Environmental Law Midterms (Case Digests on Mining) Flashcards
Case 1.
G.R. No. 127882
WON the FTAAs issued were valid.
Yes. The notion that the deliberations reflect only the views of those members who spoke out and not the views of the majority who remained silent should be clarified. We must never forget that those who spoke out were heard by those who remained silent and did not react. If the latter were silent because they happened not to be present at the time, they are presumed to have read the minutes and kept abreast of the deliberations. By remaining silent, they are deemed to have signified their assent to and/or conformity with at least some of the views propounded or their lack of objections thereto. It was incumbent upon them, as representatives of the entire Filipino people, to follow the deliberations closely and to speak their minds on the matter if they did not see eye to eye with the proponents of the draft provisions.
In any event, each and every one of the commissioners had the opportunity to speak out and to vote on the matter. Moreover, the individual explanations of votes are on record, and they show where each delegate stood on the issues. In sum, we cannot completely denigrate the value or usefulness of the record of the ConCom, simply because certain members chose not to speak out.
However, it is of common knowledge, and of judicial notice as well, that the government is and has for many many years been financially strapped, to the point that even the most essential services have suffered serious curtailments — education and health care, for instance, not to mention judicial services — have had to make do with inadequate budgetary allocations. Thus, government has had to resort to build-operate-transfer and similar arrangements with the private sector, in order to get vital infrastructure projects built without any governmental outlay.
Case 2.
G.R. No. L-55132
WON the acts of respondents constitute “Theft of Mineral” considering that they paid sand and gravel tax.
Yes, Section 78 of P.D. No. 463 provides:
“Section 78. Theft of Minerals. Any person who, without a mining lease or a temporary permit to mine, shall extract, remove, and/or dispose of minerals for commercial purposes belonging to the Government or from a mining claim or claims leased, held, or owned by other persons, without the written permission contemplated in Section 12, shall be deemed to have stolen the ores or the products thereof from the mines or mills. He shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned from six months to six years or pay a fine from one hundred pesos to ten thousand pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court, besides paying compensation for the minerals extracted and disposed of, the royalty and the damage caused thereby.”
The elements of Section 78 of P.D. No. 463 are all present, to wit:
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the respondents, conspiring and mutually helping on another, willfully and feloniously extracted, removed and/or disposed of minerals or materials aggregates like sand and gravel;
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materials were taken from Banaue, Ifugao, which is covered by commercial permit issued by Bureau of Mines in favor of Felix de Castro;
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the extracting was done without any mining lease or permit of their own pursuant to law.
Further, the sand and gravel tax merely shows payments of taxes, the receipts are insufficient to prove that proper Government Office gave its consent to extract, remove or dispose the said sand and gravel.
Case 3.
G.R. No. 46787
WON such collection of the municipal ordinance is valid, as the petitioner alleged that the municipality’s power to levy is limited by Section 52 of PD 463.
Yes. Cement is not a mineral product but rather a manufactured product. As the power of taxation
is a high prerogative of sovereignty, the relinquishment is never presumed and any reduction
or diminution thereof with respect to its mode or its rate must be strictly construed, and the same
must be coached in clear and unmistakable terms in order that it may be applied. More specifically
stated, the general rule is that any claim for exemption from the tax statute should be strictly
construed against the taxpayer.
He who claims an exemption must be able to point out some provision of law creating the right;
it cannot be allowed to exist upon a mere vague implication or inference. It must be shown
indubitably to exist, for every presumption is against it, and a well-founded doubt is fatal to the
claim.
Floro Cement Corporation failed to meet this requirement. The exemption mentioned in Sec.
52 of P.D. No. 463 refers only to machineries, equipment, tools for production, etc., as provided
in Sec. 53 of the same decree. The manufacture and export of cement do not fall under the said
provision for it is not a mineral product. It is not cement that is mined only the mineral products
composing the finished product. By the parties’ own stipulation of facts submitted before the CFI,
it is admitted that FloroCement Corporation is engaged in the manufacturing and selling, including
exporting of cement. As such, and since the taxes sought to be collected were levied on these
activities pursuant to Sec. 19 of P.D. No. 231, Ordinances Nos. 5 and 10, which were acted
pursuant to P.D. No. 231 and P.D. No. 426, respectively, properly apply to FloroCement
Corporation.
Case 4.
G.R. No. 137174
WON the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Republic Act No. 7942 repealed the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 984, with respect to the power
and function of petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board to issue, renew or deny permits for the
discharge of the mine tailings.
