Democratic peace theory Flashcards
(30 cards)
What is required for a system to be described as anarchical?
There is no higher authority.
What is the difference between classical and neo-structural realism? (what is realism)
Classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau, argue that states have an inherent drive to achieve power and supremacy.
Neo-structural realists such as John Mearsheimer disagree. They argue that it is the structure of the international system, the lack of hierarchy that makes states act in a certain way. There is a lack of trust between countries as each is looking to increase its power. States seek relative gains.
What does liberalism argue about international relations?
Power is important but it is not the only thing guiding states. Countries do not have to achieve objectives alone, instead we have international relations.
Absolute gains can be made, e.g. through trade.
There are mechanisms that can facilitate trust e.g. diplomacy.
What is a criticism of democratic peace theory (that it takes a static understanding of states, war, democracy)?
It takes a static understanding of states, democracy and war, which have not been static concepts.
Democratic peace theory operates with static concepts of war, democracy and state, despite these concepts changing radically over the years. It is difficult to make any claims about the 19th century due to the limited number of democracies. The post-WWII era which has had many democracies has experienced few wars, largely underpinned by US economic and military power.
What is Spiro’s approach and why is it problematic?
David Spiro carried out a study in 1994 in which he attempted to demonstrate empirically that the zero wars fought between democratic countries was an insignificant result. He examined the years between 1816-1976 and found the probability in each year of there being zero wars. The only period with any significant result was a few years around WWI. However, investigating in this year-by-year basis is problematic. Spiro does acknowledge this, and he also looks at five, ten and twenty year periods. This is still a problem though. When determining significance, the largest period possible should be looked at. One individual event might not be significant, but if this individual event is repeated consistently, it might become significant. For example, throwing a coin and getting zero heads is not significant, throwing it three times and getting zero heads is not significant, but throwing it ten times and getting zero heads is significant. Another problem for Spiro’s result is that another thirty years have elapsed since his study, and there have been no wars between democracies in that period. The more time passes without a war between two democracies, the stronger the evidence for the democratic peace theory.
Is zero a significant result?
Most political scientists have established that zero is significant, e.g. Jack Levy and his claim that DPT is ‘the closest thing we have to an empirical law in the study of international relations’.
Kosuke Imai and James Lo conducted a nonparametric sensitivity analysis and found a very strong and signficant relationship.
What is the most ambiguous case?
Spanish-American War 1898
The most ambiguous case is the Spanish American war. However, the Spanish system was not sufficiently democratic for it to be it to be a successful counterexample. After 1890, Spain had universal male suffrage and a bicameral legislature with an executive nominally responsible to it. However, ministers were selected by the King who was the de facto ruler. Liberals and Conservatives rotated being in power by agreement not election. Changes in government preceded elections, with corruption so widespread that the election result was printed in the newspaper the day before the election. No study places Spain at the time into the democratic category. Most of the unclear cases take place in the 19th century which was a century of imperfect democracy.
What are a few other potential cases of democracies fighting each other, and why are they ultimately unsuccessful?
i) Finland vs Western democracies 1941
Finland was mainly concerned with fighting the Soviet Union, and only nominally at war with Britain and France. The conflict does not get close to 1000 casualties.
ii) American civil war 1861
The American civil war was not an interstate war. The confederacy did not have any international recognition as a state. It was a civil war.
iii) Lebanon vs Israel 1967
In the Six-Day War of 1967 Lebanon (then still an at least marginally democratic state, as it was not when invaded by Israel in 1982) participated in “combat” only by sending a few aircraft into Israeli airspace; the planes were driven back with, apparently, no casualties at all.
iv) 1863 Ecuador vs Colombia
This fits the criteria for war, but neither regime meets any reasonable requirement for democratic stability.
How does Bruce Russett define ‘war’?
‘War here means large-scale institutionally organised lethal violence.’ The threshold commonly agreed on in the social science literature is that a war must involve 1000 deaths.
What are the conceptual arguments in favour of the democratic peace theory? (Norms)
Firstly, democracy socialises political elites to act in accordance with certain democratic norms. They favour negotiation, cooperation and compromise. The liberal principle of non-interference with individual sovereignty can be extended to nation states. Liberal democracies are thus less inclined to interfere with their neighbours. The mutual dedication to democratic norms helps to foster trust and respect between two democracies. This can explain why they are less likely to fight. As emphasised by Charles Lipson, democracies expect other democracies to act in this way, favouring diplomatic settlements over war. Over time, this creates a virtuous cycle, where democracies are able to form reliable partners with each other.
What are the conceptual arguments in favour of the democratic peace theory? (Institutional)
(Economic costs)
Economic costs: The citizens in a democracy bear the economic costs of war and will hence be more hesitant to pursue conflict. This reluctance to go to war is translated via democratic institutions to the country’s foreign policy.
How does Sebastian Rosato criticise the (norms) arguments in favour of democratic peace theory?
Firstly, he argues that democracies do not externalise liberal norms. This is demonstrated by the rampant colonialism and imperialism which major European democracies engaged in in the 19th and 20th century. Between 1815 and 1975, 66 out of 108 of the wars were imperial. Furthermore, democracies do not inherently respect other democracies. This can be shown by the persistent attempts by the USA to destabilise left-leaning governments, prioritising stopping the spread of communism over the proliferation of democracy. Many of these destabilisation efforts were targeted at democracies, such as Guatemala, British Guyana, Chile and Brazil. It might be objected that these countries were not greatly democratic. However, much of the US effort was to impose more autocratic governments in their place. Rosato argues that the most natural response to these examples is to cast doubt on the assumption that democracies externalise norms and display greater trust/respect for each other.
