. World Trade Organization (WTO), 1995
83
Understand why international investment occurs
Think of the Heckscher- Ohlin theory, import goods that utilize your scarce capital, export goods that utilize abundant capital.
84
Describe characteristics of FDI (i.e., ID differences between FL and FDI)
Foreign direct investment: investment from companies for production facilities in a foreign country; companies maintain control over facilities abroad
o Actual investment not loans, stocks, or bonds seen in portfolio investment
o The lender is an MNC to a country
o Lender gets managerial rights in FDI vs. portfolio investment where the investor does not maintain control of the foreign operation
85
Identify the overall + (four) specific reasons why companies choose to invest abroad
Location and profit +
1. Access to host country market (avoid trade barriers)
2. Access to natural resources
3. Minimize costs of production (cheaper labor)
4. Less stringent regulations and tax laws (on pollution, etc.)
86
Identify two major reasons why countries allow foreign companies to invest
1. Less risky capital source (no loans to pay back)
| 2. Benefits from resource/skill access
87
Identify the three resources that countries gain access to through FDI
1. Managerial
2. Technological
3. Competition (marketing)
88
Identify the two ways in which a country can respond to BoP deficits
1. Adjust to the deficit
| 2. Finance the deficit (borrow to pay off)
89
Identify the three ways in which a country can adjust to its BoP deficits
1. Trade policy
2. Monetary policy
3. Fiscal policy
90
Identify two ‘types’ of currency value policy and understand benefits, costs, and groups in favor
1. Interest rate policy: relationship b/t currencies’ values
o Strong/appreciated value relative to another currency
Benefits: cheaper imports
Costs: more expensive exports
Groups in favor: consumers
o Weak/depreciated value
Benefits: cheaper exports
Costs: more expensive imports
Groups in favor: producers, especially domestic
2. Exchange rate policy
o Pro-fixed rate: international transactions/activities
o Pro-float rate: domestic transactions/ activities
91
Identify three types of ER policy and understand benefits and costs
1. Fixed ER: govt. commits to holding value of currency stable against some benchmark
o Benefits: stability, predictability
o Costs: cannot change interest rates for other reasons, must be used to maintain the fixed exchange rate
2. Floating ER: govt. allows market conditions to set the value of currency
o Benefits: can change interest rates for domestic factors such as unemployment and inflation
o Costs: volatility in currency value
3. Adjustable Peg ER: govt. commits to holding value of currency stable to some benchmark, with ability to reevaluate if deemed necessary/ from time to time
92
Identify the three domestic factors explaining why development is hard to attain and explain the logic behind each domestic factor
1. Geography
o Resource curse, natural disasters, disease, location accessibility, extreme climate
2. Policies
o Infrastructure and property security promote economic growth
o Why don’t we see more of them?
Lack of technical expertise
General vs. particularistic interests
3. Institutions
o Democratic institutions: public goods, general interests, equal
93
Identify the three international factors explaining why development is hard to attain and explain the logic behind each int’l factor
1. Colonial legacies
o The legacy of colonialism tends to continue to impact foreign colonies. It makes it harder for them to develop economically, politically, and socially. Economically speaking, colonizing powers tended to run colonies for their own good. They set up colonial economies that were based solely on providing raw materials or low-value materials to the imperial power.
2. International market
3. International institutions
o Rule bias problem for developing countries
o IMF has qualified majority voting; World Bank has qualified majority voting for major changes such as amending articles or increasing bank capital
94
Transnational advocacy network (TAN)
set of individuals and NGOs acting in pursuit of some normative objective (interest) across borders, typically want social/political change through peaceful action
95
Difference between TAN and formal IO
TANs have no governmental actors and lack central authority for coordination (unlike IOs which tend to have both)
96
Identify, explain three ways TANs influence outcomes
1. Power of ideas to change interests
1. Disseminating new knowledge
• Raising public awareness
• Potential problem: counter-mobilization
2. Promoting new norms
2. Naming and shaming
• Calling attention to norm violations
• Boomerang model (see study guide for pic)
• Naming and shaming w/ the boomerang model can be useful in autocratic nations where directly speaking out can be dangerous, reaching out to a TAN for them to lobby their country to put pressure on the 1st country can be effective.