The SC held that the CA erred in ruling that the PAB had no authority to issue the Order from the
ruling of the Court of Appeals that the PAB has been divested of authority to act on pollution related matters in mining operations is anchored on the provisions of RA 7942 (Philippine Mining
Act of 1995). However, Section 19 of EO 192 vested the PAB with the specific power to adjudicate pollution cases in general. Sec. 2, par. (a) of PD 984 defines the term “pollution” as referring to any alteration of the physical, chemical, and biological properties of any water, air, and/or land resources of the Philippines, or any discharge thereto of any liquid, gaseous, or solid wastes as a will or is likely to create a harmful environment. On the other hand, the authority of the mine’s regional director is complementary to that of the PAB.
While the mine’s regional director has express administrative and regulatory powers over mining operations and installations, it has no adjudicative powers over complaints for violation of pollution control statutes and regulations. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, RA 7942 does not vest quasi-judicial powers in the Mines Regional Director. The authority is vested and remains with the PAB. Neither was such authority conferred upon the Panel of Arbitrators and the Mines Adjudication Board which were created by the said law. The scope of authority of the Panel of Arbitrators and the Mines Adjudication Board conferred by RA 7942 clearly excludes adjudicative responsibility over pollution cases.
Case 5.
G.R. No. 134030
WON the DENR has jurisdiction over Tuason’s complaint.
The Court upholds the finding of the DENR Regional Executive Director that the DENR does not have jurisdiction over Tuason’s complaint.
At the time of the filing of the complaint, the jurisdiction of the DENR over mining disputes and controversies is governed by P.D. No. 1281, entitled “Revising Commonwealth Act No. 136, Creating the Bureau of Mines, and for Other Purposes.”[14]
Particularly, P.D. No. 1281 vests the Bureau of Mines (now the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau) of the DENR with jurisdictional supervision and control over all holders of mining claims or applicants for and/or grantees of mining licenses, permits, leases and/or operators thereof,… including mining service contracts and service contractors insofar as their mining activities are concerned.
Under Section 7 of P.D. No. 1281, the Bureau of Mines also has quasi-judicial powers over cases involving the following:
(a) a mining property subject of different agreements entered into by the claim holder thereof with several mining operators;
(b) complaints from claimowners that the mining property subject of an operating agreement has not been placed into actual operations within the period stipulated therein; and
(c) cancellation and/or enforcement of mining contracts due to the refusal of the claimowner/operator to abide by the terms and conditions thereof.
Case 5.
G.R. No. 134030
WON the MAB erred in invalidating the Agreement to Operate Mining Claims.
The allegations in Tuason’s complaint do not make out a case for a mining dispute or controversy within the jurisdiction of the DENR. While the Agreement to Operate Mining Claims is a mining contract, the ground upon which the contract is sought to be annulled is not due to Asaphil’s refusal to abide by the terms and conditions of the agreement, but due to Induplex’s alleged violation of the condition imposed by the BOI in its Joint Venture Agreement with Grefco, Inc.
The DENR is not called upon to exercise its technical knowledge or expertise over any mining operations or dispute; rather, it is being asked to determine the validity of the agreements based on circumstances beyond the respective rights of the parties under the two contracts.
Thus, the DENR Regional Executive Director was correct in dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over Tuason’s complaint; consequently, the MAB committed an error in taking cognizance of the appeal, and in ruling upon the validity of the contracts.
Given the DENR’s lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of Tuason’s complaint, the Court finds it unnecessary to rule on the issue of validity of the contracts, as this should have been brought before and resolved by the regular trial courts, to begin with.
Case 6.
G.R. No. 129820
W/N the petitioner acquired a preferential right on mining rights over Block 159.
As a general rule, prospecting and exploration of minerals in a government reservation is
prohibited under Sec.13 of PD 463 - However, the same rule provides an exception involving
instances when the government agency concerned allows it.
Section 13. Areas Closed to Mining
Location. – No prospecting and exploration shall be allowed: (a) In military, and other Government
reservations except when authorized by the proper Government agency concerned. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 463 reiterates the rule and clarifies it further by stating that prospecting,
exploration, and exploitation of minerals on reserved lands other than mineral reservations may be undertaken by the proper government agency. As an exception to this rule, qualified persons may undertake the said prospecting, exploration, and exploitation when the said agencies cannot undertake them.
In the facts of the case, subsequently, the DENR Secretary reversed the reversal and reinstated the original dismissal. The Mining Adjudication Board (MAB) upheld this decision, noting that the respondent had preferential mining rights over Block 159. The MAB also highlighted that the petitioner’s application for a MPSA over Block 159 was erroneous and improper since it was filed before the area was excluded from the coal reservation. Therefore, the respondent’s preferential rights were recognized, although it didn’t guarantee immediate approval of their MPSA, but rather an evaluation of their application without accepting other mining applications for Block 159 during the process.
Case 7.
G.R. No. 161957
W/N it was proper for the RTC, in the proceeding to compel arbitration under R.A. No. 876, to
order the parties to arbitrate even though the defendant therein has raised the twin issues of
validity and nullity of the Addendum Contract and, consequently, of the arbitration clause therein as well.
