Developmental Flashcards

Question

What are the two processes of learning and what does this aim to achieve? (Piaget)

Answer 1

Assimilation: (process of generalising) application of old schema to a new instance (calling a cat a dog) Accommodation: development of a new schema (calling a cat a cat, or even a Persian cat). Aims to achieve equilibration

Answer 2

Birth-2yrs = Sensorimotor Stage 2-7yrs = Preoperational Stage 7-11yrs = Concrete Operational Stage 11 yrs up = Formal Operational Stage

Answer 3

This stage is the initial building block of everything else During this stage, the child has a very limited number of skills at her disposal, which develop: - Sensory abilities (vision, touch, hearing, etc) - Motor & Sensorimotor abilities - Gradually, these allow for the development of cognition – understanding & representing the surrounding world.

Answer 4

Object permanence - we have to know an object still exists when we aren’t looking - 4 – 8 months. Initially, “Laurent’s reaction to falling objects still seems to be non-existent: he does not follow with his eyes any of the objects which I drop in front of him.” ‘out of sight, out of mind’ - 8-12 months. The child knows that occluded objects still exist (basic “object permanence”): “Laurent searches in front of him for a paper ball which I drop above the coverlet.”. - However... the child is still subject to the A not B error

Answer 5

We have to know that an object is where it was last acted upon, not elsewhere - This is where the 8-12 month olds fall down! - Babies stick with the location they think the object belongs in, and not the location they saw someone put it - fail to understand that objects cannot move on their own

Answer 6

- In the early part of the Preoperational Stage (the pre-conceptual period 2-4 years) there is a rapid increase in language - Piaget put this down to the development of symbolic thought - Make-believe play and imitation arise here - They are thinking symbolically but not use cognitive operations

Answer 7

Only viewing things from one's own perspective Developed by end of pre-operational stage

Answer 8

Being able to judge the amount there is of something, even if one is more spread out/ a different shape e.g. same number of beads but one set is more spread out - able to recognise it is still the same number Developed by end of pre-operational stage

Answer 9

Being able to consider a subset and a full set at once e.g. brown and green beads - ask a child if there are more brown beads or more beads, they should say more beads Developed by end of pre-operational stage

Answer 10

- This is characterized by the development of organized and rational thinking - The ability to pass egocentrism, conservation and class inclusion tasks in an intuitive way develops by the end of the preoperational period (5-7 years), but logical justification is only given in the concrete operational stage

Answer 11

- By this stage they pass the egocentrism test: decentration has occurred according to Piaget (the ability to consider different perspectives) - They also pass the conservation test, meaning they understand: * Reversibility: the ability to imagine the opposite of a perceived transformation. * Invariance: that things stay the same unless something has been added or subtracted. - They also pass the class inclusion test

Answer 12

Concrete operational stage (7-11) - Seriation - able to sort things in order of length - Transitive inference - compare two values by using their relation to an intermediate value

Answer 13

- In this stage, children can reason logically about objects that are not currently present. - They can also conduct verbal reasoning, which deals with logical thought about totally hypothetical scenarios. ‘Edith is taller than Susan. Edith is shorter than Lily. Who is the tallest?’

Answer 14

Many different kinds - length, liquid, mass, area, volume Number conservation usually develops by 5-6 years and volume conservation not until 10-11 years (e.g. water level rising when something put in)

Answer 15

He adapted it to include the idea that concepts (e.g. conservation), once acquired, might not be immediately applied to all cases.

Answer 16

- ‘The experimenter is up to something funny, I’ll play along’ - Children have seen the experimenter make the change, so the experimenter is repeating the question because she wants a different answer this time. - If instead of the experimenter, naughty teddy makes the transformation, preoperational children pass. - Perceived trust of experimenter, no trust of naughty teddy - characteristics of experimenter have an impact - Children don't trust beards - effect of dad having beard?

Answer 17

- Preoperational children fail the class inclusion task (‘are there more brown beads or beads?’) - But if rephrased to emphasise the class, they pass! Showed four toy cows, three black, one white, all asleep: ‘Are there more black cows or more cows?’ > ‘black cows’ ‘Are there more black cows or more sleeping cows?’ > ‘sleeping cows’

Answer 18

This is big in transitive inference - Bryant and Trabasso (1971) argued that the main problem for children in inferring the difference between A and C was in remembering the premises (A>B and B>C) - Assessing children's working memory - not whether they can perform the operation - Children who were trained to remember these premises passed.

Answer 19

When looking time rather than reaching is used, children in the sensorimotor stage seem to have a concept of object permanence (Kellman & Spelke, 1983).

Answer 20

- One of the fundamental ideas behind Piaget is that learning occurs through interaction with the environment - But what if learning is something that occurs in a social context - From this angle the individual constructs knowledge - not through solitary interaction with the world or the environment, but in a social context.

Answer 21

“What a child can do in co-operation today he can do alone tomorrow”. - The child uses tools provided by culture: real tools (pens, paper) & symbolic tools (maths, language). - And they are taught by others – it doesn’t come from the child

Answer 22

- The learner has a Zone of Proximal Development. - “Distance between the actual developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance, or in collaboration with more capable peers.” - The teacher provides ‘scaffolding’ for learning (Wood et al 1976 ; Bruner, 1986).

Answer 23

- Kellman and Spelke (1983) habituated 4-month-old infants to a rod with an occluder in the middle - Infants then habituated - show infant same thing over and over, eventually the amount of time they pay attention decreases each time - habituation occurs when attention reaches less than 50% of attention on first trial - They present objects without occluder - infants dishabituate to a broken rod, but not to the one that’s intact - See broken rod as a new object - We see the same with other shapes and patterns - This suggests that they were perceiving the object as being whole, without ever seeing it being whole - This means they must have some representation of the object?

