Discovery Flashcards
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.2 and the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. §3500
provide federal defendants the right to inspect certain witness statements, but only following the testimony of a government witness on direct examination. (The law specifically provides that before this point, “no statement . . . in the possession of the United States which was made by a Government witness or prospective Government witness . . . shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection. . . .”) The law defines “statement” to mean those declarations relating to the subject matter of the witness’s testimony and constituting: (1) a written statement made by the witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him; (2) a recording or transcription of an oral statement, provided that it is substantially verbatim and was recorded contemporaneously; and (3) any statement made to a grand jury
Despite the language of the statute, however, in many federal courts it is the practice of prosecutors to provide “3500” or “Jencks material” to the defense shortly before trial begins or shortly before the witness testifies, rather than after the witness testifies on direct
Kyles
The Kyles majority opinion notes two important qualifications on the scope of the Brady doctrine. The first was that the prosecutor is not only obligated to turn over information that is in her possession, but also “has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.” This means that it is no defense to an alleged Brady violation p. 1233that the prosecutor did not realize the favorable evidence (say, a witness statement to the police that strongly supports the defense) existed—Brady imposes an obligation on the prosecutor to go looking for the information.
Second, and perhaps counter-intuitively, the good or bad faith of the prosecutor is legally irrelevant to the question of whether there was a Brady violation. The purpose of Brady, the Court has said, is to ensure a fair trial, and neither good faith errors nor intentional suppression of information should affect whether the information is material
UNITED STATES v. RUIZ (SCOTUS)
In this case we primarily consider whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require federal prosecutors, before entering into a binding plea agreement with a criminal defendant, to disclose “impeachment information relating to any informants or 4other witnesses.” We hold that the Constitution does not require that disclosure
The holding in Ruiz is limited to the failure to disclose impeachment evidence or evidence going to affirmative defenses before entering into a plea agreement
Williams v. Florida (SCOTUS)
We conclude, however, as has apparently every other court that has considered the issue, that the privilege against self-incrimination is not violated by a requirement that the defendant give notice of an alibi defense and disclose his alibi witnesses
FRCP 16(b)
It requires a defendant to disclose: (1) books, papers, documents, data, photographs, and tangible objects that are within his possession, custody, or control and that he intends to use in his case-in-chief at trial; (2) any results or reports of any physical or mental examinations, as well as any scientific tests or experiments, that are within his possession, custody, or control and that he intends to use in his case-in-chief or, with regard to reports, that were prepared by a witness he intends to call and that relate to the witness’s testimony; and (3) a written summary of any expert testimony that he intends to use describing the opinions, bases, reasons for the opinions, and qualifications of the expert. Note that the bulk of this disclosure is broadly conditioned on prior defense requests for the same type of discovery from the prosecution, and on the prosecution’s compliance with these requests. In many states, however, the prosecution’s entitlement to discovery is automatic, and not conditioned on a prior defense request
FRCP 16(d)(2)
It says that when a party has failed to comply with a discovery obligation, “the court may: (A) order that party to permit the discovery or inspection; specify its time, place, and manner; and prescribe other just terms and conditions; (B) grant a continuance; (C) prohibit that party from introducing the undisclosed evidence; or (D) enter any other order that is just under the circumstances
Taylor v. Illinois
As a sanction for failing to identify a defense witness in response to a pretrial discovery request, an Illinois trial judge refused to allow the undisclosed witness to testify. The question presented is whether that refusal violated the petitioner’s constitutional right to obtain the testimony of favorable witnesses. We hold that such a sanction is not absolutely prohibited by the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment and find no constitutional error on the specific facts of this case