Yes. Disputes do not go to arbitration unless and until the parties have agreed to abide by the
arbitrator’s decision. Necessarily, a contract is required for arbitration to take place and to be
binding. R.A. No. 876 recognizes the contractual nature of the arbitration agreement.
The doctrine of separability, or severability as other writers call it, enunciates that an arbitration agreement is independent of the main contract. The arbitration agreement is to be treated as a separate agreement and the arbitration agreement does not automatically terminate when the contract of which it is part comes to an end.
The separability of the arbitration agreement is especially significant to the determination of
whether the invalidity of the main contract also nullifies the arbitration clause. Indeed, the doctrine denotes that the invalidity of the main contract also referred to as the container contract, does not affect the validity of the arbitration agreement. Irrespective of the fact that the main contract is invalid, the arbitration clause/agreement still remains valid and enforceable.
The separability of the arbitration clause is confirmed in Art. 16(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law and Art. 21(2) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The proceeding in a petition for arbitration under R.A. No. 876 is limited only to the resolution of the question of whether the arbitration agreement exists. Second, the separability of the arbitration clause from the Addendum Contract means that the validity or invalidity of the Addendum Contract will not affect the enforceability of the agreement to arbitrate. Thus, Gonzales’s petition for certiorari should be dismissed.
Case 8.
G.R. No. 163101
W/N the case should have first been brought to voluntary arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA).
On the First issue of whether the POA should have referred the case to voluntary arbitration, we find that, indeed, the POA has no jurisdiction over the dispute which is governed by RA 876, the arbitration law.
Case 8.
G.R. No. 163101
W/N the cancellation of the Rehabilitation/Operating Agreement (RAWOP) was supported by evidence.
On the second issue regarding the cancellation of the RAWOP by the POA Benguet was remiss in prosecuting the MPSA application and clearly failed to comply with its obligation in the RAWOP. Based on the foregoing discussion, the cancellation of the RAWOP was based on valid grounds and is, therefore, justified. The necessary implication of the cancellation is the creation of Benguet’s right to prosecute MPSA Application No. APSA-V0009 and to further develop such mining claims.
Case 8.
G.R. No. 163101
W/N there is no unjust enrichment in the instant case.
On the third issue, it is clear, that there is no unjust enrichment in the instant case as the cancellation of the RAWOP, which left Benguet without any legal right to participate in further developing the mining claims, was brought about by its violation of the RAWOP. Hence, Benguet has no one to blame but itself for its predicament.
Case 9.
G.R. No. L-43277
W/N SMPI is entitled to such surface rights.
SMPI is not entitled to said surface rights as it failed to comply with the requisite of prior written permission by the Landowners before entering the private land in question.
Section 27 of the Mining Act explicitly outlines the procedure for prospectors seeking to enter private lands. They must first apply in writing for written permission from the private owner, claimant, or holder of the land. In cases where permission is refused or there’s a dispute over compensation, the compensation amount should be agreed upon by the prospector, the Director of the Bureau of Mines, and the surface owner. If no unanimous agreement is reached, the Court of First Instance in the province where the lands are located will determine the compensation. However, if the prospector deposits a sum jointly agreed upon with the Director and the court, they can enter the land without written permission while awaiting the final compensation determination. The court will also assess the value and reasonable rental for mining purposes if the prospector decides to locate and exploit minerals found on the land.
The purpose of this law is clear: to prevent trespass on private property. Obtaining the written permission of the private landowner is crucial, as indicated in the prescribed forms by the Bureau of Mines for the declaration of a mining claim location, which requires the locator to confirm that written permission has been granted for prospecting and locating a mining claim on private property.
In this case, Section 27 is inapplicable because SMPI didn’t enter the land for the purpose of prospecting but for locating a mining claim. The limestone deposits were readily visible on the land’s surface, obviating the need for entering the land. It’s essential to note that “entering” precedes “prospecting,” and “prospecting” precedes “discovery,” which is a prerequisite for the location of a mining claim.
Section 26 of the Mining Act stipulates that prospecting must adhere to the law’s provisions. SMPI’s prospecting, done in violation of the law, rendered it an illegal act, and consequently, the subsequent location of mining claims was illegal and void. Compliance with the law is paramount for a valid discovery and location, as the Mining Act requires acting in good faith, disallowing trespass as the basis for a mining right.
SMPI’s suggestion that Section 67 of the Mining Act be applied to its case is untenable. This section pertains to the lease of a mining claim, which SMPI wouldn’t be entitled to due to its failure to comply with the Mining Act’s provisions and provide written authority from the landowners. Moreover, the Court cannot grant authority or fix rental due to SMPI’s non-compliance with the Act, which is a mandatory prerequisite.
Case 10.