How does Sebastian Rosato criticise the (institutional) arguments in favour of democratic peace theory?
(Economic costs)
Economic costs: He argues plausibly that accountability is to be measured by the consequences of the decision going wrong. Table 4 demonstrates that autocrats are roughly just as likely to be removed from office for taking their country into a losing or costly war. Autocrats are considerably more likely to be brutally punished. Both the democrat and autocrat should thus be reluctant to enter a war. Only a small subset of the population tends to bear the cost of war. Excluding the two world wars, the fatalities in percentage terms tend to be very small and the economic costs once spread over the population are very rarely devastating. These costs may well be justified given a sufficiently important military or strategic objective.
What might a suffragist explanation of the democratic peace be?
Another potential explanation for democratic peace theory is the extension of suffrage to women- who have more peaceful preferences. This argument is proposed by Barnhart, Trager, Saunders and Dafoe in their essay The Suffragist Peace. They cited research conducted on American men and women which asked questions about the use of military force; and found that women were decisively more pacifist than men (Barnhart et al 2020, 637-40). When suffrage is extended to women, the foreign policy position of the median voter shifts to become more peaceful- incentivising politicians to adopt more peaceful policies (Barnhart et al 2020, 640). Democracies without women’s suffrage are 192% more likely to initiate conflict than democracies where women can vote (Barnhart et al 2020, 654). This is an interesting argument, and it seems plausible than it can partially explain why democracies tend to be more peaceful in relations to one another. However, it does not seem likely that it offers a comprehensive explanation of the democratic peace. Many years that are studied as part of the democratic peace theory (particularly the 19th century) include democracies without suffrage extended to women. Furthermore, this suffragist peace argument would better explain a monadic theory than the dyadic one we are considering. Indeed, it would lead to the conclusion that democracies are more peaceful in all relations, when in fact it is generally observed that they are only more peaceful when dealing with other democracies. Overall, this suffragist argument is not a convincing explanation of democratic peace theory.
In which direction on a one-dimensional democracy-authoritarian scale is a state most likely to go to war?
Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder demonstrate that in the period where a country is democratising, they are two thirds more likely to go to war than a state which is not undergoing regime change (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 12). Regimes which are democratising are slightly more likely to go to war than regimes that are going in the opposite direction.
What is the Thucydides trap?
The Thucydides trap refers to the high likelihood of war between the global hegemonic power, and a rising power that threatens its status. It derives its name from the observation of Thucydides about the conflict between rising power Athens and Sparta. In 12 of the past 16 cases over five hundred years, there has been war.
What is the challenge posed to the democratic peace theory by the Ancient world? (according to William Antholis)
There were 14 wars between clear democracies. 8 of these were part of the Athenian campaign against Syracuse. Five other wars: Mantea, Megara, Mende, Miletus, Amphipolis.
What conclusion about the norms and institutional logic does Antholis draw?
Democratic institutions at best provided a weak constraint on war-making.
Democratic states were more reluctant to go to war with other democracies. However, perceptions were key. Democracies had to perceive that the other country was democratic for it be impactful.
Why are the counterexamples from the ancient world not particularly appropriate?
Difference in concept of state: The concept of a state was radically different in Ancient Greece compared to now.
There was no bureaucratic structure in the states of the Ancient world. Instead, power resided directly in the people. There was no stable, impersonal institutions. It is through these institutions that DPT postulates a causal effect.
Difference in democracy: Democracies were exclusionary in who they allowed citizenship and hence could attend assemblies. Democracy was also direct rather than representative.
DPT is usually applied to democracies within a stable, liberal international order with emphasis on diplomacy, trade, sovereignty, human rights.
In contrast, the ancient world closer resembled the Hobbesian world of constant insecurity.
The DPT is about modern liberal democracies embedded in a particular kind of international system, and applying it to ancient city-states is a category error.
Summary- ancient states are not like modern day states, ancient democracy is not like modern day democracy, and the environment that democracies operated within was entirely different.
What are the three broad arguments made by liberal international relations scholars?
i) International institutionalism
ii) Economic interdependence
iii) Democratic peace theory
What is the liberal argument relating to international institutionalism?
Diplomacy, UN, an effective hierarchy has not necessarily emerged, but it is more structured than realists think.
What is the liberal argument relating to economic interdependence?
The world is so interconnected that the damage countries will do to each other will be too great. E.g. Taiwan as the silicon shield.
How were democracies different in the 19th century?
Democracies in the 19th century were very unlike democracies now. Even the most democratic countries had limited franchises, often interference from the monarchy and less of an emphasis on liberal rights. Recent developments such as democratic backsliding have made it harder to categorise democracies as many fall into a hybrid category.
States have become more clearly defined and much stronger than they were in the 19th century.
How was war different in the 20th century compared to the 19th century?
In the 19th century there were many formal interstate wars, usually fought between monarchies. The World Wars showed that democracies can be willing to fight, but not towards each other. The Cold War saw a decline in interstate wars. Democracies fought wars aimed at bringing about regime change, e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan. These were not territorial in nature. There is also a changing nature of warfare, e.g. cyberwarfare, economic coercion.