Answer 24

Young infants have many core cognitive capacities available to them Object representation Number Space Agents and actions - Innate, domain-specific systems of knowledge. - Each system has its own set of core principles - Learning is an enrichment of the core principles

Answer 25

- Infants aren't good at motor movements, but can do looking tasks, this is why they fail object permanence tasks - Many of these core capacities cannot be seen in search paradigms, but can be observed with looking measurements

Answer 26

- If infants see a hand moving to grab something, and then change goals they look for longer - If they know a hand is going to grab the same object, they don't look for as long - they may know that the same object is there

Answer 27

Looking times are a fragile measurement – effects are small and some inferences have been oversold, also only one trial per infant

Answer 28

- Infants can represent the spatial location of objects, the fact that they exist continuously - don't just disappear (even if hidden), and the fact that solid objects cannot pass through one another - They perceive the unity of a partly hidden object by analysing the movements and configuration of its visible surfaces. - Baillargeon (1985) - violation-of-expectation paradigm with 3½ month-olds - they looked longer (dishabituation) at an impossible event when a moving object (drawbridge) passed through a solid object than the possible event

Answer 29

- Individual variation: in the drawbridge study, only fast habituators show the effects. - Need for careful control: when habituated to the impossible event, babies looked longer at the possible event: just interested in novelty (Cashon & Cohen 2000)? Just training infants to believe a certain thing?

Answer 30

Xu & Spelke (2000) tested if 6 month olds had an ‘approximate number’ system for distinguishing between large sets: Two sets of squares each containing different numbers of dots, but each varying the size and layout of the dots Tested whether infants could tell the difference between the numbers despite the varying sizes and layouts Habituated to one set with one number, tested on a square with that number and a square with a different number Result: 6 month-olds looked longer at the new number than at the old number. Therefore they can discriminate between a set of 8 and a set of 16. They cannot discriminate between 8 and 12 in this way, so it is only approximate!

Answer 31

- Mix, Huttenlocher & Devine (2002) points out that infants may have been responding not to number but to ‘contour length’ - So imagine putting a piece of string around each dot, and then putting those strings end to end. - If during habituation, infants were paying attention to contour length, then in test they could have looked longer at the novel number purely because it had a very different contour length – not because they perceived number! - Plus, these contour length differences weren’t so large in the 8 vs 12 condition, which might explain the null result there.

Answer 32

Showed that infants computed number when objects differed in colour, pattern and texture However, when objects were identical they instead computed continuous extent (area filled by objects), and if there was a different number but same continuous extent they viewed this as the same

Answer 33

Blue Wall study (Hermer & Spelke, 1994) 18-24 month olds Hide teddy in one corner, disorient child by spinning them round, observed where child will look for teddy One out of four walls were blue - geometric cues Rats can use geometric info to figure out sense of direction, children search at geometrically correct corners but do not take colour into account as a cue Spelke concludes they have a geometric module for reoreintation, which is impervious to colour information

Answer 34

- Cheng & Newcombe (2005) point out that the room used by Hermer & Spelke was very small (1.2 x 1.8m). - Toddlers do use colour for reorientation in a large room (Learmonth et al 2002).

Answer 35

Alison Gopnik argues that very young infants think like scientists - They are observing the statistics of their environments; forming and testing hypotheses, and revising their theories on the basis of new data - Contrast with Piaget who thought young children were irrational and illogical, she thinks they are rational but do not know much

Answer 36

Habituated to a box with mostly white balls or mostly red balls, experimenter pulls a sample of balls out of the box which are the majority colour, then shows the box to the infant which is mostly the opposite colour or the expected colour. 8 -month-olds look longer at the unexpected display They can make inferences about the population from a sample

Answer 37

Can 3-4 year olds give objects with the same causal powers the same name? (Gopnik & Sobel, 2000) - Children are given experience of objects (‘blickets’) which had a new causal power: the ability to make a machine (‘blicket detector’) light up. - Child is shown that two of these make it light up & play music; two don’t. - Then shown one that does, and told “this one is a blicket. Can you show me another blicket?” - Results: they chose the one with the same causal powers on 74% of trials. - Objects with the same function are grouped together, not objects with the same shape

Answer 38

Knowledge is innate Knowledge is domain specific Learning as consolidation and enrichment of the starting position Learning through language and symbol systems

Answer 39

- Some innate knowledge - Knowledge is not domain specific - Learning can fundamentally alter the existing understanding - Learning through exploration and seeking out evidence

Answer 40

It allows us to examine physical brain growth, or development of functional networks It allows us to relate behaviour in development to to the structures and networks which underpin it

Answer 41

Means better language abilities

Answer 42

EEG, fMRI, MEG, NIRS

Answer 43

Tests electrical activity in the brain Very high temporal resolution Low spatial resolution Can be used in early infancy

Answer 44

Measures changes associated with blood flow Very high spatial resolution Requires stillness which can be tricky Not appropriate if there is metal in the body - Problem for children with cochlear implants (metal) where you might want to use fMRI to look at language related regions in the brain

Answer 45

Measures magnetic fields produced by the electrical currents in the brain Very high temporal resolution Requires some tolerance from the participant

Answer 46

Uses Near Infra-Red (NIR) light to measure light scattering and absorption, allowing us to measure change in blood flow Trade off between spatial and temporal resolution Can be used early

Answer 47

An umbrella term for the processes underlying conscious, goal-directed thought, most often in novel circumstances. Inhibitory control Monitoring/ updating working memory Planning Problem-solving Attention-switching Forward planning

Answer 48

A test of means-end behaviour Willats (1999) 6- to 8-month-old infants are presented with an object which they can only retrieve by an intermediary action (pulling it towards them on a supporting cloth) 7-month-olds would sometimes retrieve the object by chance (without watching it during their response) 8-month-olds demonstrated intentional means-end behaviour: they looked at their ‘goal’ when pulling the ‘means’ This required them to execute a sequence of actions in the correct order – an executive function task. If this, then that = means to end

Answer 49

Can only move one disk at a time Can only put small on large, not other way round Measures Problem-Solving and Planning Improvement with age Older children could pursue long-term goals Can also manage subgoals

Answer 50

Prefrontal cortex Phineas Gage lost a lot of executive function due to PFC injury

Answer 51

Cognition can be thought of as the flow of information through a series of stores (Atkinson & Shiffrin 1968). Baddeley & Hitch (1974) propose that there is a central executive controlling what to attend to, how to encode it, and what to prioritise.