3. Facilitating cooperation
• Formal agreements/ treaties
• Information provision
1. Endorses: third party info about content
2. Monitors: third party info about compliance
97
Norm
standard of shared behavior for actor’s w/a given identity; define what is “right” or appropriate under certain circumstances
98
norms life cycle
```
a 3-stage model of how norms diffuse within a population and achieve a “taken for granted” status
Stages of norm life cycle:
1. Norm emergence
2. Norm cascade
3. Internalization
```
99
International law
body of rules which bind states and other actors in world politics in their relations w/ one another, and is considered to have the status of law
100
unifying principle
sovereignty
101
purpose
facilitate cooperation
102
2 sources of international law
1. Customary international law:
• Examples: laws of the sea (pre-1956), laws of war (later codified in the Hague and Geneva Conventions), and diplomatic immunity practices (later codified)
2. International conventions or treaties
• Examples: Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972), Geneva Conventions (1864 and later years), NATO (1949), Kyoto Protocol (1997), UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1956, 1982), and Vienna Convention (1961) on diplomatic immunity practices
103
Identify and describe the dimensions along which international law can vary
1. Obligation: degree to which states are legally bound by a rule, high obligation: you are required to do something if you don’t comply, low obligation: aspirational, not strongly bound
2. Precision: degree to which international legal obligations are fully specified (fully specified or imprecise)
3. Delegation: is the treaty creating some kind of court or body to enforce the stipulations of the treaty? The degree to which third parties are given the right to enforce, implement, or interpret a rule/ law
104
WTO Dispute Settlement Body
* Appellate body: 7 judges, 4-year terms
| * Obligation: high, precision: pretty high, more than GATT
105
Identify the five stages of the WTO’s DSB
1. Consultations stage
• Up to 60 days in length
• Complainant and respondent try to work out differences through discussion
• WTO Director-General can help if requested
2. Panels stage
• Up to 45 days for appointment, plus 6 months for panel to finish
• Hearing in which disputant states argue their case
• Judges: 3-5 experts from different countries
• Ruling: whether respondent is violating WTO rules, recommendations for compliance
3. Appeals stage (optional)
• Approx. 60-90 days
• Can be initiated by either side
• Heard by 3 members of the appellate body
• Uphold, modify, or reverse panel’s ruling
• DSB accepts or rejects appeals report
4. Implementation stage
• 1st benchmark: within 30 days of rulings adoption
• Respondent must inform DSB of “intentions to implement” DSB’s ruling
• Discussion of time to compliance (reasonable period)
• If non-compliance suspected, complainant can refer back to original panel
5. Appeals stage (optional)
106
Understand what actors are involved in democracy promotion
International or outside actors: states, NGOs, TANs, and IOs
107
International standard for promotion
Article 25 of International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights:
b) to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage, and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the electors
108
Political promotion approach
o Conceptualization of democracy: political contestation (competitive), openness
o Main focus: political process, institutions
o Methods of promotion: direct support of domestic opposition (training, advice moral support, funding or indirect support of key institutions, independent electoral commission, election monitoring, independent judiciary, independent media
o Conditions for success: contingent on structures of democracy being implemented, there must be a viable domestic opposition group
o Example of “successful” case: Ukraine 2004, election monitors caught election cheating, led to domestic protests which led to a revote where pro-west, cheated candidate ended up winning
o Weakness: short term focus, ignores long term implications, backlash against sovereignty infringement
109
Developmental promotion approach
o Conceptualization of democracy: equality, justice, especially in social and economic realms
o Main focus: economic development, state capacity, good governance, democracy is seen as a contributing factor
o Methods of promotion: indirect support by promoting socioeconomic development and human rights (local level development projects, development of rule of law, strengthening minority rights)
o Conditions for success: state you are helping must be willing to enact meaningful reform
o Example of “successful” case: EU accession (joining the EU), democratic system required, benefits of joining include: access to markets, freedom of movement, employment, and development aid
o Weaknesses: takes time for benefits to appear
110
Generations of human rights
1st generation: political and civil rights
2nd generation: economic and social rights
3rd generation: group/ minority rights
111
3 major sources of int’l human rights (HR) standards
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948)
o 4 pillars: dignity, liberty, brotherhood, and equality
o Not binding
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
o Favored by western nations
o Examples: right to life, liberty, equality before law, freedom of thought, religion, and expression, protection against torture and slavery
o Legally binding if signed
3. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
o Favored by USSR and allies, LDCs
o Examples: minimum standards of living, right to form trade unions and strike, free primary education