G.R. No. 157882
W/N REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942 and the CAMC FTAA are void because they allow the unjust and
unlawful taking of property without payment of just compensation, in violation of Section 9, Article III of the constitution.
NO.
The provision of the FTAA in question lays down the ways and means by which the foreign-owned
contractor, disqualified to own land, identifies to the government the specific surface areas within
the FTAA contract area to be acquired for the mine infrastructure. The government then acquires ownership of the surface land areas on behalf of the contractor, through a voluntary transaction in order to enable the latter to proceed to fully implement the FTAA. Eminent domain is not yet called for at this stage since there are still various avenues by which surface rights can be acquired other than expropriation. The FTAA provision under attack merely facilitates the implementation of the FTAA given to CAMC and shields it from violating the Anti-Dummy Law.
There is also no basis for the claim that the Mining Law and its implementing rules and regulations do not provide for just compensation in expropriating private properties. Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 provide for the payment of just compensation.
Case 11.
G.R. NO. 54305
WON the trial court is divested of jurisdiction to hear and decide a mining controversy in view of the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 1281?
YES.
The answer is in the affirmative. Tracing the development of Presidential Decree No. 1281, Justice Nocon, now Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, in his separate concurring opinion on the assailed decision, thus, correctly noted the following: PD 1281 issued on January 16, 1978, gives more teeth to the Bureau of Mines (Sec. 3) for its regulatory and adjudicative powers and functions which becomes (sic) ‘original and exclusive’ even over ‘cancellation and/or enforcement of mining contracts,’ reiterating the same procedure laid down in PD 99-A and PD 309. Clearly, the three Decrees — 99-A, 309, and 1281 — divested judicial tribunals of jurisdiction over mining controversies including cancellation and enforcement of mining contracts by making the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the Bureau ‘original and exclusive’ (Sec. 7, PD l281).” This Court agrees with the conclusion espoused by the respondent appellate court as to this aspect of the case. The declaratory action filed by ATLAS is within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 1281. It is not an entirely different or distinct cause of action. Were We to rule otherwise it would be ratifying two judicial bodies exercising jurisdiction over essentially the same subject matter — a situation analogous to split jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.
Presidential Decree No. 1281 is a remedial statute. It does not create new rights or take away rights that are already vested. It only operates in furtherance of a remedy or confirmation of rights already in existence. It does not come within the legal purview of a prospective law. As such, it can be applied retroactively independent of the general rule against the retrospective application of statutes. Being procedural in nature, it shall apply to all actions pending at the time of its enactment except only with respect to those cases which had already attained the character of a final and executory judgment. Were it not so, the purpose of the Decree, which is to facilitate the immediate resolution of mining controversies by granting jurisdiction to a body or agency more adept at the technical complexities of mining operations, would be thwarted and rendered meaningless. Litigants in a mining controversy cannot be permitted to choose a forum of convenience. Jurisdiction is imposed by law and not by any of the parties to such proceedings.
Presidential Decree No. 1281 is a special law and under a well-accepted principle in statutory construction, the special law will prevail over a statute or law of general application. Jurisdiction having been conferred by a special statute therefore prevails over the jurisdiction granted by a general law.
Case 12.
G.R. No. 65021
W/N the RTC has jurisdiction to hear the case and is it the proper venue for it.
YES.
Presidential Decree No. 1281 which took effect on January 16, 1978 vests the Bureau of Mines with jurisdictional supervision and control over all holders of mining claims or applicants for and/or grantees of mining licenses, permits, leases, and/or operators thereof, including mining service contracts and service contractors insofar as their mining activities are concerned. To effectively discharge its task as the Government’s arm in the administration and disposition of mineral resources, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1281 confers upon the Bureau quasi-judicial powers as follows:
“SECTION 7. In addition to its regulatory and adjudicative functions over companies, partnership or persons engaged in mining exploration, development and exploitation, the Bureau of Mines shall have origins and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:
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“(c) cancellation and/or enforcement of mining contracts due to the refusal of the claimowner/operator to abide by the terms and conditions thereof.”
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that the subject agreement is a mining contract and the private respondent, in seeking a judicial declaration of its nullity, does not wish to abide by its terms and conditions. These elements alone bring the action within the ambit of Section 7 of P.D. 1281. Whatever the basis for the refusal to abide by the contract’s terms and conditions, the basic issue remains one of its cancellation, which is precisely what P.D. No. 1281 places within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Bureau
The reason underlying such refusal is indeed an irrelevant matter insofar as jurisdictional competence is concerned, for to make jurisdiction dependent thereon would not only be “ratifying two judicial bodies exercising jurisdiction over an essentially the same subject matter — a situation analogous to split jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice” but also clearly ignoring the object of P.D. 1281 to make the adjudication of mining cases a purely administrative matter.