Answer 52

The PFC changes throughout childhood and into adolescence – including synaptic pruning; increased myelination & connectivity; increase & subsequent decrease in gray matter (Giedd et al, 1999)

Answer 53

Myelin improves connection speed in different areas of the brain - PFC becomes myelinated much later than other areas Explains why children's inhibition of responses develops a lot later than other functions like language

Answer 54

At 8-12 months, the child makes a perseverative error, continuing to search at A after the object moves to B. With age, errors decrease, as does the delay period over which the child will search correctly. This demonstrates difficulties in set-shifting, inhibition and working memory

Answer 55

Diamond (1990) showed that in monkeys, A-not-B task performance was governed by the PFC Infant monkeys with lesions of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex showed no evidence of passing at delays of 2,5, or 10 sec even by the end of their testing Lesions of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex produced a profound deficit on the A-not-B task as long as any demand whatsoever was placed on memory

Answer 56

EEG differences in 7-12 month old infants who can vs those who cannot solve the A not B task after a long delay: Power of EEG signal at frontal electrodes (lots of change in strong group) Coherence of EEG signal between front and back electrodes Individual differences in brain activity (related to maturation of PFC) explain some of the individual differences in A not B performance

Answer 57

A test of attentional shifting (Zelazo, Frye & Rupus, 1996) 3- and 4-year-olds asked to sort a stack of cards either by colour or shape Half way through the game, the rule changes Despite answering correctly to questions concerning the game ‘rules’, at 3 years children typically continue sorting cards with respect to the first dimension. By 4-5 years they switch successfully. They lack the ability to switch attention between aspects of the scene (colour and shape) – a central executive task. At 3-4 years, executive function is still developing.

Answer 58

Another measure of attentional shifting, but relates to flexibility as well – you don’t know the rules!

Answer 59

Children do card sorting task while brain activity is recorded via NIRS (near infra-red spectroscopy – measuring blood oxygenation related to brain function) Nearly all aged 5 but only 75% aged 3 successfully switch rules Change in blood oxygenation in prefrontal areas between control phase (sort blank cards) and study. Compare 3s who pass vs fail (persevere) - different strengths of EEG activity

Answer 60

It requires literacy

Answer 61

Day/Night task is commonly used (Gerstadt et al 1994) Stop-signal task (Pliszka, Lotti & Woldorff, 2000): Press left for A, right for B. If S appears, stop your response and don’t press anything Go/NoGo task (Jonkman, Sniedt , Kemner 2007): 6-7yrs, 9-10 yrs, adult Press a button when the letter X appeared, but only when it was preceded by the A (Go condition). When an A is followed by another letter, inhibit your prepared response (A-not-X, NoGo condition).

Answer 62

All ages: medial frontal cortex more active during NoGo task. Children only: additional posterior source, different for 6-7yrs and 9-10 yrs. Johnstone, Barry, and Clarke (2007) At 7 – 12 years, little or no developmental change in behavioral measures on Go/No-Go and Stop tasks But important changes in the neural mechanisms that accompanied performance. For instance, the central and parietal ‘‘No- Go’’ N2 component decreased in amplitude with age, whereas the parietal ‘‘Stop’’ N2 component increased in amplitude with age across this developmental period.

Answer 63

“Tracing neurodevelopmental trajectories provides an additional layer at which executive control mechanisms can be distinguished.”

Answer 64

The scalp activity recorded as a result of visual stimuli

Answer 65

- Only a few electrodes if studying one specific part of brain - Identifying brain activity not muscle activity - Put many brain responses on top of each other to create an average over time to hunt within general noise to find a reliable reaction to what you're seeing

Answer 66

Braddick (1993) found cortical orientation develops as early as 3 weeks By 5 weeks we show very strong evidence of orientation perception They are sensitive to relatively small changes in degree of orientation by 3 months (e.g. Franklin et al 2010) - Could happen earlier - could be limitations of tools

Answer 67

When an object looms towards you it might be some kind of threat When we perceive a physical threat we may want to take defensive action An instinctive action to take is blinking - Blinking useful as it does not take motor control - young infants Measuring direction towards themselves

Answer 68

Yonas et al (1977) tracked whether infants blink to avoid collision from 1-9 months They start doing this from about 4 months, but not before Other studies also looked at things like eye widening, posture change, moving arms etc But what if they don’t see it as a threat???

Answer 69

Orioli et al (2018) measured looming in a preferential looking paradigm in infants between 14 and 94 hours old One condition had an incoming and receding object, the other had two approaching or two approaching and not colliding Results showed longer looking to approaching object in Exp 1 And longer looking to colliding vs non colliding in Exp 2

Answer 70

Wattam-Bell 1991 compared same direction movement with direction change. Responses to directional motion emerge at ~10 weeks for low speeds and ~13 weeks for high speeds.

Answer 71

Have no directional cells in visual cortex (Cynader, Berman & Hein, 1973; Pasternak et al, 1981)

Answer 72

Gibson and Walk (1960) wanted to test whether depth is innate They asked infants to crawl over a visual cliff or come away from it to the shallow side 92% refused to cross the cliff

Answer 73

For this to work the baby had to be old enough to crawl – does this show innateness? Is there an ethical issue in making them attempt it for trust in parents? Is there a role for experience here??? Could be teaching babies to do dangerous things Could erode trust in mum if mum is encouraging baby to do a dangerous thing

Answer 74

The perception of depth through noticing differences between the images in the two eyes (‘binocular disparity’)

Answer 75

Red-green should give different messages about depth to the brain Responses emerge at ~11-13 weeks

Answer 76

Depth detail - stereoacuity - improves greatly within 4-5 weeks of onset (Birch, Gwiazda & Held, 1982)

Answer 77

- Motor development could be seen as progression through a series of milestones, phases or stages. - These were prominent in the 1930’s – 1940’s and are still the basis for ‘modern’ development scales – e.g. the Bayley scales - Development was thought to occur in a rigid manner, with the stages occurring in strict order, and similar times for all infants e.g. Shirley (1933) motor milestones