o Binding if signed
112
3 reasons why states may sign int’l HR agreements
1. Alter domestic political incentives: recently democratized countries may want to lock in/signal new changes by signing, make it harder to backslide
2. Contingent rewards (linkage): to keep aid, if you sign, you may get side benefits
3. Influence human rights in other countries: states that already respect rights, sign to influence other states to sign, gives you right to criticize
113
Effects of signing HR treaties on a state’s HR practices
o Short term: mixed, 2 potential explanations:
1. Sporadic enforcement
2. Masking continued abuse
o Long term: potentially more beneficial
114
Selection effect
occurs when states that already comply sign on so there is no additional effect, they just select treaties they already comply with
115
Identify the four recent innovations in int’l HR institutions
1. Individual petition: individuals can direct petition supranational courts, remedies the responsibility of other states to gatekeep
2. Universal jurisdiction: right to prosecute crimes against humanity, regardless of location of the crime and citizenship of the criminal
3. ICC: International Criminal Court, human rights court of last resort, created by Rome Statue in 1998, tries individuals
4. PTAs: preferential trade agreements, material interests- attaching HR provisions to PTAs, binding provisions help
116
stability argument of WMDs
mutually assured destruction (MAD): any use of nuclear weapons would lead to one’s own destruction
MAD increases costs of war
Mutual deterrence
117
instability argument
multiple countries having WMDs won’t led to peace/stability because deterrence conditions might not be met which eliminates deterrent effect more weapons world wide will lead to increased chance of world destruction
118
the three conditions necessary for a successful deterrent effect
1. Ability to identify attack’s origin (cannot retaliate if you don’t know where it came from)
2. Credible second-strike ability (if an attacker doesn’t think you can strike back, deterrence is eliminated)
3. Rational decision maker (if the attacker wants to live, deterrence still exists, must be rational)
119
three reasons why proliferation may be problematic
1. Effect on bargaining power: nuclear weapons are a source of military power, disarming is hard to push because it eliminates a source of power for a state, once someone has nukes it’s hard to get them to disarm
2. Deterrence conditions not met: ID, 2nd strike, rational, if one or more are not met, proliferation is a big issue
3. Nonstate actors gaining access: proliferation means more states have weapons, more places that a terrorist group could get weapons from, deterrence doesn’t apply to terrorist groups
120
three potential ways to prevent WMD proliferation
1. Establish institutions (NPT, IAEA)
2. Address security concerns (NATO members)
3. Coercive disarmament
121
Understand why use of violence by terrorist networks is rational
o Violence is the most viable strategy based on their interests, due to a powerful adversary, there is an asymmetric power capacity that makes violence an only option, due to a responsive adversary, violence may lead the govt. to change policy by inflicting violence on citizens, due to the group’s small base of support, terror/violence is all that is w/in their scope
o If not rational, generalizable predictions on terrorism wouldn’t be possible
122
three rationalist explanations for terrorism
1. Incomplete info: strong incentive to bluff about capabilities of terrorist group, terror attacks occur through surprise typically, strategic capability eliminated if you warn about an attack
2. Commitment problem: target state worried that terrorist group cannot promise not to use violence in the future, terrorist group worried that target state cannot promise to uphold deal, if group becomes nonviolent
3. Issue indivisibility: all or nothing demands (Hamas w/ Palestine)
123
four strategies used by terrorists to further own interests through violence
1. Coercion: includes policy change through threat or imposition of costs on the target, uncertainty: resolve, target audience: target state
2. Spoiling: creating tension or violence in an effort to convince adherents to a negotiated settlement to abandon agreement (if a moderate group in the terrorist home state is coming to an agreement with target state, terrorist group will spoil the deal by attacking target state), uncertainty: credibility, target audience: target state
3. Outbidding: using increasingly extreme announcements or actions against the target state to cultivate political support from home state, often seen in competition between two groups, uncertainty: resolve, target audience: home population
4. Provocation: attempting to incite a disproportionate response from target state in order to create political sympathy for the provoker, uncertainty: credibility, target audience; home population (attack target state to provoke larger response against home population to gain home population support against target state)
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four potential counterterrorism strategies, overall implication of these strategies
1. Deterrence: preventative, threaten terrorists with high costs, retaliatory
2. Criminalization: reactive, prosecuting individuals/groups for planned attacks in court
3. Defensive: preventative, make attacks costlier to carry out
4. Preemption: preventative, disrupt or destroy terrorist groups before they attack (offensive)
5. Also negotiate and compromise
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Compellence vs. deterrence
Compellence: using threats to change status quo, deterrence: using threats to maintain status quo