Answer 78

Dynamic systems: Motor abilities are present earlier than previously thought. However, their expression is limited by other factors: physical development, experience with motor programs and the visuomotor environment. This view was pioneered by Esther Thelen in the 1980’s and is more recently held by Karen Adolph (NYU). (e.g. Thelen, 1984; Adolph, 2000)

Answer 79

Flexible timing, individual differences. Children are in two stages at once; regress from one to another; skip stages – continuous, not stage-like change (Piek, 2006; Adolph & Berger, 2006) - Children often achieve a milestone, forget how they did it and develop it again later, some go through two stages at once or skip stages - Infants are very variable

Answer 80

It assumes everyone is experiencing the same thing at home (same motor stimulation and practice) when this is not the case

Answer 81

- Support for sitting from hole in the ground; sand; cushions - Support for walking from vigorous bouncing (“kitwalse” – to make jump) - Luring with food - Burying up to knees on a sandy beach at 1 year - Massage & exercise

Answer 82

Infants take around 9000 steps per day = 29 football fields This will cause huge change in motor development once infants are walking this much

Answer 83

Determined by walking experience rather than age; & experience in that specific walking mode

Answer 84

At 7-8 months, the visual cliff is avoided by: 35% inexperienced crawlers (11 days); 65% of experienced crawlers (41 days) (Berthenthal, Campos & Barrett, 1984). Successful performance in a similar paradigm is dependent on experience in that posture (sitting vs crawling) (Adolph, 2000). For humans, experience is necessary for learning the visual cues to depth and feeding them into motor plans.

Answer 85

1 day - chicks 3-4 weeks - rats and kittens

Answer 86

12 infants aged 4 weeks old, baby held over a table top for 1 minute Usually by this age the newborn stepping reflex is disappearing (totally by ~ 8 weeks). This was thought to be a result of inevitable neural maturation. But can it in fact be altered by physical context? Stepping with weights decreased stepping frequency. Stepping in water increased stepping frequency, as (buoyancy counteracts gravity). Stepping is limited by muscle strength as well as central factors

Answer 87

Innate drive to form close relationship with caregiver

Answer 88

Behaviours: sucking, clinging, crying, smiling, following – which elicit care from the caregiver

Answer 89

Primary attachment figure - has to be a woman

Answer 90

Breaking maternal bond any time in the first 5 years of life can lead to profound cognitive, social, and emotional consequences – e.g. aggression, depression, delinquency - Not clear how long separation must be to have consequences

Answer 91

Birth – 6 weeks - Preattachment phase Orienting & signaling to anyone - figuring out who they should be attached to 6 weeks – 6-8 months - Attachment in the making Increasingly orienting to and seeking comfort from primary caregiver. 6-8 months – 18-24 months ‘Clear cut’ attachment Stays close to primary caregiver. Separation protest; fear of strangers. 18-24 months + - Formation of reciprocal relationship With mother/caregiver. Child increasingly accommodates mother’s needs. Reduction in immediate proximity-seeking; development of internal working model of relationship.

Answer 92

Captures the child’s beliefs about how trustworthy others are; their own value; and their own social effectiveness Very influenced by Lorenz’s theory of imprinting Believed that attachment had a critical or sensitive period

Answer 93

Positive and loved

Answer 94

Unloved and rejected

Answer 95

Angry and confused

Answer 96

Harlow showed that monkeys need ‘contact comfort’ from mother – not just food.

Answer 97

Her studies led Bowlby (1969) to change his ideas and conclude that infants can have more than 1 attachment figure

Answer 98

Used at 12 – 24 months to measure attachment 1) Mother, infant & experimenter in room 2) Mother & infant play 3) Stranger enters, talks to mum, plays with infant 4) Mum leaves. Stranger plays with baby. 5) Mum returns. Stranger leaves. Mum settles infant. 6) Mum leaves: infant alone 7) Stranger comes in, tries to settle infant, then stands back. 8) Mum returns. Stranger leave. Mum settles infant 5 and 8 are the reunions

Answer 99

These are scored every 15 seconds, on a scale of 1-7 intensity. Proximity and contacting seeking Contact maintaining Avoidance of proximity and contact Resistance to contact and comforting

Answer 100

Does infant use mum as a base to explore from at the start? e.g. Infant plays with toys e.g. Infant moves around room How does the infant behave when mother is absent? e.g. Infant looks at or goes to door

Answer 101

Does not play much with mother. Is not distressed by her absence; plays happily with stranger. Avoids interactions with mother even during reunions. Can be comforted by either mother or stranger. These children operate independently of their attachment figure. She may not be responding to their needs adequately (Ainsworth, 1979). This strategy minimises possible negative reactions from the parent

Answer 102

Uses mother as a secure base for exploration. Plays with stranger only when mum is there. Distressed when mum leaves. Happy to see her return and is easily calmed down from any distress related to her absence. These children possess a “representational model of attachment figures(s) as being available, responsive, and helpful”.

Answer 103

Less exploration than average. Very distressed by mother’s absence. Afraid of stranger. When mother returns, seeks contact with her but also shows resistance (e.g. pushing away). The child is at the same time clingy and resistant. Perhaps the mother has given inconsistent responses to the child. This strategy of focus on the parent clearly demonstrates to the parent the need for greater responsiveness.

Answer 104

This was later introduced by Main & Solomon (1986). No consistent/ organised, obvious strategy for gaining contact with mother or for being soothed and comforted. Contradictory behaviour (e.g. cries a lot but then indifferent). Misdirected behaviour (going to stranger rather then parent on reunion). Freezing or fear of parent. “The parent is at the same time the source of fright as well as the only potential haven of safety”. “Fright without solution” (quotes from van Izendoorn et al, 1999). Related to drug abuse, maltreatment etc -- but not always.

Answer 105

Secure = 62% Avoidant = 15% Resistant/ambivalent = 9% Disorganised = 15%

Answer 106

Does not seem to be From 110 twin pairs assessed in the strange situation, genetics explained only 14% of the variance (O’Connor & Croft, 2001).

Answer 107

Higher Type A (avoidant) in Germany; Higher Type C in Japan & Israel

Answer 108

Intracultural variation is 1.5 times higher

Answer 109

Children attached normally to parent (Clarke-Stewart et al 1994). Children also attached securely to caregiver, who is more sensitive than either parent (Goosens, van Ijzendoorn 1990). So continuous maternal attachment not necessary?

Answer 110

Child is usually equally attached to mother and father Model of the world is affected by how studies are designed - by not including fathers it was assumed they had no role in attachment

Answer 111

High quality care is related to better linguistic and cognitive scores in primary school, until 11 years. More childcare (irrespective of quality) associated with more aggression – still significant by 12 years

Answer 112

Maternal sensitivity hypothesis (Bowlby/Ainsworth) suggests that the mother’s responses to the infant determine their attachment. Promptness, appropriateness & completeness of responses. These ratings of maternal sensitivity correlate somewhat with attachment (De Wolff & van Ijzendoorn, 1997: r=.24). Interventions to improve sensitivity improve attachment (Bakermans-Kranenburg, van Ijzendoorn & Juffer 2003)

Answer 113

Meins et al 2001 Suggested that sensitivity is a very broad measure and not predictive enough – e.g. does not predict whether an infant will be insecure-avoidant or insecure-ambivalent. Specifically focussed on the content of the responses, rather than their promptness. Do they indicate that the mother understands her infant as “a mental agent, capable of intentional action”? This would allow her to make appropriate infant-directed responses and actions. Sensitivity - viewing infant as its own person with its own mental state

Answer 114

Maternal responsiveness to change in infant’s direction of gaze Maternal responsiveness to infant’s object-directed action M looks at, picks up, or talks about object of infant’s attention Imitation; Encouragement of autonomy She interprets infant as intentional agent

Answer 115

“Which do you prefer?” “Are you bored?” “You’re joking!” “She says, ‘Mummy roll me back over’”

Answer 116

Maternal sensitivity related to attachment security Appropriate mind-related comments strongly related to attachment security, more so than sensitivity, and discriminates between insecure avoidance and insecure ambivalent groups.

Answer 117

curiosity & problem solving at 2 yrs social confidence at nursery at 3 yrs empathy & independence at 5 yrs

Answer 118

No SS classification isn’t stable across 6 months (Belsky et al 1996); 46% stability from 15 to 36 months (NICHD Early child Care Research Network 2001).

Answer 119

Autonomous, Dismissing, Preoccupied, Unresolved

Answer 120

72% yes, but about 22% changed classification, and 44% of those experiencing negative life events (Waters et al 2000). 77% yes (Hamilton, 2000) Not in a high risk sample – changes in classification particularly linked to maltreatment, maternal depression, family functioning at age 13 (Weinfeld 2000). Not in a middle class sample (Lewis 2000)

Answer 121

The ability to attribute mental states (desires, attitudes & beliefs) to oneself and others (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). “Theory of mind underlies the ability to explain, predict, and interpret actions and speech by attributing mental states – such as beliefs, desires, intentions and emotions – to oneself and to other people.” (Astington & Hughes (2013) – Ox. Handbook of Developmental Psychology This involves understanding alternative perspectives and decentering from egocentric representations (Piaget). Reverse to mind-mindedness - child developing independent thoughts and desires Figure out someone's mental state and take action on that mental state

Answer 122

We can’t directly see or measure someone else’s mind And a theory because it has predictive value e.g. getting the right present .. OR, I think she is angry, so I’d better leave…

Answer 123

If I see you eating a chocolate donut I might theorise that this is a preference for chocolate And so choose a chocolate ice-cream for you

Answer 124

Children need exposure and experience of the world to develop this A good example is hide and seek Young children often stand in plain sight and cover their eyes Here they fail to appreciate others can see when they can’t

Answer 125

- Marketing - knowing what people will want to buy

Answer 126

False belief is understanding that someone can have a different view to your own. Demonstrating false belief shows theory of mind (Wimmer & Perner, 1983)

Answer 127

Children (4, 6 and 8 years old) are told a story about a boy called Maxi. They see toy characters & cupboards, too. A well-known false belief task “Maxi helps his mum put away some shopping, putting the chocolate into the blue cupboard. After he leaves to go to the playground, his mother takes the chocolate out, cooks with it, and returns it to the green cupboard. She realises she has forgotten the eggs, and goes out to get some. Maxi comes back, hungry, and wants chocolate…” Where will Maxi look?

Answer 128

4 year olds fail; 6 and 8 year olds pass Younger children can’t work out that Maxi doesn’t know it has moved – they can’t assign a false belief to him. The interim conclusion is that Theory of Mind develops at 5 years or more.

Answer 129

Control test for memory : children did remember where the chocolate was and where Maxi had put it. Control test for competing ideas: Current position of the chocolate (green) vs. where Maxi would look (blue). If the chocolate disappears from the box it’s really in (green), so that the current position is ‘nowhere’, then this competition is removed. This makes performance improve at 4 years, but not at 3 years. Conclusion: False belief develops at 4-5 years (Wimmer & Perner, 1983).

Answer 130

Sally puts a ball in her basket. Then she leaves. Anne moves the ball to a box. Where will Sally look for the ball? Results: 3 year olds fail but 4 year olds pass (Baron Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). Conclusion: The Sally-Ann task suggests that the false belief aspect of theory of mind develops at 4 years

Answer 131

Perner, Leekham & Wimmer, 1987 Child sees Smarties tube E: “What’s in the box?” C: “Sweets” E shows C that it actually contains pencils! E: “When your friend comes in I’m going to show her this box. What will she think is in the box?”

Answer 132

“When your friend comes in I’m going to show her this box. What will she think is in the box?” 3 yrs: “pencils”. 4 yrs: “sweets”. “What did you think was in the box before it was opened?” 3 yrs: “pencils”. 4 yrs: “sweets”. Conclusion: The false belief aspect of ToM, and the ability to have insight into one’s own prior beliefs (‘representational change’) develop at 4 years.

Answer 133

Also called the deceptive box task or the unexpected contents task False belief: He thinks this is X but I think it’s Y Representational change: I once thought X but now I think Y Appearance-reality: This looks like X but in fact is Y

Answer 134

Also around 5 years

Answer 135

Performance on a number of tasks suggests that there might be a universal, stage-like, development of theory of mind at around 4-5 years

Answer 136

- Sharing toys - understanding other children might want the toy - Trying to comfort another child when they're upset - Empathy is a significant part of ToM - Deception - Pretend play (appearance-reality) - Jokes - Prosocial behaviour - Cooperation

Answer 137

These tasks we’ve seen aren’t straightforward. We have: Multiple objects Complex sentences People coming and going Often run by an unfamiliar adult - A lot of information to hold in their mind - depends on linguistic development - May be task demands or theory of mind

Answer 138

Understanding that actions have intentions A 9 month old baby watches a hand reaching for an object – then the hand reaches for the same object (goal) in a different location, or a different object (goal) in the same location. Results: 9-month-olds look longer to the new goal than the new location. 5-month-olds do not show these effects. Conclusion: By 6-9 months, infants perceive not just movement paths, but the relation between an human agent and a goal. They seem to infer the intentions of the actor (their mental state) [This competence is also taken as an example of Spelke’s ‘core knowledge’ of actions and agents. ]

Answer 139

Object moves into yellow box, and actor sees the move so has a true belief that it’s in the yellow box. Object moves into yellow box & back to green. Actor does not see the move, so has a false belief that it’s in the yellow box. On the test trial, the infant either sees the actor look in the green box, or in the yellow box. In the crucial false belief conditions, will she look longer if the actor looks in the correct box, or in the box where the actor thinks it is? Results: babies look longer if the actor looks in the correct box! They expected the actor to look in the incorrect box because they thought the actor had a false belief So 15 month olds can apparently notice and learn that someone has a false belief (“it’s in the yellow box”), and use that to predict their behaviour (“she should look in the yellow box”). If the actor’s behaviour goes against that prediction (she looks in the green box), the baby seems surprised (looks longer). This study suggests that infants of 15 months possess theory of mind.

Answer 140

Implicit v Explicit understanding of theory of mind (e.g. Clements & Perner, 1994): these are qualitatively different types of understanding, with implicit developing before explicit. - Implicit TOM emerges before 4 years (looking time; pretend play, deception).

Answer 141

Perner & Ruffman (2005): Understanding behaviour but not mental states: “People look for an object where they last saw it”? Wellman & Woolley, 1992: Understanding the ‘simple desires’ of another person – knowing what the other person wants, but not especially why, or what beliefs they might hold about it. Able to predict what someone might do, but not for example why they might look in the wrong place.

Answer 142

Explicit, verbal performance only emerges at 4 years (e.g. false belief). Being able to explain why people have false beliefs

Answer 143

Children and adults really theorise about others’ mental states. This allows them to generate new hypotheses about mental states

Answer 144

Children and adults merely imagine themselves in the shoes of another person

Answer 145

TOM is an innate human cognitive capacity (though one that needs to mature) The “theory of mind module” can be impaired in developmental disorders

Answer 146

Kulke (2018) tested replicability and convergent validity of looking time tasks. Mixed results. Very few replicated, many more not replicated/mixed Treat results of previous studies with caution - File draw problem - not publishing negative findings - not publishing things until you get the result you want

Answer 147

Maxi task is complex, involving long script, props etc. They lose track of whose perspective they are supposed to track as Maxi leaves the room. The Onishi task is simpler. Do children of 3.5 years fail the false belief task because it interrupts perspective-tracking?

Answer 148

Girl puts her bananas inside one of two fridges; goes for a walk towards the child (kept visible). Experimenter moves bananas to the other fridge, prompting child that the girl can’t see the move. Child is prompted throughout. Child is given figure and acts out response: ‘what happens next?’. The task is interactive, non-verbal, non-binary (no need to explicitly consider alternatives), no focus on target, avoiding ‘the pull of the real’.

Answer 149

3.5 year olds in this experiment, 80% failed the Smarties task, but 80% passed the Duplo task. When the Duplo girl disappeared from the scene, 80% failed it. So keeping track of perspective is crucial. When they made a verbal response, 80% failed it. So avoiding the pull of the real is crucial. There is no discontinuity in development, but a perspective-tracking system present early on that is initially fragile. This argues against dualist theories. Supports continuity theory

Answer 150

Opposite of dualist - theory of mind gradually develops, no implicit and explicit Perspective-tracking system present early on that is initially fragile

Answer 151

A set of principles for action which derives from social ideas of right and wrong

Answer 152

Cognitive processes underlying the consideration of moral rules, their basis, and their conflicts (complex problems)

Answer 153

Piaget (1932) examined children’s moral reasoning using clinical interviews: Interviewing about games and rules Posing moral dilemmas Piaget approached children in the playground and: Asked them to teach him the rules of the game Played the game with them Watched them playing together Asked where the rules come from and if they could be changed

Answer 154

0 – 5 years: ‘amoral’ / ‘premoral’ Played game, but didn’t understand there were rules 5 – 10 years: Heteronomous morality / moral realism Understood rules, but did not understand that they were just rules. “Rules are rules”. “Rules have to be obeyed”. New rules “would be cheating”. 10 years +: ‘Autonomous morality’ / ‘moral relativism’ Understood that rules are conventional and alterable by social consent

Answer 155

Heteronomous children (5-10 years) say John is naughtier because he broke more cups, i.e. focus on the consequences of actions. Autonomous children (10 years +) say Henry is naughtier because he intended to break the cup, i.e. focus on the intentions of actions.

Answer 156

The big movement for Piaget is when children start to understand that intentions can be separate from consequences This comes with understanding that rules are social agreements, not inviolable truths They also start to understand that the principle behind the rule might matter more than the rule

Answer 157

Kohlberg (1984) posed more complex dilemmas which allowed extension of the stage-theory into adulthood. Controversially claimed that cognitive development drives moral reasoning.

Answer 158

In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging $2,000, or 10 times the cost of the drug, for a small (possibly life-saving) dose. Heinz, the sick woman’s husband, borrowed all the money he could, about $1,000, or half of what he needed. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell the drug cheaper or let him pay later. The druggist replied, “No, I discovered the drug, and I’m going to make money from it.” Heinz then became desperate and broke into the store to steal the drug for his wife. Should he have done this? Why / why not?

Answer 159

Preconventional Conventional Postconventional

Answer 160

1. Heteronomous morality: Obedience and punishment orientation (Avoiding punishment) – a bad action is one you are punished for 2. Individualistic, Instrumental morality: Self-interest orientation (What's in it for me?) Most children are here in these two stages

Answer 161

3. Interpersonally normative morality: Interpersonal accord and conformity (Appearing like a ‘good boy’) 4. Social system morality: Authority and maintaining social-order (Law and order) We get here some time around adolescence Start to be concerned with the approval of others

Answer 162

5. Human right and social welfare morality: evaluating that laws are in accord with human rights & values (Uphold the spirit of social contract) 6. Morality of the Universalizable, Reversible, Prescriptive General Ethical Principles: Universal ethical principles (Principled conscience) Not all adults reach stage 5, very few reach stage 6 It requires us to know that eg. Heinz must steal the drug More sophisticated cognition

Answer 163

Research supports the move from punishment to social rules to ethical principles (Walker 1988) However it has also found we move from one to the other depending on the situation So it might be more like acquiring a skill than reaching a stage?

Answer 164

It’s worth noting that Kohlberg only studied boys Gilligan (1982) suggested there were gendered differences: Men see morality in terms of justice and abstract rules Women see morality in terms of compassion But we also need to be wary of gendered expectations based on one culture…

Answer 165

Making this a universal claim is a problem across cultures (Simpson 1974) Different cultures may have differing emphasis on liberty and freedom vs obedience and community, making them appear as though they are in different stages Moral behaviour vs moral reasoning?

Answer 166

The common intuition is that it’s OK to flip the switch

Answer 167

David is a great transplant surgeon. Five of his patients need new parts. One needs a heart, the others need, respectively, liver, stomach, spleen, and spinal cord. But all are of the same, relatively rare, blood-type. By chance, David learns of a healthy specimen with that very blood-type. David can take the healthy specimen’s parts, killing him, and install them in his patients, saving them. Or he can refrain from taking the healthy specimen’s parts, letting his patients die. (Thomson 1976)

Answer 168

Irving is President, and has just been told that the Russians have launched an atom bomb towards New York. The only way in which the bomb can be prevented from reaching New York is by dropping one of our own atom bombs on Worcester: the blast of the American bomb will pulverize the Russian bomb. Irving can do nothing, letting all of New York die; or he can press a button, which launches an American bomb onto Worcester, killing all of Worcester.

Answer 169

The consequences of an action are all that matter? I guess not ‘The doctrine of the double effect’ – there is a moral difference between intending harm and foreseeing that it will happen as a result of your intentions (in spur, your friend dies). But people think it is less OK to nuke your own cities

Answer 170

Instead we have hardwired moral intuitions resulting from evolutionary processes (Mikhail, 2011; Haidt 2001; Singer 2009). Because the responses to some of these kind of dilemmas are very consistent across culture (Mikhail, 2007).

Answer 171

Hamlin (2013) suggests that young children and even babies have a ‘moral core’, evolved in order to facilitate cooperation. She argues that some aspects of morality must emerge without much experience If there is a cognitive core, can’t there be a moral core?

Answer 172

Even young children (2-3 years) are implicitly aware of the rules of the game, even when they have not been explicitly told anything (Rakoczy, 2008). When given a choice to take a treat from a good puppet or a naughty puppet, most 1 year-olds take from the naughty puppet 3 year olds show awareness of rules and an understanding that rules may change – in one context a yellow stick is used as a toothbrush and in one as a carrot – their protest is specific to the context. 2 year-olds are more rigid.

Answer 173

Here, 3 yr olds are more rigid than 5 yr olds. “They both insist on their version of rule over and over and do not acknowledge that the alternative rule is acceptable. In fact, they continue to argue over the rule for 66 more lines and do not eventually agree on a rule.”

Answer 174

Feeling concern for others despite moral costs (empathy) By 13-14 months, we can see prosocial behaviour - designed to help someone else – such as sharing, showing, comforting a child in distress (Hastings, 2007)

Answer 175

Identifying and disliking uncooperative others – this involves analysing others’ behaviours Morality plays for 6-8 month olds (Hamlin, Wynn & Bloom 2007) Display phase: baby watches a protagonist trying but failing to reach a goal, plus helper & hinderer agents. Test phase: Babies are allowed to reach for the helper or the hinderer. 14/16 10-month-olds and 12/12 6-month-olds chose the helper Conclusion: babies show moral evaluation. 3 month olds avoid the hinderer; 6 month olds positively evaluate the helper, too. Conclusion: some development of moral evaluation from 3- 6 mo. (Hamlin et al 2011)

Answer 176

Punishing those who misbehave Hamlin et al 2011 showed infants prefer appropriately antisocial characters (who harm bad agents) to inappropriately prosocial ones (who help bad agents) This has been demonstrated even as young as 5 months (Hamlin 2012) Conclusion: moral retribution can be seen around 5 months

Answer 177

19 months Looking is longer for unequal sharing (Sloane, Baillargeon, Premack, 2012)

Answer 178

Developmental disorder tends to focus on the symptoms and causes and treatments where they exist Neurodiversity takes the focus of pathologizing, and focuses more on individual differences, and the role of society and societal norms Psychology has tended in the past to focus on the former

Answer 179

Onset in the developmental period – usually before school The effects can either be specific to one domain, or global deficits across a number of domains There is a high rate of co-occurance, so eg. ADHD commonly co-occurs. Diagnosis looks at either excess (overactive behaviours) and deficits

Answer 180

The APA and DSM (2013) use ASD as an umbrella term to cover autism, Pervasive developmental disorder – not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS) and Asperger syndrome First specifically described by Kanner in 1943 Relatively common – 1 in 100 (Baird, 2007) or even 1 in 54 (CDC) Probably even more due to underdiagnosis

Answer 181

Profiles are very different – often referred to as ‘spiky’ This means the differences between strengths and weaknesses are magnified – peaks are very high and troughs are lower Varies over time, not just over skill An important idea as it can help how we frame needs (eg support in a generalist-focused school setting)

Answer 182

From abnormal social approach and failure of normal back-and-forth conversation; to reduced sharing of interests, emotions, or affect; to failure to initiate or respond to social interactions

Answer 183

From poorly integrated verbal and nonverbal communication; to abnormalities in eye contact and body language or deficits in understanding and use of gestures

Answer 184

From difficulties adjusting behaviour to suit various social contexts; to difficulties in sharing imaginative play or in making friends

Answer 185

- Stereotyped or repetitive motor movements, use of objects, or speech (e.g., simple motor stereotypies, lining up toys or flipping objects, echolalia). - Insistence on sameness, inflexible adherence to routines, or ritualized patterns (e.g., extreme distress at small changes, difficulties with transitions, rigid thinking patterns, greeting rituals, need to take same route). - Highly restricted, fixated interests that are abnormal in intensity or focus (e.g, strong attachment to or preoccupation with unusual objects, excessively circumscribed interest) - Hyper- or hyporeactivity to sensory input or unusual interests in sensory aspects of the environment (e.g., apparent indifference to pain/temperature, adverse response to specific sounds or textures)

Answer 186

Yes It’s important to note that we do not know what causes autism. No specific genes have consistently and unrefutedly been identified. Both effects and severity range greatly Loads of variability Could show any number or combinations of symptoms

Answer 187

Wakefield famously published a link between autism and MMR vaccine This has been refuted many, many times over Eg Offit and Coffin (2003) go into depth on this That this persisted has been a great failure of science communication Small sample size and weak study - people wanted it to be true - political motivations

Answer 188

85% of typically developing children passed the task. 86% of individuals with Down syndrome passed. Only 20% of children with ASD passed. But note that some passed! So ToM can’t account for everything. ASD participants passed in a verbally mediated way – and in a very conscious fashion (Happé 1995) - if this was causal there should not be any variability

Answer 189

Sheppard and others have shown that non-autistic individuals struggle to read feeling or emotions of autistic people They are also more likely to form negative first impressions of autistic people This is known as double empathy

Answer 190

Umbrella term, high order control processes: (Ozonoff and Jensen 1999) Planning Inhibition Cognitive flexibility (set-shifting) Multitasking Working memory; attention All lower in ASD

Answer 191

Local, detail-focused processing style in ASD (Frith & Happé, 1994) Features perceived at the expense of global configuration and meaning. Accounts for strengths as well as weaknesses in ASD. Poor performance on tasks requiring recognition of global meaning or integration of stimuli in context (Navon figures). Good performance where attention to local information helps (Embedded figures). Shows favouring a local versus global processing style Very detail-oriented

Answer 192

Baron-Cohen noticed higher instances of ASD in males than females Also testosterone in womb is higher in ASD than non-ASD in males He attempted to explain it in terms of the difference between “male” and “female” brains

Answer 193

The drive to identify another person’s emotions and thoughts, and to respond to these with an appropriate emotion “Female brain”: empathising better than systemising

Answer 194

The drive to analyse the variables in a system, to derive the underlying rules that govern the behaviour of a system. Systemising also refers to the drive to construct systems. “Male brain” : systemising better than empathising Baron-Cohen claimed that socialising in ASD done via systemising

Answer 195

So this theory sees people on a continuum from F – M – ASD, where ASD is a more emphasised version of M, such that: Females: better at empathising, eye contact, reading emotions Males: better at attention to detail, structural / factual information

Answer 196

Poor theory based on gendered stereotypes There is of course ASD in females, and a good deal more are undiagnosed Some suggested that females are better at masking, but the criteria need work Poor evidence for male / female differences in the general population Evidence for testosterone links very weak

Answer 197

Some researchers suggest that there are a number of independent, co-existing deficits in ASD – weak CC, ToM, EF (Pellicano et al, 2006). Not every child has each deficit – 50-70% had deficits on TOM, EF. So this comes back to the spiky profiles idea

Answer 198

Prevalence 1:20,000 approx Some reports of 1:7,500 (Stromme et al., 2002) Sporadic genetic disorder (v. rarely runs in families) Deletion of approx 25-28 genes on chromosome 7 Main gene affected/implicated is the elastin gene

Answer 199

Feeding difficulties and failure to thrive as newborn Extreme heart and blood vessel abnormalities (SVAS) Hyperacusis (sensitive hearing)

Answer 200

Facial dysmorphology Short height / stature

Answer 201

Prevalence 1:1,000 (Worldwide) Genetic trisomy of Chromosome 21 Other types of genetic mutation can also occur, but these are much more rare. Trisomy occurs in 90-95% of cases.

Answer 202

Sucking and feeding problems Congenital heart defects Hearing and vision deficits

Answer 203

Facial dysmorphology Slow growth

Answer 204

Full scale IQ scores in of 40-90 (mean 55) (Bellugi et al., 2000). Mild-moderate learning difficulty (Searcy et al., 2004).

Answer 205

By adulthood IQ is generally in moderate to severely delayed range (e.g. IQ=25-55)

Answer 206

Not much change in IQ over development, but lots of individual differences (Mervis et al 2012)

Answer 207

Differences between domains of skill are relatively small, and are magnified as the children age and develop There are therefore developmental changes in the DS cognitive phenotype

Answer 208

Individuals with WS have a higher language ability than children with DS matched for overall IQ Language falls above full scale IQ in WS and the opposite is apparent in DS In WS, language is a relative strength, but there are questions as to whether it is truly intact

Answer 209

Understand and can reproduce small parts of an image but not the overall shape Draw things not at all accurately Implications for everyday tasks like drawing and navigation

Answer 210

Oversimplify when reproducing images Implications for everyday tasks like drawing and navigation

Answer 211

Individuals with WS and DS seem to show a pro-social compulsion. They seem to relish and seek out social interactions and have a pre-occupation with emotions. This might place these individuals at higher risk with things like ‘stranger danger’.

Answer 212

Studies suggest that, like with ASD, ToM might be impaired in DS and WS (although findings are mixed and there is a lot of individual variation). Whereas individuals with ASD tend to pay less attention to faces, people with DS and WS tend to enjoy (or even get stuck on?) looking at faces.